The Passions of Rhetoric: Lessing’s Theory of Argument and the German Enlightenment

139 Pages·1993·1.82 MB·English

by  Evelyn K. Moore (auth.)

THE PASSIONS OF RHETORIC:
LESSING'S THEORY OF ARGUMENT AND THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT
Library of Rhetorics
VOLUME 3
SERIES EDITOR
Michel Meyer, European Centre for the Study ofA rgumentation, Universite Libre
de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
EDITORIAL BOARD
James L. Golden, Department of Communication, The Ohio State University,
Columbus, Ohio, U.S.A.
Josef Kopperschmidt, Fachbereich Sozialwesen, Fachhochschule Niederrhein,
Monchengladbach, Germany
SCOPE
The bookseries Library ofR hetorics is meant as a companion series to the interna
tional journal Argumentation. The bookseries and the journal should reinforce each
other. The bookseries would mainly focus on:
- Argumentation strlcto sensu (the theory of reasoning)
- Literary and legal rhetoric
- Rhetoric and the humanities
- Sociology and historical aspects of rhetorical thought
- Particular problems in rhetoric and argumentation.
The titles published in this series are listed at the end ofthis volume.
The Passions of Rhetoric:
Lessing' s Theory of Argument
and the German Enlightenment
by
EVEL YN K. MOORE
Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio, U.S.A .
.....
"
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Moare, Evelyn K.
The passions of rhetorTC . LessTng's theory of argument and the
German enl ightenment I Evelyn K. Moare.
p. cm .. -- ILibrary of rhetorics . v. 3)
Includes bibl icgraphical references and index.
ISBN 978-94-010-4881-1 ISBN 978-94-011-1996-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-1996-2
1. Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 1729-1781--Philosophy. 2. Lessing,
Gotthold Ephraim, 1729-1781--Knowledge--Rhetoric.
3. Rhetoric--1500-1800. 4. Enl ightenment--Germany. 5. Germany
-Intellectual life--18th century. 1. Title. II. Series.
PT2415.M66 1993 '
832' .6--dc20
93-13187
ISBN 978-94-010-4881-1
Printed on acid-free paper
AlI Rights Reserved
© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1993
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 1993
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
This book is dedicated in memory of my father Ewald Knopp
Table of Contents
Preface ix
Introduction xi
1. The Conflict between Philosophy, Rhetoric and Theology 1
2. Rhetoric and Theological Argumentation: ~ssing on Cardano 19
3. Johann Melchior Goeze's Polemic against the Theatre 38
4. Lessing contra Goeze: The Case for Rhetoric 51
Conclusion 74
Notes 77
Primary Sources 104
Secondary Sources 107
Index 119
vii
Preface
The goal of this book is to ascertain Lessing's views on argumentation and rhetoric.
I intend to establish that these views constitute a systematic and coherent theory
and to argue that for Lessing rhetoric in argument can yield philosophical truth.
Analysis of Lessing's views also sheds light on the general significance of rhetoric
in the 18th century. The denial that rhetoric has claims to truth is a long-standing
prejudice of Western thought. This position is evident in Kant's rejection of rhetoric
in philosophical discourse. But in my view, the situation in the 18th century in
Germany was somewhat more complex. Rhetoric did not die a quiet death but was
very much alive in polemical tracts, and Lessing was a pivotal figure in a culture
dominated by argument and disputation. I asked myself why and how this polemical
age came to an end and how does the rejection of polemics by the 19th century affect
our understanding of the 18th century? In the Introduction, I address some of these
questions and establish a historical framework for the development of polemics in
the 18th century.
Another reason this polemical age has traditionally been seen as problematic for
the scholars of the period is because argument, disputation and debate cannot be
submitted to the same easy analysis as the systematic treatises produced at the end
of the century. I submit that this difficulty is itself a result of the rejection of 18th
century polemics. By making argument itselfthe focus of my investigation, I attempt
to illuminate this important discourse strategy so central to 18th century intellectual
life.
The opposition between truth and language has characterized Western philosophy
since Plato, who wanted to remove rhetoric and its effect on the emotions from
philosophy. I examine Lessing's position on this issue. I show that Lessing attempts
to resolve the opposition between truth and language by incorporating emotions
through a rhetorical conception of argument. He argues that rhetorical devices are
not just ornamentation, but are essential to argument itself.
In presenting Lessing's views on argument and rhetoric I have a two-fold purpose.
I want to show both Lessing's contribution to the history of rhetoric and the role he
plays in the long-standing debate between philosophy and rhetoric. While Plato's
rejection of the Sophists is the source of this conflict in Western thought, Lessing
anticipates and influences modern theorists on language. His views on rhetoric and
ix
x PREFACE
argument Iead directly to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. But while Lessing's rhetorical
skills have been rightly praised, and alas not often imitated, his own writings on
Ianguage and its function in the search for truth have not been acknowledged. Thus,
I hope not only fill a void in Lessing scholarship and 18th-century rhetorical studies,
but also to provide a Iink to modern theories of language and philosophy. Lessing's
arguments for a rhetorical polemics presents a powerful counterpoint to the anti
rhetorical position embodied by Kant and his followers, a position which Iike the
anti-rhetorical prejudices of Plato, has biased our perception of the 18th century. It is
my hope that this book will help restore to our picture ofthe 18th century the primacy
of rhetoric and rhetorical argument.
In order to make my study as accessible as possible I have provided translations
of alI the quotations in the text. Unless otherwise indicated, these translations are my
own. An asterisk follows each translation for which I have provided the original text
in the endnote.
I am gratefui to alI the people who have so generously given me their time in
reading this manuscript, making suggestions and generally providing me with the
encouragement to complete this project. I would Iike to especially thank John Vaio,
Eugene Costa and James Parente, Jr. This book would not have been possible
without them. I aiso want to thank Marianne Boniger, David Weible, Maria Dobozy,
Kamakshi Murti for their encouragement and friendship. In addition I want to thank
my colleagues at Kenyon, CIifton Crais, Donna Heizer and George McCarthy for
their help. I wish to thank Mamie Gray for alI her help with the early stages of this
manuscript. 1 am also indebted to Jackie Dove for helping me with the Iast stages of
typing and Gintautas CiabIis for proofreading the manuscript. Finally I would like
to thank my sons, Adam Moore and Andrea Costa, and especially my mother, Helen
Knopp, for being there for me during difficult times.
Introduction
In favor of criticism. - Now something that you formerly Ioved as a
truth or probability strikes you as an error; you shed it and fancy that
it represents a victory for your reason. But perhaps this error was as
necessary for you then, when you were stiU a different person - you
are always a different person - as are alI your present "truths", being
a skin, as it were, that concealed and covered a great deal that you
were not yet permitted to see .... We negate and must negate because
something in us wants to live and affirm - something that we perhaps
do not know or see as yet. - This is said in favor of criticism.
Nietzsche The Gay Science #307
In The World as Will and Representation Schopenhauer proclaims that he intends
to wage a relentless polemic against Kant. The purpose of this polemic is not to
negate Kant's theories but rather to purify them. The polemicist is bold and direct.
If he were to be cautious his language "would of necessity become feeble and flat
through circumlocutions."I* In order to expose his opponent's errors and reveal the
truth, the polemicist has the obligation to be merciless.
His mistakes must be separated from it, rendered harmless, and then given over
to oblivion. Therefore in the polemic I am about to institute against Kant, I have
only his mistakes and weaknesses in view. I face them with hostility, and wage
a relentless war of extermination upon them, always mindful not to conceal them
with indulgence, but rather to place them in the brightest light, the more surely to
destroy them. (Schopenhauer World as Will and Representation 1.417?*
This statement of purpose provides a remarkably concise definition of polemic: It
is verbal war, waged relentlessly against error. There is no retreat from the assault
in which ideas are put to the test. Furthermore for Schopenhauer such a battle has a
definite epistemological purpose because it leads to truth.
Various aspects of polemics as described by Schopenhauer have posed problems
for scholars for a number of reasons. First, the hostile aspects of polemical encounters
have generally been misinterpreted. That is, such hostility is often taken to be an
expression of personal enmity rather than the formulaic and necessary attitude of
XI
xii EVELYN K. MOORE
polemical debate. Second, polemic cannot be separated from its context. Thus, one
must be familiar with Kant's ideas in order to understand Schopenhauer's polemic
against them. When the opponent is Kant, familiarity is easily managed. But when
the opponent is unfamiliar, which is often the case, only the issues presented by the
well-known debater are considered. Lack of familiarity with polemical conventions
and disregard for context necessarily engender problems of interpretation.3
While Schopenhauer's detinition of polemics as a method of philosophical in
quiry is compelling, it does not reflect the prevalent 19th century attitudes vis-a-vis
polemics. His statement is rather an echo of the great polemical debates of the 18th
century. Lessing stands out as the best known representative of these debates, and
his development of a polemical style is duly noted by contemporaries and literary
historians alike. Indeed, he is acclaimed as a master of the genre.4 But, as Eric
A. Blackall (1959) notes, no "satisfactory account of Lessing's views on language"
exists.5 No one has asked whether he,like Schopenhauer, articulated his own position
on polemics and what the implications of an underlying theory of polemics might
be for his work. Moreover, Lessing's polemical writinghas itself presented a major
obstacle in assessing his accomplishments. According to Rene WelIek (1955), for
example, Lessing was an important tigure in the history of literature, but his lack of
systematization, that is, his production of dialogic and polemical works, prevented
him from making a real contribution to literary and aesthetic theory.6 Lessing' s strictly
theological writings have an analysis somewhat different from the theoretical discus
sions of literature and art. But here also polemical style and intent present serious
obstacles to any determination of Lessing's theological view. Thus, scholars and
theologians pose a number of questions. Does Lessing have a systematic position?
Is he a deist or perhaps a pantheist like Spinoza? Does he support or undermine
Christian revelation? Or is he really an atheist underneath it ali? AII these views
have found supporters.1
Although these conclusions are wildly different, they alI have one thing in com
mon. A theological position only emerges when a systematic theory is present. Thus
scholars who wish to detine Lessing's stand on a particular issue also tind it neces
sary to establish such a theory. Hans Leisegang (1931), for example, tries to tind a
consistent pattern to Lessing's thought; this "Grundform" then becomes the basis of
a consistent theory.8 Another approach is to tind biographical evidence that supports
a particular position. For example, Theodor Wilhelm Danzel (1880), among others,
maintains that Lessing was a folIower of Spinoza because of his alleged cori versation
with Jacobi.9 AII these critics with a penchant for systematic analysis attempt to
ferret out the real position hidden behind the polemical rhetoric. For most of them
the polemical style obscures Lessing's true thoughts.lO
But why are these works a problem for some and not for others? The same polem
ical style that make Lessing's contributions seem difficult to assess excited some of
Lessing's contemporaries. Herder, for example, admires Lessing's lively prose style.
On the other hand, Goethe criticizes Lessing for his polemical attacks.11 But Friedrich
Schlegel's discussion of the matter determined the direction of Lessing scholarship.
Both Schlegel and Goethe represent the next generation for whom Lessing embodies
something they both admire but something they leave behind. Schlegel, like Herder,