Table Of ContentUCAV – THE NEXT GENERATION AIR-SUPERIORITY FIGHTER?
BY
MAJOR WILLIAM K. LEWIS
A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF
THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES
FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES
AIR UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
JUNE 2002
DISCLAIMER
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not
reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force, or Air University.
-i i-
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Major William K. Lewis was commissioned through the United States Air Force Academy in
1988. He is a senior pilot with more than 2,500 hours in the T-37, T-38, AT-38 and F-15 Eagle.
He is a Distinguished Graduate of the Squadron Officer School and the Air Command and Staff
College, and is a graduate of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies. Major Lewis is
currently assigned to the 56th Air Operations Squadron, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Hickam
AFB, Hawaii.
-i i i-
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank the students, faculty and staff of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies
(SAAS) for all the support contributing to the origin, development, and completion of this study.
I would especially like to acknowledge: Dr. David R. Mets for his insightful, encouraging and
patient guidance throughout this year; and Col. Stephen D. Chiabotti, Commandant of SAAS, for
his influence as a leader, scholar and mentor. They worked hard to make this pilot objectively
evaluate the future of air power. Finally, thanks to my wife, Paige and my children, Nicole and
Jake. This may be the only paper I write with an acknowledgments section and I’ve always
wanted to say that.
-i v -
ABSTRACT
Air superiority is an essential military mission, and will continue to be so for the
foreseeable future. Control of the air is not an end of its own, but rather it provides the flexibility
and freedom of action central to a full range of military capabilities. In the coming century the
United States will confront a number of disparate and ambiguous challenges to its hegemony.
The resources available to meet those challenges will undoubtedly be constrained. Extremely
long lead times in the acquisition and procurement of new technologies mean that now, as the F-
22 Raptor begins to replace the venerable F-15 Eagle, the next- generation air-superiority fighter
is entering development. Unmanned aircraft must be considered as an alternative to manned
aircraft for this critical mission. While cost has been the driving factor for advances in UCAV,
technology has been the major limitation. This thesis concludes that an air-superiority UCAV
should be feasible by the year 2025 and that it should provide an effective and affordable
alternative to manned air-superiority fighters.
- v -
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
DISCLAIMER ...........................................................................................................ii
ABOUT THE AUTHOR ..........................................................................................iii
ACKNOWLDEGMENTS ........................................................................................iv
1 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................1
2 AIR-SUPERIORITY FIGHTER...............................................................................12
3 POTENTIAL THREAT............................................................................................27
4 AIR-SUPERIORITY UCAV REQUIREMENTS....................................................31
5 AIR-SUPERIORITY UCAV FUTURE CAPABILITIES........................................54
6 UCAV EFFICIENCY...............................................................................................74
7 CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................85
8 IMPLICATIONS......................................................................................................88
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................93
-v i-
Illustrations
Table
1 Manned vs. Unmanned Aircraft Development Costs...............................................58
Figure
1 IHPTET and VAATE Program Goals and Trends...................................................64
2 Airborne Data Link Data Rate Trends......................................................................66
3 Processor Speed Trend..............................................................................................68
4 Autonomous Control Trend......................................................................................69
5 SAR Weight and Coverage/Resolution Trends........................................................71
-v i -i
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
If the enemy has air supremacy and makes full use of it, then one’s own
command is forced to suffer the following limitations and disadvantages:
By using his strategic air force, the enemy can strangle one’s own
supplies, especially if they have to be carried across the sea; The enemy
can wage the battle of attrition from the air; Intensive exploitation by the
enemy of air superiority gives rise to far-reaching tactical limitations for
one’s own command.
—Field Marshall Erwin Rommel
On 17 December 1903, the Wright Brothers flew 120 feet in twelve seconds over
the sands of Kill Devil Hill. The age of powered flight had arrived—from that time
forward military aircraft had a profound impact on the conduct of war.1 During World
War I aircraft initially served as reconnaissance platforms but were quickly adapted to
attack the enemy on and behind his own lines. The first aerial engagements were crude
attempts by surface commanders to deny their adversary aerial artillery spotting and
reconnaissance operations, while allowing and enhancing their own. These early
missions mark the beginning of the unending quest of air forces to control and exploit the
aerospace medium.2 As aircraft matured, a number of advances in systems such as early
warning radar, passive detection, airborne surveillance, surface-to-air missiles and anti-
aircraft artillery made attempts to control that medium increasingly lethal and difficult.3
The air-superiority fighter has continually adapted to this environment and still plays a
key role in modern war.
1 Walter J. Boyne and Philip Handleman, Brassey’s Air Combat Reader (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s,
1999) 2.
2 Mike Spick, Fighter Pilot Tactics: The Techniques of Daylight Air Combat (New York: Stein and Day,
1983) 22-35.
3 John R. Walker, Air Superiority Operations (London: Brassey’s, 1989) 1.
- -1
The skies over Afghanistan in the 21st century saw a new aircraft on the prowl.
The Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) carried Hellfire anti-armor air-to-surface
missiles to fire at the targets that it detected with an amazing array of sensors.4 No longer
were manned aircraft required to engage and destroy the fleeting targets discovered by
reconnaissance aircraft. Additionally, the USAF began modifying Raytheon surface-to-
air Stinger missiles to an air-to-air version that can be carried on the Predator to give it a
counterair capability against enemy helicopters, cruise missiles, and unmanned aircraft.5
The relatively cheap and versatile Predator UAV has become America’s newest air-
superiority fighter.
Background and Significance of the Problem
Air superiority remains an essential military mission. Although control of the air
does not itself destroy or defeat the majority of enemy forces, it provides the freedom of
action and strategic flexibility that allow other military forces to do so.6 Air superiority is
central to a full range of military capabilities, including power projection of sea and land
forces, close air support, interdiction, and freedom of maneuver for ground forces. In
future conflicts, American air forces could possibly face sophisticated Russian, Chinese,
and allied aircraft and air defense systems that are capable of challenging current and
future U.S. fighters for air superiority. These systems, although extremely expensive,
have the potential to proliferate around the world in sufficient numbers to threaten U.S.
4 Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., “Missile-Firing Drone: USAF’s Armed Predator UAV Breaks New Ground,”
ISR Journal, 2002 Issue 1, 36-38.
5 David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “Stinger Eyed for UAV Role,” Aviation Week and Space
Technology, 4 March 2002, 44.
6 Air superiority is not an end in itself. See Phillip S. Meilinger and John D.W. Corley, Air Superiority:
Blunting Near Sighted Criticism, study project (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College,
1993) 4.
- -2
regional and global interests. Planning for the future of air superiority is something that
must begin today.
In the coming century the United States will confront a number of disparate,
ambiguous challenges to its security. The budget to meet those challenges will most
likely be severely constrained. In this fiscal environment, there will be no easy choices
among weapons systems. As aerospace analyst Williamson Murray notes, “As it does
with all things connected with war, American defense policy confronts ‘an option of
difficulties.’ Unfortunately, hard choices are not inherently part of the American
culture.”7 Extremely long lead times in the acquisition and procurement of new
technologies mean that now, as the F-22 begins to replace the venerable F-15, the next
generation aerospace superiority fighter is entering development.8 Technology is
advancing rapidly, but costs are skyrocketing. Unmanned air vehicles (UAV) should be
considered as an alternative to manned aircraft for effective and efficient completion of
this critical mission.
The United States military has a long history of involvement with UAVs. The
first attempt at employing a UAV was the Sperry N-9 Flying Bomb in 1918.9 Since that
time, UAVs have had active reconnaissance roles in many American conflicts: Vietnam,
OPERATION DESERT STORM, OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE, OPERATION
ALLIED FORCE, and OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, to name just a few. As
7 Williamson Murray, “Hard Choices: Fighter Procurement in the Next Century” (Cato Policy Analysis No.
334, 1991) 1.
8 Larry Grossman, “Fighter 2020,” Air Force Magazine, November 1991, 30-35. Grossman says that the
Air Force’s Wright Laboratory began identifying key technologies to serve as building blocks for an air-
superiority fighter to follow the F-22 in 1991, over ten years before the Raptor was scheduled to enter
service.
9 Richard M. Clark, Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles: Airpower by the People, For the People, But Not
with the People (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2000) 7.
- -3
Description:While cost has been the driving factor for advances in UCAV, technology has
been the major limitation. This thesis concludes that an air-superiority UCAV.
