Table Of ContentA HANDBOOK OF VERIFICATION PROCEDURES
Also by Frank Barnaby
THE AUTOMATED BATTLEFIELD
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND MILITARY DOCTRINE (co-editor)
FUTURE WARFARE (editor)
MAN AND THE ATOM
NUCLEAR ENERGY
RETHINKING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DILEMMA IN EUROPE (co-editor)
A Handbook of
Verification Procedures
Edited by
Frank Barnaby
Foreword by
Brigadier Michael Harbottle
Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN 978-1-349-11043-8 ISBN 978-1-349-11041-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-11041-4
© Frank Barnaby, 1990
Foreword © Brigadier Michael Harbottle, 1990
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1990
All rights reserved. For information, write:
Scholarly and Reference Division,
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
First published in the Uni ted States of America in 1990
ISBN 978-0-312-03258-6
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A Handbook of verification procedures/edited by Frank Barnaby;
foreword by Michael Harbottle.
p. cm.
Includes index.
ISBN 978-0-312-03258-6
I. Arms control-Verification. 2. Nuclear arms control
-Verification. I. Barnaby, Frank.
UAI2.5.H36 1990
327.1 '74'0287-dc20 8~334
CIP
Contents
List of the Contributors VI
Foreword by Brigadier Michael Harbottle Vll
1 Introduction
Frank Barnaby 1
2 The Use of Satellites for Verification
Caesar V oute 7
3 Verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban
Roger Clark and John Baruch 37
4 Verification of a Cut-Off in the Production of
Fissile Material
Gordon Thompson 179
5 Verifying the INF Treaty and START
Owen Greene and Patricia Lewis 215
6 Verifying a Halt to the Nuclear Arms Race
Gordon Thompson 264
7 Verifying NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Reductions and
Stabilising Measures
Jonathan Dean 310
Index 347
V
List of the Contributors
Frank Barnaby author, former director, Stockholm International
Pe ace Research Institute; former guest Professor of Peace Studies,
Free University, Amsterdam.
John Baruch Senior Research Fellow, Department of Physics,
Leeds University.
Roger Clark Research Fellow, Department of Earth Sciences,
Leeds U niversity.
Jonathan Dean Arms Control Adviser of the Union of Concerned
Scientists; formerly US Representative to NAT O-Warsaw Pact force
reduction negotiations in Vienna; author of Watershed in Europe
(1987) and Meeting the Gorbachev Challenge (1989).
Owen Greene Lecturer in Pea ce Studies at Bradford University.
Patricia Lewis Senior Research Analyst and Managing Director of
the Verification Technology Information Centre (VERTIC, Lon
don).
Gordon Thompson Executive Director of the Institute for Resource
and Security Studies, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Caesar Voute Emeritus Professor at the International Institute for
Aerospace Survey and Earth Sciences ITC, Enschede, the Nether
lands.
vi
Foreword
Nothing is more essential to the achievement of arms control than
that it should be verifiable. Arms control and disarmament negotia
tions have been hampered over the years because of the inability of
governments to agree the verification procedures required to guaran
tee the effectiveness of any agreements. Despite improvements in
East-West relations, doubts are still expressed in official circIes as to
whether verification is workable or practical. It is this uncertainty
wh ich has served to frustrate the successful concIusion of the
negotiations.
In 1982, at the time of the United Nations' Second Special Session
on Disarmament, I questioned the US State Department and the
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office on what progress they
hoped to see come out of the session. Both insisted that any arms
control settlements would depend upon reaching agreement on
acceptable verification procedures. When I asked what was being
done to formulate the necessary procedures, the answers were the
same - nothing. I was left with the impression that there was not
much incentive to establish 'acceptable' procedures, and thus there
was a lack of urgency to bring about arms control. It was evident that
there was little concern that nothing was being done. Later I was to
raise the same question with the Russians. Their answer was that
agreements on arms control measures had to come first; verification
would follow. This seemed to be a Catch-22 situation, and since the
superpowers were no nearer a disarmament agreement after three
decades of negotiation it looked as if the situation was never likely to
alter so long as such opinions prevailed.
So it was that in 1983, when I established the London Centre for
International Peacebuilding, the first project the centre undertook
was a study of the practicalities of verification and the practical
procedures required to implement it. A Handbook 01 Verification
Procedures is the product of that study.
The Handbook originally was intended to be a working manual for
practical use both by those negotiating arms control agreements and
those who would be required to implement the procedures. Sub
sequently, this format was found to be impractical. Nevertheless, the
Handbook has not lost its initial purpose to provide a practical guide
VII
viii Foreword
to new thinking in the approach to verification. Certainly it is in
advance of anything so far produced and represents a new step
forward in arms control.
The 1987 INF agreement did incIude significant proposals with
regard to verification which augur weil for the future. However, basic
problems remain because of the reluctance of governments to accept
new thinking and change their long-standing attitudes towards veri
fication and its questionable viability. As in 1982, there is today the
same scepticism and lack of enthusiasm for a radical re-evaluation of
all things related to defence and security. This has been apparent
throughout the preparation of the Handbook. Negative responses
and unwillingness to think positively about verification do make one
wonder how serious are politicians and the military about creating the
safeguards from which can come real progress towards arms control
and disarmament. It would see m that what is really needed is a
philosophical change in outlook.
The centre owes Dr Frank Barnaby a debt of great gratitude for, in
the first place, undertaking to direct the project, and for all the hard
work over five years he has put into the preparation of the Hand
book. The centre is very appreciative of his personal contribution to
its content and for bringing together such an eminent and experi
enced group of co-authors. Their undoubted experience and the
calibre and quality of their respective contributions guarantee the
integrity of the Handbook. The centre would wish to express its
grateful thanks and deep appreciation to Ambassador Jonathan Dean
and Dr Gordon Thompson of the United States, Professor Caesar
Voute of the Netherlands, and Dr Patricia Lewis, Dr Owen Greene
Dr Roger Clarke and Dr John Baruch of the United Kingdom.
One can but hope that the Handbook will have a significant impact
on the thinking and practical approach to the process of verification,
and will serve as a useful tool in future negotiations on international
arms control and disarmament.
MICHAEL HARBOTTLE, BRIGADIER
Director, London Centre for International Peacebuilding
1 Introduction
Frank Barnaby
The purposes of verification have recently been defined as the
detection of violations or possible violations of a treaty, thereby
providing early warning of any threat to the State's security arising
under a treaty regime; the deterrence of violations of an agreement
by increasing the risk of detection and complicating any attempts at
evasion; acting as a domestic and international confidence-building
measure in the vi ability of an arms control treaty; and providing data
for the presentation of arms control issues to the public.1 This book
examines how, in practice, the effective verification of various
urgently needed arms control treaties can be achieved.
The effectiveness of any arms control or disarmament treaty will
depend on the effectiveness of its verification provisions. Verification
is, therefore, a crucial issue. It is also a highly technical issue, often
relying on, for ex am pIe , sensors on board satellites - incIuding
photographic cameras, television cameras, multispectral scanners,
radiometers, microwave radars, gamma-ray detectors, X-ray de
tectors, and detectors of electronic and communications signals - and
complex arrays of seismic monitoring stations.
Given its importance, it is surprising that there is so little public or
political interest in verification. In fact, verification is usually only
mentioned as a reason (or an excuse?) for not negotiating an arms
control treaty. Verification is, for example, often said to be a major
obstacIe to a comprehensive test ban treaty even though many non
governmental seismologists argue that, with modern technology,
verification need not be a problem. And commercial chemical
companies - particularly West German and Japanese - are objecting
to proposals for a ban on the production of chemical weapons
because, they say, verification would be too intrusive and would
threaten industrial secrets. These objections are a major baITier to
the current multilateral negotiations of a treaty prohibiting the
production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons.
Verifying the implementation of existing treaties is a controversial
issue. Both the USA and the USSR have, for example, accused the
other of violating arms control treaties.2 Verification will continue to
be controversial until efforts are made to solve verification problems
on an international scale.
1
