Toward an Anarchist Film Theory

24 Pages·2010·0.31 MB·English

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AnarchistDevelopmentsinCulturalStudies
“Post-Anarchismtoday”
2010.1
Toward an Anarchist Film Theory:
Reflections on the Politics of Cinema
∗
Nathan Jun
Abstract
Cinema,likeartmoregenerally,isbothanartisticgenreandapolitico-
economicinstitution.Ontheonehandthereisfilm,amediumwhich
disseminatesmovingimagesviatheprojectionoflightthroughcellu-
loidontoascreen.Individualfilmsor“movies,”inturn,arediscrete
aestheticobjectsthataredistinguishedandanalyzedvis-à-vistheir
formandcontent.Ontheotherhandthereisthefilmindustry—the
elaboratenetworkofartistic,technical,andeconomicapparatuses
whichplan,produce,market,anddisplayfilmstoaudiences. Since
itsinception,boththeaestheticandpoliticalaspectsofcinemahave
beensubjecttovariousformsoftheoreticalanalysiswhichhavebeen
subjecttocritiqueinturn.InthispaperIofferabriefsurveyofthese
analysesandcritiquesfollowedbyasketchofanalternativeapproach
tofilmtheory.DrawingupontheideasofFoucaultandDeleuze,this
“anarchist”filmtheoryseekstopresentaviablecriticalmethodology
whileatthesametimeelucidatingtheliberatorypotentialoffilm.
I.ThePoliticsofFilmTheory: FromHumanismtoCultural
Studies
Prior to its emergence as a distinct academic discipline in the
1970s, filmstudiescouldberoughlydividedintotwodistinctbut
closely-relatedcamps: humanism,whichanalyzedcinemainterms
∗
NathanJunisassistantprofessorofphilosophyandcoordinatorofthephilosophy
programatMidwesternStateUniversityinWichitaFalls,Texas. Heisco-editor
(withShaneWahl)ofNewPerspectivesonAnarchism(Lexington,2009)and(with
DanielSmith)DeleuzeandEthics(EdinburghUniversityPress,forthcoming2010)and
authorofAnarchismandPoliticalModernity(Continuum,forthcoming2011).Hehas
alsopublishedandpresentedwidelyonthetopicsofpoststructuralismandclassical
anarchism.
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of its promotion of, or opposition to, classical Enlightenment val-
ues(e.g.,freedomandprogress),andvariousschoolsofformalism,
whichfocusedontheformal,technical,andstructuralelementsof
cinemaingeneralaswellasofindividualfilms.1AsDanaPolannotes,
humanistcriticsfrequentlyvacillatedbetweenskepticismtoward
cinemaandprofound,evenhyperbolicadulationofit(Polan,1985:
159). Tosome,filmrepresented“thedeathofcultureforthebenefit
ofacorruptanddebasingmasscivilization”(ibid.).2Toothers,film
didnotkillculturesomuchasdemocratizeitbydestabilizingthe
privileged,elitestatusofart(cf.,Cavell,1981). Ultimately,however,
“theproandconpositionsmergeintheircommongroundoforigi-
narypresuppositions: theyunderstandartasredemption,transport,
utopianoffer”(Polan,1985: 159).
Likethepro-filmhumanists,formalistcriticsemphasizedtheartis-
ticdepthandintegrityofcinemaasgenre. (Thisisespeciallytrue
of auteur theory, according to which films are expressions of the
unique ideas, thoughts, and emotions of their directors; Staples,
1966–67: 1–7.) Unlikehumanism,however,formalismwascentrally
concernedwithanalyzingthevehiclesormechanismsbywhichfilm,
asopposedtootherartisticgenres,generatescontent. Thisconcern
gave rise, in turn, to various evaluative and interpretive theories
whichprivilegedtheformalelementsoffilm(e.g.,cinematography,
editing,etc)overandaboveitsnarrativeorthematicelements(cf.,
Arnheim,1997,1989;Bazin,1996,1967;Eiseinstein,1969;Kracauer,
1997;Mitry,1997).
Incontrasttotheoptimistichumanistsandtheapoliticalformal-
ists, the Marxist critics of the Frankfurt School analyzed cinema
chieflyasasocio-politicalinstitution—specifically,asacomponent
oftherepressiveandmendacious“cultureindustry.”Accordingto
HorkheimerandAdorno,forexample,filmsarenodifferentfrom
automobilesorbombs;theyarecommoditiesthatareproducedin
ordertobeconsumed(Horkheimer&Adorno,1993: 120–67). “The
technologyofthecultureindustry,”theywrite,“[is]nomorethan
theachievementofstandardizationandmassproduction,sacrific-
ingwhateverinvolvedadistinctionbetweenthelogicofworkand
thatofthesocialsystem”(ibid.,121). Priortotheevolutionofthis
industry, culture operated as a locus of dissent, a buffer between
1 Foranexcellentoverviewofformalisminfilmtheory,see(Andrews,2000:341–51).
2 See,forexample,Leavis(1952).OnLeavis’dismissalofcinemaandmassculturemore
generally,seeMulhern(1979).
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runawaymaterialismontheonehandandprimitivefanaticismon
theother. Inthewakeofitsthoroughgoingcommodification,culture
becomesamassculturewhosemovies,television,andnewspapers
subordinateeveryoneandeverythingtotheinterestsofbourgeois
capitalism. Massculture,inturn,replacesthesystemoflabouritself
astheprinciplevehicleofmodernalienationandtotalization.
ByexpandingtheMarxist-Leninistanalysisofcapitalismtocover
theentiresocialspace,HorkheimerandAdornoseverelyundermine
thepossibilityofmeaningfulresistancetoit. Ontheirview,thelogic
ofEnlightenmentreachesitsapexpreciselyatthemomentwhen
everything—includingresistancetoEnlightenment—becomesyet
anotherspectacleintheparadeofculture(ibid.,240–1). Whatever
formsofresistancecannotbeappropriatedaremarginalized,rele-
gatedtothe“lunaticfringe.”Thecultureindustry,meanwhile,pro-
duces a constant flow of pleasures intended to inure the masses
againstanylingeringsentimentsofdissentorresistance(ibid.,144).
Theultimateresult, asToddMaynotes, isthat“positiveinterven-
tion[is]impossible;allresistance[is]capableeitherofrecuperation
withintheparametersofcapitalismormarginalization[...]there
isnooutsidecapitalism,oratleastnoeffectiveoutside”(1994: 26).
Absentanyprogramfororganized,massresistance,theonlyoutlet
leftfortherevolutionarysubjectisart: thecreationofquiet,solitary
refusalsandsmall,fleetingspacesofindividualfreedom.3
Thedominanceofhumanistandformalistapproachestofilmwas
overturnednotbyFrankfurtSchoolMarxismbutbytheriseofFrench
structuralisttheoryinthe1960sanditssubsequentinfiltrationofthe
humanitiesbothinNorthAmericaandontheContinent. AsDudley
Andrewnotes,thevariousschoolsofstructuralism4didnotseekto
analyzefilmsintermsofformalaestheticcriteria“butrather[...]
to ‘read’ them as symptoms of hidden structures” (Andrew, 2000:
343; cf., Jay, 1993: 456–91). By the mid-1970s, he continues, “the
mostambitiousstudentswereintentondiggingbeneaththecom-
monplacesoftextbooksand‘theorizing’theconsciousmachinations
ofproducersofimagesandtheunconsciousideologyofspectators”
(ibid.). Theresult,notsurprisingly,wasafloodofhighlyinfluential
books and essays which collectively shaped the direction of film
theoryoverthenexttwodecades.5
3 ThispositionreceivesoneofitsfullestarticulationsinMarcuse(1964).
4 Forexample,Barthesiansemiotics,AlthusserianMarxism,andLacanianpsychoanaly-
sis.
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Oneofthemostimportantstructuralistswas,ofcourse,Jacques
Derrida. Onhisview,wedowelltorecall,aword(or,moregenerally,
asign)nevercorrespondstoapresenceandsoisalways“playing”
off other words or signs (1978: 289; 1976: 50). And because all
signs are necessarily trapped within this state or process of play
(whichDerridaterms“differance”),languageasawholecannothave
afixed,static,determinate—inaword,transcendentmeaning;rather,
differance“extendsthedomainandtheplayofsignificationinfinitely”
(ibid, 280). Furthermore, if it is impossible for presence to have
meaningapartfromlanguage,andif(linguistic)meaningisalways
inastateofplay,itfollowsthatpresenceitselfwillbeindeterminate
— which is, of course, precisely what it cannot be (Derrida, 1981:
119–20). Without an “absolute matrical form of being,” meaning
becomesdislodged,fragmented,groundless,andelusive. Thefamous
consequence,ofcourse,isthat“Iln’yapasdehors-texte”(“Thereis
nooutside-text”)(Derrida,1976: 158). Everythingisatextsubjectto
theambiguityandindeterminacyoflanguage;whatevernoumenal
existenceunderlieslanguageisunreadable—hence,unknowable—
tous.
IncontrasttoMarxist,psychoanalytic,andfeministtheorists,who
generallysharedtheFrankfurtSchool’ssuspiciontowardscinema
andthefilmindustry,Derrideancriticsarguedthatcinematic“texts”
donotcontainmeaningsorstructureswhichcanbeunequivocally
“interpreted”orotherwisedetermined(cf.,Brunette&Wills,1989).
Rather,thecontentofafilmisalwaysandalready“deconstructing”
—thatis, underminingitsowninternallogicthroughtheplayof
semioticdifferences. Asaresult,filmsare“liberated”bytheirown
indeterminacyfromthehermeneuticsoftraditionalfilmcriticism,
which“repress”theirownobjectpreciselybyattemptingtofixor
constituteit(Brunette&Wills,1989: 34). Spectators,inturn,are
freetoassignmultiplemeaningstoagivenfilm,noneofwhichcan
beregardedasthe“true”or“authentic”meaning.
Thislatterramificationprovedenormouslyinfluentialonthedis-
ciplineofculturalstudies,themodusoperandiofwhichwas“todis-
coverandinterpretthewaysdisparatedisciplinarysubjectstalkback:
howconsumersdeformandtransformtheproductstheyusetocon-
structtheirlives;how‘natives’rewriteandtroubletheethnographies
of(andto)whichtheyaresubject...”(Bérubé,1994: 138;seealso
5 OfparticularimportanceareBaudry(1986: 299–319),Heath(1976: 68–112),Metz
(1973:40–88;1974),Mulvey(1975:6–18).
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Gans,1974,1985: 17–37;Grossberg,1992;Levine,1988;Brantlinger,
1990;Aronowitz,1993;During,1993;Fiske,1992;McRobbie,1993).
AsThomasFrankobserves,
Thesignaturescholarlygestureoftheninetieswasnotsome
warmed over aestheticism, but a populist celebration of the
power and ‘agency’ of audiences and fans, of their ability to
evade the grasp of the makers of mass culture, and of their
talentfortransformingjustaboutanybitofculturaldetritus
intoanimplementofrebellion(Frank,2000: 282).
Suchagestureismadepossible,again,byDerrida’stheoryofde-
construction: theabsenceofdeterminatemeaningand,byextension,
intentionality in cultural texts enables consumers to appropriate
andassignmeaningthemforandbythemselves. Asaresult,any
theorywhichassumesthatconsumersare“necessarilysilent,pas-
sive,politicalandculturaldupes”whoaretrickedormanipulated
bythecultureindustryandotherapparatusesofrepressivepower
isrejectedas“elitist”(Grossberg,1992: 64).
A fitting example of the cultural studies approach to cinema is
foundinAnneFriedberg’sessay“CinemaandthePostmodernCondi-
tion,”whicharguesthatfilm,coupledwiththeapparatusoftheshop-
pingmall,representsapostmodernextensionofmodernflaneurie
(Friedberg,1997: 59–86). LikeHorkheimerandAdorno,Friedbergis
notinterestedincinemaasanartformsomuchasacommodityoras
anapparatusofconsumption/desireproduction. Atthesametime,
however,Friedbergdoesnotregardcinemaasprincipallyavehicle
of“massdeception”designedbythecultureindustrytomanipulate
themassesandinurethemtodomination. Althoughsherecognizes
theextenttowhichthetransgressiveandliberatory“mobilizedgaze”
oftheflaneuriscapturedandrenderedabstract/virtualbythecine-
maticapparatusofthecultureindustry(ibid.,67),shenonetheless
valorizesthis“virtuallymobile”modeofspectatorshipinsofarasit
allowspostmodernviewersto“tryon”identities(justasshoppers
“tryon”outfits)withoutanyessentialcommitment(ibid.,69–72).
Thiskindofapproachtoanalyzingfilm,thoughostensibly“rad-
ical”initspoliticalimplications,isinfactanythingbut. AsIshall
argue in the next section, cultural studies — no less than critical
theory—restsoncertainpresuppositionswhichhavebeenseverely
challengedbyvarioustheorists. MichelFoucault,inparticular,has
demonstratedtheextenttowhichwecanmovebeyondlinguistic
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indeterminacybyprovidingarcheologicalandgenealogicalanalyses
oftheformationofmeaning-producingstructures. Suchstructures,
heargues,donotemergeinavacuumbutareproducedbyhistor-
ically-situated relations of power. Moreover, power produces the
verysubjectswhoalternatelyaffectandareaffectedbythesestruc-
tures,anotionwhichunderminestheconceptofproducer/consumer
“agency” upon which much of critical theory and cultural studies
relies. Thoughpowerrelationshavethepotentialtobeliberating
ratherthanoppressive,suchaconsequenceisnotbroughtaboutby
consumeragencysomuchasbyotherpowerrelationswhich,follow-
ingGillesDeleuze,eludeand“deterritorialize”oppressivecapture
mechanisms. AsIshallargue,thecontemporarycinematicappara-
tusiswithoutadoubtaformofthelatter,butthisdoesnotmean
thatcinemaassuchisincapableofescapingalongliberatorylines
offlight.
II.FoucaultandFilmTheory
TidygeneralizationsaboutFoucaultareneithereasynorparticu-
larlyworthwhiletomake. Yetifthereisasinglepithyaphorismthat
capturesthespiritofhisproject,itisBacon’s“Ipsascientiapotestas
est”—knowledgeitselfispower. Foucault’sperspectiveisofcourse
verydifferentfrom—indeed,inradicaloppositionto—theproto-
EnlightenmentscientismofBacon,forwhomknowledgeisalways
powertodo. Asweshallsee,knowledgeforFoucaultisratherpower
to say, on the one hand, and power to be said, on the other. This
distinctionunderliesthemetaphilosophicalcharacterofFoucault’s
analysis,whichrepudiatesthenotionoftranscendent“Knowledge”
and instead focuses on the complex power relations which make
possible,giveriseto,andshapetheveryideaofknowledge(s).
ForFoucault,allstatementsbelongtoaparticulardiscourse,which
isthesetofallpossiblestatementsthatcanbearticulatedabouta
particulartopicwithinaparticularhistoricalperiod(Foucault,1994:
79, 158). Discoursedefinestheboundariessurroundingwhatcan
andcannotbesaid,andtothisextentshapesorconstructswhatcan
beknown,i.e.,theobjectofknowledgeitself. Foucault’searlyworks
areprincipallyconcernedwiththeconditionsofpossibility(“histori-
calaprioris”)thatmustbeinplaceinorderforcertainstatements
(again, that which can be said) to actually emerge within a given
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discourse(ibid.,86–92).6Theyarealsoconcernedwithdemarcating
andanalyzingdiscursiveformations—thehistoricalrupturesanddis-
continuitieswherebynewformsofdiscourseappearandsupplant
older forms of discourse (Foucault, 1972: esp. Part II, chapter 2).
Foucaultreferstothismodeofanalysisas“archeology”(Foucault,
1994: xxii).
Thepointofthearcheologicalmethodis“tograspthestatement
in the narrowness and singularity of its event; to determine the
conditionsofexistence,tofixitslimitsasaccuratelyaspossible,to
establishitscorrelationswithotherstatementswithwhichitmay
belinked,andtoshowwhatotherformsofarticulationitexcludes”
(Foucault,2003: 401). ForFoucault,knowledgeisnotathing(e.g.,
aparticularmentalstate)butratherarelationbetweenstatements
withinaparticulardiscourse—specifically,therelationofwhatcan
bespokenorthoughttothatwhichcannot.
Foucault’smajorworksintheearlyperiodinvolvetheapplication
ofthearcheologicalmethodtoaparticulardiscourse. InMadness
andCivilization,forexample,heanalyzesthediscourseofmadness
vis-à-visvarioushistoricalinstitutions: theworkhouse,thehospital,
theasylum,etc(1965). Theappearanceofanewdiscursiveforma-
tion(e.g.,thediscourseofmadnessorinsanity)givesrisetoanew
institutional form (e.g., the asylum), a new knowledge form (e.g.,
psychiatry) and a new object of knowledge (e.g., the insane). By
reflectingontheconditionsofpossibilitywhichwerenecessaryin
orderforparticularinstitutionalformstoemerge,Foucaultuncovers
anewformofdiscursiveknowledgethathasbeenconstructedin
history.
Theearlyworksseektodescribeparticulardiscursiveformations
(through“archeology”)butnottoexplainhowandwhytheycame
about. Beginning with Discipline and Punish, Foucault turns his
attention to analyses of how power relations produce knowledge
withinparticulardiscursiveformations(amethodthathecalls“ge-
nealogy”)(Foucault,1995). Tothisend,hemovesbeyonddiscursive
formationstoaconsiderationofotherformsofknowledgethatare
formedandconstitutedbypower—viz.,non-discursiveformations
6 Forexample,statementsaboutairplanescouldnotbeutteredintheMiddleAges
becausethehistoricalaprioriconditionnecessaryfortheproduction,transmission,
andintelligibilityofsuchstatementswithindiscourse(viz.,theactualexistenceof
airplanes)wasnotyetsatisfied.
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andtheformationofsubjects. Non-discursiveformationsareprac-
ticesthroughwhichpowerismanifestedinparticularforms(e.g.,
theprison,theasylum,thehospital,etc). Subjects(e.g.,prisoners,
madmen,patients,etc)inturn,arecreatedthroughtheprocessof
beingacteduponbynon-discursivepractices.
ForFoucault,powerisnotandcannotbecentralizedintheform
ofasinglecoerciveapparatussuchas“capitalism.”Itexistsnotonly
atthemacro-levelofsociety(e.g.,inideologies,governments,etc.)
butalsoatthemicro-levelofsubjects(asindisciplinarypower)(ibid.,
135–69). TheinvisiblesurveillanceofthePanopticonrevealsaform
ofpowerthatisdynamic,ubiquitous,anddiffuse(ibid.,195–228). It
operatesonlyintherelationsofthosetowhomitapplies. Itcanbe
exertedonindividualbodies(anatomo-power)orentirepopulations
(bio-power) Foucault, 1990: 140). It is not an absolute force but
ratherarelationshipthatexistsbetweenforces—asetofactionsor
forcesexerteduponotheractionsorforces,oruponsubjects(2003:
137). Itisthecapacitytoactuponandtobeactedupon,thusisnot
onlyrepressivebutproductiveaswell.
WhenFoucaultsaysthatpower“openspossibilities,”heisrefer-
ring specifically to the capacity of power to bring about new dis-
cursiveandnon-discursiveformationsandhencetoproducenew
formsofknowledge. Becausepowerisamodeofreciprocalaffec-
tivity,however,itnotonlyproducesknowledgebutisproducedby
knowledgeinturn. Therangeofpossiblestatementscircumscribed
byaparticulardiscursiveformationisshapedbypowerrelations,
butthevisiblemanifestationofpowerrelations(forexample,atthe
levelofpracticesandtheformsthesepracticestakeininstitutions)
isinturnshapedbywhatcanbesaid.
Howdoesthisreciprocalshapingtakeplace? Inthefirstinstance,
werecallthatpowermakesactionspossibleandismadepossible
by them in turn. This is because all actions, once actualized by
power,arerelatedtootheractions(henceotherpossiblemodalities
ofpower). Buttosay, speak, utter, write, orcommunicateinany
way is to perform a certain kind of action — namely, the action
ofproducingstatementswithinaparticulardiscourse. Knowledge,
then, is essentially the power to produce statements which are in
turncapableofbeingrelatedtootherstatementswithinaparticular
discourse. TruthforFoucaultissimplythemechanismwherebythis
powerisexercised:
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‘Truth’istobeunderstoodasasystemoforderedproceduresfor
theproduction,regulation,distribution,circulationandopera-
tionofstatements[...]Eachsocietyhasitsregimeoftruth,its
‘generalpolitics’oftruth: thatis,thetypesofdiscoursewhich
it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and
authoritiesthatenableonetodistinguishtrueandfalsestate-
ments,themeansbywhicheachissanctioned;thetechniques
andproceduresaccordedvalueintheacquisitionoftruth;the
status of those who are charged with saying what counts as
true(Foucault,2003: 316–17).
InDisciplineandPunish,asintheearlierarcheologicalworks,Fou-
caultanalyzesdiscursiveformationssurroundingtheinstitutionsof
disciplineandpunishment. Thechangecomesinhisextendingthis
analysistonon-discursiveformations(practices)and,mostimpor-
tantly,tothepowerrelationswhichgiverisetobothdiscursiveand
non-discursiveformations. Thus,forexample,Foucaultdiscussesthe
non-discursiveformationofpunishmentactualizedintheinstitution
oftheprison.
Powerrelations,then,producenon-discursiveformationsatthe
levelofpractice(e.g.,punishment)whichareinturnmadevisiblein
institutions(e.g.,theprison). Moreover,thesepracticesproducenew
formsofknowledge(e.g.,criminology)whichinturnproducenew
objectsofknowledgeatthelevelofthesubject(e.g., thecriminal
type). ThisrevealsanotherofFoucault’sessentialinsights: thatsub-
jectsareproducedandshapedbypowerrelationsvis-à-visbecoming
objectsofdiscourse(e.g.,study,inquiry,analysis,classification,etc)
andpractices(e.g., work, education, discipline, consumption, etc).
ToparaphraseW.V.Quine(andturnhimonhishead),tobeistobe
theobjectofapraxisandthesubjectofatheory. Mysubjectivityis
exhaustedbythepowerexertedonmebyothersandtheworldand
thepowerwhichIexertinturn.
Aradicalconsequenceofthisviewisthatsubjects,strictlyspeak-
ing,arenotontologicallybasicinthewaytheyarefor,say,Sartre.
This does not mean that individual subjectivities do not exist for
Foucault—theydo. Hispointisthatthereisnopreexistenthuman
natureoressencewhichprovidestheontologicalfoundationofsub-
jectivity. Thebodyaloneisbasic;andbodiesareconstantlybeing
createdandre-createdassubjectsbothbyaffectingotherbodiesand
bybeingsoaffected. Capitalistpower,forexample,ismanifestedin
practiceatthelevelofinstitutions(e.g.,shoppingmalls)andexerted
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uponbodies. Thisrelationbetweenthebodyandpowergivesriseto
particularformsofsubjectivity—viz.,thatoftheconsumer(whose
bodyisaffected bypower)and, forexample, thecultureindustry
(whichaffectsthebodiesofothersthroughpower).
FromaFoucauldianperspective,cinemaisbothadiscursiveand
non-discursive formation: a mode of knowledge manifested con-
cretely at the level of individual films and a mode of power man-
ifestedconcretelyatthelevelofthefilmindustry. Thereciprocal
relationbetweenfilmsandthefilmindustry,inturn,producesapar-
ticularformofsubjectivity—thatoftheviewerorspectator. Against
bothcriticaltheoryandculturalstudies,Foucaultwouldclaimthat
therelationbetweenfilmsandspectatorsisneitherwhollypassive
norwhollyactive. Themeaningofaparticularfilmmaybeassigned
toitbyaparticularspectator,butthespectatorquaspectatorispro-
ducedinturnbyhisorherviewingofthefilm. Moreover,therange
of meanings ascribable to a film and the corresponding modes of
spectatorshiptheyproduceareboundedbyconditionsofpossibil-
ity—towit,thecomplexnetworkofdiscursiveandnon-discursive
formationswhichproducebothfilmsandspectators.
Allofthisisbywayofsayingthat: (a)cinemaassuchisnotre-
ducibleeithertoitsformal(i.e.,discursive)orpolitico-economic(i.e.,
non—discursive)components; rather, bothcomponentsproduce
andshapeeachotherreciprocally;(b)themeaningofcinemaisnot
reducibleeithertotheproductionorconsumptionofcinematicob-
jects;rather,meaningbothcreatesandiscreatedbyviewer-subjects;
(c)theparticularformswhichfilmstake,theparticularmeanings
whichareassignedtothem,andtheparticularmodesofspectator-
shipwhichassignsaidmeaningsaremutuallyirreducible; allare
producedbyacomplexnetworkofpowerrelations. Tothiswemust
add(d)thatthepowerrelationswhichgiverisetocinemaquacin-
emaareneitherrepressivenorliberatoryinandofthemselves. The
extenttowhichcinemamayberegardedasoneortheotherdepends
entirelyonthepoliticalandsocio-economicrelationswhichaffect
andareaffectedbyit.
Asthehistoryofcinemamakesplain,thereisnowaytodisentan-
glefilmfromcapitalism. Ontheonehand,Westerncapitalismgave
rise to industrial technology, the market economy, the tri-partite
classsystem,etc.,allofwhichareconditionsofpossibilityforthe
emergenceofcinema. Ontheotherhand,theproliferationofcinema
asamodernmediumofcommunicationcontributedtothetransfor-
mationofcapitalism(i.e.,fromindustrialcapitalismtomultinational
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