Table Of ContentWHY ABM?
Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy
Edited by
Johan J. Hoist & William Schneider, Jr.
With Contributions from:
Frank E. Armbruster
Donald G. Brennan
Raymond D. Gastil
Charles M. Herzfeld
Johan J. Hoist
Herman Kahn
William Schneider, Jr.
Michael E. Sherman
Albert Wohlstetter
A Collection of Papers by
Staff and Fellow Members of Hudson Institute
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
y H IS VOLUME could never have been completed without
the wholehearted support and cheerful cooperation of all the
contributors. We had many long debates about the contents of
particular sentences, paragraphs, and sections of the various
chapters as well as the structure of the arguments. We hope and
believe that this process did not result in any lasting animosity
towards the editors. The editors owe a particular debt of grati-
tude to the President of Hudson Institute, Max Singer, and its
Director, Herman Kahn, for their advice and encouragement.
Through the successive drafts of this volume, other members of
the professional staff, especially Edward S. Boylan and Andrew
J. Pierre, furnished helpful criticism and assistance. Nancy M.
Kavenagh applied skill and tolerant patience to the preparation
of the index.
A special expression of appreciation is required for those of
the Hudson Institute support staff who labored above and be-
yond the call of duty to meet the impossible and erratic demands
of the editors. We want to thank, in particular, Helen Iadanza,
Anne Marsek and Mary Mitchell, and also Cecelia Deighton,
Rosa Dogan, Nance Glass, Ann Marie Hampson, Brenda Hor-
ton, Jean Robinson, Lucille Schwartz and Lucy Stephenson.
Sylvia M. Halpern of Pergamon Press was an exceptionally
helpful and patient copy editor.
Some portions of three of the chapters in this volume have
appeared elsewhere (parts of Chapter 4 in Fortune, June 1969,
of Chapter 5 in Adelphi Papers #43, 1967 and Foreign Affairs,
April 1969, and of Chapter 8 m Adelphi Papers #43, 1967). We
are grateful to The Council on Foreign Relations, Fortune
and the Institute for Strategic Studies for permission to incor-
porate the material into the expanded essays included in this
volume.
JJ.H. & W.S.
vii
Hudson Institute studies may contain explicit or implicit policy
assumptions or recommendations. These policy views are the respon-
sibility of the authors concerned, and do not necessarily represent
the views of Hudson Institute, its members, officers, trustees, or
contract sponsors.
INTRODUCTION
yHE PROBLEM of devising and deploying defenses against
ballistic missiles has confronted policy-makers for almost a
decade. The debate over such deployment has at various times
emphasized the technical aspects, and,at other times, the political
aspects have been in the forefront. At no time has either com-
ponent been absent. With the September 1967 decision of the
Johnson Administration (ratified later, although in modified
form by the Nixon Administration) to deploy an operational
system to defend the U.S. against at least some types of nuclear
attack, the issues, once almost the exclusive domain of national
security specialists, have now received widespread public atten-
tion. In this process, however, many of the important (even
crucial) issues involved have become obscured by a bewildering
barrage of conflicting statements by scientists, political figures,
and other opinion leaders.
The present volume does not purport to be balanced in the
sense of containing the views of both fervent advocates and im-
passioned opponents of ballistic missile defense. All of the con-
tributors are either friendly to some form of missile defense or
feel that the issue remains open. We do feel, however, that the
volume as a whole is balanced in the sense of presenting an
analytical and, given the assumptions laid down by the authors,
fair evaluation of the various issues. Clearly some chapters are
more polemical than others. To some extent this is a matter of
style as much as of conviction. There is no chapter outlining the
case against any missile defense deployment, although the reader
will find most of the arguments against ABM mentioned in
various contexts. The opponent of ABM will find most of the
ix
INTRODUCTION
facts which are relevant to his argument in the present volume.
Those who are interested in studying the case against ABM may
be referred to the bibliography for specific references.
In particular, we want to emphasize that the present volume
is not focused on any particular deployment decision of present
or past Administrations. The analyses address issues which are
associated with missile defenses in general and with a wide
spectrum of potential deployment configurations.
All of the contributors to the present volume are staff
members of the Hudson Institute, except Dr. Herzfeld and
Professor Wohlstetter who are both Fellow Members of the
Institute. We should emphasize that the points of view expressed
by the contributors to this volume do not reflect the general
political position of the Hudson Institute staff, or more impor-
tant, the position of the organization or its Board and Members.
A cursory examination of the list of Fellow and Public Members
suggests that there is probably something like an even split on
the ABM issue. The analyses contained in this book should
illustrate, moreover, that the issues involved are much more
complex than what is suggested by a simple pro-con dichotomy.
We have found it useful to consider the problem of missile
defenses in three broad categories. The first of these concerns
the background and context of missile defense deployment
(Part I). This area is the only one where the technical and political
issues overlap—the essence of the missile defense problem is
political, not technical. To introduce the reader to the jargon
of missile defense and place the recent debate over the deploy-
ment of the Safeguard system in perspective, William Schneider,
Jr. ("Missile Defense Systems: Past, Present, and Future")
discusses early attempts at the resolution of the technical diffi-
culties as well as the representatives of the current state-of-the-
art, the Sentinel-Safeguard systems. Some future concepts of
ballistic missile defense are also discussed in this connection.
Charles M. Herzfeld discusses in considerable detail ("Mis-
sile Defense: Can It Work?") some issues concerning the efficacy
of currently programmed missile defense systems with respect to
the range of potential threats posed by adversaries. This chapter
aims first of all at identifying and asking the relevant questions.
Given a workable missile defense system, Raymond D.
Gastil ("Missile Defense and Strategic Doctrine") considers the
role of doctrine in our evaluation of ballistic missile defenses.
This essay serves as a useful introduction to the political discus-
x
INTRODUCTION
sion in the remaining sections of the book which consider alter-
native deployments and some of the most relevant policy con-
siderations.
In Part II, Herman Kahn presents the case for the immediate
deployment of a "thin" defense—approximately represented by
the proposed Safeguard program recently announced by the
Nixon Administration ("The Case for A Thin System"). The two
major alternative missile defense deployments seriously con-
sidered—the defense of population centers and the exclusive
defense of strategic forces—are presented respectively by Donald
G. Brennan ("The Case for Population Defense") and Albert
Wohlstetter ("The Case for Strategic Force Defense").
Part III analyzes some of the most important policy issues
involved in any deployment decision. The reaction of the Soviet
Union has become a crucial issue in the debate over the arms
race implications of the U.S. deployment of ballistic missile
defenses. Johan J. Hoist examines Soviet attitudes and behavior
in regard to active defense in general and missile defense in
particular ("Missile Defense, The Soviet Union and The Arms
Race").
Any significant change in U.S. strategic weapon procure-
ment policy has implications for America's alliance relation-
ships, especially as they affect the credibility of the American
commitment. The issue has been raised most urgently with
respect to U.S. relations with our NATO allies. Some of the
important issues in this connection are weighed by Johan J.
Hoist in "Missile Defense: Implications for Europe."
Another question frequently raised during the debate over
missile defense is its impact on the future process of nuclear
proliferation. Michael E. Sherman ("Missile Defense and Nu-
clear Proliferation: Friends or Enemies?") explores the inter-
actions between Superpower BMD systems and the incentives
and interests of the non-nuclear powers.
The possibility of an "irrational China" has been one of the
principal official justifications offered by both the Johnson and
Nixon Administrations for their respective Sentinel and Safe-
guard systems. Frank E. Armbruster considers this and alter-
native scenarios of Chinese behavior in "The Problem of China."
Although the once-vociferous debate in the early 1960's
over passive (i.e. civil) defense has become of interest only to
professional analysts, the relationships between active defense,
passive defense, and offensive forces remain important if missile
XI
INTRODUCTION
defense is to be seriously considered as a national policy option.
Raymond D. Gastil ("Civil Defense and Missile Defense")
weighs the issues involved.
Part IV contains some further perspectives which are rele-
vant to an examination of the issues involved. It is now almost
certain that the United States and the Soviet Union will enter
into a series of talks aimed at a limitation, reduction or regula-
tion of strategic weapons, including ABM. In "Strategic Arms
Control and Stability: A Retrospective Look" Johan J. Hoist
considers the last attempt by the superpowers at serious dis-
cussions of strategic force issues, the 1958 surprise attack con-
ference, and asks what lessons can be drawn from it. Finally,
Herman Kahn ("The Missile Defense Debate in Perspective")
offers his analysis of the debate over the ballistic missile defense
issue and tries to place the present volume within the context
of that debate.
JOHAN J. HOLST
and
WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, JR.
Croton-on-Hudson, Ν. Y.
May 28, 1969
xii
Chapter 1
MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
by William Schneider, Jr.
pEW TASKS ever assigned to the defense research community
have been as difficult to fulfill technically as the problem of
devising defenses against ballistic missiles. The development of
1
ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems has undergone consider-
able evolution since the major research and development effort
was begun in 1956. The evolution of BMD systems has, however,
primarily been a refinement of the basic concept of ballistic
missile interception defined at the outset of the BMD research
program. The incoming warhead is detected and tracked by some
combination of radars. The information obtained by the radars
is interpreted and processed by sophisticated computer facilities.
The destruction of the incoming warhead is accomplished by an
interceptor (missile) warhead exploding in the vicinity, of the
incoming warhead. The sheer magnitude of the task, intercepting
an enemy warhead traveling at four miles per second with an
interceptor traveling much more slowly, seemed to give meaning
to the metaphor of "hitting a bullet with a bullet."
'Ballistic missile defense (BMD) is used frequently in this volume
rather than ABM (anti-ballistic missile) on the grounds that the
former is a more generic expression not specifically tied to any
given solution to the problem of providing defenses against ballistic
missiles.
3
4 WHY ABM?
EARLY MISSILE DEFENSE CONCEPTS
Despite the discouraging prognosis for the successful resolu-
tion of the problem of devising defenses against ballistic missiles,
research work began in 1956 on the Nike Zeus ballistic missile
defense system.
As the Nike Zeus system developed, it became necessary to
design and build separate radars for each of the functions
necessary to eventually intercept the incoming ballistic missile
warhead. These functions include:
acquisition: the detection of the incoming enemy war-
head
target track: the tracking of the incoming enemy war-
head with sufficient precision to permit a
successful intercept
discrimination: to distinguish between the true warhead
and decoys or other objects
missile track: to track the interceptor missile so that it
can accurately complete the intercept.
Moreover, since Nike Zeus was a terminal/late mid-course
2
defense system, these facilities would have to be duplicated for
each city which required protection.
By 1962, the Nike Zeus system had successfully intercepted
its first inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) on a test firing
from the Pacific test range at Kwajalein Atoll. Further tests
conducted on ICBM's fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base
(California) demonstrated the feasibility of the technique of
interception, but it also became clear that the Nike Zeus system
had limitations which would make deployment of the system
undesirable.
2
A11 ballistic missile defense systems ever seriously considered for
deployment have been either "area" or "terminal" defense or some
combination thereof. An area defense permits coverage for thousands
of square miles (e.g. about 12 area defense missile batteries can
provide protection for the entire continental U.S.). Terminal defense
on the other hand, can only afford protection for a few hundred
square miles—typically the size of a city. Thus many terminal defense
batteries would be required for complete protection of the U.S.
population.
