Table Of ContentSOCIETAL BREAKDOWNAND THE RISE OFTHE
EARLYMODERN STATE IN EUROPE
SOCIETAL BREAKDOWNAND THE RISE OF THE
EARLY MODERN STATE IN EUROPE
MEMORYOF THE FUTURE
DmitryShlapentokh
palgrave
macmillan
SOCIETAL BREAKDOWN AND THE RISE OF THE EARLY MODERN STATE IN
*
EUROPE
Copyright © Dmitry Shlapentokh, 2008.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2008 978-0-230-60375-2
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First published in 2008 by
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CONTENTS
1 Introduction:Revolution asDisintegration;
Meltdown and the Riseofthe StrongState;
Major Theorists and Framework ofthe Work 1
2 Background to the EarlyModern Era 17
3 Crime inFrance in the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Centuries 35
4 Medical Implications:
AsocialProcessand Disease 73
5 PersistentDanger:AsocialBehavior
in the Sixteenth Century 107
6 Conclusion:
The Riseofthe Despotic Government 131
Notes 185
Index 225
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
REVOLUTION AS DISINTEGRATION;
M ELTDOWN AND THE RISE OF THE STRONG STATE;
MAJOR THEORISTS AND FRAMEWORK OF THE WORK
A
great deal ofresearch has been done on the reasons for revolu
tionary changes in societiesand nations, but there are fewer studies
on the meaning ofrevolution asaphenomenon.There isnot much
diversity in defining revolution. It is usually seen as radical change.
This image ofrevolution is,however, comparativelynew.It emerged
in the eighteenth centuryand implied alinear vision ofhistory.
In earlier times,revolutionswere seen asrotationsembedded in a
cyclicalvisionofhistory.There wasoftenanimplication thatastrong
government would reemerge at the end of a revolutionary cycle.
Observerswere notso muchconcernedwith thetransitionfrom one
orderto anotheraswith the collapse oforder. Consequentlythe pri
maryconcern ofnew emerging elite was reestablishing basic order.
This drive for basic order provided the major justification for the
governments ofmany non-Western and premodern regimes. It led
rulers to confront not a segment ofthe population but the entire
society, and the confrontation provided these regimes with charac
teristicsquite similar to those oftotalitarian regimes in the twenti
eth century.
This role oftotalitarian governments and similar regimes in the
past hasnot been understood by mostAnglo-American political sci
entists,due mostly to the factthatinthe Westasocialbehavior,crime
inparticular, never reached such ascaleasto draw massiveinterven
tion from a repressive state.Some socialscientists did hold the view
2 THE RISE OF THE EARLY MODERN STATE IN EUROPE
that brutal totalitarian type regimes might be necessary in case of
societal breakdown, but their publications were marginalized and
tendedto disappear fromWestern intellectual discourse.In fact,they
oftenlater marginalized their own ideas.This, for example, wasthe
case with Pitirim Sorokin, the seminal American sociologist of
Russianextraction.Sorokin sometimes openlysawthe riseoftotal
itarian regimes-which he found not just in the present but in the
distant past-as the only antidote for the destructive asocial drive,
but he did not stress this theory in most ofhisworks.In general he
saw the antidote for asocial behavior not in repression but in the
Christiantype ofaltruistic love.
Allthisprovidedanadditional reason formostWestern punditsto
marginalize the role ofasocial processes in shaping global history
and the role oftotalitarian-type regimes in preserving basic order.
This volume will show that asocial processes constitute a major, if
notthe most important,force in manynon-Western and premodern
revolutionsand thatthese processescontributedagreat dealtoshap
ing regimes with features oftotalitarian governments.
THE MODERN DEFINITION OF REVOLUTION
According to Hannah Arendt, "revolutions, properly speaking, did
notexistprior to the modern; they are among the mostrecentofall
major political data."! The definitions of revolution vary.' Most
twentieth-century social scientists regarded revolution primarily as
change'Some,suchasArendt, assumedthat overallpatternsofchange
were discernible; otherscautionedthatthe reasons forthese changes
could vary from one society to another and that the patterns could
be different."Yet,although recognizing diversity in the revolution
aryexperience,socialscientistsstillassumed abasicdefinitionofrev
olution asa phenomenon usuallyimplying radical change from one
political and socialorderto another.
Most socialscientists who dealt with revolution as a social phe
nomenon sawthe destructive and constructive sides ofrevolution
as interrelated. It was in this context that revolution was defined
by Theda Skocpol, regarded as one of the major authorities in
the field.According to Skocpol, "revolutions, above all, are not
more extreme manifestations ofsome homogeneous type ofindi
vidual behavior. Rather, they are complex conjunctures ofunfolding
INTRODUCTION 3
conflicts involving differentlysituated and motivated (at least mini
mally organized) groups, and resulting not just in violent destruc
tion of a policy, but also in the emergence of new sociopolitical
arrangements.t" Chalmers Johnson elaborated on the work ofthe
prominentsociologistTed RobertGurr, who madeviolencean essen
tial aspect ofrevolution. At the same time, Johnson advised, "vio
lence is not an emotional urge toward destruction, but rather a
rational strategy intended to accomplish change involving societal
reconstruction along with destruction.??
Political and social change wasregarded asan essential aspect of
revolution but not the only one.Most researchers implied that rev
olution meant victory for the downtrodden masses, at least for
groups that opposed the elite, so they sawit asconnected with the
notion ofmobilization and collective actions."In these cases, revo
lutionwasimplicitlyseen asan attack against the prevailing elite.For
thisreason,Skocpol acceptedLenin'sstatementin TheTwoTacticsof
SocialDemocracy in the Democratic Revolution that revolutions are
"the festivalsofthe oppressed and exploited.At no other times are
the massesofthe people in position to come forward so activelyas
creators ofnew social order.t'" Many social scientists followed this
interpretation,which implied that the paramount role ofthe down
trodden masses wasthe overthrow ofthe old order and incorpora
tion in the new revolutionary state machinery, at least in the first
periodofthe regime's existence.?
Skocpol among others saw the major reason for revolution as a
problem with the state and elaborated theories in which state
centered, top-down problems initiated the process of revolution,
whereas it was the masses that actually engaged in unfolding the
process ofchange. According to Skocpol, with each new regime
10
there has been much greater popularincorporation into the state
run affairs ofthe nation.i' at least in the first period ofits exis
tence; the masses would be more involved in the work ofthe state
than before.
The new order isthus aproduct ofradical change, mostlybring
ing powerto the masses,at leastin the initial stages ofrevolutionary
development.Yetlately, on solidification ofthe order, these break
downs have actually reinforced the power ofthe state. According
to Skocpol, "the new state organizations forged during the revolu
tions were more centralized and rationalized than those ofthe Old
Regime."
4 THERISE OFTilEEARLY MODERN STATEINEUROPE
Stillin the longrun, this riseofstate powerwasrelated notto the
increasing push for totalitarian ossification but to the rise of the
democratic tradition. The riseofthe West since the eighteenth cen
tury coincided with the spread ofdemocratic institutions, the new
political and socialorder. And this order-Western democratic capi
talism-providedthe powerful clanforexpansion ofEuropeanstates.
This order might be praised or condemned depending on social
scientists' viewsand political inclinations, butthe notion ofthe nov
eltyofthe newsystemhasnever been challenged. Thus,because rev
olution is visualized as a process ofchange and the nature ofthe
modern socialsciencesimplies the historicization ofsocialphenom
ena, which places them in the context ofhistorical development,
revolutionsareimplicitlyconnectedwith drastic change.This model
ofexplanationfor revolutions wasusuallyapplied wheneverchanges
took place, whatever their cultural context. Yet, this definition of
revolution and linear vision ofhistory can be applied preciselyonly
to very few social phenomena, mostly in the context of modern
Western history.
ANCIENT REVOLUTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
CYCLICALVISION OF HISTORY
In ancient times, revolutions were seen not in the contextofalinear
vision ofhistory but as embedded in a cyclicalmodel. Revolution
wasacceptedasaliteralrotation,and political revolutionwasrelated
to similarprocessesin nature.The naturalcourseofcosmic develop
ment wasseen asengaged in endless "revolutions." This revolution
could be seeninallgrandphilosophicalsystemsofancienttime.The
circle wasan essential model for cosmic processes in Hinduism and
Buddhism. Itappeared in Heraclitus's ideas ofthe emergingcosmic
fire that consumed the universe just to produce it once again. The
same model could easilybeseen in the Stoics' vision ofthe cosmos.
One might expect the situation to change with the advent of
Christianity, with its assumption ofa new world that was not only
the beginning butalsothe end,so that restoration ofthe old would
not be possible. Yetthe explanationofcosmologicalprocesses in the
context ofrotation continued to be popularat the beginning ofthe
modern era, when the word revolution was actually coined. "The
word 'revolution'wasoriginally an astronomical term,which gained
INTRODUCTION 5
increasing importance in the natural sciences through Copernicus's
De Revolutionibus orbium coelestium. In this scientific usage it
retained its precise Latin meaning, designating the regular, lawfully
revolving motionofthe stars, that, sinceit wasknown to be beyond
the influence ofman and hence irresistible, wascertainly character
ized neither by newness nor byviolence." This vision ofcosmologi
cal processes and ofnature in general continued to provide models
for understanding the historical process. In this case,the revolution
rotation ofthe planetswasdirectly related to the explanation ofrev
olutions in history. "The word revolution entered the domain of
political thought proper bywayofnatural philosophy [science]."12
The structural analogies between cosmic and historical rotation
were well-known to ancient people, and the developmentofscience
provided more affirmation: "The growing importance ofthe word
[revolution] for astronomy and for science, generally, coupled with
an inclination to fiteachchangeofthe heavenlybodiesintoanastro
logical or scientific scheme, helped to make the word revolution an
ever more popularterm, and paved the wayfor itsintroduction into
the language ofpolitics."13 Like natural phenomena, political revo
lutions did not bring many changes.
The cyclical vision of the historical process could be seen in
Aristotle and later in Polybius's cyclicaltheory ofrevolution "from
the collapse ofmonarchy and aristocracy through a more and more
democratic republic to military dictatorship, and back to monar
chy."!" For him, revolution was simply an appointed, recurring
cycle.The relationshipofchange to the cyclicalvision ofthe cosmic
and historical process could be supported by examples such as the
way the Greek states and later Rome evolved. Arendt notes that
"modern revolutions have little in common with the mutation
rerun ofRoman history," or with the civicstrife that disturbed the
Greek politic.IS
The medieval vision ofhistorical processes wasalso bound to the
vision ofhistory in classicalantiquity.The stress on rotation and the
actual stability of the historical process could be found among
thinkers ofthe Middle Ages who, more than anybody else, seemed
to be propagatingthe linear vision ofhistory. "Christianphilosophy,
itistrue, brokewith the time conceptofantiquity, because the birth
ofChrist,occurringinhumansecular time,constituted anew begin
ning, aswell asa unique, unrepeatable event," Arendt statcd.!" Yet,
