1984 or the Brave New World? Evidence from a Field Experiment on Media Censorship in China

127 Pages·2017·4.74 MB·English

1984 or the Brave New World?
Evidence from a Field Experiment on Media Censorship in China
YuyuChen
DavidY.Yang*
August7,2017
—VERYPRELIMINARY—
—PLEASEDONOTCIRCULATE—
Abstract
Directevidenceonwhetherandwhycensorshipworksislimited. Weconductafieldexperimentin
China to examine whether providing access to uncensored internet leads citizens to acquire politically
sensitiveinformation,andbecomeaffectedbyit.Wetracksubjects’mediaconsumption,beliefsregarding
media, economic beliefs, political attitudes, and behaviors. We find 4 main results: (i) free access alone
doesnotinducesubjectstoacquirepoliticallysensitiveinformation;(ii)temporaryencouragementleads
toapersistentincreaseinacquisition,indicatingthatdemandisnotlowduetofixedfactors;(iii)acquisition
bringsbroad,substantial,andpersistentchangestoknowledge,beliefs,attitudes,andintendedbehaviors;
and(iv)socialtransmissionofinformationisstatisticallysignificantbutsmallinmagnitude.Wecalibratea
simplemodeltoshowthatChina’scensorshipapparatusmayremainrobusttoalargenumberofcitizens
receiving access to uncensored internet, given the low demand for and moderate social transmission of
uncensoredinformation.
Keywords:censorship,information,media,belief
JELclassification:D80,D83,L86,P26
*Chen: Guanghua School of Management, Peking University. Email: [email protected]. Yang: Stanford University.
Email:[email protected]. YangisgratefultoRanAbramitzky,MatthewGentzkow,andMurielNiederlefortheirguidanceand
supportatallstagesofthisproject.HelpfulandmuchappreciatedcommentsandsuggestionswereprovidedbyDougBernheim,Mike
Callen,DavideCantoni,ArunChandrasekhar,RajChetty,StefanoDellaVigna,DaveDonaldson,PascalineDupas,RubenEnikolopov,
BenEnke,BenGolub,DavidLaibson,NathanNunn,JenPan,MariaPetrova,MollyRoberts,GerardRoland,MarkRosenzweig,Al
Roth,AndreiShleifer,AdamSzeidl,NoamYuchtman,andmanyseminarandconferenceparticipants.KepingWang,YifeiSun,Shuai
Chen,JiXu,XiYao,YuLi,YingzhenZhang,ZitengLei,XinchengQiu,MinFang,HuitianBai,andMiqiXiongandadedicatedsurvey
recruitmentteamprovidedoutstandingassistanceinimplementingthefieldexperiment.FinancialsupportfromStanfordCenterfor
InternationalDevelopment,StanfordCenteratPekingUniversity,StanfordGraduateResearchOpportunityFund,StanfordFreeman
SpogliInstituteforInternationalStudies,StanfordInstituteforResearchintheSocialSciences,StanfordDepartmentofEconomics,
Stanford EconomicResearch Laboratory, National Natural Science Foundationof China, Al Roth and twodonors from Beijingis
greatlyappreciated. TheexperimentisapprovedbyStanfordIRB(ProtocolID34318), andisregisteredatAEARCTregistry(ID
0001412).
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1 Introduction
Media censorship is a hallmark of authoritarian regimes.1 Regimes such as China spend a tremendous
amount of resources to block foreign websites so that uncensored, regime-threatening information is out
of reach from citizens. Scholars have long suggested that censorship is key to the popular support and
stabilityoftheseregimes(Ford,1935).
However,directempiricalevidenceonwhetherandwhycensorshipworksislimited. Socialscientists
typically model censorship as the government imposing cost for citizens to access valuable information
that can affect their beliefs and behaviors. Policy-makers in the west have been thinking along the exact
sameframework: combatingcensorshipboilsdowntoeliminatingthecosttoaccessuncensoredinforma-
tion. Nevertheless, toolstobypasscensorshipareavailableatlowcostinChina, yettraffictouncensored
websitesremainslimited(Robertsetal.,2010). Thewillingnessofauthoritarianregimestotolerateporous
censorshipsuggeststhatcosttoaccessmaynotbethebindingconstraint. Citizensmaynotdemandpoliti-
callysensitiveinformationduetoreasonssuchaslackofinterestinpolitics,fearofgovernmentreprisal,or
distrustofforeignnewsoutlets. Moreover,citizensmaynotbeaffectedeveniftheyacquirepoliticallysen-
sitiveinformation,becausetheimpacthingesonthedegreetowhichcitizensarewillingorabletochange
their beliefs and attitudes in response to uncensored information. In fact, whether and why censorship
works is a complex question as it involves multiple margins: access may not be sufficient for citizens to
acquirepoliticallysensitiveinformation,andacquisitionmaynotbesufficienttoaffectcitizens’knowledge,
beliefs,attitudes,andbehaviors.
Inthispaper,weconductafieldexperimenttoinvestigatewhetherandwhycensorshipworksinChina.
Doesreducingthecosttoaccessuncensoredinternetnecessarilyleadcitizenstoacquirepoliticallysensitive
information? Doestheacquisitionofpoliticallysensitiveinformationaffectcitizens’beliefs,attitudes,and
behaviors? Werandomlyassign1,800universitystudentsinBeijingtoeitheracontrolconditioninwhich
they are subject to censorship as in the status quo, or a treatment condition in which they are given tools
to bypass censorship for free for 18 months.2 A subset of the treated students also receive temporary
encouragementfor4monthstovisitwesternnewsoutletsblockedduetocensorship. Wedirectlyobserve
all browsing activities of foreign websites by the treated students. We also observe students’ decisions to
purchaseaccesstouncensoredinternetthemselvesaftertheexperimentends.Usingsurveys,werepeatedly
measure a wide range of outcomes on students’ knowledge of current and historical events, beliefs and
attitudestowardsmedia,economicbeliefs,politicalattitudes,andintendedbehaviors.
1FreedomHouse’sFreedomofthePressReportshowsthat86%oftheworld’spopulationdoesnotenjoymediafreefromcensorship.
Inparticular,stateswith“unfree”mediaareconcentratedamongregimesthatareundemocraticandrespectlimitedpoliticalrightsof
theircitizens.Source:freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/china,lastaccessedonDecember11,2016.
2Chinaishometotheworld’smostsophisticatedinternetcensorshipapparatus. Universitystudentsarethecoreparticipantsof
anti-authoritarianmovementstochallengetheincumbentregime,notonlyinChinabutaroundtheglobe. Inaddition,internetis
Chineseuniversitystudents’dominantsourceofmediaconsumption,asTVistypicallynotallowedinuniversitydorms.Wediscuss
externalvalidityofourfindingsinSection5.1.2.
1
We find four main results. First, free provision of tools to access uncensored internet has little impact
onstudents’acquisitionofpoliticallysensitiveinformation. Nearlyhalfofthestudentsdonotusethetools
at all. Among those who do, almost none spend time browsing foreign news websites that are blocked.
Thisindicatesthatstudents’lowdemandforuncensored,politicallysensitiveinformationisanimportant
reasonwhytheydonotconsumesuchinformation,inspiteofthelowcost.
Second, temporary incentives to visit western news outlets lead to large and persistent increases in
students’acquisitionofpoliticallysensitiveinformation.Thelong-runincreaseininformationconsumption
— spending on average 435% longer time on foreign news websites — suggests that demand is not low
duetofixedfactorssuchaslackofpoliticalinterestorfear. Rather, acrucialfactorshapingstudents’low
demandappearstobetheirunderestimationofthevalueofuncensoredinformation. Aperiodofexposure
to foreign news outlets persistently increases students’ trust of these outlets, and raises their valuation of
theaccess. Attheendoftheexperiment,about23%ofthesenewlyexposedstudentspaytocontinuetheir
accesstouncensoredinternet.3 Hence,theincreaseddemandhasresultedinalastingincreaseinstudents’
acquisitionofuncensoredinformation.
Third,acquisitionofpoliticallysensitiveinformationbringsbroad,substantial,andpersistentchanges
to students’ knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and intended behaviors. Acquisition, as a result of free access
and temporary incentives, makes students: (i) more knowledgeable of current events and notable figures
censoredondomesticmedia, aswellaspoliticallysensitiveeventsinthepast; (ii)morepessimisticabout
Chinese economic growth and stock market performance in the near future, revealed in an incentivized
manner;(iii)moreskepticaloftheChinesegovernment,lesssatisfiedwithitsperformance,andmorelikely
todemandchangesinChineseinstitutions;and(iv)morewillingtoactforchanges,morelikelytoplanon
leavingChinathroughforeigngraduateschools,andmorelikelytoreporthavingpulledoutinvestmentin
theChinesestockmarket(amongthesmallnumberofinvestors). Theeffectisthelargestamongstudents
whohavelimitedaccesstoalternativesourcesofuncensoredinformation(e.g. thosefromdisadvantaged
background).
Fourth,studentswhoacquirepoliticallysensitiveinformationtransmitsomeoftheirknowledgetotheir
peers, butthemagnitudeofsuchspilloverismuchsmallerthanwhatisneededtoinformthemajorityof
the student population. Exploiting variations in treatment saturation across university dorm rooms, we
find that if a student actively browses foreign news websites and is informed of a sensitive news event,
his roommate is on average 12.7 percentage points more likely to correctly answer a quiz on that same
event.4 Asimplecalibrationexercisesuggeststhatthesocialtransmissionistoomoderatetoqualitatively
affect the knowledge level among the entire student population, given the proportion of students who
have had access to uncensored information prior to our experiment. These students with existing access
arehighlyclustered(potentiallyduetosocialcomplementarityinusage),whichdampensthescaleofsocial
transmissionofpoliticallysensitiveknowledge.
Takentogether,ourfindingssuggestthatcensorshipinChinaiseffectivenotbecausetheregimemakesit
impossibletoaccesssensitiveinformation(asinGeorgeOrwell’s1984). Rather,itfostersanenvironmentin
3Similarresultsarefoundregardingotherunfamiliarbutbeneficialtechnology. Forexample,Dupas(2014)findsthataone-time
subsidyonantimalarialbednetshasapositiveimpactonKenyanvillagers’willingnesstopayayearlater,whichispredominately
drivenbyvillagerslearningaboutthevalueofbednets.
4Therateofsocialtransmissionofknowledgeishigheriftheparticularnewseventattractsmoreattention(e.g. morelikelyto
learnedifastudentregularlybrowsesforeignnewswebsites).Wehowevernotethatourdataonlyallowsustoobservetransmission
amongroommates,andhencecanunderestimatetheoverallsocialtransmissionofknowledge.
2
whichcitizensdonotdemandsuchinformationinthefirstplace(asinAldousHuxley’sBraveNewWorld).
Inthefinalsectionofthepaper,wetakethepartialequilibriumeffectsestimatedfromtheexperimentand
calibrate a simple model to show that: (i) the porous censorship apparatus is robust with respect to the
existingshareofstudentsaccessinguncensoredinternetpriortoourexperiment;and(ii)itwouldberobust
eveniftheaccessisprovidedtoasubstantiallylargershareofstudents.Therobustnessisdrivenbythelow
demandforandthemoderatesocialtransmissionofuncensoredinformation,evenamongtheyoungand
educated population. Importantly, the censorship apparatus would remain robust: students are likely to
continueunderestimatingthevalueofaccessinguncensoredinternetunlesstheybegintoacquirepolitically
sensitiveinformation.
OurmodelsimulationalsodemonstratesanoptimisticscenariothattheBraveNewWorldfailstocapture:
thecensorship apparatuscanalsobe fragile, preciselybecauseit hingesonsuppressingcitizens’ demand
for uncensored information by distorting their beliefs on its value. Exposure to foreign media can raise
citizens’demandforuncensoredinformation,andtheincreaseindemandislikelytopersist,whichwould
destabilizethecensorshipapparatusandimposesubstantialpressureontheregimetotightenitsgrip.Once
60%ofthestudentsbegintodemandandactivelyacquiresensitiveinformation, suchinformationwould
spreadtotheentirestudentpopulation.
Ourpapercontributestothelargebodyofliteratureonthepoliticaleconomyofmassmedia.Theoverall
impactofmediacensorshipidentifiedinthisstudyincreasesourbroadunderstandingofhowmassmedia
influences citizens’ political preferences and shapes aggregate outcomes.5 Our study adds an important
datapointby: (i)investigatingthecaseofChina,thelargestcountrythatengagesinstate-ledinformation
control; and (ii) providing the first causal evidence via a field experiment to identify the impact of media
censorshiponshapingcitizens’knowledge,economicbeliefs,politicalattitudes,andbehaviors.
In particular, this paper relates to the small strand of the literature on mass media that emphasizes
the importance of demand-side factors. Theoretically, Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) demonstrate that
readerbiasescangenerateslantinmedia,despitemarketcompetition.6 Empirically,GentzkowandShapiro
(2010) show that newspaper slant in the United States can be largely accounted for by firms catering to
consumerpreferences.7 Mostrelevanttoourproject,HobbsandRoberts(2016)documentthatthedemand
forcensorshipcircumventiontoolisspurredafterthesuddencensorshipofInstagraminSeptember2014,
andpeoplesubsequentlyusethetooltobrowseblockedwebsitessuchasTwitterforthefirsttime;Roberts
(2016)showsthattheChinesegovernmentdeploysfrictions(e.g. makingconnectionsslow)andflooding
(e.g. distracting citizens with positive or irrelevant contents) to restrict the flow of sensitive information
on the internet — a strong indicators that the censorship apparatus leverages citizens’ low demand for
informationtoachievethegoalofinformationcontrol. Ourpapercomplementsthislineofliterature,aswe
use field experimental evidence and a simple economic framework to show that demand-side factors are
5Forexample,DellaVignaandKaplan(2007)ontheUS;Yanagizawa-Drott(2014)onRwandaGenocide; Adenaetal.(2015)on
NaziGermany;andEnikolopov,Petrova,andZhuravskaya(2011),Enikolopov,Petrova,andSonin(2016),andEnikolopov,Makarin,
andPetrova(2016)oncontemporaryRussia. DellaVignaandGentzkow(2010)reviewtheempiricalliteratureonpersuasionacross
broaderdomains,andPratandStro¨mberg(2013)provideamorerecentsurveyofthisliteratureparticularlyinthedomainofpolitics.
6Relatedly,GentzkowandShapiro(2006)showthatwhenBayesianconsumersinfernewsoutletsasmoretrustworthyifthereports
layclosertotheirpriorbeliefs, themediaoutletbecomesmorelikelytoslanttowardsreaders’priorexpectationsifthereareless
feedbacksreadersmayreceiveregardingtruth.
7Inaddition,Gerber,Karlan,andBergan(2009)findthatrandomlydistributingpartisannewspaperstoUScitizensfailstolead
tochangesintheirknowledge,politicalopinions,andbehaviorsrelatedtovoting. Thissuggeststheimportancetotakeintoaccount
ofcitizens’demandforinformation,asrandomsubscriptiondoesnotnecessarilyleadtoexposuretonewinformation. Abramitzky
andSin(2011)documentthattheinflowofwesternknowledgeintoEasternEuropeafterthecollapseofCommunismismuchmore
pronouncedinSatelliteandBalticcountriesthantheSovietones,suggestingthecrucialroleplayedbyunderlyingdemanddifferences.
3
crucialtoourunderstandingofhowandwhycensorshipworks.
Thesefindingsalsocontributetothegrowingempiricalliteratureontheendogenousformationofbe-
liefs and preferences when authoritarian regimes have direct incentive to intervene.8 We show that cen-
sorship can effectively manipulate citizens’ beliefs, attitudes, and preferences along the direction of the
regimes’intention. Inparticular, despitecitizens’moderatelevelofawarenessandsophisticationregard-
ingmediacensorshipandthedirectionofbiasesincensoredinformationcontents,theycannotfullyde-bias
themselvesfromthedistortedinformationenvironment.9
Inwhatfollows,weprovideabriefoverviewofinternetcensorshipinChinainSection2. InSection3,
wedescribetheexperimentaldesign,outcomevariablesofinterest,andotherempiricalsetupsofthefield
experiment. InSection4,wepresentresultsonwhetherprovidingaccessincreaseacquisitionofsensitive
information,andinSection5,wepresentresultsonwhetheracquiringsensitiveinformationaffectsknowl-
edge, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. In Section 6, we simulate the counterfactual scenarios of media
censorshipinChina. Finally,inSection7,wediscusslessonsfromourexperimentalresults,andspeculate
theexternalvalidityofthisstudyonotherauthoritarianregimesthatdeployinternetcensorship.
2 Internet censorship in China
ThemedialandscapeinChinaisamongthemostregulatedandrestrictedintheworld,andChina’smedia
freedomlevelisrankedconsistentlytowardsthebottomoftheworld.10 Inparticular,China’sinformation
controlovertheinternet,primarilythroughcensorship,issecondtononeintermsofitsscaleandtechno-
logicalsophistication. Inthissection,webrieflydescribetheinfrastructureoftheGreatFirewallthatserves
asthebuildingblockofcensorship,andthemarketfortoolstocircumventcensorshipinChinatoday.
2.1 TheGreatFirewall
TheadministrativeregulationsandlegalframeworkinChinaensurethatmediaoutletsbaseddomestically
would incur severe business and political cost from publishing contents that the state deems threatening
and objectionable.11 As a result, contents on domestic media outlets are routinely self-censored during
theeditorialprocess,orcensoredandfilteredaccordingtotheordersfromthePropagandaDepartmentof
the Communist Party of China (King, Pan, and Roberts, 2013, 2014). Transmission of politically sensitive
information on domestic social media such as Weibo and WeChat is also limited due to platform-wide
keywordfiltersandex-postcontentdeletion.
SincetheChinesegovernmentdoesnothavethejurisdictiontodirectlycontrolforeignmediaoutlets,an
importantaspectofChina’sinternetregulationisitsefforttoblockinternetusersinChinafromaccessing
8Among others, state indoctrination (Voigtlander and Voth, 2015; Cantoni et al., 2017) and historical experiences (Alesina and
Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln,2007;GiulianoandSpilimbergo,2014;Fuchs-Schu¨ndelnandSchu¨ndeln,2015;ChenandYang,2015)havebeen
identifiedtogeneratelastingimpactoncitizenspoliticalattitudes.
9Somerecentstudiesinvestigatehowpeopleupdatebeliefsbasedoncensored(ortruncated)information. Inanabstractsetting,
Enke (2017) documents that people form biased beliefs by neglecting absence and non-occurrence, failed to take into account of
theselectionunderlyingthedatageneratingprocess. Inpoliticalcontext, ChiangandKnight(2011)documentthatvotersinthe
US discount information from biased news outlets, and Bai et al. (2015) show that Chinese citizens have difficulties interpreting
informationonairpollutionwhenthegovernmentcontrolledmediaconflictswithuncensoredsources.
10FreedomHouse’sFreedomofthePressReportin2016labelsChina’s“NetFreedomStatus”asnotfree,andratesits“PressFreedom
Score”as87(outof100,where100indicatesthemostunfree).
11WebrieflyoutlinethelegalandadministrativeframeworkofinternetcensorshipinChinainAppendixA.
4
tospecificforeignwebsites(orcontentshostedonthosewebsites). TheGreatFirewall,amajorpartofthe
umbrellaGoldenShieldProjectdirectedbyChina’sMinistryofPublicSecurity, beginsitsoperationin2003
andservesasthemaininfrastructuretoachieveaccessblockageofpotentiallyunfavorableincomingdata
fromforeignmediaoutlets.
TheGreatFirewalldeploysseveraltechnologiestoblockentirewebsitesorspecificwebpagesfrombeing
accessedbyIPaddresseslocatedinChina.12 Duringthetimeframeofourfieldexperiment,12ofthe100
most trafficked websites in the world (and 161 of the Alexa top 1000 global websites) are blocked by the
GreatFirewall.13 Someprominentexamplesare: Google,YouTube,Facebook,Twitter,Instagram,Blogspot,
Tumblr, Dropbox, Blogger, Vimeo, Soundcloud, and Flickr. In particular, 9 of the top 20 news websites
rankedbyAlexaareblockedbytheGreatFirewall: forexample,CNN,NewYorkTimes,theGuardian,BBC,
Bloomberg,WallStreetJournal,andReuters.14
Thesharpestdifferencebetweenforeignnewsoutletsandtheirdomesticcounterpartslaysinthespace
of investigative journalism (Qin, Stro¨mberg, and Wu, 2016). Uncensored investigative journalism may
substantially shape readers’ knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes. Our project focuses on the censorship of
such foreign news websites that directly host information, rather than foreign social media websites that
canbestudents’sourceofinformationaswell.
2.2 Toolstobypasscensorship
Access blockage introduced by the Great Firewall can be bypassed through proxy servers or traffic data
encryption (e.g. virtual proxy network, or VPN). This technological loophole has led to the creation of
a range of censorship circumvention tools and services to aid internet users in China gaining access to
websitesthatareotherwiseblockedbytheGreatFirewall.
TherearemorethanadozenoftoolstobypasscensorshipavailabletotheChineseinternetusersatthe
time when we start the experiment. Their prices range from free of charge to no more than US$ 25 per
month, as of November 2015.15 Generally, the more expensive a tool is, the faster and more stable is its
connection, especially during periods such as the annual March meeting of the People’s Congress when
theChinesegovernmenttemporarilyshutsofftheconnectionchannelofsomeVPNservices. Thisindicates
thatwhilethegovernmentistechnologicallycapableofthoroughlydisruptingtheoperationofcensorship
circumventiontools,itchoosesnottodosoduringmajorityofthedaysintheyear.
Approximately1-8%oftheinternetusersinChinaregularlypurchasetoolstobypasscensorship.16 As
aresult,all10ofthetop10websitesintermsoftrafficinChinaasof2017aredomestic,amuchhigherratio
12SomecommontechnicalmethodsusedbytheGreatFirewallare:IPblocking,DNSfilteringandredirection,URLfiltering,packet
filtering,man-in-the-middleattack,TCPconnectionreset,andVPNblocking.
13Estimatesareprovidedbygreatfire.org,anorganizationthatmonitorstheactivitiesoftheGreatFirewall.
14ThefullAlexarankingofglobalnewswebsitescanbefoundathttp://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/News,lastaccessed
onDecember11,2016. NotallforeignwebsitesareblockedbytheGreatFirewall,andnotallblockagestartedatthesametime. For
example,whileMicrosoftBingservicesremainunblockedbytheGreatFirewallasoftoday,almostallGoogleservices(including
Googlesearch,Gmail,GoogleScholar,etc.)havebeenblockedfromaccessingbyIPaddresseslocatedinChinasince2011.TheBritish
newspaperEconomistisoneofthenewestadditiontothelist,firstblockedinApril2016duringourstudy.
15The“CircumventionCentral”fromgreatfire.orgprovidesreviewsofsomepopulartools. Similarreviewscanbefoundin
“LeapOvertheFirewall:AReviewofCensorshipCircumventionTools”publishedbytheFreedomHouse.
16Source:USCongressionalResearchReport“China,InternetFreedom,andU.S.Policy”publishedin2012,https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/row/R42601.pdf,lastaccessedonJune22,2017. ThetotalnumberofinternetusersinChinaisestimatedtobemorethan721
millionin2016. Source: InternetLiveStats,whichcompilesdatafromtheInternationalTelecommunicationUnion,WorldBank,andthe
UnitedNationsPopulationDivision,www.InternetLiveStats.com,lastaccessedonDecember11,2016.
5
comparedtothatinHongKong(4outof10),Taiwan(5outof10),andSouthKorea(3outof10).17
Legalityofbypassinginternetcensorship Asofthebeginningofourfieldexperiment,thereisnolawin
ChinaexplicitlyregulatestheusageofVPNandsimilarservicesinChina.18 Infact,officialsatthePropa-
ganda Department and the Ministry of Public Security rarely recognize the existence of the Golden Shield
Project and the Great Firewall, making public and legal discussion of usage of tools to bypass the Great
Firewallimpractical. Asaresult,manybusinesses(especiallytheforeignones)operatedinChinaarenavi-
gatinginsuchlegallygreyzone,astheyrelyonVPNtoolstoensuresecurity,confidentiality,andreliability
oftheirdatatransmission. However,theenactmentoftheCybersecurityLawinlate2016indicatesthatthe
ChinesegovernmentmaybegintotakemeasurestoregulatetheVPNmarketinthenearfuture.
Importantly, existing evidence shows that Chinese internet users, especially college students, exhibit
littlefearinusingtoolstobypasscensorship(Roberts,2016). Infact,explicitcensorshipandsalientactions
toblockinformationaccesscanbacklash—informationconsumptionmaybeactuallyincreased,similarto
theso-called“forbiddenfruiteffect”(HobbsandRoberts,2016).
3 Experimental design
WenowdescribethefieldexperimentthatweconductamonguniversitystudentsinBeijingtostudywhat
makes censorship work. In Section 3.1, we describe the experimental treatments of free provision of ac-
cess to uncensored internet, as well as the encouragement to visit foreign news outlets. We describe, in
Section3.2, theoutcomesofinterestthroughwhichweexaminehowthesetreatmentsaffectstudents’ac-
quisitionofuncensoredcontents. Inordertostudyhowtheacquireduncensoredcontentsaffectstudents,
weusethedifferencesinacquisitionofuncensoredcontentsinducedbytheexperimentaltreatmentsasthe
firststagevariation,andwemapittoabroadrangeofoutcomesofinterestsuchasknowledge,economic
beliefs,politicalattitudes,andintendedbehaviors,alldescribedinSection3.3. InSection3.4,wedescribe
the logistics of the field experiment, discussing the timeline, recruitment, treatment assignment, as well
aspanelsurveyandsampleretention. Finally, inSection3.5, wediscussissuesrelatedtointerpretingthe
informationacquisitionandsurveyoutcomes.
3.1 Accessandencouragementtreatments
Theexperimentaldesigncanbesummarizedinthefollowingfigure. Atthebaselinesurvey(priortotreat-
mentassignment),weidentifystudentswhohavealreadypurchasedandarecurrentlyusingtoolstobypass
censorship—theexistingusers. Weexcludetheminoursubsequenttreatmentassignment,butwefollow
them throughout the study since they serve as useful benchmarks to interpret the treatment effects. For
thosewhoarenotexistingusersofthecensorshipcircumventiontools,werandomlyassignthemtoeither
a control condition in which they are subject to censorship as in the status quo, or an access (A) treatment
inwhichtheyreceivefreeaccesstouncensoredinternetfor18months. Amongarandomsubgroupofthe
17Source:Alexatopwebsitesbycountry,http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries,lastaccessedonJuly15,2017.
18TherehasbeennocaseofchargesbroughtagainstChineseinternetusersforbrowsingwebsitesblockedbytheGreatFirewall.
However,activelyspreadingcontentsblockedbytheGreatFirewalltoalargegroupofpeopleisdirectlysubjecttogovernment’s
cybersecurityregulations. Therehavebeenjudiciaryactionsbroughtagainstthosecases, typicallyunderthechargesof“inciting
socialunrestandsocialturbulence”or“disruptingsocialorder.”
6
studentswhoreceivetheaccesstreatment,weinadditionassignanencouragement(E)treatmentwherewe
encouragethemtovisitforeignnewswebsitesblockedduetocensorship.
Access No access to Free access to
treatment uncensored internet uncensored internet
Encourage
-ment No Yes No Yes
treatment
Control Control + Access +
Access Existing users
(status quo) Encouragement Encouragement
Toaddressconcernssuchastheencouragementtreatmentalonegeneratesexperimenter’sdemandef-
fectorchangesstudents’perceptionongovernmentsuppression,wealsoprovidetheencouragementtreat-
menttoarandomsubgroupofstudentsinthecontrolgroup. Thesestudentsarepresentedwiththesame
encouragementtreatmentmaterial,althoughtheywouldnotbeabletoclickthroughthelinksorvisitthe
blockedwebsitesmentionedinthematerial.Formostofouranalysesthroughoutthepaper,wepoolcontrol
groupstudentswhowereandwerenotencouragedtovisitforeignnewswebsitestogetherforsimplicity.
WeexaminewhethertheencouragementaffectscontrolgroupstudentsintheAppendix.
Overall,ourexperimentcreates5groupsofstudents: (i)thecontrolgroupstudents[C];(ii)thecontrol
groupstudentswhoareencouragedtovisitforeignnewswebsites[CE];(iii)studentswhoreceiveonlythe
accesstreatment[A];(iv)studentswhoreceiveboththeaccessandtheencouragementtreatment[AE];and
(v)theexistingusers.
3.1.1 Freeaccesstouncensoredinternet
Theaccesstreatmentprovidesstudentswithafree18-monthssubscriptiontoatooltobypasscensorship.
ThetoolestablishesfastandstableconnectiontotheinternetunrestrictedbytheGreatFirewall,andenables
studentstoaccesswebsitesthatareotherwiseblocked,andtoconsumeuncensoredinformation.
We choose one of the most premium censorship circumvention tools available in China, so that unfa-
vorablefeatures(e.g. slowconnectionspeed)thatmaypreventstudentsfromusingthetoolarekepttoa
minimum. AnindividualaccountwouldcostUS$25permonthifstudentsweretopurchasedirectly,and
almostnostudentspurchasethisparticulartoolpriortoourexperiment. existingusersofcensorshipcir-
cumventiontoolspriortoexperiment. Thetoolrequireslessthan1minutestosetup,andstudentsdonot
needtosignoneachtimetheywishtobrowseuncensoredinternet—thetooloperatesineachbrowsing
sessionbydefault. Thetoolworksonbothcomputersandmobiledevices.19
Theaccesstreatmentisdistributedtoassignedstudentsintheformofabonuslotteryaftertheycom-
pletethebaselinesurvey. Weinformtreatedstudentsthatthistool,whileprovidedforfree,isofvalueUS$
25permonthandisa“professionalandsecureinternetservicethatallows[one]tobrowseinternetwebsites
aroundtheworldwithoutrestrictions,accessinformationinaspeedymanner;anditisaserviceadopted
19WedescribeafulllistoffeaturesofthetoolweprovideinAppendixB.1.
7
by many business enterprises and professionals in China.”20 Students in the treatment group are given
personal accounts for the tool, and they could activate the service and start the setup process right away,
followingdetailedinstructionsontheservicewebsite. Welimiteachaccounttosimultaneouslyoperateon
a maximum of 2 devices in order to prevent multiple students from sharing one account. We, however,
cannotruleoutthepossibilitythatstudentscanlendorselltheentireaccounttoanotherstudent.
Simultaneously,wealsodraw100studentstowinthelotteryprizeofaone-yearVIP-accountofYouku
(US$30invalue),avideostreamingserviceinChinathatissimilartoNetflix. Thisservesasaplaceboand
helpsalleviateconcernsoftheexperimenter’sdemandeffect.
3.1.2 Temporaryencouragementtovisitforeignnewsoutlets
Inadditiontoaccess, werandomlyprovidetemporaryencouragementtovisitforeignnewsoutletsinor-
der to examine students’ demand for uncensored information. The encouragement treatment consists of
avarietyofmaterialsmimickingadvertisementcampaignstopromoteforeignnewsoutlets, anditisdis-
tributed in the format of bi-weekly “newsletters” to students’ email and WeChat accounts. Students are
informedthatthesenewslettersareanintegralpartofthestudy, andwecuratecontentstohelpstudents
stayinformed.
Therearetwophasesofencouragementtreatment.21 Thereisnobetween-subjectsrandomizationinthe
orderweimplementthetwophases, andweinferhowstudentsrespondtoeachphaseoftheencourage-
mentbychangesintheirbehaviorsovertime. Notethataconfoundingfactortothisinterpretationisthe
broad time trend affecting how students respond to the encouragement that may precisely coincide with
thetimewhenweswitchencouragementtreatmentphases.
The first phase of the encouragement treatment is purely informational. It consists of 4 newsletters
introducing students to a variety of foreign websites that are blocked by the Great Firewall that students
may never hear of (e.g. the Chinese language edition of the New York Times). Moreover, it highlights to
studentsthatpoliticallysensitivenewseventsareoftenreporteddifferentlybetweendomesticnewsoutlets
andtheirforeigncounterparts.
The second phase of encouragement treatment involves news quizzes with monetary rewards. These
quizzesaimtoencouragestudentstovisittheChineseeditionoftheNewYorkTimes, awebsiteweexclu-
sivelyfocusoninordertoconcentratetheimpactofencouragementonstudents’foreignnewsconsump-
tion. We design the quizzes such that if (and only if) students visit the front page of the New York Times
Chineseedition,theycouldeasilylocatetheanswerwithinacoupleofminutes. Weimplement4roundsof
suchquizzes,andstudentsearnUS$2.5iftheyanswercorrectlyineachround.22
Theencouragementmaterialscovermanynewscontents. Inordertocapturestudents’broadinformed-
ness, we measure students’ knowledge in both the news events explicitly covered in the encouragement
20Studentscanlearnmoreaboutthecensorshipcircumventiontoolitselfandtracktheirusagestatusfromtheservicewebsite.
Weintentionallykeepthelanguageintroducingthetoolvaguetoavoidpoliticalpressurefromtheschooladministration. Almost
allparticipantsinourstudyunderstandwhatcensorshipcircumventiontoolsareandknowwhattheyareusedfor—accordingto
ourbaselinesurvey,mostofthemhaveheardofthetools,orhavepeopleintheirimmediatesocialcirclewhohavebeenusingthe
tools.WecommunicatewithparticipantsofthestudysimultaneouslyviaemailandWeChat(equivalenttoWhatsApp)messages.In
AppendixB.2,wepresentthetranslatedemailscriptinwhichweinformthetreatedstudentsoftheaccesstreatment.
21WedescribetheencouragementsenttostudentsingreaterdetailsinAppendixC.AppendixFigureA.1,A.2,andA.3present
screenshotsoftheencouragementnewsletters.
22Topicscoveredinthequizzesinclude: wealthinequality,undergroundwaterpollution,censorshiponkeyeconomicindicators,
andlaborunrest,allinthecontextofChina.
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materials,aswellasthosethatarenevermentioned. Forexample,wemeasurestudents’knowledgeonthe
episodeofthePanamaPapers,whichisnevercoveredintheencouragementtreatment.
TheencouragementtovisitforeignnewsoutletsstartsinDecember2015,simultaneouswiththedistri-
bution of the access treatment. Each phase of the encouragement lasts for 2 months. The encouragement
treatmentendsinMarch2016, 6weekspriortothemidlinesurvey.23 Inotherwords, theencouragement
treatmentistemporary,anditcreatestwodistinctperiodsduringtheexperiment: (i)fromDecember2015
toMarch2016,theencouragementtreatmentisinplaceandthevalueofvisitingforeignnewswebsitesis
boosted(especiallyduringthesecondphaseofencouragement);and(ii)fromMarch2016untiltheendof
thestudyinApril2017,theencouragementtreatmentisnolongerinplace.
3.2 Outcomes: acquisitionofuncensoredinformation
We measure the impact of access to uncensored internet on the following three categories of outcomes
relatedtostudents’mediaconsumption,inparticulartheiracquisitionofuncensoredinformation.
Browsing activities of foreign websites For students in the treatment group who have activated their
accountsofthecensorshipcircumventiontool, wedirectlyobserveallactivitiestheyperformedonlineso
long as the traffic is routed towards websites hosted outside of China. Students are informed that their
online activities are logged as part of the user agreement of the censorship circumvention tool. Based
on approximately 1.5 billion click-level activity logs recorded by the server, we construct the following 4
key outcome variables: (i) whether a student activates the tool; (ii) whether a student actively uses the
service after activation; (iii) total time spent on browsing foreign websites each day24; and (iv) total time
spentoneachcategoriesofforeignwebsitessuchastheBig-4(Google,Facebook,YouTube,Twitter),news,
entertainment,etc.25
Therearetwocaveatstothismeasurementofinformationacquisition. First,wedonotobserveonline
activities of existing users of the censorship circumvention tools, students in the control group, or those
treatedstudentswhodonotactivatethetool.Inordertocompareexposuretoforeignnewswebsitesacross
all study participants, we ask all students to report the frequency at which they visit foreign websites to
obtaininformation,repeatedlythroughouttheexperiment.26 Second,wedonotobservebrowsingactivities
onwebsiteshosteddomestically,becausethecensorshipcircumventiontoolisnotoperatedtoreroutethose
onlinetraffics. Inordertocapturethepotentialcrowd-outeffectofforeignnewsconsumptionondomestic
newswebsites,weaskstudentstoranktheimportanceintermsofinformationacquisition,amongvarious
domesticandforeignmediasources.
Decisionstopurchaseaccessafterexperimentends Theaccesstreatmentoffreesubscriptiontothecen-
sorship circumvention tool expires just before the endline survey, 18 months after the experiment starts.
23We donot explicitlyinform studentsthat thelast roundof the incentivized quiz wouldbe inmid-March. Itis unlikely that
studentscontinuetoregularlyvisitforeignnewswebsitesoutofanticipationoffuturequizzes—theycouldalwaysvisittheNewYork
Timesaftertheyarepresentedwiththespecificquizquestions.
24Weremove“passive”onlineactivitiessuchasthosegeneratedbyautomaticbackgroundrefreshes,andweremove“inactive”
browsingsessionswhereparticipantsspendmorethan30minutesonaparticularwebpagewithoutanyadditionalactivities.
25WeusetheAlexiscategorizationofdomainnames.WemanuallycategorizedomainsthatarenotcoveredbytheAlexisdatabase.
Inparticular,thecategoryoftopforeignnewswebsitesconsistsoftop20newssitesbasedonAlexisTopWebsitesrankings,excluding
newsportalssuchasYahooNewsandGoogleNews. Source:http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Top/News,lastaccessed
onJanuary8th,2017.
26Wepresenttheactualwordingsofthesequestionsalongwithothermedia-relatedoutcomesinA.1,PanelA.
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