The Primum Mobile in the Thomistic Aristotelianism of Charles De Koninck

545 Pages·2016·1.88 MB·English

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
The Primum Mobile in the Thomistic Aristotelianism of Charles De Koninck:
On Natural Philosophy as Architectonic
A DISSERTATION
Submitted to the Faculty of the
School of Philosophy
Of The Catholic University of America
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
©
Copyright
All Rights Reserved
By
John G. Brungardt
Washington, D.C.
2016
The Primum Mobile in the Thomistic Aristotelianism of Charles De Koninck:
On Natural Philosophy as Architectonic
John G. Brungardt, Ph.D.
Director: Richard F. Hassing
This dissertation argues that natural philosophy is a qualified form of wisdom. It thereby
providesanavenuetowardsthereintegrationofthescientificspecialtiesintoasapientialview
of the cosmic whole. I draw inspiration from Charles De Koninck, who writes in a principled
fashion on this theme. The dissertation’s main contention is that there are perennial conclu-
sions warranted by Aristotelian physics, and these ground the discipline’s claim to being a
type of wisdom. One such conclusion is the existence and general nature of the first mobile
or fundamental cosmic body, which Aristotle mistakenly identified with the outermost celes-
tial sphere. The current, yet tentative, replacement is “physical space,” dialectically studied
by modern cosmology via the fundamental spacetime conditions for local motion and the
“expansion” of space.
Therefore, two contributions are made by this dissertation. First, it defends the sapiential
or “architectonic” role of natural philosophy. The centerpiece for this case is the disentangle-
ment of those features of the ancient theory about the first mobile now surpassed by modern
science from those features that necessarily obtain in general natural philosophy. This opens
a theoretical space for cooperative work by modern science to discover the specific nature
of this fundamental body. Second, by following such a course, the dissertation provides a
much-needed exegesis of De Koninck’s interpretation of Aristotelian natural philosophy.
The dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part (Chapters 1–5) argues for the
existenceandnatureofthefirstmobile.Chapters1–4inparticulardefendthetraditionalnat-
ural philosophical proofs for the first mobile’s existence and nature. In a dialectical fashion,
Chapter 5 argues that “physical space” is this fundamental cosmic body, drawing extensively
from progress in modern cosmology. Based upon these investigations, the dissertation’s sec-
ond part details the method of general physics and defends its role as directive over the
particular domains of modern science. Specifically, Chapter 6 defends the method of natural
philosophy as proportionate to the nature of the human mind. Chapter 7 explains the sapien-
tial role of general philosophical physics vis-à-vis modern science, bringing the investigation
to completion.
This dissertation by John G. Brungardt fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral
degree in Philosophy approved by Richard F. Hassing, Ph.D., as Director, and by Jean De
Groot, Ph.D. and Kevin White, Ph.D. as Readers.
Richard F. Hassing, Ph.D., Director
Jean De Groot, Ph.D., Reader
Kevin White, Ph.D., Reader
ii
For my godfather
“La Sabiduría es más ágil que cualquier movimiento;
a causa de su pureza, lo atraviesa y penetra todo.”
– Sab. 7, 24
iii
For the waking there is one cosmos [ ], and
κόσμον
it is common; but when men sleep, each one turns
aside into a private [cosmos]. We should not act
and speak like those asleep. Therefore, we ought to
follow what is common. Although reason is com-
mon to all, the many live as if having a private
wisdom.
Heraclitus, DK 89, 73, 2
The superior science is more of the nature of wis-
dom than the ancillary; for the wise man must not
be ordered but must order, and he must not obey
another, but the less wise must obey him.
Aristotle
Metaphysics, I. 2
Because the aforementioned artisans, considering
the ends of certain particular things, do not attain
to the end of the whole universe, they are called
wisewithrespecttothisorthatthing,accordingto
which sense it is said that as a wise architect I laid
a foundation (I. Cor. iii). The name of “wise man”
simply speaking is reserved to him alone whose
consideration dwells upon the end of the universe.
St. Thomas Aquinas
Summa contra Gentiles, I. 1
I suppose that ideally the physicist should be al-
lowed to elucidate his own universe up to a point,
and then hand it over to the philosopher to ascer-
tain its exact status in relation to a wider outlook.
But in practice we have not sufficient confidence
in one another, and we both make raids over the
border to suggest all sorts of ways in which the
other fellow may be deceiving himself and us.
Sir Arthur S. Eddington
“Physics and Philosophy”
iv
[A] proliferation of scientistic beliefs has seriously
obstructedourcollectivevision,...ithasinfactes-
tranged us from an immemorial wisdom that has
nurtured mankind—or at least its more enlight-
ened members—throughout the ages .... It is our
earnest hope that in setting forth considerations
befitting this task we may help, in some small
measure, to promote a genuine understanding of
that philosophia perennis which is not just a for-
mal philosophical system, but truly a timeless wis-
dom and a perennial love.
Wolfgang Smith
Cosmos and Transcendence
From the fact that the experimental sciences go
farther in the direction of concretion one cannot
conclude that they can be substituted for the phi-
losophy of nature of the ancients. To identify the
philosophy of nature with the experimental sci-
ences which are only its dialectical extension is to
destroy it in its root, to deny the most certain part
of our knowledge of nature, as well as its most no-
ble natural subject. For that reason, the identifica-
tionofthetwomissesinthemostcompletemanner
the point of the ancients and of wisdom.
Charles De Koninck
“Are the Experimental Sciences Distinct from the
Philosophy of Nature?”
Nearly everyone holds that whatever interest the
Physics may now possess can be no more than his-
torical. This we interpret as a challenge, not so
much to the particular doctrines it contains but,
whatisfarmoreimportant,tothemeaningandva-
lidity of the kind of questions its author assumes
the human mind should be facing.
Charles De Koninck
“Random Reflections on Science and Calculation”
v
Table of Contents
Front Matter
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Epigraphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Introduction 1
§i There is a natural path that characterizes human knowledge and in particular
the study of natural philosophy; does this path make possible a type of wisdom
about the natural order? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
§ii The path in modern science is characterized by private and artificial roads,
mitigating the possibility of a wisdom about nature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
§iii Maintaining a sapiential view of the study of the cosmos is the role of natural
philosophy and must be recovered. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
§iv This project will examine the sapiential role of natural philosophy by consid-
ering as its test-case the existence and nature of the first moved mover, for this
being (or beings) stands at the border between general natural philosophy and
cosmology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
§v Reflection upon the processes of investigation concerning an object materially
common to both the philosophy of nature and the modern sciences permits
one to sort out their relationship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
§vi The work of Charles De Koninck is especially fit for this project. . . . . . . . 15
§vii The project’s main theses, division, order of argument, and mode are as follows. 20
I The Existence & Nature of the Primum Mobile 23
Introduction to Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Chapter 1 Finding the Natural Path
& the Principles of Mobile Being 25
Introductory Note to Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
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§1 Natural philosophy follows an investigative arc along the natural path in our
knowledge that proceeds from what is better known to us to what is better
known in itself, or by nature. (Physics, Book I.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
§2 The reality of motion is assumed by natural philosophy; nonetheless, it defends
the reality of motion and thereby defends its own existence while discovering
its first ultimate cause. (Physics, Book I.2–9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Conclusions and Observations from Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Chapter 2 Nature & Cosmos, Motion & Action,
& Some Clues about the First Mobile 85
Introductory Note to Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
§3 Nature as a principle and cause of motion must be assumed by physics, yet its
intelligibility is manifested from the certainty of common experience, orienting
the physicist more determinately towards questions about ultimate causes; in
particular, the questions of efficient causality and the priority of per se as
opposed to chance causes of the whole are raised at this juncture. (Physics,
Book II) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
§4 Thedefinitionofmotionandthedemonstrationthatactionexistsinthemobile
show that the mobile as such is passive; this motivates further investigation
into the efficient causes of motion. (Physics, Book III.1–3) . . . . . . . . . . . 105
§5 The natural path of investigation in physics leads from the principles, causes,
subject, and definition of motion to consider the primary concomitants and
consequents of motion. (Physics, Books III–VI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
§6 The existence of place requires an ultimate principle of immobility for being
placed. (Physics, Book IV.1–5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
§7 The existence of time as a measure of absolute simultaneity depends upon the
unity of a cosmic measure of time; if absolute simultaneity can be defended
independently, then a single cosmic measure of time must exist. (Physics, Book
IV.10–14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
§8 The impossibility of the void indicates that some cosmic plenum must exist;
furthermore, since every being which is in motion must be a body, if there is
a first moved mover, then the nature of the first moved mover must share in
corporeality in some way. (Physics, Book IV.6–9 and Book VI) . . . . . . . . 151
Conclusions and Observations from Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Chapter 3 The First Mobile in Physics, Book VII 157
Introductory Note to Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
§9 The argument for a first mobile provides the necessary integrity for the general
inquiry into mobile being as such. (Physics, Book VII) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
§10 The first moved mover exists; this can be shown as a corollary to the argument
for a First Mover from the nature of the physical continuum and corporeal
agency. (Physics, Book VII.1–2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
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§11 The conclusions about the first mobile body from Aristotelian cosmology are
not perennial ones. (Selections from De Caelo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
§12 The conclusion reached is attended by some problems needing resolution, but
has achieved key results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
Chapter 4 The First Mobile in Physics, Book VIII 223
Introductory Note to Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
§13 The argument for a first mobile provides the necessary integrity for the general
inquiry into mobile being as such. (Physics, Book VIII) . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
§14 The first moved mover exists; this can be shown as a corollary to the argument
for a First Mover based on necessary conditions for cosmic-scale causality.
(Physics, Book VIII.5–6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
§15 The determinate features assigned to the first mobile body from the Aris-
totelian theory about cosmic sources of generation and corruption are not
perennial or primary conclusions. (De Caelo Book II.3 and De Generatione,
Book II.10–11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
§16 The conclusion reached is attended by some problems needing resolution, but
has achieved key results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Chapter 5 Dialectical Indications of the First Mobile
from Modern Cosmology 265
Introductory Note to Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
§17 “Dialectic” issaidinmanyways;theprocedureofthischapterwillbedialectical
in three ways. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
§18 Proposalsaboutthespecificnature ofthefirst mobilebodyrequiremore deter-
minate observations and theories which replace the primitive experiences upon
which ancient, medieval, and Newtonian cosmology relied; modern cosmology
is in the position to perform this task. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
§19 A candidate for the first moved mover is drawn from indications provided by
modern cosmology; “physical space” is the first moved mover in the cosmos. . 305
§20 An Aristotelian scientific cosmology is possible, but a final account concerning
the formal parts of the universe, required by such a cosmology, has not been
attained; continued progress in the study of the cosmos requires the philosophy
of nature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
Conclusions and Observations from Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
viii