Small States and Alliances

192 Pages·2001·1.08 MB·English

by  Heinz Gärtner (auth.)

Small States and Alliances
Erich Reiter· Heinz Gartner
(Editors)
Small States
and Alliances
With 18 Figures
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg GmbH
DDr. Erich Reiter
Militărwissenschaftliches Buro
des Bundesministeriums fUr Landesverteidigung
Stiftgasse 2 a
1070 Vienna
Austria
E-mail: [email protected]
Dr. Heinz Gărtner
Osterreichisches Institut
fUr Internationale Politik
Operngasse 20 B
1040 Vienna
Austria
E-mail: [email protected]
The publication of this book was made possible by a generous
contribution from the Austrian Ministry of Defence /
Institute for Military Studies.
ISBN 978-3-7908-2492-6
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Small states and alliances / Erich Reiter; Heinz Giirtner (ed.).
ISBN 978-3-7908-2492-6 ISBN 978-3-662-13000-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-13000-1
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Table of Contents
Small States and Alliances. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Heinz Gärtner
Introductory Comments on the Objective of the Small States
and Alliances Workshop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Erich Reiter
Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns . . .15
Volker Krause, J. David Singer
The Concept of Military Alliance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
Stefan Bergsmann
Small States and European Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Simon W. Duke
Gaining Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Christian Tuschhoff
Engineering Influence: The Subtile Power of Small States in the CSCE/OSCE .63
Micheal W. Mosser
Small States and International Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Erwin A. Schmidl
The Danish Experience. Denmark in NATO, 1949–1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89
Svend Aage Christensen
Small States and Alliances – A Swedish Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101
Gunnar Lassinantti
Finland, the European Union and NATO – Implications for Security
and Defence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113
Kari Möttöla
Small States and Alliances: The Case of Slovenia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145
Anton Grizold, Vinko Vegiè
Switzerland and Europe’s Security Architecture:
The Rocky Road from Isolation to Cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161
Heiko Borchert
Austria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .183
Heinz Gärtner, Otmar Höll
Small States and Alliances
Heinz Gärtner
Introduction
ThearticlesinthisvolumearetheresultofaworkshopinViennainNovember
1999.TheworkshopwasorganizedbytheAustrianInstituteforInternationalAf-
fairs,theInstituteforMilitaryStudies,theAustrianDefenseAcademy,theDepart-
mentforPoliticalScienceandtheUniversityofVienna.Thepapersarebasedon
the following questions and arguments.
The Cold War system was based on the concept of ”balance of power.” For
HansMorgenthaualliancesarethe”mostimportantmanifestationofthebalance
ofpower.”Inthisobservationmembersofallianceshavecommoninterestsbased
onthefearofotherstates.StephenWalthassincemodifiedthisconcept.Forhim
alliancesaretheresultofa”balanceofthreat.”Intheoldsystemtheexistenceof
alliances and a potential threat were inseparable.
Since1989,thepoliticallandscapeofEuropelooksquitedifferent.Themain
threatonwhichthebalanceofpoweroftheColdWarwasbasedhasfadedaway.
According to some analysts, alliances can hardly survive without a sufficient
threat. Consequently, they concluded: ”NATO’s days are not numbered but its
yearsare.”SevenyearsaftertheendoftheColdWar,NATOshowsnosignsofde-
mise,however.Inthisrespect,thepredictionthatallianceswouldweakenwithout
threatappearstobewrong.NATOlookslikeitwillbeanexceptiontotheserules
and cornerstones of alliance theory.
Thereisnosmallamountofallianceliteratureonthequestions:Whydostates
formalliances?Whendotheyformalliances?Whatsizewillthealliancebewhenit
isformed?Statisticallyorientedresearchtestedthecorrelationbetweenalliance
commitmentsandinvolvementinwar.AftertheendoftheColdWar,thefocus
shifted.Now,theliteratureonalliancestriestoexplorethequestions:Whydoalli-
ancesdissolve?Whataretheforcesoreventsthatleadstatestoabandonsecurity
tiesthattheyoncewelcomed?Whydosomealliancespersistinthefaceofsuch
strains?Whydosomealliancessurviveevenaftertheiroriginalrationalehasevap-
orated?
Another interesting part of the alliance literature, however, relates to small
states. It is on why, how, and under what conditions states engage in alliances.
Whatarethebenefitsandcostsofalliance?Howarethebenefitsandcostsofalli-
ancesallocatedamongtheirmembers?Whatdetermineswhoallieswithwhom?
Cansmallstatesstillpursuetheirownsecurityinterestswithinanalliance?Can
they even become an integral part of an alliance?
2 Heinz Gärtner
In particular for small states, the decision to join alliances depends on the
judgementwhethertheoverallbenefitsofdoingsoaregreaterthanthecosts.Does
theperceivedthreatwarrantthecosts?Doestheincreasedsecurityresultingfrom
thepartner’scommitmentoutweighthelossofautonomysacrificedinthecom-
mitmenttothepartner?Underwhatconditionsandwhendoesasmallstateneed
theenhanceddeterrenceofattackonitselfandtheenhanceddefensecapability?Is
itpreparedtoaccepttheriskofhavingtocometotheaidoftheally,whenone
wouldhavepreferrednottodosointheabsenceofcommitment?Andmember-
ships, of course, do cost money that could arguably be better spent elsewhere.
Whatarethealliance’sbenefitsforsmallstatesaftertheendoftheEast-Westcon-
flict?
Alliancescanbedefinedasformalassociationsofstatesboundbythemutual
commitmenttousemilitaryforceagainstnon-memberstatestodefendmember
states’ integrity. Alliances call for the commitment of all participating states to
takeeffectiveandcoercivemeasures,inparticulartheuseofmilitaryforce,against
anaggressor.Cansmallstatesbeconfidentthatthesystemwouldcometotheiraid
intheeventualityofaggressionfromoutsidethealliance?Otherstatesinthesys-
tem,inparticularthegreatpowers,mightnotconsiderthethreattoasmallstateor
acivilwarasathreatworthyofcollectiveaction.Ontheotherhand,smallstates
mightfindthemselvesobligatedtoparticipateinaconflictinwhichtheyhadno
direct interest; this risk has been called ”entrapment”, the logical opposite of
”abandonment”.
Aretheseanxieties–thatsmallstatescouldbedrawnunwillinglyintothewars
ofbigstates–reasonable?Theresultsofempiricalresearcharemixed.Ontheone
hand,datashowthattheonsetofwarisunrelatedtoallianceformationandcon-
figuration.Ontheotherhand,themagnitude,duration,andseverityofwarare
substantivelyconnectedtoallianceconfiguration,forthereasonthatwarspreads
throughalliances.Alliancesturnsmallwarsintobigwars.Aresmallstatesdragged
intothewarsofbigpowersoraretheyprotectedbybigpowers?Smallstatesare
thusalwayscaughtinthetrapofbeing”entrapped”or”abandoned”.Thegreater
one’sdependenceontheallianceandthestrongerone’scommitmenttotheally,
thehighertheriskofentrapment.Theloosertheties,thelargertheriskofbeing
abandonedinthecaseofwar.Onestrategytoescapethistrapinhistoryhasbeen
to adopt ”neutrality” or ”hide.”
Traditionalmilitaryalliances,asdefinedabove,havelosttheirmeaningafter
theendoftheEast-Westconflict.HowcanNATOendureintheabsenceofaseri-
ousopponent?NATOischanging.NATOisredevelopingitsstructure.Itwilldo
both, include former members of the Warsaw Treaty organization and develop
strongcooperationwithRussia.Mostimportantofall,thecoreoftheColdWar
NATO, (nuclear) deterrence and collective defense (enshrined in Art. V of the
WashingtonTreaty)isbecominglessandlessimportant.Thisconceptdefinesthe
primarypurposeoftheallianceasdefenseofNATOterritoryagainstamajorat-
tack. NATO’s activities are therefore less concentrated on collective defense.
NATOwillnotfocusonasinglemission–collectivedefense–anymore,asitdid
Small States and Alliances 3
duringtheColdWar.Nolongerpreparingonlyorprimarilyforacoalitionwaron
itsagenda,itnowfocusesoncrisismanagement,peacekeeping,humanitarianac-
tion,andalsopeaceenforcement.The”newNATO”looksandactsinpartquite
differentlyfromtheoldNATO.ThePartnershipforPeace(PfP)programhasal-
readybeendesignedaccordingtothenewrequirements.CooperationofthePart-
nerswithNATOcanbeorganizedonanindividuallevelthroughpeace-keeping
exercises, military-to-military contacts, and similar activities. The new
Euro-AtlanticPartnershipCouncil(EAPC)providesamechanismforproductive
consultation and more meaningful communication among Partners and in-
creaseddecision-makingopportunitiesforpartnersrelatingtoactivitiesinwhich
theyparticipate.IsthissufficientforthesecurityneedsaftertheendoftheCold
War?Howmuchinfluencedosmallstateshavewithinthealliance,andonwhatis-
sues?Whataretheadvantagesofstayingoutside,whatarethoseofbeingamem-
ber?
Some of the small states of Europe look to NATO as the primary mili-
tary-securityalliance,althoughwithvariousdegreesofenthusiasm.Themosten-
thusiastic small state supporters of NATO are former members of the Warsaw
Treaty Organization, seeking full membership not only for the security NATO
would provide but to demonstrate their full membership in post-Cold War Eu-
rope.SomesmallstatesinNATOaremoreenthusiasticabouttheprospectsfora
EuropeansecurityorganizationintheframeworkoftheEUthanothers.Thestates
notparticipatinginanalliance(Sweden,AustriaandFinland)arewaryoflinking
themselvestoocloselytotheAlliance,findingthesecuritypostureoftheEUmore
acceptable.ThePfPprogramalsodevelopedapowerfulalternativeforthosesmall
states that do not want to or cannot join NATO.
Scholars,practitioners,policy-makersandadvisorsfromseveralcountrieswill
beinvitedtodiscusstheseissues.Theywilladdresshistorical,empirical,andtheo-
retical topics. They will also be asked to give policy recommendations.
ThepurposeofDavidSinger’sandVolkerKrause’sarticleistoreviewresearch
onformalalliances,withafocusonalliancepoliciesofso-called”minorpowers,”
oftenalsoreferredtoas”smallstates.”Specifically,theyaddressthefollowingtwo
questions:First,whataresomesourcesofminor-poweralliancecommitments?
Or, what are some benefits minor powers can expect from formal alliance ties?
Second, what are some consequences of minor-power alliance commitments in
termsofarmedconflict?Or,areminorpowerswithformalallianceconnections
moreorlesslikelythanthosewithoutsuchbondstobecomeinvolvedinmilita-
rizeddisputesandwars?Theauthorsarguethatminorpowers,giventheirrather
limitedcapabilities,mayhaveastronginterestinalliancecommitmentsnotonly
toenhancetheirmilitarysecuritybutalsotoobtainavarietyofnon-militarybene-
fits,suchasincreasedtradeorsupportfordomesticpoliticalregimes.Oneofthe
problemswithalliancebondsis,however,thatalliedsupportoftenrequiresminor
powerstomakesignificantautonomyconcessions,allowingallies,mostnotably
major-power allies, to gain influence over their minor-power alliance partners.
Additionally,alliancetiesmayreduceminorpowers’diplomaticflexibilitytopre-
ventforeignpolicycrisesfromescalatingtoall-outwarfarewhileleavingituncer-
4 Heinz Gärtner
tain whether allies will honor their pledges of military support in the event of
armed conflict or war.
StefanBergsmanntriestodevelopatheoreticallyusefuldefinitionofthecon-
cept of military alliance. He argues that all definitions developed so far are not
clear,conciseandnarrowenoughtobeausefulbasisforfurthertheorizing.He
proposestodefineanallianceas”anexplicitagreementamongstatesintherealm
ofnationalsecurityinwhichthepartnerspromisemutualassistanceintheformof
a substantial contribution of resources in the case of a certain contingency the
arising of which is uncertain.”
SimonDukeconcludesthatthebehaviorofsmallstatesintheEuropeanSecu-
rityandDefenseIdentity(ESDI)andmoregeneralEuropeansecuritycontextsis
distinguishedbydiversityasmuchasbysimilarities.Itisdifficulttoascertainany
specific type of behavior that distinguishes larger from smaller state behavior.
Eventhepresenceoffourneutralandnon-alignedstates(NNA’s)intheEU,which
isoftentakenasanexemplarofsmallstatebehavior,showsconsiderablediffer-
ences between their outlooks. Their respective NNA positions may be substan-
tiallymodifiedbydecisionsofothersmallstatestojoin,ornot,alliancessuchas
Estonia’s potential membership of NATO. Amongst the small states there may
alsobesignificantdifferencesofopinionsuchasthepro-EuropeanstanceofBel-
giumandthepro-AtlanticstanceoftheNetherlands,inspiteoftheirveryclosere-
lationsinotherfields.Theargumentthatthesmallstatesshouldadoptacoherent
positionsothattheymaymaketheirvoiceheardbythelargerstatessuffersfrom
the false assumption that there is a sufficient identity of interests amongst the
smallerstatesorlargerstates.Smallerstatesmaywellbemosteffectivewhenthey
engagethelargerstatesfrompositionsofrelativeinfluence,suchastheEUPresi-
dency,wheretheycanmodifyorshapeagendas.Withtheoverallthemeofsmall
statesandalliancesinmind,itwouldappearthattheabsenceofanyovertthreatto
thesecurityofmostsmallstatesinEuropehasdecreasedtherelevanceofalliances
forsmallerstates.Asaconsequence,smallstateshaveshownfarmorewillingness
todevelopspecificlinkstosecurityorganisationsthatreflectonlytheirimmediate
concerns.Alliances,inthetraditionalsense,weredesignedtoaddressthreatsfrom
withoutandthereisnoguaranteethatlargerstateswillwishtoinvolvethemselves
inintra-staterivalries.UnliketheColdWar,smallerstatesmaynowchoosetoin-
volvethemselvesonan àlacartebasisinawiderangeofsecuritycommitments
withanemphasisupontheirownsecurityrequirementsandthoseintheimmedi-
atevicinity.Alliancemembershipornon-membershipforsmallerstatesnowcar-
riesdifferentcostsandbenefitsthanintheColdWareraandthisisinpartbecause
theverynatureofsecurityandallianceshaschanged.Onefactorthathasnotap-
preciablychanged,however,isthatsmallerstatesstillhavetheabilitytoupsetthe
designs for stability promoted by the larger states.
Smallstatesformanalliancetobalanceagainstarisinghegemon.Followingon
thisargumentsomescholarsarguedthatstatesmustalsoperceivethechanging
balance of power as a threat to their security before they form an alliance with
otherstates.ChristianTuschhoffarguesthatthechangingbalanceofpoweramong
Small States and Alliances 5
statesnolongermeansanewmilitarythreat,however.Tuschhofffurtherargues
thatGermanyincreaseditspowerrelativetoitsNATOalliesduringtheseyears.
Further,thechangingbalanceofpowerwasmadepossiblebythemechanismsof
militaryintegrationthataredistinctivetoNATO.Thisisanimportantinstanceof
how a small state gained control at the expense of its originally more powerful
partners.Andstillsuchchangedidnotaffectthestabilityoftheallianceasawhole.
The institution of military integration allowed for a changing balance of power
amongallies,i.e.peacefulchangethatcouldhavebrokenNATOapartifinstitu-
tions had failed to mediate among allies.
MichaelMosser attemptstoshowthroughthestoryofsmallstatesembedded
withinoneinternationalorganization,theConferenceonSecurityandCoopera-
tioninEurope(CSCE),thattheimportanceofsmallstatestointernationalorgani-
zations and to international relations more generally has been understated and
misunderstood.Thefocusonpowerratherthaninfluence,andonstatesontheir
ownintheinternationalstatessystemratherthanwithininternationalorganiza-
tions,hasledthefieldtodismissoutofhandthepossibilitythatsmallstatescan
actstrategicallytopreservetheirsecuritywhileatthesametimecontributingto
the stability and efficacy of international organizations. He mostly deals with a
brieftheoreticalexplorationoftherolesmallstatesmightbeexpectedtoplayin
internationalorganizations,andahistoricaltreatmentoftherolethesmallNNA
statesdidplayintheCSCE.Heattemptstoshowthatdespitetheirsize,smallstates
wereabletoengineerinfluenceintheorganization,butnotwithoututilizingthe
built-inrulesanddecision-makingproceduresundergirdedbystrongnormsfa-
voringequalityandnegotiationoverconfrontation.Muchmorethananegative
use(orthreatofuse,asthecasemaybe)oftheconsensusdecision-makingrule
wasatplayingivingsmallstatesavoiceintheoperationsoftheCSCE.Infact,he
stateswithouttoomuchexaggerationthattheoperationalmodalitiesoftheCSCE
itselfgavetheopportunityforanystate,regardlessofsize,toengineerinfluence,
butthatthesmallNNAstatesweretheoneswhohadoneofthelargeststakesin
keepingtheprocessaliveandthusweremostkeeninhavingtheirvoiceheard.Itis
nosurprise,then,thattheNNAswereabletogettheirinterestsacrossintheCSCE.
What is surprising, however, is the way they were able to go about it.
Erwin A. Schmidl collects together advantages and disadvantages of smaller
statesininternationalpeaceoperations.Ontheonehand,becauseoftheirstruc-
ture–“smallisbeautiful”–theyaresometimesbetterorganised,andbenefitfrom
the“everybodyknowseverybody”-syndrome.Beingsmaller,theytendtobemore
flexible.Anotherpositivequalificationonemightrightfullyexpectofpersonnel–
military,policeorcivilian–fromasmallercountry:becausebeingforcedtowork
withlimitedbudgets,theyareusedtoimprovise,andtrainedtothinkflexibly:an
obviousrequirementinpeaceoperations(“corporal’swars”);unfortunately,Aus-
triahasthedubioushonortoserveasaprimeexample.Ontheotherhandthey
havelessweight–or”punch.”Becauseoftheirbackground(andlackof“back-up”),
contingentsfromsmallercountriesareingeneralbettersuitedforcivilian,police,
orlimitedmilitary–esp.“specialist”–tasksthanforfightingunits.This,justas
theirsometimeslessaggressiveimagecanbeanadvantageaswell,dependenton
6 Heinz Gaertner
thecharacterofaparticularmission.Despitethesedeficienciesthereisatendency
toincludesmallstatesinpeaceoperations–partlybecausethepresenceofmany
contingentshelpsthe“international”imageofthesemissions,andbecauseitcor-
respondstotheprincipleof(atleastintheory)equalitybetweenthestatesasem-
bodiedintheUNCharter(“onecountry–onevote”).Italsomeetsthe(usually
erroneous) self-image of international organisations of being actors themselves
ratherthanjustastage.Anditfitstheambitionsofsmallercountries(andtheir
politicians,civilservants,andmilitaryofficers)whooftenseek“toplayarole,too”
(the “we-too” phenomenon).
SvendAageChristensen discussesthecostsandbenefitsofalliancemember-
shipforsmallstatesonthebasisofGlennSnyder’stheoryofalliancebehavior.Ac-
cordingtothistheory,alliancepoliticsareplayedoutintwogames,thealliance
gameandtheadversarygame.Thealliancegamereferstopoliticswithinthealli-
ance,whiletheadversarygameconcernspoliticsbetweenopposingalliancesand
nations.Christensendevelopsfouradaptivemodesofbehaviorinadaptationthe-
oryandtheircharacteristics:dominance,balancing,acquiescenceandquiescence.
Followingadaptationtheory,Danishpolicyconcerningthedefensedimensionof
EU seems to be very close to a policy of quiescence.
DanishpolicyconcerningthedefensedimensionoftheEUisdeterminedby
theso-callednationalcompromiseof1992,accordingtowhichDenmarkremains
outside the defense dimension of the EU, including membership of the WEU,
commondefensepolicyandcommondefense.AccordingtotheEdinburghDeci-
sionadoptedbytheHeadsofStateorGovernment,12December1992,Denmark
doesnotparticipateintheelaborationandtheimplementationofdecisionsand
actionsoftheUnionwhichhavedefenseimplications,butwillnotpreventthede-
velopmentofclosercooperationbetweenMemberStatesinthisarea(Protocolon
the position of Denmark).
TheothersideofthecoinisanextraordinaryDanishactivisminNATO.This
aspectofDanishsecurityanddefensepolicyratherqualifiesasapolicyofbalance,
characterisedbyahighdegreeofparticipation,anoffensivepowerpriorityanda
highdegreeofsensitivitytotheeventualityofbeingleftoutofthefora,inwhich
decisions concerning the future security landscape of Europe are being made.
GunnarLassinanttitakesthediscussion’spointofdepartureinthreecircum-
stances:1.Thegeopoliticallocationofthestatesinquestion,2.Thehistory,tradi-
tions,politicalandotherdomesticcircumstancesofthosestates,3.Thealliances
availableandtheirrelationshiptodifferentstates.Helooksatthecase-studySwe-
den.Sweden’spolicyofneutralityevolvedgraduallystartingaround1840.Swe-
den’s neutrality policy has rested on unilateral decisions taken by the Swedish
GovernmentandtheSwedishRiksdag(parliament).Thus,itdoesnotbuildonin-
ternationalagreementsinthesamewayastheneutralitypoliciesofFinland,Swit-
zerlandandAustria.ImmediatelyaftertheSecondWorldWar,Swedishneutrality
policywasbasedonmaintainingastrongdefenseforce.Infact,attheendofthe
1940sandduringthe1950sSweden’sdefenseforcewasoneofthestrongestinEu-
ropeandthiswasalsotrueinpartinlaterdecades.Untilthe1990s,Sweden’sneu-