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A Duty to Prevent Genocide
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For Kasia, and her devoted Sam
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A Duty to Prevent
Genocide
Due Diligence Obligations among the P5
John Heieck
University of Kent, Brussels School of International Studies, UK
Cheltenham,UK+Northampton,MA,USA
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©JohnHeieck2018
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EdwardElgarPublishingLimited
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UK
EdwardElgarPublishing,Inc.
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USA
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isavailablefromtheBritishLibrary
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DOI10.4337/9781788117715
ISBN9781788117708(cased)
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Contents in brief
Acknowledgements viii
Introduction 1
1 The P5’s duty to prevent genocide under the Genocide
Convention 13
2 The P5’s duty to prevent genocide under customary
international law 72
3 The conflict between the P5’s duty to prevent genocide and
the P5’s rights and duties under conventional and customary
international law 119
4 Resolving the conflict between the P5’s duty to prevent
genocide and the P5’s rights and duties under conventional and
customary law 166
Conclusion 207
Bibliography 217
Index 241
v
Full contents
Acknowledgements viii
Introduction 1
1 The P5’s duty to prevent genocide under the Genocide
Convention 13
1 Introduction 13
2 The Genocide Convention 14
3 The Bosnian Genocide case 14
4 The scope and breach of the P5’s duty to prevent genocide
under the Genocide Convention 49
5 Conclusion 70
2 The P5’s duty to prevent genocide under customary international
law 72
1 Introduction 72
2 Customary international law in general 73
3 The test for custom in case law – uncontroverted opinio
juris – and its application to the duty to prevent genocide 76
4 Conclusion 117
3 The conflict between the P5’s duty to prevent genocide and
the P5’s rights and duties under conventional and customary
international law 119
1 Introduction 119
2 Conflict within the Security Council: The P5’s duty to
prevent genocide and the P5’s rights underArticles 39,
41, 42, and 27(3) of the UN Charter 123
3 Conflict without the Security Council: The P5’s duty to
prevent genocide and the P5’s duty not to use force under
conventional and customary law 157
4 Conclusion 165
4 Resolving the conflict between the P5’s duty to prevent
genocide and the P5’s rights and duties under conventional
and customary law 166
vi
Fullcontents vii
1 Introduction 166
2 Article 103 of the UN Charter 167
3 Jus Cogens norms 173
4 Erga Omnes obligations 202
5 Conclusion 206
Conclusion 207
1 Summary analysis 207
2 Parting thoughts 215
Bibliography 217
Index 241
Acknowledgements
This book would not have been possible without the guidance, encour-
agement, and constructive criticism of Teresa Cabrita,YutakaArai, Harm
Schepel, Bill Bowring, Luis Eslava, Nikolas Rajkovic, Maïté Van
Regemorter, and Kevin Jon Heller. I cannot thank you enough.
Additional thanks are owed to my parents, John and Sheila Heieck, to
my family, Ted Heieck and Rachel Siecke, and to my friends, Michelle
Reyes Milk, Michele Simonato, Jake Slosser, Moritz Pieper, Octavius
Pinkard, Inez Summers, Olya Burlyuk, Ogˇuzhan Keskin, Andrea Varga,
Salvatore Dziekan, Tom Casier, Tugba Basaran, Amanda Klekowski von
Koppenfels, Robert Heinsch, Freya Baetens, Collin Mangrum, Michael
Kelly, Patrick Borchers, Shane Osborn, and Chuck Hagel, for their
support over the years.
Lastly, I would like to thank Ben Booth, Amber Watts, Jennifer Lee,
Catherine Cumming, Jane Bayliss, and the entire team at Edward Elgar. I
could not have asked for a better publishing experience.
viii
Introduction
Since the SecondWorldWar, the prohibition of the use of force has been
the cornerstone upon which the entire edifice of the United Nations (UN)
peace and security system has been built. It was designed specifically to
outlaw the use of force as a means by which states might resolve their
international disputes. In its stead, the following system of the use of
force was put in place: states may engage in force only if (a) they are
acting in self-defense pursuant toArticle 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations (UN Charter),1 or (b) they have been authorized by the Security
Council to use force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. There are no
other exceptions available in the UN system. The goal of such a system
was simple: in order to avoid a devastating third world war, the jus ad
bellum in the post-war era would be tightly constrained.
During the building of the UN system, the law of genocide was
undergoing a contemporaneous construction. Responding to the atrocities
of the Holocaust, the law of genocide culminated in the drafting of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Genocide Convention).2 Article I of the Genocide Convention provided
for the prohibition, prevention, and punishment of the crime of genocide.
However, due to the political deadlock between the United States (US)
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold
War, the operationalization of both the UN system and the Genocide
Convention became frozen.3
1 Charter of the United Nations (1945), 892 UNTS 119 (1945).
2 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(1948), 78 UNTS 277 (1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
3 For a critical historical analysis of the US and the USSR’s approaches to
the drafting of the Genocide Convention, see A. WEISS-WENDT, ‘The Soviet
Union and the Genocide Convention: An Exercise in Cold War Politics’ in
A. BIEN´CZYK-MISSALA and S. DUBSKI (eds.), Rafał Lemkin: A Hero of Human-
kind, The Polish Institute of InternationalAffairs,Warsaw 2010, at 179–94, esp.
179 (opining that: ‘The ideological adversaries [i.e. the United States and Soviet
Union] worked hard to install safeguards that would make it difficult, if not
utterly impossible, to use the Genocide Convention as legal blackmail. In effect,
these efforts rendered the Genocide Convention dysfunctional.’).
1
