Table Of Contenta documentari)
stumi of
lintlsh pollcij
touiards
Indian nationalism
1889-1909
B. L. BBOVER
NUNC C0CN05C0 EX PARTE
THOMASJ. BATA LIBRARY
TRENT UNIVERSITY
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2019 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation
https://archive.0rg/details/documentarystudyOOOOgrov
A Documentary Study of
British Policy Towards
Indian Nationalism
1885-1909
,
1
rjui'y’l 'ii<.iii::':
t'Qyr-
oiv'it - .
f
A Documentary Study of
British Policy Towards
Indian Nationalism
1885-1909
B. L. GROVER
FOREWORD
Professor Humayun Kabir
INTRODUCTION
Professor Bisheshwar Prasad
NATIONAL PUBLICATIONS
VI
yom flattery.” The correspondence edited by Dr. Grover brings
out clearly that the British followed this principle in their own
dealings. This perhaps explains why with a handful of men, they
were able to maintain an empire for almost two hundred years.
Dr. Grover’s study has thrown new light on many problems
of Indo-British connection. Among them two of special interest
may be mentioned here. There has for many years been a contro¬
versy about the role of the British and especially that of Hume in
the establishment of the Indian National Congress. Dr. Grover
has by and large accepted the safety-valve theory. This is no doubt
correct but as he has pointed out, there were a number of conflict¬
ing motives which moved the various protagonists. There were
some who wanted to canalize Indian discontent into safe channels.
There were others who wanted that the foundation should be
laid of a movement which would lead ultimately to self-govern¬
ment, if not independence. There was also the elfect on Indian
affairs of the interplay of political forces in the United Kingdom.
Dr. Grover has suggested that at least part of the reason why
Hume acted as and when he did was to forestall the initiative of
Surendra Nath Banerjea. Banerjea had already established himself
as perhaps the foremost nationalist of the day and the Govern¬
ment disliked him not only because he was a former member of
the Indian Civil Service who had rebelled against the official
code but even more because he showed signs of what they regarded
as extremism. Banerjea had already started an all-India organisa¬
tion but Hume and his colleagues bypassed and ignored him.
Hume was careful in choosing as his colleagues Indians who were
well-established in life and less discontented and rebellious than
those who worked with Banerjea. It is interesting to note that
though Banerjea was one of the leading nationalists of the day,
he was for a long time not included in the leadership of the
Congress and became its President only after about ten years.
Dr. Grover’s study of the origin of the Muslim League is
also revealing. Many Indian historians have looked upon the
Simla Deputation as a command performance. There is little doubt
that the Government of the day was sympathetic to the point of
view represented by the Aga Khan and his colleagues. Dr. Grover
is however right in pointing out that the deputation cannot be
explained only in terms of British encouragement. In my book
Of Cabbages and Kings, I have traced in some detail the changing
vii
attitude of the British authorities towards the Indian Muslims.
Till about 1885, it was one of unconcealed hostility and perse¬
cution. Though Moghul power had decayed by the time the Bri¬
tish became dominant in India, the myth of the Moghul Empire
continued till the great Revolt of 1857. As such, British pohcy
was directed mainly against the Muslims. The Permanent Settle¬
ment of 1793, the Resumption Proceedings of 1820 and the Edu¬
cational Policy of 1834 were all directed consciously to undermine
Muslim influence and position in Indian life. The Hindus played
an equally important role in the Revolt of 1857, but for reasons
of expediency the British concentrated their anger on the Muslim
participants. It was perhaps from the time of Lord Lytton that the
British became apprehensive of the role of the rising Hindu
intelligentsia. For some twenty years, from 1885 to 1905, the
British attitude was uncertain and hesitating and favoured some¬
times the Hindus and sometimes the Muslims.
It was during these two decades that there was a slow rap¬
prochement between the Government and the Indian Mushms.
The growing power of the Hindu middle classes had disturbed
not only the Government but also the upper classes among the
Muslims and made them apprehensive of their future. Sir Syed
Ahmed Khan offers an interesting case study of the way in which
the mind of the Mushm intelligentsia was working during this
period. He started as a great believer in co-operation between the
Hindus and the Muslims in every field of life but changed later to
become a protagonist of Anglo-Muslim co-operation in education
and politics rather than united Hindu-Muslim endeavour for
economic and political emancipation. In fact, in his later years
Sir Syed Ahmed worked consciously and deliberately to keep the
Muslims away from the main stream of Indian political life.
The British attitude of initial official hostility to and later
uncertainty about the Indian Mushms changed in the first decade
of the twentieth century into one of patronage and support.
The Simla Deputation of the Aga Khan and his collaborators
served only to highlight this change in a dramatic way but it was
in fact a culmination of a process which had started years ago.
British patronage of Indian Muslims in 1906 and afterwards was
however half-hearted and cautious as a result of deliberate policy.
After the estabhshment of British power in India, there had
initially been a real effort on the part of some British administra-
VllI
tors and educationists to foster the growth of a genuine Indian
nationalism. The intellectual renaissance which began with Raja
Ram Mohan Roy and led to the emergence of a number of dis¬
tinguished intellectuals in all parts of India was a natural outcome
of this effort. The experience of the Indian Revolt of 1857 and
even more the growing nationalism of the Indian middle classes
as seen in the various political movements culminating in the
outburst that followed the partition of Bengal completely changed
the earlier British outlook. When therefore the Muslim League
was founded, the British gave it enough support to keep it alive as
a counterpoise to the Congress but never extended the support to
an extent where it could become an independent political force
working for its own ends. This remained the position of the
Muslim League till the outbreak of the Second World War.
Dr. Grover’s introductory chapters are always interesting
and at times penetrating in their insight. One may not agree
with all that he says but there is little doubt that his findings will
by and large be accepted by all objective and impartial students
of history. He has earned our thanks by bringing together this
interesting collection of the ‘private papers’ of Secretaries of
State and Viceroys and offering an analysis of the motivations
behind the publicly declared policies and attitudes of the British
Government with regard to India.
New Delhi,. HUMAYUN KABIR
April 8, 1*966
