Speculation: Within and about Science

297 Pages·2019·1.926 MB·English

by  Peter Achinstein

SPECULATION

SPECULATION
Within and About Science
PETER ACHINSTEIN
1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.
© Oxford University Press 2019
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress
ISBN 978– 0– 19– 061505– 5
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
Draga Juditomnak
“Speculation” (mass noun): The forming of a theory or conjecture
without firm evidence.
—Oxford Living Dictionaries
CONTENTS
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xv
1. Scientific Speculation: A Pragmatic Approach 1
2. The Complex Story of Simplicity: Ontological
and Epistemic Speculations 68
3. Non- Epistemic Simplicity: Maxwell, Newton,
and Speculation 122
4. Holism vs. Particularism: An Evidential
Debate (“Find the Ether”) 168
5. The Ultimate Speculation: A “Theory of
Everything” (What Is It, and Why Should We
Want One?) 216
6. Summing Up 262
Index 273

PREFACE
Every problem has a solution, and every solution has a
problem. That’s why there is speculation. It’s easier to do
and has fewer problems. That’s also why, according to some
scientists, philosophers speculate while scientists test and
prove. Philosophical claims are often just too vague, too
general, too abstract, and too numerous to be tested and
proved. When they become more precise, less general, more
concrete, and less numerous, they are candidates for sci-
entific investigation. They become capable of verification.
Therefore, according to some of the greatest defenders of sci-
ence, scientists have no need to speculate, and should com-
pletely avoid such a loose and unregulated activity.
This is not the only view about speculation that has been
advocated by great thinkers. A contrasting one is that spec-
ulation is crucial when you are trying to come up with an
explanation of a group of observed phenomena. For the ac-
tivity to be scientific, however, it must be followed, as soon
as possible, by an attempt to test and prove the speculation