The development of egalitarianism, altruism, spite and parochialism in childhood and adolescence

15 Pages·2013·0.39 MB·English

by  Ernst Fehr

EuropeanEconomicReview64(2013)369–383
ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect
European Economic Review
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
The development of egalitarianism, altruism, spite and
parochialism in childhood and adolescence
Ernst Fehra, Daniela Glätzle-Rützlerb, Matthias Sutterc,d,n,1
aUniversityofZurich,Switzerland
bUniversityofInnsbruck,Austria
cEuropeanUniversityInstitute,Florence,Italy
dUniversityofCologne,IZABonnandCESifoMunich,Germany
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Articlehistory: Westudyhowthedistributionofother-regardingpreferencesdevelopswithage.Based
Received12October2012 onasetofallocationchoices,weclassifyeachof717subjects,aged8–17years,aseither
Accepted24September2013 egalitarian,altruistic,orspiteful.Wefindastrongdecreaseinspitefulnesswithincreasing
Availableonline15October2013
age.Egalitarianismbecomeslessfrequent,andaltruismmuchmoreprominent,withage.
JELclassification: Females are more frequently classified as egalitarian than males, and less often as
C91 altruistic. By varying the allocation recipient as either an in-group or an out-group
D03 member, we also study how parochialism develops with age. Parochialism emerges
significantlyintheteenageyears.
Keywords: &2013ElsevierB.V.Allrightsreserved.
Other-regardingpreferences
Egalitarianism
Altruism
Spite
Parochialism
1. Introduction
Other-regardingpreferencesareafundamentalcornerstoneinthehumanabilitytocooperateinlargegroupsofgenetic
strangers(Bowles,2004;BoydandRicherson,2005).Thisraisestheimportantquestionhowother-regardingpreferences
develop in human life, inparticular examining the age at which other-regarding behavior sets in and whether there are
gender differences in behavior. Recent research has focused on the development of the upside of other-regarding
preferences by showing that egalitarianism and efficiency concerns become more prominent as children and teenagers
get older (Fehr et al., 2008; Almås et al., 2010). However, theory suggests that other-regarding behavior in groups may
co-evolvewithparochialism,apotentiallyharmfuldownsideofother-regardingpreferences(ChoiandBowles,2007).The
developmentofparochialism–implying in-groupfavoritism andout-grouphostility–hasreceivedlittleattention sofar
(see Bernhard et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2006, for studies with adults). The same holds true for the development of
spitefulness, a human trait that puts negative value on the other person′s well-being. While spitefulness seems to be a
nCorrespondingauthor.
E-mailaddress:[email protected](M.Sutter).
1DepartmentofEconomics,EuropeanUniversityInstitute,ViadellaPiazzuola43,50133Firenze,Italy.
0014-2921/$-seefrontmatter&2013ElsevierB.V.Allrightsreserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.09.006
370 E.Fehretal./EuropeanEconomicReview64(2013)369–383
robustphenomenonofanon-negligibleminorityofadultsubjects(Falketal.,2005;Herrmannetal.,2008;Kerschbamer,
2013),nothingisknownsofarabouttherelativefrequencyofspitefulbehaviorinchildhoodandadolescenceandhowit
mightchangewithage.
In this paper, we study in a unified framework how both benevolent and malevolent other-regarding preferences
developinasampleof717subjectsaged8–17years.Wealloweachsubjecttomakethreesimpleallocationchoicesfrom
whichwecanclassifyherpreferencetypeaseitheregalitarian,altruistic,orspiteful.Egalitariantypespreferallocationsthat
yieldequalpayoffsforbothpartiesoverthosewithunequalpayoffs.Altruistictypesvaluetheotherperson′spayofforthe
joint payoff positively, and spiteful types put a negative value on the other person′s payoff. We also vary whether the
recipientoftheallocationisanin-grouporanout-groupmember,inordertostudyparochialismandhowitdevelopswith
age.Whilethereisalreadyquitesomeevidenceonother-regardingpreferencesandtheinfluenceofageonthem,littleis
stillknowabouttheemergenceofparochialismwithage.
Wefindastrongdecreaseofspitefulnesswithincreasingage.Egalitarianismbecomeslessfrequentandaltruismmuch
moreprominentwithage,thelatterimplyingthatthechoiceofthepie-maximizingallocationincreaseswithage.Females
aremorefrequentlyclassifiedasanegalitariantypethanmalesare(whichissimilartofindingsforadults;seeCrosonand
Gneezy,2009),andfemalesarelessoftenwhatwecallanaltruistictype.Interestingly,parochialismintheformofaworse
treatment of out-group members, compared to in-group members, emerges and first becomes significant in the teenage
years.Hence,whilealtruismbecomesmoreimportantinadolescence,weobservemorediscriminationagainstout-group
membersatthesametime,whichisconsistentwiththemainresultinChoiandBowles(2007).
Studyingthebenevolentandmalevolentaspectsofother-regardingpreferencesisimportantbecauseknowledgeabout
other-regarding preferences is key in designing institutions and their associated incentives. In particular, egalitarianism
(i.e., inequalityaversion) and reciprocityarelikelytobe important in employer–employee relationships in labor markets
(Bewley,1998).Negativeother-regardingpreferences–likespite–havebeenfoundtobeinfluentialonbehavioraswell,for
instancebyinducingsabotageintournaments(HarbringandIrlenbusch,2011).Beyondinfluencingbehaviorinsmall-scale
groups,other-regardingpreferencesmayalsoshapeasocietydecisivelybyaffectingdecisionsonsocialwelfareortaxation
(Fortinetal.,2007).
Whilemanystudieshaveexaminedother-regardingpreferencesinadults(seeCamerer,2003,orCooperandKagel,2012,
for surveys), much less is yet known about how these preferences develop with age, in particular before humans enter
working life. Studying the development of other-regarding preferences is interesting for several reasons. First, from a
theoretical perspective, it can illuminate how models of economic behavior (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002) can account for the behavior of children and teenagers. These models were
developed on the basis of experimental evidence from adult subjects, but it is unclear whether adult behavior is the
consequence of any directional development in the prevalence of other-regarding preferences. The fact that economic
decisionmaking“maywellchangeoverthelongterm,withchangesinage,education,politicalandreligiousbeliefs,and
othercharacteristics”(BoltonandOckenfels,2000,p.171)hasbeenwellacknowledged.Inourpaper,wehopetocontribute
to a more detailed understanding of howage influences distributional preferences. Second, from an applied perspective,
knowingmoreaboutthedifferenttypesofother-regardingpreferencesandtheirintensityinchildhoodandadolescencecan
provide a benchmarkagainst whichadult behaviorcan be measured.Acomparisonof theintensityofbenevolentother-
regardingpreferencesobservedinadulthoodcomparedtochildhoodandadolescenceisofgreatinterest.Ifitisstrongerin
adulthood,thiswouldimplythatsocializationintheteenageyearsshouldbeconsideredashelpfulforpromotingefficient
interactions in the workplace; if it is weaker, humans would seem to “lose” efficiency-promoting other-regarding
preferencesinthetransitionfromchildhoodtoadultage.Third,empiricalevidenceprovesthatchildrenandadolescents
influencetoalargeextentmanyhouseholddecisionsandoverthepastfewdecadestheirpurchasingpowerhasincreased
substantially–atleastinhighlydevelopedcountries(McNeal,1992;Dauphinetal.,2011).Fourth,andmoregenerally,given
the fact that children′s economic decisions differ in many areas from adults′ decisions, important sociopolitical
consequences emerge. Policies, imposed by adults on children, may not be in accordance with the preferences of the
affectedchildrenifadultsdonotknowthechildren′spreferenceswell.Beyondthisaspect,ifother-regardingpreferences
were to be found to be susceptible to policy interventions in education – a question that is still open to thorough
investigation–knowingthedistributionandthedevelopmentalchangesofother-regardingpreferencesduringchildhood
andadolescencewouldbeaprerequisiteforanykindofintervention.
The economic decision making of children and adolescents has received increasing attention in recent years. William
HarbaughandKateKrausepioneeredthesystematicinvestigationofhowchildrenmakeeconomicdecisionsinawidearray
ofdomains,suchasrationalityinrevealedpreferences(Harbaughetal.,2001),risktaking(Harbaughetal.,2002),ortrust
andtrustworthiness(Harbaughetal.,2003b).Asfarasother-regardingpreferencesinchildrenandteenagersareconcerned,
the overallevidence seems to suggest thathumans becomeless selfish as theygrowolder (Murnighan and Saxon,1998;
Harbaugh et al., 2003a; Benenson et al., 2007; Sutter and Kocher, 2007; Gummerum et al., 2008, 2010). These studies,
however, have concentrated on a binary classification of more or less selfish behavior, preventing the classification of
subjects into different types of other-regarding preferences and, hence, leaving open the investigation of how the
distributionoftypeschangeswithage.
Fehretal.(2008)tookafirststepinclassifyingdifferenttypesofchildren′sother-regardingpreferencesbydevisingthree
simpleallocationtasksfromwhichtheycaninferasubject′stypeasegalitarian,altruistic,orspiteful.Theirexperimentwith
229children,aged3–8,showsthategalitarianism(i.e.,inequalityaversion)developsstronglybetweentheagesof3and8.
E.Fehretal./EuropeanEconomicReview64(2013)369–383 371
Whileselfishnessclearlydominatesin3-year-olds,many7–8-year-oldspreferegalitarianallocations.2Moreprecisely,about
60%ofchildrenaged7–8canbeclassifiedashavingegalitarianpreferences,whilethecorrespondingsharefor3–4-year-olds
issmallerwitharound20%.Whileitistruethatalsopreschoolerscanshareequally(SigelmanandWaitzman,1991;Olson
andSpelke,2008),thefractionseemstoincreasewithage.Relatedresearchhasalsofoundthatstartingfromanageof6–8
years, children show already a tendency to sacrifice their own resources in order to be fair, increasing the likelihood of
egalitarianallocations(BlakeandMcAuliffe,2011;ShawandOlson,2012).3
WeusetheexperimentaldesignofFehretal.(2008)andextendtheiranalysistoadolescenceinordertostudyhowthe
transitiontoadulthoodshapessubjects′other-regardingpreferences.Thiswillallowustobridgethegapbetweenchildren
(asinFehretal.,2008)andadults,whilekeepingthedesignidentical.Theagespanconsideredinourpaperissimilartothat
investigatedinapaperbyAlmåsetal.(2010)onthedevelopmentofinequalityacceptance.Theyranexperimentswith486
subjects,aged10–18,whohadtomakedistributionalchoicesinmodifieddictatorgameswherethepietobedistributed
coulddepend–inadditiontoownproductivity–onluckandtheefficiencyofgivingawaymoneytotherecipient.They
found that older children are more willing to accept inequalities when the latter are the consequence of individual
achievements; furthermore, they care more about efficiency than younger children do. The authors also observe gender
differencesinefficiencyconcerns.Fromthe9thgradeonwardsefficiencyconsiderationsplayamoreimportantroleformale
than for female participants. Overall, their findings imply that children′s fairness norms evolve fromfavoringequality in
theiryoungestcohortof10-year-olds(similarto8-year-oldsinFehretal.,2008)tofavoringequityintheolderagegroups.
ComparedtoAlmåsetal.(2010),ourdesignalsoallowsustostudythedevelopmentofspitefulnessand,inparticular,the
influenceofparochialism,whichisthemaininnovationinourpaper.
A paper by Martinsson et al. (2011) studied the development of social preferences in a sample of 650 Austrian and
Swedishchildrenandteenagersaged10–15years.Insixdictatorgamessubjectshadtochooseoneoftwopossiblepayoff
allocations.Fromthesechoices subjects wereclassifiedintofourpreferencetypes:self-interest,socialwelfare,difference
aversionandcompetitive.Thecorefindingofthepaperisthatdifferenceaversion(whichisasimilarconcepttoinequality
aversion)decreaseswhilesocial-welfareconsiderationsbecomemoreimportantwithage,whichisinlinewithourfindings.
ComparedtothepaperbyMartinssonetal.(2011)wearealsoabletostudyspitefulnessandparochialism.Thelatterfeature
of ourstudy is alsothe main,and important, difference toaworking paper bySutteret al. (2010) inwhichtheyuse the
designofEngelmannandStrobel(2004)toclassifysubjectsintoinequalityaverse,maximin,efficiency-lovingandselfish.
WhileSutteretal.(2010)usealmostthesamesubjectpoolashere(separatedbymorethan6months,though),theydonot
studyspitefulnessandparochialism.Asfarasthedevelopmentofegalitarianismandaltruismisconcerned,itisreassuring
that both papers yield similar results,despiteemploying two different researchdesigns. As childrenand teenagers grow
older,inequalityaversionbecomeslessimportant,whileefficiencyconcernsincreaseinimportanceforboysandmaximin-
preferencesgainimportanceinshapingbehaviorofgirls.
Studyingbothspiteandparochialisminourpaperwillshedlightonthemalevolentsideofother-regardingpreferences.
Thisisalsoimportantfromatheoreticalpointofview,sincerecentevolutionarytheoriessuggestthatprosocialbehavior
(i.e.,thebenevolentside)andparochialism(i.e.,themalevolentsideofother-regardingpreferences)evolvejointly(Choiand
Bowles, 2007). An examination of common developmental origins of the benevolent and malevolent aspects of other-
regardingpreferencesisthereforeofgreatinterest.
Therestofthepaperisorganizedasfollows.WeintroducetheexperimentaldesignandprocedureinSection2.Section3
presentstheresults,andSection4concludesthepaper.
2. Experimentaldesignandprocedure
2.1. Design
Participantsinourstudyhadtomakedecisionsinthreesimpleallocationtasksthatwewillrefertoasgamesbelow.4
Each participant was matched with one anonymous partner from the same age cohort, and had to choose between two
allocations that assigned money between the two players. The order of presentation of the three decisions and two
allocationswasrandomized.
Theprosocialgameofferedachoicebetweentheallocation(1,1)–thatis,1pointforthedecisionmaker,1pointforthe
recipient – and the allocation (1,0). This game serves as a measure of the most basic form of prosociality, namely the
willingness toavoid advantageous inequality for the benefitof the partner. Importantly, prosociality in this game has no
2Interestingly,thedesireforegalitarianallocationsseemstobedeeplyrootedininfantsalready,asrecentresearchhasshown.Childrenwhoare
15–21-montholdshowsomefairnessunderstandingandaltruisticbehaviorbygazingsignificantlylongerwhenresourcesaredistributedunequally
betweentworecipientsasopposedtoequally(SchmidtandSommerville,2011;Sloaneetal.,2012).Egalitarianallocationsseemalsotomakeanallocator
moreattractivetoinfants,because16-month-oldshaveaclearpreferenceforafairratherthananunfairallocator(GeraciandSurian,2011).
3Anotherstrandofliteraturedealswiththequestionwhetherwhatisobservedbyaresearcherasfairbehaviorispartlymotivatedbyadesireof
experimentalsubjectstoappearfair.Whilethishasbeenshowntobethecaseforadults(Batsonetal.,1997,2002),onlyrecentworkbyShawetal.(2013)
hasillustratedthesamepatternforchildren.Intheirstudy,childrenasyoungasofage6–8yearsshowfairbehaviorthatisnotonlymotivatedbymeansof
truefairness,butalsoinordertoappearfairtoothers.SeealsoHouseretal.(2012)forhowreputationconcernsaffectchildren’sdecisionmaking.
4Ofcourse,theallocationtasksarenotinteractivegames,butratherindividualdecisionmakingtasks.However,fornotationalconvenience,weprefer
theterm“game”forthethreedifferenttasks.
372 E.Fehretal./EuropeanEconomicReview64(2013)369–383
costs for the decision maker, enabling various different motives to drive the choice (1,1): an egalitarian preference that
avoidsinequalities(FehrandSchmidt,1999;BoltonandOckenfels,2000),efficiency-seeking(CharnessandRabin,2002),a
desiretomaximizethepayoffoftheworst-offsubject(maximin;Rawls,1974),orevenself-interestedbehaviorbecausea
purelyself-interestedindividualwouldrandomlychoosebetweenthetwoallocationsasshereceivesonepointregardlessof
herdecision.
Intheenvygame,thedecisionmakerhadtochoosebetweenallocations(1,1)and(1,2).Asintheprosocialgame,the
decision maker can increase the partner′s payoff at no cost to herself, but now this choice results in disadvantageous
inequality. Looking at a subject′s pattern of choices in both the prosocial and the envy games allows distinguishing
inequalityaversionfromamotivetobealtruistictowardsthepartnerbyincreasinghispayoff,orfromamotiveofspitethat
minimizes the partner′s payoffs. If an individual wants to avoid inequality, she chooses (1,1) in both games. An altruistic
individualwhocaresforthepartner′spayoff,however,wouldchoose(1,1)intheprosocialgameand(1,2)intheenvygame.
Aspitefulindividual,finally,wouldpick(1,0)intheprosocialgameand(1,1)intheenvygame.
Thesharinggameletsubjectschoosebetweenallocations(1,1)and(2,0).Contrarytothepreviousgames,theegalitarian
choice of (1,1) is costly for the decision maker and thus indicates a strong form of inequality aversion. Note that the
predictionforaselfishdecisionmakerimpliesunambiguouslythechoiceof(2,0)inthisgame,whilepickingtheegalitarian
optionclearlyindicatesprosocialbehavior.
Considering a subject′s pattern of choices across all three games allows the classification of different types of other-
regardingpreferences.Inparticular,wewillclassifysubjectsintofivebehavioraltypes.Stronglyegalitariansubjectspickthe
egalitarian allocation (1,1) in all three games. Weakly egalitarian subjects choose the egalitarian allocation in all games
exceptthesharinggame,whereegalitarianbehavioriscostly.Stronglyaltruisticsubjects alwaysselectthe allocationthat
maximizesthepartner′spayoffandatthesametimethejointpayoff.Weaklyaltruisticsubjectsoptfortheallocationthat
maximizesthepartner′spayoffandthejointpayoffinallgamesexceptthesharinggame.Finally,spitefulsubjectsalways
prefer the allocation that minimizes the partner′s payoff or maximizes the positive difference in own versus partner′s
payoff.5Table1summarizestheclassificationofsubjects.
In order to study the development of parochialism, we implemented an in-group and an out-group condition across
subjects.Whiletherecipientinthein-groupconditionwasknowntobefromthesameclass(hisorheridentityremained
secret,ofcourse),therecipientintheout-groupconditionattendedanotherschool,butwasinthesamegrade.Thiswas
commonknowledgetostudents(seetheinstructionsintheAppendix).Thein-groupconditionwasimplemented intwo
differentways.Inthe“in-group all”condition,all studentsfromarespective classparticipated onceassendertoanother
in-groupmemberandonceasrecipientofatransferfromanotherin-groupmemberintheexperiment.Incontrast,onlyhalf
of the students from a respective class participated in the experiment as sender the “in-group half” condition, while the
remainingstudentsactedasrecipientsofthesenders′transfersandthusdidnotmakeanydecisions.Wechosethein-group
allconditionasamethodtocollectmoredatafromoursubjectpool.Moreover,thisallowedustoinvestigatewhetherit
makes a difference if each subject participates in the experiment as sender as well as receiver (as in the in-group all
condition)oronlyasasender(asinthein-grouphalfcondition).Separateχ2-testsforeachagegroupandgamerevealthat
nosignificantdifferencesbetweenthetwoin-groupconditionscouldbeobserved(seeTable2),allowingustopoolthedata
frombothconditions.
2.2. Subjectpoolandprocedure
Thisexperimentwaspartofa2-yearprojectruninsevenschoolsinTyrol,whichisafederalstateinwesternAustria.
The project was approved by the State Board of Education in Tyrol, and the headmasters of participating schools gave
permissiontoconductseveralexperimentsinintervalsof2–3months.Theseexperimentswereruninclassduringregular
schoolhours.Werandomlyselectedatotalof38classesinthe3rd,5th,7th,9th,and11thgradesatthebeginningofthe
project, and followed them for two school years. Parents were informed about the project, which was described as a
scientific project that studies decision making in children and teenagers, but without revealinganydetails on anyof the
experiments.Allstudentsexceptfivereceivedtheirparent′spermissiontoparticipateintheproject.Besidesaskingparents
forconsent,wealsosolicitedeachstudent′swillingnesstoparticipateintheexperiments.Nosinglestudentdissented.This
wholeprocedureconstitutesaparticularlynoteworthyfeatureofourexperiment,asitavoidsanykindofproblemsdueto
self-selectionintoanexperiment.
Theexperimentwascarefullyexplainedinclass,andallparticipantshadtoanswertwocontrolquestionstochecktheir
understandingbeforestartingtheexperiment(seeAppendix).6Weproceedinouranalysiswiththose717participantsin
theroleofadecisionmakerwhoansweredbothquestionscorrectly,andexclude35otherdecisionmakerswithincorrect
answers from the following analysis (see Table 3). The results presented below remain qualitatively identical if the 35
5Notethatwedonotdifferentiatebetweenspitefultypeswhominimizethepartner’spayoffandcompetitivetypeswhotrytodoasgoodaspossible
comparedtothepartner.Wealsodonotelicitenvioustypeswhoreducethepartner’spayoffonlywhentheyareaheadanddonotcareaboutthepartner’s
payoffinallothercases.
6NotethatthisisdifferentfromthepaperbyFehretal.(2008),wheretheexperimentwasexplainedandcarriedoutindividuallywitheachsubject.
Giventhefactthatwewantedtoimplementadesignwhichwasidenticalforallagegroupsandobviousproblemslikeahighertendencytoelicitsocially
desiredbehaviorinindividualinteractionsamongolderparticipantsandexperimenterswedecidedtoruntheexperimentsinclasswithpenandpaper.
E.Fehretal./EuropeanEconomicReview64(2013)369–383 373
Table1
Definitionofother-regardingpreferencetypes.
Type Prosocialgame Envygame Sharinggame
Stronglyegalitarian (1/1) (1/1) (1/1)
Weaklyegalitarian (1/1) (1/1) (2/0)
Stronglyaltruistic (1/1) (1/2) (1/1)
Weaklyaltruistic (1/1) (1/2) (2/0)
Spiteful (1/0) (1/1) (2/0)
Table2
χ2-testsforbehavioraldifferencesin“in-groupall”and“in-grouphalf”.
Agegroup Prosocialgame Envygame Sharinggame
8/9years p¼.157 p¼.979 p¼.791
10/11years p¼.856 p¼.382 p¼.913
12/13years p¼.678 p¼.083 p¼.923
14/15years p¼.923 p¼.342 p¼.925
16/17years p¼.902 p¼.532 p¼.536
The table shows that there is no significant difference between the
in-grouphalfandthein-groupallconditionatthe5%-levelinanyofthe
comparisons.Theoneweaklysignificantdifference(intheenvygame
for12-to13-year-olds)iswellwithinthelimitsofchance.
Table3
Samplesize.
Grade Agegroup Controlquestion Total
Correct Wrong
3rd 8/9years 71 17 88
5th 10/11years 207 13 220
7th 12/13years 172 3 175
9th 14/15years 135 2 137
11th 16/17years 132 0 132
717 35 752
excluded subjects were included in the analysis. In addition to the 752 decision makers, we had 443 subjects as passive
recipients of the decision makers′ choices. Recall that 309 subjects (out of the 752 decision makers) participated in the
in-groupallconditionwheretheywerebothactivedecisionmakersandpassivereceivers.
The points earned in the experiment were converted into Euros for payment. The exchange rate was made roughly
proportionaltotheaverageweeklypocketmoneywithineachgrade(seeTable4).Thisapproachwastakentoensurethat
themarginalincentiveswerecomparableacrossgrades.
Finally,wewouldliketomentionthattheuseofone-shotgamesunderanonymity,asinthisstudy,isakeyfactorin
distinguishingprosocialbehaviorfrompurelyselfishmotives.Selfishmotivesmayalsoplayaroleinrepeatedinteractionor
face-to-face contacts, meaning that subjects behave prosocially just to benefit in future interactions. This is ruled out in
ourstudy.
3. Experimentalresults
Below we will first analyze behavior in single games, and then study the pattern of other-regarding preferences that
emerges when all three decisions of a subject are considered. Within each subsection, we proceed with an analysis that
addressestheinfluenceof(i)age,(ii)parochialism,and(iii)gender.
3.1. Behaviorinsinglegames
3.1.1.Age
Fig.1showstherelativefrequencyofchoosingtheegalitarianallocation(1,1)ineachgameacrossourfivedifferentage
cohorts.Thefigurepoolsdatafromthein-groupandout-groupconditionsaswellasfromgirlsandboys,inordertopresent
374 E.Fehretal./EuropeanEconomicReview64(2013)369–383
Table4
Exchangerateandweeklyaveragepocketmoney.
Agegroup Exchangerateof1point Increase(%)a Weeklypocketmoney(average) Increase(%)
8–9years .5€ 2.9€
10–11years .75€ þ50 4.7€ þ62
12–13years 1€ þ33 6.5€ þ38
14–15years 2€ þ100 13.4€ þ106
16–17years 3€ þ50 23.7€ þ77
aMeasurestherelativeincreaseinpocketmoneybyagegroupinrowxoveragegroupinrowx–1.
across games
1.0
0.8 0.80 0.86
0.73 0.80
n choice 0.6 0.69 00..5734 0.49
a 0.54
alitari 0.4 0.40
g
e
0.2 0.14
0.10
0.06 0.06 0.06
0.0
8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
envy game (1,1) vs. (1,2) prosocial game (1,1) vs. (1,0)
sharing game (1,1) (2,0)
Fig.1. Therelativefrequencyofegalitarianchoicesacrossgamesandagegroups.
theoverallpatternofresults.Fig.1revealsimportantandsystematicbehavioralchangesacrossage.Intheprosocialgame,
the relative frequency of choosing (1,1) over (1,0) increases monotonically with age. Almost 90% of 16- to 17-year-olds
choosetheegalitarianallocation,whileonly54%of8-to9-year-oldsdoso.Aninversepatternisfoundfortheenvygame.
Herewenoteamarkeddeclineoftheegalitarianchoicefrom80%for8-to9-year-oldsto40%for16-to17-year-olds.Hence,
the altruistic allocation of (1,2) is much more frequently chosen at older ages, indicating that tolerance towards
disadvantageousinequalityincreasesinoldersubjects(whichissimilartothemainfindinginAlmåsetal.,2010).Wedo
notfindamonotonicageeffectinthesharinggame.Onaverage,onlyaround10%ofsubjectsineachagegroupchoosethe
(costly) egalitarian allocation (1,1) over (2,0).7 Hence, when it costs money, the egalitarian choice is selected much less
frequently thanwhen it is notcostly. Table 5 presents the results of probit regressions for the three games inwhich the
decisiontochoosetheegalitarianallocation(1,1)isthedependentvariable.Asindependentvariables,weconsideradummy
for female and in-group, as well as the variable age exact which measures the exact age of our participants inyears and
months.The resultsin Table5 revealasignificantlypositiveageeffect fortheprosocial gameandanegativeoneforthe
envygame.
3.1.2.Parochialism
Fig. 2 illustrates the effects of parochialism. Panel (a) shows that the egalitarian allocation of (1,1) is chosen more
frequentlyinthein-groupthanintheout-groupconditionfromtheageof12to13yearsonwardintheprosocialgame.
While Table 5 presents a significant maineffectofin-group, adding an interaction term in-groupnage exact(as wellas an
interactiontermfemalenageexact)tothespecificationinTable5revealsthatthein-groupeffectissignificantonlyfromthe
7Note,thatourresultsfor8-to9-year-oldsaredifferentfromtheresultsofFehretal.(2008)for7-to8-year-olds.Yet,thisdifferencecanbeattributed
toadifferenceinrewardsusedinbothstudies,asisshowninunpublishedworkbyFehretal.(2012).Theyshowthatifsweetsareusedasareward
medium,54%ofthe8-to9-yearoldsprefertheegalitarianoptioninthesharinggame,whichisnolongersignificantlydifferentfromthe45%of7-to8-year
oldsinthestudybyFehretal.(2008).ThismeansthatFehretal.(2012)canbasicallyreplicatetheFehretal.(2008)resultswhensweetsareusedasreward
medium.Concerningtheprosocialgame,resultsareevencloser.WhileFehretal.(2012)findthat79%ofsubjectsprefertheegalitarianchoicewhentheir
behaviorisincentivizedwithsweets,Fehretal.(2008)report80%ofegalitarianchoices.ThepaperbyFehretal.(2012)isintendedtostudytheeffectsof
therewardmedium,butdoesnotconsideranyaspectsofdevelopmentofchoicebehaviorwithage,whichdistinguishesitclearlyfromthispaper.Here,we
haveusedmoneyasarewardmediuminordertohaveanattractiverewardmediumespeciallyforouroldestsubjects.Onamoregenerallevel,wenote
thataseconomistsweprefer,ingeneral,theuseofmonetaryrewardssincemoneyisageneralmeansofexchange–whilenon-monetaryrewardstypically
lackthispropertyandthereforemightinhibitthegeneralizabilityofbehaviorwithparticularrewards.However,usingmoneyisnotalwayspossiblewhen
workingwithchildren(forinstanceduetorestrictionsfromparticipatingschools),forwhichreasonFehretal.(2012)hasbeenwrittenasacontributionto
understandhowdifferentrewardsinfluencebehavior.
E.Fehretal./EuropeanEconomicReview64(2013)369–383 375
Table5
Probitregressionswithegalitarianchoiceasdependentvariable.
Independentvariables Prosocialgame Envygame Sharinggame
female .028 .174nnn .053nnn
ageexacta .037nnn (cid:2).059nnn (cid:2).004
in-group .097nn (cid:2).056 .071nnn
BICb 811.3 917.8 449.2
#Observations 717 717 717
Thetableshowsmarginaleffects.Robuststandarderrorsclusteredonclass
level.
Includingcontrolsforonlychild,adummyforyoungestchild,thenumber
ofsiblingsandtheamountofpocketmoneyperweekseparatelytothe
regressionsdoesnotyieldanysignificanteffects.
nnnDenotessignificanceatthe1%level.
nnDenotessignificanceatthe5%level.
aageexactinyearsandmonths.
bBayesianinformationcriterion.
age of 12/13 years on (po.05 for females and males).8,9 This additional specification is included in Table A1 in the
Appendix.10Panel(b)revealsthatthedeclineintherelativefrequencyofchoosing(1,1)ismuchsteeperforthein-group
thantheout-groupconditionintheenvygame.Thisindicatesthatassubjectsgetolder,theyarerelativelymorewillingto
accept disadvantageous inequality in the in-group than in the out-group condition. The in-group effect – while non-
significantinthemainspecificationofTable5–issignificantfortheoldesttwoagegroupsof14-to15-and16-to17-year-
olds(po.01forfemalesandmales;seeTableA1intheAppendix).11Inthesharinggameinpanel(c),wenotethatsharing
is,ingeneral,morefrequentlyobservedinthein-groupthanintheout-groupcondition.Thisdifferenceissignificantfrom
theageof10to11yearsonwards(po.05forfemales,po.1formales;seeTableA1).12
3.1.3.Gender
Fig.3presentsthebehaviorofgirlsandboysinthethreegames.Whilethereisnoclearcutpatternofgenderdifferences
attheaggregatelevelintheprosocialgameinpanel(a),girlsarealwaysmorelikelytochoosetheegalitarianallocation(1,1)
intheenvygameinpanel(b).Table5illustratesthatthegendereffectissignificant,andanextendedmodelthatincludesan
interaction term of femalenage exact (as well as an interaction term in-groupnage exact) shows that the gender effect is
presentandsignificantineachsingleagegroup(po.1forin-groupandout-group;seeTableA1intheAppendix).Girlsare
alsomorelikelytochoose(1,1)inthesharinggameineachagegroup,exceptintheoldestone,ascanbeseeninpanel(c)of
Fig.3.WenotefromTableA1thatthegenderdifferenceissignificantforthethreeyoungestagegroups,i.e.,uptotheageof
12–13years(po.05forin-groupandout-group).
3.2. Distributionofother-regardingpreferencetypes–behavioracrossallthreegames
RecallfromTable1theclassificationofother-regardingpreferencetypes fromasubject′spatternofchoicesacrossall
threegames.Whilethethreegamesallowfor8differentchoicepatterns,itisreassuringtonotethatthefivetypeslistedin
8Note,thatinFig.2(a)thedifferencebetweenthein-andout-groupconditionfortheoldestagegroupof16-to17-yearoldsissmall.However,the
differenceissignificantinamultipleregressioncontrollingforadditionalfactorssuchasgenderandtheexactageandnotonlythecondition.
9Table5(andTable6)useindividualleveldata,applyingrobuststandarderrorsontheclasslevel.Afairlyconservativeapproachwouldbetotakethe
averagebehaviorwithinoneclassasoneindependentunitofobservationandthenapplynon-parametrictests.Giventhatwehaveatmosteightclasses
pergrade(sixingrade3,andeightineachofthegrades5,7,9,and11),suchconservativetestingtypicallyfailssignificanceatconventionallevels.Forthis
reason,wehavepooledtheclassesingrades5and7(thefirst4yearsinthistypeofschool)andgrades9and11(thefinal4yearsinthistypeofschool),
yielding16classesineachsubsampletoperformMann–WhitneyU-tests.Thenwetaketheaveragechoiceintheprosocialgamewithinoneclassasone
unitofobservationandcompareclassesinthein-groupconditionwiththoseintheout-groupcondition.Thisyieldsasignificantdifferenceforpooled
grades9and11(po.01;N¼16).
10Wedonotpresenttheextendedmodelswithinteractiontermsinthemainbodyofthetextforreasonsofsuccinctness.Notethatstandardsoftware
doesnotcorrectlycalculatemarginaleffectsandp-valuesofinteractiontermsinnonlinearmodels(seeAiandNorton,2003).Wecorrectedforthisand
presenttheadjustedtestsonjointcoefficientsintheAppendix.Itisnoteworthy,however,thattheextendedmodelsshownintheAppendixhaveaworse
fit–accordingtoBayesianinformationcriterion(BIC)–thanthemodelsshowninTable5.
11A(weakly)significantdifferenceingrades9and11isalsoconfirmedintheconservativetestingapproachdescribedinfootnote9above(p¼.06;
N¼16).
12Notethatpanel(c)ofFig.2cannotperfectlyconveythissignificantin-groupeffectinthesharinggame,especiallyfor14-to15-year-oldteenagers,
sincethemultipleregressionmodelcancontrolmoreappropriatelyforthevariationinthedatathanthefigurecan.Ifweuseanon-parametricMann–
WhitneyU-testwiththeaveragechoicesinaclassastheunitofobservation,wegetp¼.14(p¼.15)forthesubsetof10/11-and12/13-yearolds(14/15-and
16/17-yearolds),withN¼16persubset.
376 E.Fehretal./EuropeanEconomicReview64(2013)369–383
1.00
0.91 00..8829
0.80
0.71 0.80
0.67
e 0.64
c
choi 0.60 0.53 0.67
an 0.54
ari
alit 0.40
g
e
0.20
0.00
8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
outgroup ingroup
1.00
0.80 00..7846 0.75
ce 0.72 0.63
oi 0.60
ch 0.52
n 0.48
a
alitari 0.40 0.47 0.46
g
e 0.34
0.20
0.00
8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
outgroup ingroup
1.00
0.80
e
c
oi 0.60
h
c
n
a
ari
alit 0.40
g
e
0.20 0.18
0.14
0.08 0.09
0.05
0.09
0.00 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.04
8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
outgroup ingroup
Fig.2. Therelativefrequencyofegalitarianchoicesinin-groupandout-groupcondition.(a)Prosocialgame:(1,1)vs(1,0),(b)envygame:(1,1)vs(1,2)and
(c)sharinggame:(1,1)vs(2,0).
Table1coverthevastmajorityofsubjects.InthedatapresentedinFigs.4–6,between92%and100%ofsubjectsbelongto
oneofthese5types.Theshareofsubjectswhichcanbeclassifiedintothese5typesslightlyincreaseswithage.Notealso
that strongly egalitarian and strongly altruistic types are rare, meaning that three types (spiteful, weakly altruistic, and
E.Fehretal./EuropeanEconomicReview64(2013)369–383 377
1.00
0.88
0.84
0.80 0.85
0.72 0.80 0.78
e 0.67
c
choi 0.60 0.61 0.66
an 0.47
ari
alit 0.40
g
e
0.20
0.00
8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
male female
1.00
0.87
0.80 0.75
0.80
ce 0.63
hoi 0.60
c 0.60
n 00..4597
a
ari 0.49
galit 0.40 0.31
e 0.26
0.20
0.00
8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
male female
1.00
0.80
e
c
hoi 0.60
c
n
a
ari
alit 0.40
g
e
0.20 0.17
0.13
0.09 0.10
0.07
0.11 0.09
0.00 0.04 0.05
0.00
8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
male female
Fig.3. Therelativefrequencyofegalitarianchoicesofmalesandfemales.(a)Prosocialgame:(1,1)vs(1,0),(b)envygame:(1,1)vs(1,2)and(c)sharing
game:(1,1)vs(2,0).
weaklyegalitarian)characterizethelargemajority(ofatleast77%)ofsubjects.Theinfrequencyofstrongtypes(versusweak
types) leads us to pool strongly and weakly egalitarian types, respectively strongly and weakly altruistic types, in the
regressionsreportedinTable6.
378 E.Fehretal./EuropeanEconomicReview64(2013)369–383
behavioral types
100
14
17
23
80 26
42
cent 60 20 42 46 52
per 17 4
40 0
2 2 8
37
20 34 27 28 24
0 3 8 3 4 2
8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
strongly egalitarian weakly egalitarian
strongly altruistic weakly altruistic
spiteful
Fig.4. Behavioraltypesacrossagegroups.
behavioral types - ingroup
100
7 11
17
80 24
41
50
ent 60 18 47 54
c
per 40 101 6 1
4 12
20 41 35 35
26 21
0 3 9 3 4 3
8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
strongly egalitarian weakly egalitarian
strongly altruistic weakly altruistic
spiteful
behavioral types - outgroup
100
18
28
80 33 30
44
ent 60 24 50
c
per 40 24 1 34 41
0 0 2
40 3
20
26 27 29
20
0 3 6 3 3 2
8/9 10/11 12/13 14/15 16/17
strongly egalitarian weakly egalitarian
strongly altruistic weakly altruistic
spiteful
Fig.5. Behavioraltypesandparochialism.
3.2.1.Age
Fig. 4 shows that the relative frequency of egalitarian and spiteful types decreases typically with age, while altruistic
types become more frequent with age. The modal type is the spiteful one for 8- to 9-year-olds, while it is the weakly
altruistic type for the 16- to 17-year-olds. Table 6 presents probit regressions for each type, confirming a significantly