Table Of Content‘21st century materialism’: but if philosophy out his program under the name of ‘the
has no history, and if it has no object? materialist dialectic,’ and – perhaps more
How could we approach, under the con- telling – the enemy against which he posi-
dition of Althusser’s well-known theses, the tions his enterprise is not some imposing
contemporary condition of materialism? ‘As contemporary renovation of idealism but
philosophy has no object, nothing can hap- rather ‘democratic materialism.’ Even theo-
pen in it. The nothing of its history simply rists of so-called ‘immaterial labor’ lay claim
repeats the nothing of its object.’ Nothing to a materialist orientation. Today what
can happen. Nothing repeats. These are Althusser called ‘the emptiness of a distance
themselves theses concerning the situa- taken’ by the materialist philosopher might
tion of philosophical materialism. What seem to mark not so much a distance from
‘happens’ in philosophy is a perpetual con- idealism as the emptiness of the latter’s
flict between opposing tendencies – mate- oppositional place.
rialism and idealism – and this conflict From this perspective, the real effects of
amounts to nothing insofar as it endlessly the null traces inscribed by novel philosophi-
recurs. Philosophy is the ‘garrulous theatre’ cal projects would be internal to materialism;
of an ‘eternal null inversion’ through which the ‘distance’ that these open within the
the relation between matter and mind is conjuncture would be a distance between
rearranged. But if there is thus no history materialist positionsóof which there is no
Introduction: of philosophy, there is nevertheless a history shortage. Thus a history in 21st century mate-
in philosophy: ‘a history of the displacement rialism would be inscribed between the posi-
Null Traces, of the indefinite repetition of a null trace tions staked out, for example, by Catherine
whose effects are real.’ Malabou’s neurological dialectics of plas-
Real Effects
For Althusser, what is perpetually dis- ticity, the Churchlands’ eliminative mate-
placed is the line of demarcation between rialism, Ray Brassier’s nihilist physicalism,
materialism and idealism, an antagonism the Lacanian transcendental materialism
— —
that constitutes and exhausts the philo- extrapolated from the work of Slavoj Žižek
Nathan Brown sophical field. And in the mid-twentieth by Adrian Johnston, the Deleuzian tran-
century conjuncture that he analyzed, what scendental materialism associated with the
he called partisanship in philosophy, or ‘the journal Pli, Bernard Stiegler’s investigations
class struggle in theory,’ consisted in but- of the mnemotechnics of tertiary memory,
tressing materialist philosophy against the Antonio Negri’s Spinozist ontology of con-
hegemonic power of idealism, by which the stituent power, varieties of biopolitical
former was ‘massively dominated.’ Today theory gleaned from Foucault via Giorgio
the balance of power between these two Agamben, the rationalist phenomenology of
positions has itself undergone an inversion. Alain Badiou’s materialist dialectic, Quentin
In the present conjuncture, it might seem Meillassoux’s speculative materialism, Reza
that idealism is so massively dominated by Negarastani’s petrophilosophical hermet-
materialism that the philosophical field has ics of ‘complicity with anonymous materi-
virtually collapsed into one of its two con- als’, Gabriel Catren’s quantum mechanical
stitutive tendencies, such that the null trace speculative physics… And, to name three of
which carves out a history in philosophy has our speakers at this weekend’s event: Peter
come to displace itself entirely within the Hallward’s efforts to rethink the conditions
internal articulation of materialist positions. of a politically transformative materialism
For how many novel projects in continen- through a theory of dialectical voluntarism;
tal philosophy openly declare their ‘idealist’ Martin Hägglund’s incipient theory of arche-
orientation? Even a figure like Badiou, who materiality; Miran Božovič’s excavation and
does not hesitate to affirm his allegiance to reorientation of materialist mythoi in mod-
a more or less orthodox Platonism, carries ern French philosophy.
1
This profusion of ‘21st century material- absolute in declaring our capacity to posit
isms’ calls our attention to another basic the objective reality of matter in-itself; and
Althusserian precept: that philosophical generic insofar as the primary condition for
‘tendencies’ are precisely tendencies insofar the adequation of dialectical materialism
as they are never pure, but always internally with absolute objectivity is the rejection of
divided by factional struggles and infiltrated any determinate substance.
by elements of their nominal antagonist. As Graham Harman’s work suggests,
Hence the desire to formulate what one however, the trouble with such a generic
might call a generic materialism: one capa- materialism is that it is difficult to differ-
cious enough to accommodate divergent entiate from realism. And this is an urgent
projects under a single categorical condition, problem for our present prehension of the
yet robust enough to firmly demarcate the future of philosophy in that it touches upon
limits of a distinctive philosophical orienta- the asymmetrical relation between specula-
tion. This is what Lenin attempted a century tive materialism and speculative realism.
ago in his 1909 intervention, Materialism Thus, if the interventions of Miran Božovič,
and Empirio-Criticism, by paring the con- Martin Hägglund, and Peter Hallward draw
stitutive criteria of materialism down to lines of demarcation between discrepant
a bare minimum. Attempting to drain the orientations within materialist philosophy,
‘idealist swamp’ into which he judged early Graham Harman’s work suggests that the
20th century physics to have fallen due to the principle contradiction of the present phil-
supposed ‘disappearance of matter’ from osophical field may pass between material-
physical theory, Lenin insisted upon the ism and realism, the latter of which would
fundamental compatibility of materialist thus displace the conjunctural position of
philosophy with any and all developments in idealism.
the physical sciences, an accord enabled by In all cases, it is the real effects of these
a strategic underdetermination of the philo- traces and displacements – first and fore-
sophical category of matter. Citing Engels’ most their effects upon one another – that
remark that ‘with each epoch-making dis- is the matter of concern this weekend.
covery in the history of science, [material-
ism] has been obliged to change its form,’
Lenin argues that the sole ‘property’ of mat-
ter with the recognition of which material-
ism is vitally connected is the property of
being objective reality, of existing outside
of our cognition… The electron is as inex-
haustible as the atom, nature is infinite, but
it exists infinitely; and only this categorical,
unconditional recognition of its existence
beyond the consciousness and sensation
of man distinguishes dialectic materialism
from relativist agnosticism and idealism.
Whatever its shortcomings, what
remains enticing about Lenin’s book is its
proposition that materialism may be generic
insofar as it is simultaneously dialectical
and absolute: dialectical in its acceptance of
the mutability of human knowledge and the
relativity of any particular ‘state’ of matter;
2
1/ itself. The transition from inert matter to
a sentient being and from a sentient being
I shall be discussing the paradoxical deity to a thinking being occurs solely by means
that briefly appears on the scene of Diderot's of ‘material agents’ and through ‘purely
D’Alembert’s Dream. mechanical operations,’2 that is, ‘without
Widely considered to be Diderot’s philo- the intervention of any heterogeneous or
sophical masterpiece, this work (consisting unintelligible agent,’3 such as spiritual God
of three dialogues, written in 1769) is a highly and immaterial soul.
unusual piece of writing in which Diderot’s
own philosophical system is expounded 2/
not by someone who would be cautiously
choosing his words, weighing the argu- The idea that ‘everything in nature is linked’4
ments with care and thoughtfully refuting – this idea is one of the central tenets of
the objections as befits a formal philosophi- Diderot’s (neo-)Spinozist ontology – which
cal treatise, but by the delirious d’Alembert, left the waking d’Alembert unimpressed
who is ranting thoughtlessly in his sleep when he first heard it from Diderot’s
(he even experiences a sexual climax in the mouth the evening before, is enthusiasti-
process) and in this way comes to develop cally adopted by the dreaming d’Alembert
The Material the central themes of Diderot’s material- and spoken of as if it were his own. In his
ism. An insightful and indispensable com- feverish sleep, he says:
God in Diderot’s
mentary is provided by the medical doctor, All beings intermingle with each other,
Bordeu, whom d’Alembert’s mistress, Mlle consequently all species ... everything is in
D’Alembert’s
de Lespinasse, who has been noting down perpetual flux. Every animal is more or less
Dream the words of her sleeping lover, summons a human being, every mineral is more or less
to his bedside because she fears he has lost a plant, and every plant is more or less an
his mind. Furthermore, while in the first animal. There is nothing fixed in nature...
— —
dialogue where Diderot has been trying to Everything is more or less one thing or
Miran Božovič win him over to materialism, d’Alembert another, more or less earth, more or less
remained a more or less firmly convinced water, more or less air, more or less fire,
spiritualist dualist believing the soul to be more or less of one kingdom or another...
an immaterial, spiritual entity, in the second therefore nothing is of the essence of a par-
1 Denis Diderot, Le Rêve de d’Alembert, dialogue he undergoes a philosophical con- ticular being. No, there’s no doubt, since
in Œuvres, 5 vols., ed. Laurent Versini (Paris: version in his dream, that is, a conversion there is no quality which any being does
Robert Laffont, 1994-97), 1: 616. Translations from Cartesian dualism to Diderotian mate- not share in... and because it’s the greater or
from the first part of the Rêve are my own; rialism. In D’Alembert’s Dream, materialist smaller ratio of this quality which has made
translations from the second part are quoted monism is presented, quite literally, as the us attribute it to one being to the exclusion
from D’Alembert’s Dream, trans. Jean Stewart spiritualist dualist’s nightmare. of another. And you talk about individuals,
and Jonathan Kemp, in Diderot, Thoughts It certainly comes as a surprise that in you poor philosophers! Forget about your
on the Interpretation of Nature and Other the text, which has, already in its first para- individuals. Answer me this: is there an
Philosophical Works, ed. David Adams graph, done away with the concept of spiri- atom in nature which is exactly similar to
(Manchester: Clinamen Press, 1999). tual God and the traditional notion of imma- another atom? No. Don’t you agree that
terial soul, there nevertheless appears a sort everything is connected in nature and that
2 Ibid., 1: 614. of deity. Both immaterial soul and spiritual it’s impossible that there should be a gap in
God are rejected, in a single stroke, as nature’s chain? Then what do you want to
3 Diderot, D’Alembert’s Dream,132. agents ‘with contradictory attributes,’1 and say with your individuals? There are no indi-
all functions traditionally ascribed to them viduals, no, there are none. There is only one
4 Diderot, Le Rêve de d’Alembert, 1: 615. are taken over by matter, the only substance great individual – that is the whole. In that
existing in the universe. Matter produces whole, as in a machine or some animal, you
life and develops sensibility and thought by may give a certain name to a certain part,
3
5 Diderot, D’Alembert’s Dream, 104-105 but if you call this part of the whole an ‘indi- existing substance. Not only our body, but
(translation slightly modified). vidual’ you are making as great a mistake as our thoughts or ideas too are, strictly speak-
if you called the wing of a bird, or a feather ing, modifications of matter, since the soul
6 Ibid., 104. on that wing, an ‘individual’ … And you talk that produces them is itself nothing other
of essences, you poor philosophers! Forget than a properly organized body or a modi-
7 Ibid., 99. about your essences!5 fication of matter. That is to say, every idea
In d’Alembert’s eyes, ‘everything in nature that occurs in my mind is at the same time a
8 Spinoza, Ethics, in The Collected Works is linked’ to such an extent that the whole modification of ‘the great individual’ whose
of Spinoza, trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: of nature is a single individual. Furthermore, ‘part’ is my body – and therefore also my
Princeton University Press, 1985), 462. nature is the only true individual; particu- mind. Although Diderot’s ‘great individual’
lar beings by themselves are not true indi- is an extended thing, the same thing can be
9 Diderot, D’Alembert’s Dream, 105. viduals but rather ‘parts’ of a much wider said of it that Pierre Bayle said of Spinoza’s
‘whole’ (or totality), le tout, that is, nature God – like Spinoza’s God, Diderot’s ‘great
10 Diderot, Le Rêve de d’Alembert, 1: 620. or material universe as ‘the great individual.’ individual’ too is a being who is ‘modified
How closely the particular beings are linked at the same time by the thoughts of all
11 Pierre Bayle, Historical and Critical up into ‘the great individual,’ can best be mankind.’11
Dictionary, trans. Richard H. Popkin seen in d’Alembert’s description of his Although Diderot’s ‘great individual’ is
(Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1991), art. own ontological status within the ‘whole’: clearly not a true material God, that is, God,
‘Spinoza,’ rem. N, 311. ‘Change the whole, and you will necessar- who would be an effect of the material uni-
ily change me; but the whole is changing verse in the same way as the material soul
12 Diderot, Thoughts on the constantly.’6 Already in one of his previous is an effect of bodily organization – what
Interpretation of Nature, trans. Lorna delirious babblings we heard d’Alembert say: to some extent spoils the otherwise neat
Sandler, in Thoughts on the Interpretation of ‘Everything changes, everything passes away. (neo-)Spinozist picture of the ‘whole,’ that
Nature and Other Philosophical Works, 67. Only the whole remains.’7 Here d’Alembert is, nature or the material universe consid-
apparently comes to understand that this ered as a single ‘great individual,’ is the fact
general principle is valid also for him, who that for Diderot there is no such thing as
is himself no less ‘a part of the whole’ (or la conscience du tout, the consciousness of
of ‘the great individual’) than any other the whole,12 as he called it in his Thoughts
being. Incidentally, this passage is strongly on the Interpretation of Nature while sup-
reminiscent of Spinoza who, in the Second posedly arguing against Maupertuis’s ‘most
Part of his Ethics, writes that ‘the whole seductive form of materialism’ – the dream-
of nature is one Individual, whose parts, ing d’Alembert, as portrayed by Diderot, is
i.e., all bodies, vary in infinite ways, with- nevertheless subjected to nature (i.e., to the
out any change of the whole Individual.’8 ‘whole’ whose ‘part’ he is) to such an extent
With regard to the ‘whole’ which they form, that it appears as if it is not he himself who
the parts are desubstantialized to such an speaks and acts, but it is, rather, nature or
extent that a particular being is but ‘the sum ‘the great individual’ that speaks and acts
of a certain number of tendencies,’ and its through him. The dreaming d’Alembert
life within ‘the great individual’ but ‘a suc- says and does things he would most cer-
cession of actions and reactions’; within ‘the tainly never say or do if it depended on him.
great individual’ nothing is really born or First, in his dream, d’Alembert expounds
dies: ‘birth, life, decay’ are merely ‘changes as if it were his own a philosophical theory
of form,’ and we have no reason whatsoever that he as a convinced spiritualist dualist
to ascribe more importance to one form most certainly rejected, i.e., the materialist
over the others,9 and so forth. monism. Secondly, in the midst of his deliri-
According to Diderot, ‘there is only ous materialist monologue he begins to
one substance in the universe,’10 that is, masturbate in the presence of his mistress,
matter; all particular beings are modes Mlle de Lespinasse. The medical doctor, who
or transient, changing ‘forms’ of the only is openly enthusiastic about the philosophy
4
12 See Diderot, D’Alembert’s Dream, 100. expounded by d’Alembert in his dream, finds of the precession of the equinoxes,’14 in
this kind of action in the company of such an Diderot’s eyes this must mean as much as
13 See Diderot, Le Rêve de d’Alembert, 1:614. attractive young lady as Mlle de Lespinasse saying that – through the astronomer and
one of pure madness, thus indicating clearly mathematician d’Alembert – ‘the great
that d’Alembert would most likely go about individual’ or the material universe comes
the act in question differently if it depended to understand itself and its own laws, and
on his will.13 While this unmistakably unin- that therefore cosmology and astronomy
tentional, involuntary act of d’Alembert’s are nothing but the universe’s knowledge of
might, at first, seem to be rather out of itself. Similarly, when d’Alembert unknow-
place in a formal philosophical treatise, it is ingly advances the philosophy of material-
actually entirely consistent with the spirit ist monism, that is, the philosophical theory
of philosophy unintentionally and unknow- which is contrary to his spiritualist dualism,
ingly expounded by d’Alembert in his dream, does it not seem as if it is not he who is
namely: d’Alembert masturbates while he is theorizing about the material universe but,
speaking about the ‘miracle of life,’ that is, rather, that it is the material universe that is
about spontaneous generation, about vari- theorizing about itself through d’Alembert,
ous forms of sexual and asexual reproduc- and that therefore materialist monism is
tion, or, in short, about the ways material nothing but the philosophical theory that
organization reproduces itself – and the matter, as the only existing substance in
moment his philosophical reflections on the universe, has about itself? And finally,
the life of matter reach a climax, he himself if we include into this reading D’Alembert’s
experiences a sexual climax, that is, his body Dream itself, that is, the theoretical philo-
literally produces ‘the living matter.’ sophical treatise, in which Diderot formu-
Does not the fact that d’Alembert’s lates and develops the philosophy of mate-
involuntary talk about ‘the great work of rialism, does it not seem as if – through this
nature,’ about life of matter, and so forth, treatise of Diderot’s, which is widely con-
coincides with his no less involuntary pro- sidered to be the pinnacle of the philosophy
duction of the living matter, or with nature’s of materialism – nature itself writes its own
true act of creation in miniature, make it theory or as if matter is developing its own
appear as if matter or nature literally repro- philosophy?
duces itself and its life through d’Alembert’s In his youth, Diderot had already toyed
body, that is, through one of its ‘parts’? with the idea of a ‘whole’ that thinks
That is, the upshot of the scene is – not through its ‘parts’ and, consequently, with
that d’Alembert’s body imitates nature the idea of a being who at first takes him-
and stages its creative power but, rather, self to be an autonomous thinking subject
that nature itself literally creates the living and then comes to realize with horror that
matter through d’Alembert and propagates ideas in his mind are not really his or, in
itself. Moreover, does it not also seem as if other words, that it is not he himself who
it is nature or material organization itself thinks his thoughts, but that it is, rather,
that – through the mind it developed in the ‘whole’ whose ‘part’ he is that thinks
d’Alembert – reflects on itself? (In the first in him or through him. In one of his early,
dialogue, d’Alembert as ‘a thinking being’ lesser-known works, namely La Promenade
has been shown to be nothing other than du sceptique (The Sceptic’s Walk), Diderot
an effect of ‘material agents’ and ‘purely presents an eccentric sage – the so-called
mechanical operations.’) Since for Diderot ‘metaphysical egoist’ – who believes himself
there is no ‘consciousness of the whole,’ to be the only existing being in the universe
the whole thinks about itself through the while all other beings exist merely as ideas
consciousnesses of its ‘parts’: thus, when in his mind, that is, as modes of his thought
d’Alembert famously solves the ‘problem which are entirely dependent upon his will.
5
15 For the episode, see Diderot, In a word, he believes that he alone is all the is no more the author of D’Alembert’s
La Promenade du sceptique, in Œuvres, 1: 105. universe. He thus, understandably, takes Dream, than, in the The Sceptic’s Walk,
himself to be nothing less than a God of his Virgil is the author of the Aeneid. Just as the
16 Diderot, universe. Firmly believing that his thought philosophy of a mind who believes himself
Thoughts on the Interpretation is the cause of the existence of all beings, to be ‘alone in the world’ or who believes he
of Nature, 67. this sage is convinced that, for example, the is ‘himself the entire universe’ can only be
Roman poet Virgil is nothing other than an the most radical version of spiritualism, that
17 Ibid. ‘idea which refers to nothing’ outside his is, metaphysical egoism or spiritual monism,
mind. That is, the egoist (or his mind) is so, too, the philosophy of matter as the only
18 Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, in the only substance there is, and Virgil is substance that exists in the universe, can
Œuvres, 1: 1283. merely a mode of his thought. Accordingly, only be one of materialist monism.
the egoist claims to be the author of the
ideas constituting Virgil’s Aeneid: it was 3/
not Virgil who composed the Aeneid; it was,
rather, the egoist philosopher himself who If ‘the universe ... forms a whole,’ Diderot
created, in his thought, both Virgil and ‘his’ writes in his Thoughts on the Interpretation
epic. When Virgil – who exists solely as a of Nature, there is always a possibility that
mode of the sage’s thought – came up with the perceptions of its constituent parts will
any one of the ideas constituting the Aeneid, fuse into ‘a single perception,’ and the par-
it was, in fact, the sage who came up with ticular consciousnesses into ‘the conscious-
that idea. That is to say, it was the egoist ness of the whole.’16 This ‘infinite set of per-
sage who composed the Aeneid through ceptions’ is of course nothing other than the
Virgil.15 While writing The Sceptic’s Walk, ‘world-soul,’ and in this case, Diderot goes
Diderot could have hardly failed to notice on, ‘the world could be God.’17 Like Spinoza’s
the obvious implication that, in accordance God, the material God of that sort would not
with the metaphysical theory of the egoist be thinking any thoughts unthought by us,
sage he is portraying, he himself and the since he is nothing other than ‘an infinite
book he was writing should be considered set of perceptions’ or ‘consciousness of the
a part of the egoist’s mind, a mode of his whole,’ that is, nature’s (or ‘the great indi-
thought, and that, strictly speaking, it is vidual’s’) consciousness of itself, formed by
not he who is writing about the egoist consciousnesses of its ‘parts’ in the same
metaphysics, but rather the egoist himself way as human minds constitute the infi-
who is developing his own metaphysics nite intellect of Spinoza’s God, that is, the
through him. This should, I believe, hold knowledge that takes nature as its object.
all the more for D’Alembert’s Dream: while Of course, this kind of material God – for
Diderot would be unlikely to take himself to which Diderot cannot hide his enthusiasm
be nothing other than an idea in the ego- even when he supposedly rejects it – is not
ist’s mind, a mode of his thought, that is, a the creator or cause of the universe, but its
‘part’ of that ‘whole’ he writes about in The effect in the same way as the material soul
Sceptic’s Walk, he did think of himself as a is an effect of bodily organization. Just as
‘part’ of ‘the great Whole’ he writes about internally diversified and complex matter,
in D’Alembert’s Dream. Just as in the The making up the human body, develops its
Sceptic’s Walk it is the egoist that develops own soul, which is not a spiritual entity
his own metaphysics through Diderot, so, distinct from the body that produced it
too, in D’Alembert’s dream, it is nature as but, as Diderot puts it, portion du corps,18
‘the great individual,’ or matter as the only portion of the body, and therefore mate-
existing substance, that contemplates itself rial, so properly organized matter, making
and expounds its own theory or philosophy up the universe as a whole, can develop its
through Diderot. Strictly speaking, Diderot own mind too – and this kind of soul, the
6
19 Diderot, Le Rêve de d’Alembert, 1: 639. ‘world-soul’ or ‘universe-soul,’ again will not Travels in the Mogul Empire of a Hindu deity
be a spiritual entity distinct from the ‘body’ who is said to have produced ‘from his own
20 Diderot, D’Alembert’s Dream, 107. that produced it, that is, from the material substance’ not only the souls
universe, but, as Diderot puts it, portion
21 See Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. de l’univers,19 portion of the universe, and but also generally everything material or cor-
Macpherson (Harmondsworth: therefore material. Thus, in Diderot’s eyes, poreal in the universe... [T]his production is
Penguin, 1985), 227. none of the two souls, neither the human not formed simply after the manner of effi-
soul nor the ‘world-soul,’ is a discrete sub- cient causes, but as a spider which produces
22 Diderot, D’Alembert’s Dream, 107. stantial entity in itself, that is, an entity a web from its own navel, and withdraws it
entering the body from without (human at pleasure. The Creation then … is nothing
23 François Bernier, Travels in the Mogul soul) or creating the universe outside itself more than an extraction or extension of the
Empire, trans. Irving Brock, ed. Archibald (God), but rather a constituent part of the individual substance of God, of those fila-
Constable (Westminster: Archibald Constable body itself or the universe – and, as such, it ments which He draws from his own bowels;
and Company, 1841), 347. cannot exist without the body or universe. and, in like manner, destruction is merely the
Just as without the body there is no human recalling of that divine substance and fila-
24 Diderot, D’Alembert’s Dream, 107. soul, so too without the world there is no ments into Himself; so that the last day of
‘world-soul’ or, in other words, without the the world …, will be the general recalling of
universe there is no God. As a ‘portion of the those filaments which God had before drawn
universe,’ understandably, the material God forth from Himself.23
would be ‘subject to vicissitudes,’ he would
‘grow old and die,’20 and so forth. While the comparison between God and spi-
This ‘Mortall God’ (to borrow the expres- der (and between the universe and the spider
sion from Hobbes21) would be like a giant web) may well work for the Hindu deity, it is
spider sitting in the center of its web with misleading with regard to Diderot’s material
its threads extending throughout the entire God: the material universe may be said to be
universe, as the spider metaphor, introduced an ‘extraction’ or ‘extension’ of the Hindu
by Mlle de Lespinasse to illustrate the rela- deity, while in the case of Diderot’s mate-
tionship between the ‘meninges’ (i.e., the rial God it is rather the reverse: the material
membrane that envelops the brain) and the God is an ‘extraction’ or ‘extension’ of the
‘threads’ (i.e., nerves), leading to the surface material universe.
of her body, is elaborated upon by Bordeu.22 In an important aspect, the material God
In the metaphor, the threads of the web that of D’Alembert’s Dream would fall short of
the spider draws out of its bowels and back the God of traditional theism. Admittedly,
again are a ‘sensitive part’ of itself. That is, through his ‘identity with all things in nature’
the spider is not distinct from its web but the material God would be aware of ‘all that
continuous with it, just as the material God happens’ in the universe. In this respect, he
is not distinct from the universe but con- would resemble Malebranche’s Adam who,
tinuous with it. Just as the spider senses all before the Fall, was aware of the slightest
that happens anywhere on the web, so God movement of the smallest particles of his
knows all that happens in the universe. The blood and bodily humors, and was thus,
material God, in short, is like the ‘meninges’ with regard to his own body, as all-knowing
of the world. as God is all-knowing with regard to the uni-
Diderot most likely owes the compari- verse as a whole. Furthermore, through his
son between God and spider (and between memory, the material God would know ‘all
the universe and the spider web) to the that has happened’ in the past. About the
article on Spinoza in Bayle’s Historical and future, however, he would only be able to
Critical Dictionary. In the first in the series form ‘conjectures that were likely but liable
of remarks accompanying the article, Bayle to error’;24 in his knowledge of the future,
quotes a description from François Bernier’s then, he would resemble us, the ordinary
7
mortals, who are trying to guess what is
going to happen inside ourselves, for exam-
ple, at the tip of our foot or our hand.
8
If we define ‘object’ as that which has a armies, square circles, and bald kings of
unified and autonomous life apart from its France are all actors to an equal degree.
relations, accidents, qualities, and moments, This is very close to an object-oriented phi-
we can see that objects remain unpopular losophy. But rather than give objects their
in philosophy today. To some they sound a full independence, he defines them in terms
bit too much like old-fashioned substances, of their relations. As he puts it, an actor is
and in our time everyone is united in cursing no more than what it ‘transforms, modifies,
and whipping those substances: perturbs, and creates.’ An actor is what an
* Quentin Meillassoux has given a brilliant actor does. But if objects are autonomous,
analysis, in After Finitude, of the ‘correla- then they must be more than actors. Hence
tionst’ attitude in philosophy. The correla- there are no objects in Latour’s actor-net-
tionist thinks that there is no human with- work theory, at least not the kind we are
out world, nor world without human, but looking for.
only a primal correlation or rapport between * Finally, it is popular these days to say that
the two. Hence, the object has no autonomy the world is a continuum, a primal dynamic
for the correlationist. In franker terms, the flux, broken into pieces only by the needs of
object does not exist. human praxis, or by functional relations of
* For the empiricist, there is also no object, some other sort. I do not agree. I hold that
since there are only bundles of discrete qual- the world itself is quantized, broken into
Objects, ities. The unified object is a fiction produced discrete chunks, even if they are stranger
by customary conjunction in the habits of chunks than the old-fashioned substances
Matter, Sleep,
the human mind. There are no objects for of yesterday. To see this, let’s look briefly at
empiricism. a philosopher who has nothing to do with
and Death
* What about materialists? They might panpyschism at all: Martin Heidegger.
seem to be the most object-friendly of all
thinkers. But they are not. On the contrary, 1/ All relations are on the
— —
average materialists are reducers. They start same footing
Graham Harman
their work by exterminating all large- and Heidegger is most famous for asking the
medium-sized entities, and ultimately find question of the meaning of being. His admir-
reality only in physical microparticles such ers seem to think this question is deeper
as quarks and electrons, and possibly more than any specific answer, while his enemies
exotic ones called strings. And even if one or hold the question to be so vague and empty
more of these particles turns out to be the that no progress can ever be made. Both are
final layer of the cosmos, it will still not give wrong. Heidegger does answer the ques-
us the reality we need. As Bertrand Russell tion of the meaning of being, in his famous
admits in The Analysis of Matter, the enti- tool-analysis in Being and Time. The story is
ties of physics are purely relational. They well-known, so there is no reason to repeat
give us spatio-temporal co-ordinates and it in detail. While Husserl’s phenomenology
tangible properties that can be measured, describes things in terms of their appear-
but all these features have meaning only ance to consciousness, Heidegegr notes
in relation to other things. What does the that things primarily do not appear in con-
relating? It would be autonomous objects sciousness. Instead, they withdraw from
that do the relating. But there are no objects view into invisible usefulness. The floor in
in materialism. this room, the oxygen in the air, the heart
* Bruno Latour provides the most demo- and kidneys that keep us alive, are generally
cratic philosophy of actors that one could hidden unless and until they malfunction.
imagine. Ignoring the old distinction In the usual, lazy misreading, this is
between substance and aggregate, he says enough to make Heidegger a ‘pragmatist.’
that electrons, humans, tigers, apricots, Invisible background practice comes first;
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Description:1 ‘21st century materialism’: but if philosophy has no history, and if it has no object? How could we approach, under the con-dition of Althusser’s well-known
