Table Of ContentB
A
The perception of what he calls ‘aspects’ preoccupied Z
Wittgenstein and gave him considerable trouble in his final
years. The Wittgensteinian aspect defies any number of
traditional philosophical dichotomies: the aspect is neither
subjective (inner, metaphysically private) nor objective; it
presents perceivable unity and sense that are (arguably) not The Philosophy of
(yet) conceptual; it is ‘subject to the will’, but at the same time
Ludwig Wittgenstein
is normally taken to be genuinely revelatory of the object
perceived under it. This Element begins with a grammatical and
phenomenological characterization of Wittgensteinian aspects.
It then challenges two widespread ideas: that aspects are to
be identified with concepts, and that aspect perception has
W Wittgenstein
a continuous version that is characteristic of (normal) human it
t
g
perception. It concludes by proposing that aspect perception e
n
brings to light the distinction between the world as perceived st
e on Aspect
and the world as objectively construed, and the role we play in in o
n
the constitution of the former. A
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About the Series Series Editor p
t
This series provides concise and David G. Stern ion
structured introductions to all the central University of Iowa
topics in the philosophy of Ludwig Avner Baz
Wittgenstein. The Elements are written
by distinguished senior scholars and
bright junior scholars with relevant
expertise, producing balanced and
comprehensive coverage of the full range
of Wittgenstein’s thought.
Cover image: Adapted from a portrait of the Austrian
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Stock Photo). ISSN 2632-7112 (online)
ISSN 2632-7104 (print)
ElementsinthePhilosophyofLudwigWittgenstein
editedby
DavidG.Stern
UniversityofIowa
WITTGENSTEIN ON
ASPECT PERCEPTION
Avner Baz
Tufts University, Massachusetts
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Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781108813150
DOI:10.1017/9781108878012
©AvnerBaz2020
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Wittgenstein on Aspect Perception
ElementsinthePhilosophyofLudwigWittgenstein
DOI:10.1017/9781108878012
Firstpublishedonline:November2020
AvnerBaz
TuftsUniversity,Massachusetts
Authorforcorrespondence:AvnerBaz,[email protected]
Abstract:Theperceptionofwhathecalls‘aspects’preoccupied
Wittgensteinandgavehimconsiderabletroubleinhisfinalyears.The
Wittgensteinianaspectdefiesanynumberoftraditionalphilosophical
dichotomies:theaspectisneithersubjective(inner,metaphysically
private)norobjective;itpresentsperceivableunityandsensethatare
(arguably)not(yet)conceptual;itis‘subjecttothewill’,butatthesame
timeisnormallytakentobegenuinelyrevelatoryoftheobject
perceivedunderit.ThisElementbeginswithagrammaticaland
phenomenologicalcharacterizationofWittgensteinianaspects.Itthen
challengestwowidespreadideas:thataspectsaretobeidentifiedwith
concepts,andthataspectperceptionhasacontinuousversionthatis
characteristicof(normal)humanperception.Itconcludesbyproposing
thataspectperceptionbringstolightthedistinctionbetweentheworld
asperceivedandtheworldasobjectivelyconstrued,andtheroleweplay
intheconstitutionoftheformer.
Keywords:Wittgenstein;Perception;AspectPerception;Phenomenology;
PhilosophicalMethod
©AvnerBaz2020
ISBNs:9781108813150(PB),9781108878012(OC)
ISSNs:2632-7112(online),2632-7104(print)
Contents
Introduction 1
1 TheGrammarandPhenomenologyofWittgensteinian
Aspects 2
2 AspectsandConcepts 10
3 AspectsasPerceivedInternalRelations 19
4 ContinuousAspectPerception? 25
5 AspectsandPerceptualIndeterminacy 33
6 TheSignificanceofAspectPerception 42
Appendix:TheNaturalAttitudeandtheLimitations
oftheWittgensteinianGrammaticalInvestigation 46
References 52
WittgensteinonAspectPerception 1
Introduction
The following monograph draws on, and from, work onaspect perception that
I’vedoneoverthepasttwentyyearsorsoandpublishedineightpapersthatare
verydifferentfromeachother–notonlyintermsoftheirfocusandemphases,but
alsointermsoftheirperspectiveandapproach.Forawhile,Ihadtoyedwiththe
ideaofturningmyworkonaspectsintoamonographbutwasreluctanttodoso,
fearing that the dialectical nature of the work – the ways in which it is tied to
particular conversations with particular interlocutors and rooted in particular
momentsofmyphilosophicaldevelopmentandtheparticularinterestsofthose
moments–wouldtherebybedistorted.Nowthattheeightpapers–allmoreor
lesssubstantivelyrevisedandexpandedfromtheiroriginallypublishedversion–
havecomeoutinacollection(Baz2020),Ihavefeltreadytodotheexerciseof
distillingmyworkonaspectsintothisshortmonographonWittgensteinonaspect
perception, which I hopethe readers willfinduseful. I dofeelthatthirtyyears
afterthepublicationofStephenMulhall’sinsightfulandrightfullyinfluentialOn
Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heideggeron Seeing Aspects, the philo-
sophicaldiscussionofaspectperception–inWittgensteinandmoregenerally–
standsinneedofrefocusing.Onlytimewilltellwhether thisshort monograph
succeedsinrefocusingit–ifonlybyprovokingotherstoarticulatetheirdisagree-
mentswithit.ButIam,inanycase,gratefultoDavidSternandtoCambridge
UniversityPressfortheinvitationtowriteit.
TheaimofthisElementistointroducereaderstowhatthelaterWittgenstein
calls“aspects”,andtosomeofthemostbasicquestionsthathaveariseninthe
literatureaboutWittgensteinianaspectsandtheirsignificance.1
Section1willofferbothagrammaticalcharacterizationandaphenomenological
characterization of Wittgensteinian aspects. It will be emphasized that though
Wittgenstein himself was suspicious of phenomenology and sometimes even
presentedhisgrammaticalinvestigationasanantidotetowhathesawasthepitfalls
ofphenomenology,bothsortsofcharacterizationareimportantforanunderstanding
ofwhathecalls“aspects”,andforaproperappreciationofthesignificanceofaspect
perception.
Section2will challengethewidespread tendency –exhibitedbyStrawson,
Wollheim,andothers–toidentifyWittgensteinianaspectswith,orintermsof,
concepts.Itwillbearguedthatonanyofthemostcommonwaysofunderstand-
ing“concept”,orourconceptofconcept,thatidentificationismisguided,and
distorts both the grammar and the phenomenology of aspect perception. The
1 IspeakofWittgensteinianaspects,becauseIbelievethattheperceptionofwhatWittgensteincalls
“aspects”–eventhoughittakesavarietyofformsandmanifestsitselfinavarietyofcontexts–is
morespecificthanwhatsomeofhisinterpretershavemadeitouttobe.
2 ThePhilosophyofLudwigWittgenstein
basic point will be that Wittgensteinian aspects are not general as concepts
essentiallyareandarenotseparablefromtheobjectsperceivedunderthemin
thewaythatconceptsare.
InSection3,Iwillproposethatwhilenothavingthegeneralityofconcepts,
andwhilebeinginseparable–grammatically andphenomenologically –from
thethings perceivedunder them, Wittgensteinian aspects nonetheless connect
the things perceived under them with other things. The connection, I will
propose, is perceptual and internal, in the sense that how one thing presents
itselftousperceptually–itsperceived“physiognomy”–isnotseparablefrom
itsperceivedrelationtootherthings.
Sections4and5willaddresstheidea–tobefoundinStrawson,Wollheim,
Mulhall,Searle,andothers–thatthereisacontinuousversiontotheperception
of aspects, and that, indeed, all (normal) human perception may aptly be
understoodastheperceptionofaspects.ItwillbearguedinSection4thatthe
textualbasisforattributingthatideatoWittgensteinisweak,andthatthereis
much textual evidence against that attribution. The idea of continuous aspect
perception,itwillthenbearguedinSection5,failstorecognizetheindetermin-
acy of the phenomenal world – by which I mean, the world as perceived and
respondedtopriortobeingthought,orthoughtortalkedabout,andsopriorto
being conceptualized. The dawning of Wittgensteinian aspects, whether soli-
cited or unsolicited, willed orunwilled, it will be proposed, is the necessarily
passing introduction of (relative) determinacy into the phenomenal world –
amomentarytakingholdofthings,perceptually.
Section6willaddressthequestionofthesignificanceofaspectperception:
what,ifanything,doestheperceptionofWittgensteinianaspectsrevealabout
(normal)humanperceptionassuch?Itwillbeproposedthatitrevealstherole
weplayinbringingaboutandsustainingtheunityandsenseofthephenomenal
world; and it also reveals our capacity for more or less playful, more or less
creative,projectionofperceivablesenseontosomegivenobject,orsituation.
IntheAppendix,IwillsaysomethingaboutwhatIseeasthelimitationsof
theWittgensteiniangrammaticalinvestigation,asthoselimitationsmakethem-
selvesmanifestinWittgenstein’sremarksonaspects.
1TheGrammarandPhenomenology
ofWittgensteinianAspects
I begin with what I take Wittgenstein to mean by “seeing (perceiving) some-
thingassomething”or“seeing(perceiving)anaspect”.Thefirstfewremarksof
Section xi of part II of the Investigations are a good place to seek initial
orientation:
WittgensteinonAspectPerception 3
Twousesoftheword“see”.
Theone:“Whatdoyouseethere?”–“Iseethis”(andthenadescription,
adrawing,acopy).Theother:“Iseealikenessbetweenthesetwofaces”–
wherethemanIsaythistomaybeseeingthefacesasclearlyasIdomyself.
The importance of this is the difference in category between the two
‘objects’ofsight.
Theonemanmightmakeanaccuratedrawingofthetwofaces,andtheother
noticeinthedrawingthelikenesswhichtheformerdidnotsee.
Icontemplateaface,andthensuddenlynoticeitslikenesstoanother.Isee
that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience
“noticinganaspect”(Wittgenstein2009b(hereafter‘PPF’),111–3,transla-
tionamended).
Thefirstthingtonote,evenbeforewedrawonthebasisoftheseremarksan
understanding of what Wittgenstein means by “seeing-as” or by “aspect”, is
that he characterizes his subject matter both grammatically – in the
Wittgensteinian sense of that term – and phenomenologically. On the one
hand,hetalksabouttwousesoftheword“see”,andgivesaninitialandpartial
characterizationofthosetwouses.Thisisinlinewithhislaterphilosophical
practice. At the root of any number of traditional philosophical difficulties,
Wittgenstein identified the tendency to suppose that our words – including
philosophically troublesome words such as “see”, “understand”, “know”,
“think”,“mean”,“intend”,“pain”,andsoon–‘nameobjects’,or,ascontem-
poraryanalyticphilosophersliketosay,‘referto(denote)itemsintheworld’;
and accordingly to suppose that the best way to become clear about the
meaning of those words, or the concepts they embody, is to identify and
study those ‘objects’ directly– that is, not by way of an investigation of the
useofthosewords.2WhatWittgensteintriestogetustoseeisthatthemodel,
or picture, of ‘object and designation’ (Wittgenstein 2009a (hereafter ‘PI’),
293)ismisguidedandmisleadingwhenitcomestosuchwords,andthatwhat
weendupproducing,whenweattempttoelucidatethenatureofthe“objects”
towhichtheyaresupposedtorefer,arephilosophicallyconstructedchimeras–
‘structures of air’, as he puts it (PI, 118) – that we erect by the light of
questionable or confused theoretical commitments, and on the basis of ‘pic-
tures’thatwehaveformedforourselvesofthose“objects”.
Wittgenstein’sappealtotheuseofphilosophicallytroublesomewords,orto
what he calls their ‘grammar’, is an antidote to the tendencies and the
2 In Baz (2017a), I argue, following Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty, against this prevailing
conceptionoflanguage,which(Iargue)hasunderwrittenthephilosophical“methodofcases”
andhenceasignificantportionoftheworkproducedwithinmainstreamanalyticphilosophyin
thepastfiftyyearsorso.
4 ThePhilosophyofLudwigWittgenstein
philosophicalidlenessoremptinesstheyleadto.Intheremarksonaspects,he
repeatedlyurgeshisreader(orhimself)nottotrytounderstandaspectpercep-
tionbywayofintrospectionofwhathappensinortouswhenweseeanaspect
(seePPF,241;andWittgenstein1980a(hereafter‘RPPI’),1011).‘Forget’,he
urgeshisreader(orhimself),‘forgetthatyouhavetheseexperiencesyourself’
(Wittgenstein1980b(hereafter‘RPPII’,531).‘Don’ttrytoanalyzetheexperi-
encewithinyourself’(PPF,188;seealsoPPF,204).‘Thequestion’,hewrites,
‘isnotwhathappenshere[thatis,whensomeonetellsme:“NowIamseeing
this point as the apex of the triangle”, AB], but rather: how one may use that
statement’(RPPI,315).Wittgensteinreorientshisreader’sattentionawayfrom
hisorherownexperienceandtowardtheuseofrelevantwords–here,firstand
foremost,thewordswithwhichtheexperienceofnoticinganaspectmayaptly
andnaturallybevoiced.Toattainclarityabouttheseeingofaspects–orforthat
matteraboutanyother‘conceptofexperience(Erfahrungsbegriff)’(PPF,115)–
weneedtodomorethanjustremindourselvesofparticularisolated formsof
wordsthatmaybeusedtodescribeorotherwisegivevoicetoourexperience.
Weneedalsotoremindourselvesof‘theoccasionandpurpose’ofthesephrases
(PPF, 311). ‘It is necessary to get down to the application’ (PPF, 165), to ask
oneself ‘What does anyone tell me by saying “Now I see it as ... ”? What
consequenceshasthispieceofcommunication?WhatcanIdowithit?’(PPF,
176,translationamended).Inmyexperience,commentatorsonWittgenstein’s
remarks on aspect perception have tended to lose contact with his subject
matter, and to get themselves confused, as a result of failing to heed this
Wittgensteiniancallaltogether.Theuseoftherelevantterms,andthelanguage-
game(s)withinwhichtheyhavetheirsense,haveoftenbeenneglectedinfavor
of theoretical commitments and ambitions, which are often sustained by mis-
leadingpictures.3
BeforeofferingagrammaticalcharacterizationofWittgensteinianaspects,
ImustnotethatWittgensteinintroducesthenotionof“aspect”bywayofthe
experienceofnoticinganaspect,ofsuddenlybeingstruckbyanaspect.Andit
might be tempting to suppose, as any number of readers of Wittgenstein’s
remarksonaspectshavesupposed,thatWittgensteinianaspectsmayalsobe,
and regularly are, perceived continuously, and that Wittgenstein finds the
experience of aspect dawning or lighting up interesting, and focuses on it,
onlybecauseitbringstolightinadramaticfashiontherealityofcontinuous
3 Thus, for example, Severin Schroeder writes: ‘[W]henever something is seen (and not only
lookedatinanelyorabsent-mindedly)someaspectofitmustbenoticed,beitonlycertainshapes
orcolours’(2010,366).Buthowexactly,orinwhatsense,isthecolorofanobjectoritsshapean
aspect?SurelynotinWittgenstein’ssense.Andwhyareaspects,thusunderstood,philosophically
interesting?
