Who Gets What?: Domestic Influences on International Negotiations Allocating Shared Resources

192 Pages·2008·4.53 MB·English

by  Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir

POLITICAL SCIENCE
Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir is Assistant Á During international bargaining, who
Professor of Political Science at s gets the better deal, and why, is one
g Who Gets What?
Bates College e of the questions at the heart of the
i
r study of international cooperation. In
s
d
Who Gets What? Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir
ó
t analyzes seven agreements signed
t Domestic Influences on
i throughout a twenty-year span
r
between Iceland and Norway to
International Negotiations
allocate shared fish stocks. While
the Law of the Sea regime provides
Allocating Shared Resources specific solution concepts for negoti-
ators, it does not dictate the final
W
outcome. Looking at the actual
h negotiation process and the political
o and economic constraints negotiators
operate under, Ásgeirsdóttir examines
G
how domestic interest groups can
et
directly influence the negotiating
s process, and thus affect international

W agreements over scarce resources.
Who Gets What? demonstrates
h
empirically that a nation with more
a
domestic constraints on its negotiators
t
gets a better deal.
?
Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir
SUNY
P R E S S
S
STATE UNIVERSITY OF U
NEW YORK PRESS N
Y
www.sunypress.edu
K Y M C
Who Gets What?
SUNY series in Global Politics
James N. Rosenau, editor
Who Gets What?
Domestic Influences on International
Negotiations Allocating Shared Resources
Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir
For my parents—you have always been an inspiration.

Contents
List of Illustrations ix
Acknowledgments xi
Chapter 1. Explaining Distributional Outcomes 1
The Importance of Distributional Conflicts 6
Theoretical Framework 7
Who Matters, How, and When 14
Marginal, Monitoring, and Information Costs 14
Norway and Iceland and the Global Capture Industry 16
Conflict over Common Fish Stocks 17
Tragedy of the Commons 19
The Fisheries and the Quest for International Cooperation 19
Summary 29
Chapter 2. Role of the Law of the Sea and the Straddling Stocks
Agreement in Determining Distributive Outcomes 31
Law of the Sea Prior to 1982 32
The Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 35
Rights and Duties Imposed by the 1982 Law of the Sea 36
The Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks 38
Role of International Law in the Negotiating Process 41
Regional Fisheries Bodies and the Role of Science 43
Summary 46
vii
viii Contents
Chapter 3. The Decline of Norwegian Fishing Interests 47
Norway’s Place in the International System 48
The Actors: Government, Scientists, and Interest Groups 55
Structure of the Norwegian Fishing Industry 62
Interest Group Organization 65
Summary 79
Chapter 4. Dictating Policy and Influencing Outcomes in Iceland 81
Icelandic Fisheries Policy before the 200-Mile EEZ 82
Policy after the 200-mile Extension 85
The Actors: Government, Scientists, and Interest Groups 90
Structure of the Icelandic Fishing Industry 98
The Interest Groups 99
Summary 110
Chapter 5. Interest-Group Power and its Impact on the International
Allocation of Shared Fish Stocks 113
Capelin 115
Herring 123
Cod 128
Oceanic Redfish 135
Summary 139
Chapter 6. Conclusions 141
Broadening the Research Question 141
Same Issue Area and Changes over Time 142
The International Arena 143
Further Analysis of International Cooperation 144
Notes 145
Bibliography 157
Index 167
SUNY Series in Global Politics 177
Illustrations
Maps
Map of the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea. 2
Tables
Table 1.1. Allocation of fish stocks. 4
Table 1.2. Initial negotiating preferences. 5
Table 3.1. Changes in the composition of Norwegian exports. 72
Table 5.1. Interest group strength and distributional outcomes. 114
Figures
Figure 1.1. Capelin catches. 21
Figure 1.2. Herring catches. 23
Figure 1.3. Cod catches. 25
Figure 1.4. Oceanic redfish catches. 28
Figure 1.5. Oceanic redfish catches for participating states. 28
Figure 3.1. Changes in the number of full-time and part-time
fishermen in Norway. 71
Figure 3.2. Annual subsidies to the Norwegian fishing industry. 74
Figure 3.3. Total number of fisheries related items discussed in the
Norwegian parliament. 76
Figure 3.4. General propositions before the Norwegian parliament. 77
Figure 3.5. Questions posed about the fishing industry in the
Norwegian parliament. 78
ix
x Illustrations
Figure 4.1. Proportion of Icelandic fish exports. 100
Figure 4.2. Changes in the number of fishermen in Iceland. 105
Figure 4.3. Number of cabinet proposals in the Icelandic parliament. 107
Figure 4.4. Changes in the proportion of cabinet proposals in the
Icelandic parliament. 108
Figure 4.5. Number of resolutions passed by the Icelandic parliament. 109
Figure 4.6. Questions posed about the fishing industry in the
Icelandic parliament. 110