Table Of ContentPolitical Science
THE MANIPULATION OF CONSENT
The State and Working-Class Consciousness in Brazil
YOUSSEF COH EN
Pitt Latin American Series
"A fascinating analysis of some crucial periods in recent
Brazilian history. A provoca tive thesis that should prompt a
lot of salutary debate." —james m. malloy, University of
Pittsburgh
The Manipulation of Consent is a major contribution to our knowledge
of the mechanisms by which elites instill in the lower classes the
beliefs, values, and attitudes that legitimate their subordinate
position in the social order. Youssef Cohen explores the case of Brazil,
where the working class was relatively quiescent in the face of the
authoritarian regime established by force in 1964. Drawing on recent
advances in the theory of the State and in the study of power
relations, as well as on modern methods of social inquiry, he reveals
the techniques of ideological control in the concrete setting of
modern Brazilian society. The result is an unusually illuminating
case study that blends theoretical exposition, conceptually informed
historical analysis, and a wealth of empirical data. The Manipulation of
Consent makes a major contribution to the understanding of Brazilian
politics, the study of power relations, and the theory of the State.
Youssef Cohen is Associate Professor of Political Science at New
York University.
"This is a 'must book' for scholars and teachers interested in
power and the State. It represents the best kind of social
Science research that is being done today." — peter bachrach,
Temple University —
University of Pittsburgh Press /'
Pittsburgh'; Pa. 15260 /
ISBN 0-8229-5806-6
Gwr design by Brucc Gore
Published by the University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, Pa., 15260
Copyright © 1989, University of Pittsburgh Press
All rights reserved
Feffer and Simons, Inc., London
Manufactured in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Cohen, Youssef.
“The manipulation of consent : the State and working-class consciousness
in Brazil / Youssef Cohen.
p. cm. — (Pitt Latin American series)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-8229-3829-4. — ISBN 0-8229-5806-6 (pbk.)
1. Labor and laboring classes—Brazil—Political activity. 2. Elite
(Social Sciences)—Brazil—History. 3. Labor policy—Brazil History.
I. Title. II. Series
HD8286.5.C64 1989
305.5'62'0981—dc!9 89-5403
CIP
To Vera de Souza Gouvea
Contents
LIST OFTABLES AND FIGURES Vlii
acknowledgments ix
1. Introduction 3
2. Power and Political Consciousness 14
3. The State Ideology 29
4. The Interests of Workers 50
5. Mechanisms of Power 66
6. Maintaining the State Ideology 84
7. The Future of the State Ideology 104
8. Conclusion 116
appendix: The Evidence 123
notes 127
BIBLIOGRAPHY 159
INDEX 179
Tables and Figures
TABLES
1. Worker Response to Statenients on Government,
the People, and Strikes 40
2. Worker Response to Statenients on Government
Control of Sindicatos 41
3. Worker Response to the Question: "Whoni Can You
Trust to Defend the Interests of People Like You?" 45
4. Worker Response to the Question: "Do You
Feel You Should Trust or Distrust . . ." 46
5. Index of Annual Average Real Monthly
Minimum Wage, Guanabara, 1952-1975 61
6. Concentration of Inconie in Brazil, 1960-1976 62
7. Inflation and Growth in Brazil, 1964-1982 106
FIGURES
1. Number of Deaths under Torture and Political
"Disappearances," 1966-1975 108
viii
Acknowledgments
I
am grateful to the Ford Foundation, which sponsored
the survey used in this book, and to the Instituto Universitário
de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro and the Center for Political
Research, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan,
which jointly conducted that survey.
For their advice and critidsm, I am deeply grateful to Peter
Bachrach, Brian R. Brown, Philip E. Converse, Frederick W.
Frey, Joanne Gowa, Charles E. Lindblom, Peter J. McDonough,
James M. Malloy, Jack H. Nagel, A. F. K. Organski, Franco
Pavoncello, Nelson do Valle Silva, Amaury de Souza and Peter
A. Swenson.
To my wife, Lindsay M. Wright, I owe more than I could
possibly express.
Philadelphia
May 1987
THE MANIPULAT1ON OF CONSENT
Chapter 2
INTRODUCTION
began early on March 31, 1964. At dawn, General Mourão
Filho marched his troops on Rio de Janeiro to depose President
João Goulart. By the late morning of April 1, Mourão Filho had
been joined by General Amaury Kruel, commander of the Sec-
ond Army centered in São Paulo, and by General Ancora,
commander of the First Army in Rio de Janeiro. On the night of
April 1, Goulart fled to Pôrto Alegre, and the president of the
Senate, Auro de Moura Andrade, declared the presidency va-
cant. Following constitutional procedure, the president of the
Chamber of Deputies, Ranieri Mazilli, was sworn in as acting
president of the Republic. The next day the entire Third Army
joined the revolt, fordng Goulart to flee to the interior of Rio
Grande do Sul. On the fourth day of April, Goulart took asylum
in Uruguay. Thus ended the Brazilian democratic regime—in
power since 1946—and a vicious military dictatorship began,
which was to last for more than two decades.1
The military had met little resistance. Goulart and his retinue
had grossly overestimated their political strength.2 From the
workers and the left, where it was most expected, resistance
carne only faintly. The leftist General Labor Command (CGT)
called a general strike on March 30, but the workers did not
respond. Cities barely slowed down on April 1, and the frantic
appeals of Justice Minister Abelardo Jurema for the people to
take to the streets had no effect whatsoever. Finally, when on
3
4
THE MANIPULATION OF CONSENT
April 2, Brizola, one of the most popular politicians of his time,
urged his fellow ganchos to take up arms against the military,
nothing worthy of notice ever ensued. Brizola himself fled
shortly thereafter to Uruguay, where he joined his brother-in-
law, João Goulart.
The lack of working-class resistance to the military is usually
attributed to the political divisions among the left and the labor
leadership, to its disorganization, to Goularfs unwillingness to
fight, and of course, to the fear of retaliation. These factors are
certainly important, but they do not exhaust the range of pos-
sible explanatory variables. One other possibility is that the
workers favoreci militar}' intervention. This possibility should
be seriously considered because, as I intend to show, the avail-
able data on the behavior, beliefs, and attitudes of Brazilian
workers indicate that the majority of urban workers were in
favor of the military. To be sure, there were active militant
workers who were strongly opposed to the military. But, as
we shall see, these militant workers were only a small mi-
nority even in urban centers, where support for Goulart was
strongest.
In showing that there was a great deal of support for the
military among the working class, I have no intention of dis-
paraging Brazilian workers. I have no intention either of
reviving Lipset's argument concerning working-class au-
thoritarianism or of blaming the emergence of the military re
gime on the authoritarian values of Brazilian workers.3 On the
contrary, my purpose is to show that the authoritarian political
beliefs and values that ultimately led workers to favor the mili
tary over Goulart were originally instiTled in workers by Bra
zilian elites. What is more, it is also possible to show that the
authoritarian elite ideology fhsEllêd in workers served-the inter-
ests of elites farbetterthan the iriterests of the working class. My
main purpose is precisely to describe the msidious power
mechanisms by which Brazilian elites shaped the beliefs and
values of workers, preventing them from acquinngThe demo-
cratic values that would have better served their interests. In
doing so, I hope to reveal the means by which such insidious
