1 HM Majeed Religion and the Problem of Rationality, Insights from Akan Religious Thought pp1-22

22 Pages·2015·0.13 MB·English

Religion and the Problem of Rationality: Insights from
Akan Religious Thought
H.M. Majeed
Department of Philosophy and Classics
University of Ghana
[email protected] OR [email protected]

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/tp.v6i2.2

Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya (PAK)
New Series, Vol.6 No.2, December 2014, pp.1-22
[email protected]
http://ajol.info/index.php/tp/index
ISSN: 2076-7714
2 H.M. Majeed

Abstract
Arguments against the practice of religion and, in general, against belief in metaphysical
entities, have been made in different cultures and at different times in human history. This
article, however, does not offer a historical outline of such arguments. Rather, it reflects on
some contemporary remarks made, especially in Western thought, against religion. It
illustrates how a correct understanding of Traditional Akan Religion renders untrue claims
that seek to dismiss religion on the grounds of irrationality. Utilising philosophical reflection,
it shows how rational belief in a Traditional African Religion such as the Akan one is.
Key Words
Rationality, revelation, logical positivism, predestination, free will, Akan religion, African
religion
Introduction
In some Western conceptions, religion is deemed to be devoid of any rational basis. Such
conceptions appear to hinge on the way religion (specifically Judeo-Christianity) is practised
in Western culture. This religion, which is the dominant one in the West, is viewed as having
originated from a God whose existence cannot be scientifically proved, and who “revealed”
Himself to humans as an object of worship; and, that the principles of that religion were
brought to humankind through an intermediary (Jesus Christ). Humankind, in this case, did
not find - or better still, did not rationally discover - religion, but was given religion.
Religion, then, is generally portrayed by anti-religionists as irrational. Nevertheless, this
article seeks to show that by ‘irrationality’ critics often have in mind the idea that religious
beliefs have one or more of the following features:
• They are unscientific.
• Even when they are said to be based on ‘reason’ (as in natural religion), they cannot
lead to salvation.
• The language with which they are expressed is meaningless.
Religion and the Problem of Rationality: Insights from Akan Religious Thought 3
• They are often inconsistent.
I argue against the rejection of religion on the basis of the four points listed above, and
explain how some beliefs held in Traditional Akan Religion1 makes my position tenable. I
show how the Akan perspective differs from the views of specific Western scholars, and how
it withstands their criticisms.
On the Nature and Origin of Traditional Akan Religion
The issue of what the true nature of Traditional African Religion is - that is, whether its moral
values or the religion itself has a human or supernatural origin - has for a long time been a
subject of debate among scholars.2 With regard to the origin of Traditional African Religion,
Akan religion included, one view is that its origin is implicit in its naturalness. The opposite
view is that the supernatural origin of the religion is implied by its revealed nature. In recent
times, Pius Abioje and Kwame Gyekye have expressed these two divergent views. While
Abioje holds that Traditional African Religion is not natural but is revealed (Abioje 2007,
149-150), Gyekye suggests that Akan thinkers postulate that Akan religion has a human
origin, devoid of any divine revelation (Gyekye 1996, 5). Indeed, my own studies and
knowledge of the Akan culture corroborates Gyekye’s position. The heavy concentration of
Akan religion on the usefulness of religion to human life on earth, as well as the absence of
oral or written history about God’s expression of His own will and identity to humans,
constitute ample evidence that the religion is not revealed. The significance of all this is that
Abioje’s generalized assertion about Africa is quite mistaken.
However, Traditional Akan Religion is replete with beliefs that are related to the
supernatural. There are key Akan beliefs concerning entities such as God (Nyame), the deities

1 Throughout this work, I will refer to indigenous Akan religion as “Traditional Akan Religion”, not “traditional
Akan religion”. This is to ensure that the name of the religion is written in a manner consistent
with the way other religions are written. When the names of such religions are spelt, the initial
capital letter is used, and I have done the same for this religion because its status is similar to the
others and, as Soyinka (2004) would agree, deserves equal treatment. When, from my
observations on Akan religion I speak occasionally of Traditional African Religion, I do not imply
that no differences exist in terms of religious belief and practice among African peoples; rather, I
only endorse the well-known fact that they share a lot in common - especially in terms of the
points discussed in this article - to warrant some sort of general description.
2 Find debate on the origin of African moral values in Idowu 1962, 146; Opoku 1978, 152, 153;
Quarcoopome1987, 162-163; Wiredu 1980, 5-6.
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(abosom) and, to use Mbiti’s expression, the living-dead (nananom nsamanfo). There is also
the moral belief that there are consequences for human actions on earth, with good actions
attracting good consequences and bad actions attracting bad consequences. Nevertheless,
since these consequences are very often expected to be felt in the practical lives of humans
here on earth, it would be inappropriate to assume that Traditional Akan Religion is entirely
supernaturalistic.
Traditional Akan Religion, from the foregoing, appears to have a human origin, having been
rationally developed for the benefit of humankind. Yet some philosophers, especially
Western ones, have argued against the rationality of all religions. In this work, I seek to show
that such criticisms do not apply to Traditional Akan Religion; and since the criticisms are
made from the perspective of Christianity, responding to them naturally requires that I
contrast Traditional Akan beliefs with Christian ones at various points in the discussion.
On the Meaning of ‘Religious Beliefs’
Every religious tradition is founded on a set of core beliefs that are often about the
supernatural realm. In the understanding of Wittgenstein, a religious belief is not an ‘opinion’
of its holder but a sort of ‘dogma or faith’; and that, in matters concerning religious belief or,
generally, in religious discourse, ‘[w]e don’t talk about hypothesis, or about high probability.
Nor about knowing’ (Wittgenstein 1966, 3). This seems to suggest that Wittgenstein would
consider statements that express religious beliefs neither as scientific conclusions (or
confirmable truths), nor as claims about things that can be known. Thus belief in such things
as resurrection and the last judgement - both Christian beliefs which he pays significant
attention to in the work cited above - as well as indigenous Akan belief in the existence and
religious significance of the living-dead to the community would be seen by him as mere
dogmas. Yet a dogma is usually understood as a religious doctrine that is proclaimed as true
without ‘proof’.3 I acknowledge, however, that Wittgenstein’s critique of the idea of taking
something to be true without knowing if it indeed is, is made in connection with the Christian
religion within whose context he appears to undertake his reflections, but not with a religion
such as the Traditional Akan one; and by so doing, he seems to imply that the Christian
beliefs mentioned above cannot be proved by their holders themselves to be true in the

3 Later in the essay, the idea that strict ‘proof’ ensures rationality is questioned.
Religion and the Problem of Rationality: Insights from Akan Religious Thought 5
manner suggested by him. By virtue of that criterion, Wittgenstein’s remark could
nonetheless apply to Traditional Akan Religion. Another word used by Wittgenstein to
describe religious belief is ‘faith’. However, since faith could be understood as a religious
belief system, it is, I think, quite an appropriate term in this context.
Wittgenstein’s analysis of religious belief is interesting. For instance, although he claims that
he does not believe in resurrection, he maintains that he does not thereby contradict the
person who does. The claims ‘I do not believe in a future resurrection of the human being’
and ‘I do believe in a future resurrection of the human being’ are, according to him, not
contradictory. This, for Wittgenstein, is because he is neither suggesting the impossibility of
the resurrection nor claiming that the believer has no reason for supposing it: all he means is
that he is not sure about the resurrection (Wittgenstein 1966, 1). This indicates that the word
‘believe’ as used by Wittgenstein here implies some sort of assurance or certainty about
having knowledge, although in some cases he suggests (by it) to have ‘faith’ or ‘dogma’. For
instance, he remarks of belief in the last judgement: ‘how are we to know whether to say he
[the religious practitioner] believes [that is, knows or is certain that] this will happen or not?
Asking him is not enough. He will probably say he has proof. But he has what you might call
an unshakable belief [faith]’ (Wittgenstein 1966, 1; words in square brackets added).
However, Wittgenstein’s restriction of the distinct senses of ‘believe’ to the two parties
inadvertently calls into question the demand often made by critics of religion that the
religious practitioner must know, that is, he/she must know something about his or her beliefs
for them to be rational; for, by Wittgenstein’s own argument, faith or dogma is not
knowledge.
Furthermore, Wittgenstein’s point about the absence of contradiction in the two statements
concerning belief in resurrection appears to serve a strategic end for him: he seems to stress
this point for logical reasons; for if a religious practitioner proclaims ‘I believe in a future
resurrection of the human being’ and Wittgenstein states ‘I do not believe in a future
resurrection of the human being’, and these statements are understood respectively as ‘I have
faith that there is human resurrection’ and ‘I have faith that there is no human resurrection’,
Wittgenstein would not be able to criticize entirely the one he is opposing because, logically,
both of them would have to first acknowledge that the idea of ‘resurrection’ is meaningful
before affirming or denying its existence. Nevertheless, this clever move also lands
Wittgenstein in some difficulty because by claiming that neither he nor the religious
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practitioner is certain about the truth of religious beliefs, he (Wittgenstein) is still not better
placed - in the acquisition of knowledge - than the religious practitioner from whom he tries
to distinguish himself.
The question still remains whether or not religious belief can be rational. However, before
this issue is discussed further, an important distinction needs to be made, namely, the
distinction between supernaturalism, a term I have already used a number of times in this
article, and superstition.
By ‘supernaturalism’ I mean the view that there is a reality beyond the natural world, where
by ‘natural world’ is meant the physical realm - one which can be investigated using
scientific means. In its primal sense therefore, supernaturalism is an orientation or a
disposition and, in some sense, a worldview. It is tempting to see this orientation or belief as
simply religious since, with it, humans are able to postulate the existence of God, deities, the
living-dead and all sorts of metaphysical entities that are either worshipped or revered or
both. However, not all postulations of the supernatural are religious. Indeed, it is possible to
argue that a person has a spirit without placing any religious significance on it. Thus although
claims about all supernatural entities or events are neither scientifically testable nor provable,
the non-religious nature of some supernatural (human) experiences cannot be ignored. In
sum, the supernatural includes any experience, action or event that cannot be explained by
what are referred to as the laws of science.
Superstition, on the other hand, is any belief that is not based on knowledge or reason. By
definition then, superstition is irrational and is rejected by science not only because anything
dependent on it is incapable of empirical observation, but also because it lacks rational
justification. This is where it is distinct from supernaturalism: while superstition is always
irrational, supernaturalism could be rational. It is consistent with the preceding statement to
hold that a belief in the supernatural could become superstitious, especially if nothing that
resembles good argument could be offered for that belief. It is for this reason that Kwasi
Wiredu (1980, 42) described some traditional African beliefs as “no better than superstition”.
It is therefore possible for some beliefs, practices and arguments for the supernatural to be
unintelligible, or even unhelpful to humans. For instance, while belief in a metaphysical deity
who is infinite and finite is logically flawed, the view that people should pursue the will of a
transempirical deity even when it leads to or encourages oppression of our neighbours would
Religion and the Problem of Rationality: Insights from Akan Religious Thought 7
be inhuman. Thus, this article’s argument for the rationality of supernaturalism cannot
connote a blanket justification of anything supernatural.
On the Alleged Irrationality of Religious Beliefs
Various arguments have been advanced in support of the view that religion is irrational. Four
of such arguments are examined in this section, namely, science and religious belief, reason
and salvation, meaninglessness of religious language, and inconsistencies in religious beliefs.
Science and Religious Belief
Lara Buchak (2012, 18), in an attempt to establish the sense in which the rationality of faith
can most appropriately be determined, makes a distinction between epistemic and practical
rationality. Epistemic rationality, in her view, is when ‘you proportion your belief to the
evidence and your beliefs must be coherent (in other words, your credences must obey the
probability calculus)’ - that is to say, ‘degrees of probability obey the probability calculus’
when ‘[you] update [your] beliefs by conditionalizing on new evidence.’ On the other hand,
practical rationality involves ‘selecting the means to achieving one’s ends’ such that the
means that help you most in achieving those ends are the most rational choices to make
(Buchak 2012, 18). Buchak affirms, on the grounds of practical utility, that faith can be
rational.
However, Buchak’s position stands in sharp contrast with the views of many Western
philosophers who completely reject religious beliefs in various ways. For instance,
Wittgenstein rejects belief in God for not yielding to objective criteria and for not being
something he could be sure about (Wittgenstein 1966, 1), while other philosophers such as
Daniel Dennett (2008) and Richard Dawkins (2007) outrightly deny the existence of God. In
a manner consistent with the position of Dennett and Dawkins, Robin Horton maintains that
faith, and for that matter belief in God, is irrational, stressing that it can in no way be
supported by reason (Horton 1960, 222). In fact, Horton and his counterparts criticize
religious beliefs for not meeting the scientific criterion of rationality. It is also worth noting
that Wittgenstein does not only endorse the scientific criterion of testing beliefs, but also
asserts that the word ‘God’ does not correspond to any mental ‘picture’ (or thought) in his
mind, as he cannot also confirm any ‘evidence’ produced by the practitioner of religion:
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If I even vaguely remember what I was taught about God, I may say:
‘Whatever believing God may be, it can’t be believing in something we can
test, or find means of testing.’ You may say: ‘This is nonsense, because people
say they believe on religious experiences.’ I would say: ‘The mere fact that
someone says they believe on evidence doesn’t tell me enough for me to be
able to say now whether I can say of a sentence “God exists” that your
evidence is unsatisfactory or insufficient’ (Wittgenstein 1966, 5).
Before I continue with the issue of testing (or science), it is important that I make a comment
on Wittgenstein’s statement that people ‘believe on religious experience’. In Traditional
Akan Religion, while religious experience cannot be said not to exist, religious experience (in
many respects) is not really the reason why one postulates the existence of God. One does not
‘see’ a being and conclude that it is God or ‘hear’ a voice and conclude that it is God’s, nor is
it held in Akan thought that God is experienced in nature. It is quite odd for an Akan to say
m’ahu Nyame (I have seen God) or Nyame aka akyerε me sε … (God has told me that …).
Religious experience in the manner just described, however, does apply to some other
spiritual entities such as the deities (abosom) and the living-dead (nananom nsamanfo).
Traditional Akan Religion is naturalistic, as noted by Gyekye (1996, 5). This means that the
originators of this religion engaged in some reflection about the universe, the things which
they believed were contained in the universe (both physical and spiritual), the workings and
the relations among the said things before coming up with the idea of God (Nyame). Nyame is
conceived of as a being who is completely supernatural (sunsum) and a creator (bōrebōre).
He is not regarded as part of his creation, that is, he is not considered to be part of nature. Yet
the contrary is sometimes intended when it is claimed in some non-Akan religions that God is
experienced in nature.
Traditional Akan Religion, and for that matter African religion as a whole, is essentially
oriented toward enhancing the well-being of humankind. To this end, it is as effective as the
human being feels it is. This implies that religious beliefs (such as belief in God) are intended
to be practically useful. The deities, it is believed, are intermediaries between God and human
beings, bringing to humankind goods from God. According to Gyekye (1996, 16),
practitioners of African religion have in the past deserted some deities for not meeting the
needs of the people. Non-performance could still cause deities to suffer the same fate today;
and the seriousness with which lack of utility is confronted suggests, at the least, that
religious belief could be the most efficacious way of solving some of the problems faced by
human beings. In this sense, religious belief could be rational, especially if ‘rational’ here is
Religion and the Problem of Rationality: Insights from Akan Religious Thought 9
understood in line with Buchak’s position on practical rationality - which is that one chooses
the best means to achieving one’s ends.
Let us then return to the issue of science and religion. As earlier noted, from the arguments of
some Western philosophers above, in religious traditions such as Christianity where
revelation is the main source of religious beliefs - about God, resurrection of humans, the last
day, heaven and hell, among others - the rejection of those beliefs for their apparent lack of
rational basis is partly done on the assumption that one cannot rely on science (and thus one’s
own rational faculty) to come up with these beliefs and also to come to a firm conclusion that
they are true;4 and, that in the face of what could be regarded as ‘inconclusive evidence’,
reason requires that one rejects such beliefs. Nevertheless, is it always the case that certainty
is required for beliefs or statements expressing beliefs to be rational? If this question could be
answered in the affirmative, many scientific assumptions (and, a bit more generally, science
itself) would not be rational. This is due to the fact that it is a virtue of science that it does not
regard its claims to constitute absolute knowledge. I do not suggest that there is no truth in
science; instead, my point is that beliefs and assumptions lead to different degrees of
certainty, so that neither science nor religion guarantees certainty.5
The foregoing does not imply that the question of uncertainty associated with religious claims
does not arise in Traditional Akan Religion in which revelation is absent. After all, it has
supernatural beliefs which science cannot investigate. Philosophers of science would most
likely reject Akan religious beliefs in the living-dead and the deities as lacking ‘rational’
(scientific) basis. Nevertheless, I have explained above how rational Traditional Akan
Religion is, being a natural religion, with its beliefs (such as belief in God) having a rational
basis. This challenge to the views of the critic is enhanced by Buchak’s argument for the
practical rationality of faith:
…, whether faith is rational depends on the kind of world we are in. Faith will
be rational to the extent that evidence isn’t ordinarily very conclusive, or to the
extent that our decisions usually do have postponement costs. We won’t be
able to vindicate the claim that faith is rational regardless of the
circumstances. But we can explain why having faith is rational in certain

4 Jarvie and Agassi (1979, 173-5) share this view.
5 Robert Winston (2008) holds a similar view. Further arguments against testing (or science) are made shortly in
my discussion of Logical Positivism.
10 H.M. Majeed
worlds, perhaps worlds like ours … Individuals who lack faith because they
insist on gathering all of the available evidence before making a decision stand
to miss out on opportunities that could greatly benefit them (Buchak 2012,
35).
Thus despite all its uncertainties, religious faith may not only be rational to have, but could
also be profitable to humankind, just as we earlier observed about Traditional Akan Religion.
Indeed, as mentioned earlier (and Buchak would agree), religious beliefs can be irrationally
used. There are times when religious beliefs are put to bad use. In recent African history,
terrorism and violent conflicts are vices that beg to be mentioned. Perpetrators of the violent
attacks in Northern Uganda claim to be inspired by Christian teachings, while planners and
executors of the Nairobi Westgate Mall attack in 2013, and the ongoing terrorist acts in
Northern Nigeria claim to be inspired by Islamic doctrine. By their nature, such attacks are
unexpected, and probably the more reason why they come along with such terrible
consequences. Furthermore, several conflicts in Africa, especially political ones, have
religious undertones (Akrong 2003, 37).
In spite of the foregoing observations about the negative effects of religion, it would be quite
incorrect to suggest, as Dennett does, that the world would be better without religion or
religious beliefs. He gives the following reasons:
(a) We are quick to condemn other outrages, but religious passion, genuine or
feigned, shields people from the moral judgments of their fellow human
beings, judgments to which we should all alike be subject …
(b) True, you don’t have to be religious to be crazy but it helps. Indeed, if you
are religious, you don’t have to be crazy in the medically certifiable sense
in order to do massively crazy things. And - this is the worst of it -
religious faith can give people a sort of hyperbolic confidence, an utter
unconcern about whether they might be making a mistake, that enables
acts of inhumanity that would otherwise be unthinkable...
(c) The better is the enemy of the best: religion may make people better, but it
is preventing them from being as good as they could be. If only we could
transfer all that respect, loyalty and intense devotion from an imaginary
being - God - to something real: the wonderful world of goodness we and
our ancestors have made, and of which we are the stewards (Dennett 2008,
2; lettered numbering added).
With reference to (a) above, it is perturbing how we, as moral agents, would neglect our
moral duties (which include encouraging others to avoid acting immorally), simply because a
moral agent is ‘passionate’ about his or her religion. Besides, Dennett conveniently blames