A Minimal Metaphysics for Scientific Practice

242 Pages·2021·2.399 MB·English

by  Andreas Hüttemann

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A MINIMAL METAPHYSICS
FOR SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
Whatarethemetaphysicalcommitmentsthatbest‘makesense’ofour
scientific practice (rather than our scientific theories)? In this book,
Andreas Hüttemann provides a minimal metaphysics for scientific
practice,i.e.,ametaphysicsthatrefrainsfrompostulatinganystruc-
turethatisexplanatorilyirrelevant.Hüttemanncloselyanalysespara-
digmaticaspectsofscientificpractice,suchasprediction,explanation
and manipulation, to consider the questions of whether and (if so)
what metaphysical presuppositions best account for these practices.
Helooksattherolethatscientificgeneralisation(lawsofnature)plays
in predicting, testing and explaining the behaviour of systems. He
alsodevelopsatheoryofcausationintermsofquasi-inertialprocesses
and interfering factors, and he proposes an account of reductive
practices that makes minimal metaphysical assumptions. His book
willbevaluableforscholarsandadvancedstudentsworkinginboth
philosophyofscienceandmetaphysics.
andreas hu¨ttemann is Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at
the University of Cologne. He is the author of What’s Wrong with
Microphysicalism? (2004) and Ursachen (2013), and has published
manybookchaptersandjournalarticlesonmetaphysics,philosophy
ofscienceandearlymodernphilosophy.

A MINIMAL METAPHYSICS
FOR SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
ANDREAS HÜTTEMANN
UniversityofCologne
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www.cambridge.org
Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781316519394
doi:10.1017/9781009023542
©AndreasHüttemann2021
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Firstpublished2021
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Contents
ListofFigures pagevi
Acknowledgements vii
Introduction 1
1 LawsofNatureandTheirModalSurfaceStructure 11
2 TheProblemofCeterisParibusClauses 38
3 Causation–ConceptualGroundwork 82
4 Causation–ApplicationandAugmentation 108
5 ReductivePractices 129
6 ReductionandPhysicalFoundationalism 159
7 ReductionandOntologicalMonism 186
8 ConcludingRemarks:MethodsandEpistemicSources
inMetaphysics 203
Bibliography 217
Index 229
v
Figures
1 Deflectionofbilliardball page88
2 TransitivityI 123
3 TransitivityII 124
vi
Acknowledgements
Largepartsofthisbookwerewrittenduringtwosabbaticalsemesters,which
werefundedbytheDeutscheForschungsgemeinschaftinthecontextoftwo
research units: Causation and Explanation (FOR 1063) and Inductive
Metaphysics (FOR 2495). I thank the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
fortheirsupport.
TheresearchunitsbroughttogetheralotofpeopleamongwhomIcould
test out the views advocated in the following chapters. For numerous
helpful discussions I am grateful to Ansgar Seide, Daniel Plenge, Oliver
Scholz, Peter Hucklenbroich, Brigitte Falkenburg, Andreas Bartels, Kian
Salimkhani, Kristina Engelhard, Markus Stepanians, Gerhard Schurz,
Maria Sekatskaja, Dieter Birnbacher, Daniel Hommen, Alexander
Gebharter, Christian Feldbacher-Escamilla, Markus Schrenk, Siegfried
Jaag, Alexander Reutlinger, Marie I. Kaiser, Christian Loew and Vera
Hoffmann-Kolss.Theresearchunitsfurthermoreprovidedtheopportun-
ity to invite philosophers of science and metaphysicians to discuss their
viewsinalotofdetail.Thebookprofitedalotfromthesediscussionsand
manyofthesefoundtheirwayintothisbook.
I would also like to thank two anonymous referees for Cambridge
UniversityPressfortheirencouraging,perceptiveandhelpfulcriticismas
wellasHilaryGaskinandhercollaborators(HalChurchmanandThomas
Haynes) from Cambridge University Press for their encouragement and
editorial guidance. Furthermore, I am indebted to Sue Clements for
improvingmyEnglish.
My greatest thanks go to Markus Schrenk, Christian Loew, Siegfried
Jaag, Mike Hicks and Vera Hoffmann-Kolss, who read large parts of the
manuscriptandprovidedinvaluablecommentsandhelp.
Someofthechaptershavetheirorigins(partly)inone ofthefollowing
papers:
vii
viii Acknowledgements
Hüttemann, A. (2013). A Disposition-based Process Theory of
Causation. In S. Mumford and M. Tugby (eds.), Metaphysics and
Science,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,pp.101–22.
Hüttemann, A. (2014). Ceteris Paribus Laws in Physics. Erkenntnis, 79,
1715–28.
Hüttemann, A. (2015). Physicalism and the Part-Whole-Relation. In
T. Bigaj and C. Wüthrich (eds.), Metaphysics in Contemporary
Physics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the
Humanities104,pp.32–44.
Hüttemann, A. and Love, A. C. (2016). Reduction. In P. Humphreys
(ed.),TheOxfordHandbookofPhilosophyofScience.Oxford:Oxford
UniversityPress,pp.460–84.
Hüttemann, A. (2020). Processes, Pre-emption and Further Problems.
Synthese,197,1487–509.
Iamgratefultothepublishersaswellastomyco-authorAlanLoveforthe
permissiontoreusesomeofthesematerials.