Table Of ContentSPIES AND SABOTEURS
Spies and Saboteurs
Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry
in Human Intelligence Collection and
Special Operations, 1940-45
Jay Jakub, D.Phil
Professional Staff
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Congress
Foreword by Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker
palgrave
macmillan
First published in Great Britain 1999 by
MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London
Companies and representatives throughout the world
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN 978-1-349-40502-2 ISBN 978-0-230-37317-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9780230373174
First published in the United States of America 1999 by
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC.,
Scholarly and Reference Division,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
ISBN 978-0-312-21327-5
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Jakub,Jay, 1963-
Spies and saboteurs: Anglo-American collaboration and rivalry in
human intelligence collection and special operations, 1940-45 /Jay
Jakub ; foreword by Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 978-0-312-21327-5 (cloth)
1. World War, 1939-1945-Secret service. 2. World War, 1939-1945-
-Military intelligence. I. Title.
D810.S7J27 1998
940.54'86-DC21 97-51695
CIP
© Jay Jakub 1999
Foreword © Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker 1999
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with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 I
08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99
To my loving wife Eleni, without whose steadfast support this book would
not have been possible.
Also to my friends and colleagues at Oxford, the British Special Forces
Club, the Central Intelligence Agency, and to those veterans of OSS, SOE,
and the Secret Intelligence Service whose sacrifices and larger-than-life
exploits inspired this work.
Contents
Foreword by Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker, Chief of British
Special Operations in the Western and Central
Mediterranean (1943-45)
Xl
Preface XVll
Acknowledgments XXI
Key Terms and Acronyms XXll1
1 Planting the Seeds: 'Wild Bill' Donovan's Two
European Missions, 1940-41 1
Introduction 1
Roosevelt's 'Unofficial Representative,' July-August 1940 2
Background 2
The Visit 5
The Aftermath 7
The Navy Department's 'Observer,' December 1940-March 1941 10
Background 10
Bermuda and London 13
The Middle East 14
The Balkans 16
Back in London 18
The Aftermath 18
Conclusions 20
2 An Unequal Partnership: The Coordinator of Information and
British Mentoring, 1941-42 22
Introduction 22
From Concept to Reality: The Birth of COl and
the British Role 23
British Intervention 24
A Bureaucratic Breakthrough 27
From Birth to War 28
Together Through the Washington Minefield 28
cor
Establishing s First Overseas Station 32
Bumps in the Road 33
Problems in London 33
cor
Robert Solborg and s Special Operations Capability 38
cor
Wallace Phillips, and s Secret Intelligence Capability 40
Looking to the Far East 42
Conclusions 45
Vll
Vll1 Contents
3 Trial by Fire: London and the Proving Grounds of North Africa
and Burma, 1942-43 48
Introduction 48
The Anglo-American Intelligence Protocols of June 1942 49
London, 1942 53
Background 53
SO London 55
SI London 60
North Africa, 1942--43 66
Background 66
Operation 'TORCH' 69
The French Dynamic 72
The MASSINGHAM Controversy 74
The SO-SOE Operational Revisions of January 1943 79
Burma and India: Success and Mistrust 83
Conclusions 90
4 Coming of Age: London, Norway, and the Jedburgh-Sussex
Negotiations, 1943 93
Introduction 93
OSS-SOE, Norwegian Operations, and the Jedburgh Plan 94
OSS-SIS, Joint Chiefs Directives, and Operation SUSSEX 100
Conclusions 109
5 The Yugoslav Morass: A Case Study in Anglo-OSS
Divergence, 1942-44 110
Introduction 110
Background 111
Early Maneuvering 113
Down the Slippery Slope in 1943 121
The Huot Affair and OSS Bari 133
SOE's Formal Break with Mihailovic 135
Deepening Divisions in 1944 139
Conclusions 143
6 The Liberation of France: A Case Study in
Anglo-OSS Convergence, 1943-44 146
Introduction 146
Background, 1940-43 147
The Maquis and the Special Inter-Allied Missions 157
Semi -Integrated Organizational Collaboration 161
Contents IX
The Jedburgh Plan 170
Operation SUSSEX 174
OSS Operational Groups and British Special Forces 180
Conclusions 182
7 Key Findings 185
Introduction: A Relationship of Four Themes 185
Indirect Mutual Dependence 185
Direct Mutual Dependence 188
Restricted Independence 191
Unrestricted Independence 194
Final Observations 196
Notes 198
War Chronology of Key Events 245
Bibliography 254
Index 262
Foreword
by Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker
Dr Jay J akub' s book on the origins of the Anglo-American' special relationship' in
human intelligence and special operations during the Second World War is of sub
stantial present value. His friendly and sustained industry has been rewarded as he
picked his way through the minefields of the records and memories of nationalist,
ideological, Service, political and personal events and prejudices, genuine if some
times conflicting. His explicit conclusions are the more valuable with their free
dom from bias. Future researchers will find this a reliable, unique source from
which to judge these seminal years and efforts of Anglo-American association in
secret services.
Useful mention can also be made of the situations which preceded and influ
enced the critical years of 1940 to 1945 covered in this survey, and of the differing
positions and aims of the main protagonists: Britain with its Empire, and the
United States of America. Broadly speaking, Britain believed in an Empire to
create free-standing units as Empire became Commonwealth, as has occurred, the
final stages being hastened by the events of the Second World War. Conversely,
the United States advocated independence to be given without waiting for the
administrative and economic structures which sustain true independence. This put
the two sides at odds and complicated the relationship between the British and
American secret services.
I accepted with some diffidence Dr J akub' s flattering invitation to write this
foreword. As a junior officer, I had first been concerned - by the chance of my
employment since 1935 - in the need for Imperial organizations for action
to withstand the hostile activities of dictatorships worldwide. My Sudan service
in the late 1930s on the Ethiopian frontier and in the Public Security Department
in Khartoum led me later to witness the first victory over fascism, with the res
toration in 1941 of the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie. In Ethiopia the British
secret services were involved throughout, from secret intelligence (SI), through
clandestine action (SO), to paramilitary and regular forces, and military govern
ment.
On my return to the United Kingdom, I was charged with the supervision for
the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in London of air and sea transport
into and out of the Continent of Europe. Our map room showed by May 1941 only
two parachute drops into France, both 'blind.' By May 1944, this number had
increased to one thousand dropping points ready for action. It would have
been difficult, and certainly undesired, to show to whom the credit for this achieve
ment was due; such was the close cooperation of all three main allies - British,
Xl
Xll Foreword
American, and French. Reading this book will give some idea of the success of
their association, and the difficulties which had to be overcome in building the
groups under the conditions of occupation.
For the secret services herein recorded, the British Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS) was long-term, professional, with a great record of past success. SOE was
created from the 'D-Section' of SIS and the military research section of the War
Office Intelligence section (MIR). This took place in July 1940, for the short term,
as it turned out. It was designated 'Executive' not 'Service,' implying, as in the
Civil Service, subordination to Higher Authority. Its members were recruited
from employments in which they had shown aptitude and gained experience, to
meet many challenges ahead. All were anxious to return to their normal employ
ment once the survival of Britain and the Commonwealth was assured, and after
helping - with our allies - in the liberation of the occupied countries from the Axis
powers. Never was heard any suggestion that SOE should continue thereafter, or
that they sought employment therein. SIS regarded SOE at the outset with some
apprehension as being 'amateurish'. A similar view was held, together with SOE,
of the newborn American organizations, Coordinator of Intelligence (COl) and
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), in 1941 and 1942 respectively.
SIS thus had duties which stretched beyond the war's end, whereas SOE knew
that their tasks would be short -Ii ved. On the other hand, the American Services
were being created and led by General Bill Donovan, with his vast and varied
experience, who foresaw the place of the United States in the future world order.
He therefore urged the need for a permanent organization, combining intelligence
and action, befitting its economic strength and political stature.
In the years between the wars the world had been split into many authoritarian
groups of Left and Right. The Left, Communists and various Socialists; the Right,
Fascists, broadly representing the status quo, and capitalists. The Right had been
strengthened on the Continent by the knowledge of the bloodstained Russian
revolution, and episodes like Bela Kun in Hungary. The result was more anti
Communists than anti-Fascists in Europe before and after 1939. Another factor
was the weakness of the Democracies in the later 1930s. They had estimated
that there could not be another European war without ten years warning. Then
Germany had rearmed with unexpected swiftness, under an obvious aggressor.
All others wished to avoid a repeat of the slaughter of 1914/1918. They admired
President Teddy Roosevelt's dictum 'Speak softly, but carry a big stick.' They
spoke softly - appeasement - but pursued disarmament, not a big stick.
Yet again there had been a seismic change in conflict. Until 1918, wars had been
fought between armies, leaving out the civilian populations. The 'Troubles' in Ire
land and Russia after 1917, and later conflicts in China, Ethiopia, and Spain, had
shown that there could well be resistance against outside occupation, in which the
new facilities - air transport and wireless radio - could playa vital role. Against
this background, it was difficult for us to understand the account of the American
opposition to Donovan's first plans to help Britain. These resulted in protection
