The Limits of Detente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973

442 Pages·2012·4.99 MB·English

by  Craig Daigle

the limits of détente
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The Limits
of
Détente
The United States, the Soviet Union, and
1969 1973
the Arab-Israeli Conflict, –
c r a i g d a i g l e
n e w h a v e n a n d l o n d o n
Copyright © 2012 by Yale University.
All rights reserved.
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without written permission from the publishers.
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Set in Electra type by IDS Infotech, Ltd.
Printed in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Daigle, Craig.
The limits of détente : the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli conflict,
1969–1973 / Craig Daigle.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978–0–300–16713–9 (clothbound : alk. paper)
1. Middle East—Foreign relations—United States. 2. United States—Foreign relations—Middle
East.3. United States—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. 4. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—
United States. 5. Cold War. 6. Arab-Israeli conflict. I. Title.
DS63.2.U5D34 2012
956.04—dc23 2012016446
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48–1992
(Permanence of Paper).
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For
Jack Benson and Fred Engel
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contents
Acknowledgments ix
List of Abbreviations xv
Introduction 1
one
From Confrontation to Negotiation,
January–September 1969
10
two
The Rogers Plan,
October–December1969
48
three
The First Soviet Threat,
January–May 1970
83
four
Crisis on the Suez,
June–September 1970
113
contents
five
Fighting for Sadat,
October1970–August 1971
155
six
The Race to the Summit,
September1971–May1972
192
seven
Bombshells and Back Channels,
June 1972–February 1973
228
eight
The Contradictions of Leonid Brezhnev,
March–October1973
261
nine
The Crisis of Détente,
October1973
294
Conclusion 332
Notes 347
Index 403
viii
acknowledgments
The notion that I would ever write a book remains a somewhat foreign
concept to me. Not that long ago it seems that I was getting kicked out
of classes in middle and high school for poor behavior, struggling to get into
college, and scoring below 400 on the verbal portion of graduate admissions
exams (yes, it’s possible). Thus, countless number of teachers, colleagues,
friends, and family members have helped get me to this point and deserve
mention for their role in helping produce this book.
My interest in the history of American foreign relations dates from my
undergraduate studies at the University of Maryland, where I benefited
from the guidance of Professor Shu Guang Zhang. Not only did Professor
Zhang broaden my understanding of the US role in the world and the con-
nection between American foreign and domestic policies, but he taught me
important and valuable historical methodical techniques without which I
could not have completed this book. It was also at Maryland that I had the
great fortune to have Matt Wasniewski, now the Historian of the House of
Representatives, as my graduate teaching instructor. I thank Matt for help-
ing me develop needed skills as a researcher and a writer and for insisting
that I become a more focused and engaged reader. I am also profoundly
indebted to Matt for encouraging me to pursue my graduate studies at his
alma mater, James Madison University—the best decision I made in my
many years of education.
The two years I spent as a graduate student in history at JMU were invalu-
able in teaching me the craft of becoming a professional historian and for
ix