Table Of ContentThe Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility
The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility
Bruce N. Waller
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
© 2015 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Waller, Bruce N., 1946–.
The stubborn system of moral responsibility / Bruce N. Waller.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-262-02816-5 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Responsibility. I. Title.
BJ1451.W29 2014
170—dc23
2014013243
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Preface vii
1 The Powerful Belief in Moral Responsibility 1
2 Redefining Moral Responsibility 9
3 The Strike-Back Roots of Moral Responsibility 39
4 Belief in a Just World 53
5 Emotions without Moral Responsibility 79
6 The Power of the Moral Responsibility System 99
7 Sublime Reason 117
8 Free Will Flourishes in the Absence of Moral Responsibility 145
9 The Boojum of Creeping Exculpation 173
10 Punishment without Moral Responsibility 189
11 The Culture of Moral Responsibility 207
12 Myopic Moral Responsibility 233
13 Conclusion: How Stubborn Is Moral Responsibility? 253
Notes 265
References 269
Index 289
Preface
The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility is not a direct attack on moral
responsibility, though its purpose is to raise doubts concerning the legiti-
macy of belief in moral responsibility. Rather, it is an attempt to answer a
question that should be of interest to both moral responsibility skeptics and
moral responsibility believers: Why is belief in individual moral responsi-
bility so strong? Whatever one’s judgment concerning the strength of the
many fascinating philosophical arguments that have been given to sup-
port belief in moral responsibility, it is clear that the commitment to moral
responsibility is stronger—among both philosophers and the folk—than
the arguments in its favor could justify. So what are the other factors that
make belief in the moral responsibility system so robust and resilient? The
examination of those extraphilosophical factors ranges across biology, psy-
chology, criminology, sociology, and even touches on economics.
The belief in moral responsibility is not an isolated belief (like my belief
that I turned off the light in my office), the truth or falsity of which will
have little impact on the remainder of my beliefs. To the contrary, it is a
belief that is deeply embedded in a larger belief system, and doubting or
rejecting moral responsibility will involve major adjustments elsewhere in
a wide range of important beliefs and values. Thus, examining the strength
of belief in moral responsibility will involve deeper inquiry into its relation
with other beliefs as well as scrutiny of the system in which moral respon-
sibility functions (and the system in which it flourishes). P. F. Strawson
insisted that belief in moral responsibility is a vital element in a way of life;
examining the way of life in which moral responsibility is central involves
inquiries that go well beyond the standard philosophical terrain.
Many people have been supportive in making this book possible. Obvi-
ously, many of those who have been most supportive and most stimulating
will not agree with a word of it. Above all, they certainly do not deserve
viii Preface
blame for it (after all, no one is ever morally responsible), though they cer-
tainly have considerable causal responsibility for the book.
I am lucky to be working in a department that is philosophically stim-
ulating, very congenial and supportive, and always entertaining. Having
both philosophy and religious studies colleagues is a special benefit, broad-
ening my perspective and interests in ways too numerous to catalog. Tom
Shipka, our former chair, not only supported my work generously while
chair, but has also provided invaluable guidance and support during the
years I have served as department chair and continues to alert me to a
variety of fascinating books and articles. Brendan Minogue reads much of
my work, and his insightful, joyous criticisms (as well as his tremendous
help in elucidating a wide range of issues related to philosophy of science)
have been invaluable. Christopher Bache and I have fundamentally dif-
ferent world views, and his cordial but deep challenges often force me to
think much harder about some very basic issues. Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez
is a meticulous reader who gives excellent advice as well as much appre-
ciated encouragement. Deborah Mower alerts me to a wide variety of
research in psychology that I would have otherwise missed, and she often
raises important questions and objections that force me to rethink posi-
tions. “Tess” Tessier is a wondrous and inexhaustible resource for all things
mythical and symbolic. Mustansir Mir not only enriches my life with won-
derful poetry, but has also aided me in appreciating the riches of Islamic
thought from many centuries. Mark Vopat is a wonderful resource on eth-
ics, especially applied ethics and ethical issues related to the family; and
I shall be eternally grateful to him for finally getting dancing penguins
on our departmental website. Alan Tomhave is my trusted guide in politi-
cal philosophy as well as philosophy of law. Victor Wan-Tatah is a cordial
and reliable source on contemporary developments in religion and poli-
tics. Michael Jerryson is a wonderful new addition to our department, with
a multitude of interests and a remarkable knowledge of Asian religions.
We also have a wonderful group of people who teach a variety of courses
with us, and from whom I have learned much (ranging from bioethics to
criminal law), including Julie Aultman, Eric Boynton, Walter Carvin, Lou
D’Apolito, Sister Nancy Dawson, Martina Haines, Zoreh “Z” Kermani, Jeff
Limbian, Vince Lisi, Sarah Lown, Bernie Oakes, Regina Rogers, Joseph Sch-
onberger, Donna Sloan, Arnold Smith, Lynette Stratford, Andrew Stypinski,
and Richard White. The vital center of the department, who adds much to
its welcoming, warm friendliness and everything to its orderly efficiency, is
our remarkable departmental administrator, Mary Dillingham, who is ably
assisted by our talented and congenial student workers, Gina Ponzio and,
Preface ix
more recently, Nicole Pavlansky. That we have superb student workers is
no accident: Mary selects and trains them. Everything done in the depart-
ment is facilitated by the aid of a very supportive dean, Shearle Furnish;
an associate dean, Jane Kestner, who has fixed more of my mistakes than I
care to mention; and a provost, Ikram Khawaja, who has given us constant
strong support.
Outside the department, I am indebted to Homer Warren for literally
dozens of luncheon conversations that are always enjoyable and tremen-
dously helpful: Homer invariably sees implications and issues that deepen
my understanding of the questions we discuss. Special thanks also to Fred
Alexander, “Luke” Lucas, and Lauren Schroeder for years of wonderful con-
versations that careen into a wide variety of topics, and which are always fun
and sometimes enlightening. Many others have enriched my understand-
ing and enlarged my curiosity on a wide variety of subjects; they include
Howard Mettee, Charles Singler, Paul Sracic, Keith Lepak, Stephen Flora,
Lia Ruttan, Gary Salvner, Tom Henricks, Judy Henricks, Nawal Ammar, and
Robert Weaver.
Three philosophical friends of many years have been of special impor-
tance to my work. Richard Double’s brilliant writing and delightful conver-
sations on issues related to free will have been an invaluable guide through
the entire range of free will questions. George Graham has long been my
guide through some particularly important psychological work that I would
not have discovered, and the significance of which I would not have appre-
ciated, without our conversations and without his deeply insightful books.
Several long and intense conversations with Robert Kane—not nearly as
many as I would like—as well as his rigorous but very readable work have
had a huge influence on my thoughts, and certainly pushed me to think
much harder than I otherwise would have done about this entire range of
questions.
In recent visits to Tallahassee I have had the pleasure of luncheon discus-
sions with Randy Clarke, Al Mele, and (before he moved to Arizona) Mike
McKenna; those lively luncheons were not only a great pleasure but also
gave me a much clearer picture of several key issues.
Thomas W. Clark not only runs a website—Naturalism.org—that invari-
ably offers very insightful discussions and papers and reviews, but also his
comments on my work have been extremely helpful (we agree on almost
everything, and so Clark’s comments on the few points of disagreement are
always very challenging). In addition, Tom made possible a three-way online
discussion with Dan Dennett—on the arguments and claims in Against
Moral Responsibility—that provided a most penetrating and challenging and
