Table Of ContentA CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF E. S. BRIGHTMAN1S HYPOTHESIS
OF A GOD OF FINITE WILL
A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Graduate School
University of Southern California
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in Social Studies
by
Richard Warren Taylor
August 1951
UMI Number: EP65892
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION................... ......... 1
II. PROFESSOR BRIGHTMAN'S HYPOTHESIS . . . . . . 8
III. INTELLECTUAL FORERUNNERS ................. 22
IV. METAPHYSICAL EVALUATION ................... 43
V. RELIGIOUS EVALUATION ..................... 67
VI. CONCLUSION............................... 80
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................ 84
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Alfred North Whitehead has said that the one reli
gious dogma in debate in all times is the question, 11 What do
you mean by 'God1?1'1 It is intended that this thesis should
point out the answer of Edgar Sheffield Brightman to this
question and attempt to show some of the history of the
ideas contributing to the formation of this answer. It is
an attempt to evaluate this answer metaphysically and reli
giously from the point of view of an empirical personalistic
theme.
The special problem of this thesis is the relation
of God to good and evil. In the main-stream of orthodox
Christian theology this relation has been considered no
problem at all since no conflict between the notion of a
good and omnipotent God and the existence of certain evils
has been admitted. Empirical theists of all varieties have,
however, been forced to admit this conflict between hypo
theses and observed existence. Mill early observed that
^"Whitehead, RITM, 67-681. The bibliographical form
used is that of E. S. Brightman, Instructions for Students
in Philosophy (Boston: Boston University Press, 19^8).
Symbols used are noted in the bibliography of this thesis.
natural religion as deduced from the facts of the universe
p
negates the hypothesis of God's omnipotence. James, too,
believed that the only God worthy of the name must be
finite; i.e., non-omnipotent.3 The crux of the problem is
the question of how an all-powerful, omnipotent God who
allows all of the evil which we find in the world, particu
larly so-called "acts of God" and incurable diseases, can
possibly also be good. Many in the last thirty years have
claimed that it is not possible that the God of this world
is both omnipotent and good. Popular forerunners of this
li R
view include H. G. Wells, and G. B. Shaw.-' More systematic,
though differing, advocates of this view include Whitehead,^
*7 8 Q 10 11
McTaggart,' Bertocci, Montague,^ Shiller, Tsanoff,
2 Mill, TER, 180-181.
3 James, PU, 125.
^ Cf. Wells, GIK.
5 Cf. Dotterer, Art. (1918), 4l6.
b Whitehead, RITM, 153- I
7 McTaggart, SDR, 265.
8 Bertocci, EAG, 271.
9 Montague, BU, 68-70.
10 shiller, RS, 306, 316.
11 Tsanoff, NE, 27.
IP
and Brightman.
It is the contention of the above point of view that
any one instance of needless sin or of needless suffering
is sufficient by itself to make out a prima facie case
against the hypothesis of omnipotent ^ This
go od ne ss .
thesis is an attempt to evaluate this contention as it is
systematized by Professor Brightman. This evaluation is
based upon a dualistic epistemology and is carried out, in
the main, by the use of the empirical criterion and the
criterion of coherence. This type of an evaluation should,
it seems, be acceptable within the traditions of both per-
sonalism and empirical theism.
The empirical criterion, as used here, requires that
an hypothesis, to be acceptable, must conform to all parti
cular situations which are pertinent. These particulars may
be valid abstractions of any order. They may be religious
Insights. However, religious insights qua intuitions which
cannot be agreed upon by all parties to a given discussion
will be of no direct help in that discussion even though
jthey may provide those who can agree upon them with a hint
i 1 9
; x Brightman, FOG; POG; POR.
^■3 Dotterer, Art. (1918), 4l5-
^ Baker, CLG, xvii.
4
of a proper particular acceptable to the discussion.
The coherence criterion requires that all of the
hypotheses of a system together with its logic shall be
mutually and completely consistent.
It seems probable that the system of philosophy of
religion to which the conclusions of this thesis point may
be so limited as to exclude certain tensions which exist
between the various religious insights of an individual.
Such exclusion is certainly the aim of any adequate system
formed upon the basis of this investigation. Such exclu
sion may, however, be existentially undesirable, for there
seems to be some truth in Bernard Bosanquet!s contention^
that the tension between the finite and the infinite is the
very heart of the life of the spirit. Insofar as such a
tension exists and is not accounted for by the system sug
gested by the conclusions of this thesis, this system must
be unsatisfactory. It is expected, however, following
Whitehead, that the system should be 11 open-ended” rather
jthan internally complete and that both its unsatisfactori
ness and its open-endedness are necessarily due, at least in
part, to the present, and constant, inadequacy of current
vocabulary as symbols for communication of current thinking j
■*■5 cited by Banning, Art. (1934), 143.
and feeling.1^
It seems wise to define certain terms used in the
discussion of God at this point. Several of them have
meant other and different things in the popular usage of lay
churchmen. This difference in meaning has been one of the
major reasons for the unfortunate ill-will which exists
among various schools of religious philosophy. Disagreement
is, of course, Justifiable, but lack of understanding because
of the different use of words does not seem to be.
Omnipotence, contrary to the definition of
Hartshorne,^ may be more than power to the highest degree
possible. It means that there are no limits to God's power
1 o
which are external to his own will. If God is omnipotent
he has the power to do whatever he wills.^ God's will then
may limit the power that he makes use of and he may still be
omnipotent. However, if he lacks the power to fulfill his
20
will in any time or place then he is not omnipotent. This
power may be the power to change all existing things at once
16 Cf. Whitehead, SME.
!7 Hartshorne, MVG, 30.
j Galloway, PR, 485.
Knudson, DOG, 271.
20 Parker, ES, 358.
6
if God so wills, but it need not be this. Omnipotence might
also be possible where the willed change was a somewhat
21
slower process.
Infinite does not here have any of the various mean
ings pointed out by Russell or Whitehead in their mathema
tical writings. Nor is it the ’’proper" infinite used by
22
Tennant. The Angelic Doctor came very close when he wrote,
”We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite
because it is not finite. f,23 When applied to God with no
qualification the term infinite means that God is subject to
oil
no limitations which do not issue from his own will.
Infinite is also sometimes used in the sense of Spinoza1s
expression "infinite after its kind";2^ here it means that
something is not limited by anything of like nature.
Professor Brightman seems to have the first sense primarily
2 6
in mind in most of his books, in spite of Baker’s .ml sunder -
27
standing at this point. However, in more recent books ' he
21 Banning, Art. (193^), 1^6.
22 Tennant, PT, II, 264-267.
23 Aquines, Sum. Theol., Q.7-
2^ Galloway, PR, 478.
25 cited by Sorley, MVIG, 482.
26 Baker, CLG, xix.
27 cf. Brightman, POR.
