177 CHAPTER V THE FATWĀ ON SECTARIANISM AND ITS SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS: THE CASE

76 Pages·2009·1.34 MB·English

CHAPTER V
THE FATWĀ ON SECTARIANISM AND ITS SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS: THE CASE OF AHMADIYAH AND SHI’A

A. Introduction
Apart from pluralism, liberalism and secularism, MUI has also
pronounced fatwā on religious sects within Indonesian Islam. This chapter
focuses on MUI’s fatwā on the religious status and legitimacy of Ahmadiyah
and Shi’a. These religious minority groups have been subjected to both
verbal abuse and physical violence and discrimination in recent years. A spate
of violence against them, apparently induced by religious motives has
sparked in several parts of the country against them.1 To mention some
examples,2 in June 2005, Ahmadiyah members in Parung, West Java, were
attacked by some members of certain Islamic organizations. In December
2007, mass violence targeted at Ahmadiyah members occurred in Kuningan,
also in West Java. Several months later, similar riots took place in Sukabumi
on 28 April 2008; and in 2011, the same hostility occurred to the Ahmadiyah
community in Pandeglang, West Java.3

1 The Centre for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies (CRCS), Gadjah Mada University,
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, has annually published annual report on religious life in Indonesia
since 2008. Those reports are important in providing facts, data and analysis on how religion
operates within the context of Indonesian society. It also provides records on
religiously-inspired violence throughout Indonesia. For more information see
http://crcs.ugm.ac.id.
2 Extensive discussion on social impact of the fatwa, especially in relation to faith-based
violence will be presented in Chapter 5 on Ahmadiyah and Shi’a.
3 Ahmadiyah is basically not a new Islamic group in Indonesia. Its presence is even earlier
than the founding of the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama’, which
was founded in 1926. For more detailed discussion on Ahmadiyah in Indonesia, please refer
to Iskandar Zulkarnain, Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2005). See
also Ahmad Gaus AF, Sang Pelintas Batas: Biografi Djohan Effendi (Jakarta: ICRP and
Kompas, 2009), 216-223.
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Other than the Ahmadiyah, the Shi’a, another minority group, has also
been subject to pejorative labelling, threats and demonization based on the
perception that the group has deviated from Islam’s basic tenets. While the
matter of freedom of belief or faith is upheld as a fundamental legal principle
in many advanced societies, in countries such as Indonesia those who are
alleged as deviants and spoilers of the religion could be prosecuted as was the
case with the Shi’a in Sampang, Madura. In 2012, a Shi’a cleric in Sampang
was legally sanctioned by local Sunni leaders under the charge of spreading
heretical interpretations of Islam. Furthermore, Sunni leaders in Madura also
pushed the provincial government of East Java to ban Shi’a through a formal
provincial regulation in order to prevent the spread of the teachings of Shi’a.4
Controversy again arose when violence against Shi’a sparked once more in
August and September 2012, when a number of Shi’a followers were tortured
and their lives were threatened. Some of them were killed and their homes
and properties were burnt.5
This unfortunate spate of sectarian conflicts and tensions appeared to
have been induced by religiously-motivated conflicts which arose around or
after the proclamation of fatwā by MUI bearing on the status of these
religious minorities or sects. Although it cannot be conclusively established if
these violent attacks targeted at both the Shi’a and Ahmadiyah were indeed
caused by the fatwā, it cannot be denied that as a religious legal ruling or

4 http://www.setara-institute.org/en/content/
officials-turn-blind-eye-religious-tensions-rise-indonesia, accessed on August 27, 2012. In
January 2012, Indonesian Cleric Council or Majelis Ulama Indonesia, East Java Province has
issued a fatwa that declared Shi’ah as “sesat dan menyesatkan” (deviant and deviated from
Islamic teaching). The fatwa is stated in Keputusan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI)
Prop. Jawa Timur No. Kep-01/SKF-MUI/JTM/I/2012.
5 “Serangan Laknat Lebaran Ketupat”, Tempo weekly magazine, 9 September 2012, p.
100-101.
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opinion, fatwā is highly persuasive and exert strong influence on Muslims’
religious life and understanding. Its proclamation on the deviance status of
these sects cannot be isolated from the conflicts even if did not cause them. It
is also pertinent to note that no further fatwā were issued following the
escalation of violence in those specific locations. In fact, MUI in East Java
province even justified the fatwā against Shi’a as necessary to arrest what it
perceived to be sectarianism-induced conflicts prevalent in that district. The
fatwā targeted against these groups cannot be said to ease or quell suspicions
and deep hostility against them harboured by some Indonesians. While there
is a need to avoid overgeneralizing the fatwā as the cause of violence and
aggression against these groups, the fatwā nonetheless cannot be delinked
completely from the tensions and attacks against them.
In this chapter, I will examine the possible factors conditioning MUI’s
fatwā on Ahmadiyah and Shi’a and the modes of religious thought that
characterise its making. Competing views and orientations amongst
Indonesian Muslims in response to the fatwā will also be examined. The
chapter will also analyse the ramifications of the fatwā on Ahmadiyah and
Shi’a communities

B. Ahmadiyah and its Genesis in Indonesia
The Ahmadiyah sect is a fast growing international revivalist movement
within Islam with followers spreading across 200 countries around the
globe.6 Historically, it was started by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in Qadian, a

6 http://www.alislam.org/introduction/index.html, accessed on September 1, 2013. See also
Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmood Ahmad, Ahmadiyyat or The True Islam (Islamabad: Islam
International Publication, 2007).
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village in Punjab Province, India sometime in 1888. In the context of
imperialism and the socio-economic backwardness of the Muslims in India,
the movement attempted to reform Muslim society based on a particular
theology and religious doctrine.7 From the outset of its birth, the doctrine
and tenets of this sect have aroused controversies among Muslim societies,
especially in India and later the rest of the Muslim world.8 Ghulam Ahmad
led Ahmadiyah up to his demise in 1908, after which the leadership of the
movement was succeeded by his faithful disciple, Hazrat Maulana Hakeem
Nuruddin. Subsequently, in 1914 Ghulam Ahmad’s son Mirza Bashiruddin
Mahmud Ahmad reigned leadership of the movement. During this period, the
movement split into two groups following irreconcilable internal disputes
among its members.9 Bashiruddin became the leader of one group of
Ahmadiyah currently known as “Qadiani Ahmadiyah” or internationally
known as “Ahmadiyya Muslim Community” centred in London.10 The other
group was led by Muhammad Ali who left Qadian for Lahore and developed
the “Lahore Ahmadiyah” or “The Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam”

7 The original name of the village was Islampur. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s ancestors were
religious elite of the area, and said to be moved from Persia due to family dissension. The
ruling monarch granted his ancestors a power over administrating religious affairs, this
position is known as Qadi. Then, Islampur was popularly known as Islampur Qadi Majjhi
which by the passage of the time was called in a shorten name as Qadi and later Qadian. See
Muhammad Ali, The Ahmadiyya Movement I: Founder (Lahore: Colured Printing Press,
1918), 1-2; and Bashiruddin Mahmood Ahmad, Ahmadiyyat or The True Islam (Islamabad:
Islam International Publication, 2007), 5-8.
8 Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmood Ahmad, Ahmadiyyat or The True Islam (Islamabad: Islam
International Publication, 2007), 5.
9 See Fatkhurrahman Ahmadi Djajasugita, Benarkah Ahmadiyah Sesat? (Yogyakarta:
Penerbit Darul Kutubil Islamiyah Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia, 2007), iv.
10 The official website of this movement is www.alislam.org. Following the partition of
India into two separated countries of India and Pakistan, the center of Qadiani Ahmadiyah
moved to Rabwah, Pakistan as Punjab, where Qadian locates, belong to India. However, in
1947, when Ahmadiyah was denounced as non-Muslim minority by Pakistani government,
the centre of this movement was moved to London.
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(Ahmadiyah Anjuman Isha’at-e-Islam Lahore).11 According to Fathurrahman
Ahmadi Djajasoegita, the leader of Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (GAI), the
proponent of Lahore Ahmadiyah in Indonesia, the most fundamental issue
leading to this split is the distortion of Ahmadiyah teachings by Bashiruddin.
The distortions include the claim of prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad
and the creed of takfīr i.e. the denouncement of those who do not believe in
his prophethood as kāfir or unbelievers12 Moreover, Djajasoegita also claims
that Bashiruddin subscribed to view that the founder was a khalīfah (caliph)
similar to the khalīfah rashīdah (the four rightly-guided caliphs in early
period of Islam). These doctrines, according to Djajasoegita, are
misleading. 13 The split marked significant internal conflict within
Ahmadiyah which entails not only a conflict of its fundamental teachings, but
also the complexity of the historical dynamics of the movement along with
the evolution of diversity of thought and doctrine within it. Consequently, it
is not surprising that both the Qadian and Lahore Ahmadiyah groups have
built their own narratives of the split to support the validity of their
positions.14 The dissention persists up to present day, and both groups
continue to maintain the organizations, doctrines, and teachings in their
respective ways.
The main controversy surrounding Ahmadiyah by mainstream Muslim
religious authorities is the understanding that its tenets and doctrines
contradict the basic teachings of Islam. Amongst these, the most controversial

11 The official website of this movement is www.aaiil.org
12 Djajasugita, Benarkah Ahmadiyah Sesat, iii.
13 Ibid, iii.
14 Muhammad Ali, The Ahmadiyya Movement IV: The Split (Lahore: Coloured Printing Press,
1918), 9-10.
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is the position of Ghulam Ahmad as the Promised Messiah and Mahdi.
Others include his claim as the reincarnation of Jesus who was given the title
al-Masīh (“one who finds God”) and his position as the manifestation of the
promise of God through Prophet Muhammad’s hadīth that a guided reformer
will be sent to man in their darkest moment. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was also
believed to have announced that he is Jesus and also Muhammad at once.
They also claim that the Ahmadis have their own scripture other than the
Qur’ān. These beliefs have led religious authorities of mainstream Islam in
many Muslim countries to denounce Ahmadiyah as a non-Muslim sect or
kāfir,15 as exemplified in the case of Pakistan,16 Saudi Arabia and some
other Islamic countries. The stance against them has been employed by MUI
to support its fatwā against Ahmadiyah.17
These claims have been refuted by the dissenting faction within the
Ahmadi sect. They assert that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad never made the claim
that he was a Messiah or Prophet and in fact rejected any such accusations,
even if many of his statements may be literally understood in that way. As
Muhammad Ali, the second Hazraat Ameer of Lahore Ahmadiyah, in a
manifesto published on 2nd October 1891 in Delhi asserted that Mirza
Ghulam Ahmad rejected the accusation that he has declared himself as a
nabi.18 It was further maintained that he had also declared that he is not a

15 For example, see Wahbah Musthafa al-Zuhaili, “Masyairi wa Hukumi ala Thaifah
al-Qadiyaniyah”, Preface in Syaikh Mandzur Ahmad, al-Ushul al-Dzahabiyah fi Raddi ala
al-Qadiyaniyyah (Mecca: al-Maktabah al-Imdadiyah, 1428 AH), 12.
16 The declaration of Ahmadiyah as non-Muslim minority in Pakistan was published after
unanimous vote of the Senate and National Assembly of Pakistan on 7 September 1974.
Praise is often addressed to Prime Minister Ali Bhutto for his firm stand on this issue.
17 Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad, Invitation to Ahmadiyyat (Rabwah: Ahmadiyya
Muslim Foreign Missions Office, 1961), 1.
18 Muhammad Ali, The Ahmadiyya Movement I: The Founder (Lahore: Coloured Printing
Press, 1918), 21-22.
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prophet but a muḥaddath, that is one who is spoken to by God. In refuting his
opponents’ claim that Mirza Ghulam’s idea of muḥaddath is not completely
separated from the concept of prophethood since a muḥaddath must have
certain qualities of a prophet, Muhammad Ali maintained that such a claim
should not be equated with prophethood.19 He also maintained that Ghulam
Ahmad has also made the distinction between the concept of muḥaddath and
nabi and explained that the word nabi is used in its metaphorical sense to
mean muḥaddath or mujaddid (the reformer).20
Moreover, detailed explanation of the concept of prophethood
(nubuwwat) by Ghulam Ahmad have been uncovered to justify that the
meanings attributed to them actually mean appearances or manifestations of
some qualities of prophethood in a person who is not a prophet.21
Muhammad Ali elucidated that nubuwwat zilli or zill nubuwwat means
shadow of the Real Prophet.22 In the same vein, Djajasoegita in his book
Anwar al-Islam asserted that Ghulam Ahmad had stated that he never
rejected the Holy Qur’an as the book of Allah, Muhammad as a Prophet; or
affirmed that he was a Prophet. The allegation that Ahmadiyah had also
declared that there exist some distortions and addition to the Qur’ān was also
denied.23 Generally, members of Ahmadiyah also believe that Ghulam
Ahmad had neither declared a new religion nor innovated one. They strongly
reject the classification of Ahmadiyah as non-Muslim, and insist that

19 Ibid, 23.
20 Ibid, 24.
21 Ibid, 46.
22 Muhammad Ali, Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (The Promised Messiah) and the Finality
of Prophethood (Lahore: The Ahmadiyya Anjuman-I-Isha’at-I—Islam, n.d.), iii.
23 Fathurrahman Ahmadi Djajasugita, Benarkah Ahmadiyah Sesat?, 3.
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Ahmadis are Muslims, and embrace Islam as their religion.24 Paradoxically,
however, while insisting on the unity of Islam and identifying themselves as
no different from other Muslims who follow different ideologies, in many
ways Ahmadi thinkers and leaders frequently attempt to distinguish Ahmadis
from any other Muslims,25 which only strengthens the assumption that they
are outside the fold of Islam by those who are hostile to them.26
In the Indonesian context, the existence of Ahmadiyah is basically as old
as the established Islamic organizations such as the two largest Islamic
groups, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama’ (NU) founded in 1912 and
1926 respectively. Its arrival in the archipelago can be traced back to the
pre-independence period although the precise date of its coming is
inconclusive. According to Qadiani or Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia’s (JAI)
version, Ahmadiyah reached Indonesia sometime in 1925 through the efforts
of Rahmat Ali from India who disseminated Ahmadiyah teachings in
Tapaktuan in the western coast of Aceh. It was believed that he was able to
attract the interest of some local people, although many had rejected his new
teachings.27 Ali’s arrival was followed by other Ahmadi missionaries from
India and Pakistan. He later left Aceh for Java sometime in 1931. In Jakarta,
he successfully attracted other followers. Subsequently, the Ahmadiyah board

24 Karimullah Zirvi, Welcome to Ahmadiyyat: The True Islam (United States: Ahmadiyya
Muslim Jamaat, 2010), 51. See also Nanang RI Iskandar, Fatwa MUI dan Gerakan
Ahmadiyah Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Darul Kutubil Islamiyah, 2005), especially Chapter 3;
and Mulyono, “Siapakah yang Disebut Muslim?” online article can be accessed through this
link: http://ahmadiyah.org/siapakah-yang-disebut-muslim/
25 Bashiruddin Mahmood Ahmad, Ahmadiyyat or The True Islam (Islamabad: Islam
International Publication, 2007), 9. See also Anonymous, “Ahmadiyya Muslim Community:
An Overview”, http://www.alislam.org/introduction/index.html
26 For example see M. Amin Djamaluddin, Ahmadiyah Menodai Islam: Kumpulan Fakta
dan Data (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam, 2007); M. Amin Djamaluddin,
Ahmadiyah Membajak al-Qur’an (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam, 2000).
27 Interview with Dodi Kurniawan, Tasikmalaya, 26 May 2013.
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in Jakarta was established in 1932 with only 27 members.28 Legally, the
existence of Ahmadiyah is recognized by Indonesian law. It was granted the
status as a social organization and institution in 1953 by the Ministry of
Justice of the Republic and the Directorate of the Relations of Political
Institutions (75/D.I./VI/2003).29
It should be noted that the split within the Ahmadiayah sect is also
reflected in the history of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. The Qadiani Ahmadiyah’s
following is identified with Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) currently
centred in Bogor, West Java. The Lahore Ahmadiyah, on the other hand,
known as Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (GAI) takes Yogyakarta as the
centre of its activities.30 While the Qadiani Ahmadiyah started in Sumatera,
the Lahore Ahmadiyah came into contact with the pribumi for the first time
in Yogyakarta, Java Island. Asvi Warman Adam, a leading Indonesian
historian from Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of
Sciences), noted that two Lahore Ahmadiyah missionaries, Maulana Ahmad
and Mirza Wali Ahmad Baig visited Yogyakarta in 1924 to attend the
National Congress (Muktamar) of Muhammadiyah.31 It was recorded that
they were welcomed by the Muhammadiyah Central Board and were given
the opportunity to deliver talks about Islam, especially on the position of
Jesus within Ahmadiyah doctrine.32 The visit seemed to have been impactful,
as four years later, in 1928, a leading figure of Muhammadiyah, Raden

28 Zainal Abidin EP, Syarif Ahmad Saitama Lubis: Dari Ahmadiyah untuk Bangsa
(Yogyakarta: Logung Pustaka, 2007), 267-294.
29 A. Yogaswara, Heboh Ahmadiyah: Mengapa Ahmadiyah Tidak Langsung Dibubarkan?
(Yogyakarta: Narasi, 2008), 82.
30 The official website of GAI is www.ahmadiyah.org
31 Asvi Warman Adam, “Belajar dari Sejarah Ahmadiyah”, Indo Pos, 24 April 2008.
32 http://ahmadiyah.org/gerakan-ahmadiyah-indonesia/sejarah-singkat-gai/, accessed on 2
September 2013.
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Ngabehi Djojosoegito (1889-1966) founded Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia,
the Lahore Ahmadiyah branch in Indonesia. In addition to being an activist of
Muhammadiyah, Djojosoegito is the cousin of Hasyim Asy’ari (1871-1947)
and Wahab Hasbullah (1888-1971), the founding-fathers of Nahdlatul Ulama’
(NU). Furthermore, Adam also maintained that Irfan Dahlan (b. 1907), the
son of Ahmad Dahlan (1868-1923), the founding-father of Muhammadiyah,
was also on the board of Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (GAI).33 In addition,
in 1925, four Muhammadiyah youths including Irfan Dahlan, were sent to
Lahore to study Islam. Many sources, however, maintained that Irfan not only
studied, but also served as an Ahmadi missionary who was later sent to
Thailand to spread this movement. This historical narrative of the relationship
between Ahmadiyah and mainstream Islam groups was perhaps intended to
reveal the peaceful co-existence of the sect with other Islamic groups,
especially Muhammadiyah, in the pre-independence period.34
While for a relatively long period the narrative of Irfan’s involvement in
Ahmadiyah which marked the close relationship between Ahmadiyah and
Muhammadiyah was assumed as a historical fact by most Indonesian
Muslims, it is currently disputed by his family. In a correspondence between
Winai Dahlan, a son of Irfan, an academic at Chulalongkorn University and
Ahmad Najib Burhani, a researcher of Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia
(LIPI), and a young scholar in Muhammadiyah, the former firmly rejected his
father’s association with Ahmadiyah. He maintained that though it was true

33 Ibid.
34 For discussion on the relationship of Muhammadiyah and Ahmadiyah, please refer to
Iskandar Zulkarnain, Gerakan Ahmadiyah (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2005), especially Chapter VI.
See also Herman L Beck, “The rupture between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya,”
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Vol. 161, No. 2/3 (2005), pp. 210-246.
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