Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan

376 Pages·2015·14.72 MB·English

T
.
G
This study has been undertaken as the fi rst ever joint research publication .

between defence institutions in Denmark and Pakistan. Given the N
i
development in international security politics in the last few years, it is fair to e
l
s
argue that both Denmark and Pakistan are at a point where future security e
challenges require a development of policies and strategies. Though the n
,

roles of Denmark and Pakistan respectively are different in nature, a lot of M
commonalities in conceptual thoughts and actions were found between the .H
two countries at all levels. The book at hand gathers a number of lessons .
S
identifi ed from Afghanistan and Pakistan with the objective of promoting y
e
sustainable regional peace building and developing military and civilian d

cooperation strategies for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. &

D
.
Authors: V
e
s
Thomas Galasz Nielsen, major in the Danish Army te
and master of art student at King’s College London, is n
s
currently assigned as a military analyst at the Danish k
o
Institute for International Studies, an independent Danish v
think-tank. Previously assignments include Chief Danish

Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism:
Staff Element in 2009 to 2010 at the British Brigade
Headquarters in Helmand, Afghanistan, syndicate leader
S Sharing Experiences in
at the Royal Danish Defence Academy in military strategy, and various h
a
military assignments in the Danish Defence Staff and in units up to Brigade
r Afghanistan and Pakistan
level. in
g
Mahroona Hussain Syed is a sociologist and a Ph.D. EC By Thomas Galasz Nielsen, Mahroona Hussain Syed & David Vestenskov
xo
fellow in the Department of Government and Public Policy u
p
n
at the National Defence University, Pakistan. Besides et
re
regular contributions to local journals and books, she is ir
ein
the author of ‘The Nature of Dependency in the Socio- ns
Economic Development of Pakistan: An Exploratory Study ceurg
into the Compulsive and Voluntary Dependency Affecting se
n
Pakistan’s Socio-Economic Development’ (2010). Currently she is working as inc
y
Research Associate at Institute of Strategic Studies and Research Analysis A a
(ISSRA), National Defence University, Pakistan. fn
gd
h C
ao
nu
David Vestenskov is a consultant at the Royal Danish in
st
Defence College with an emphasis on Afghanistan and e
t
Pakistan. His analytical work and research have primarily art
ne
focused on security developments in Central Asia and the rr
ao
Maniddd lbeo Eoaksst ownh.i cHh ish ec aulrsroe nhta sw pourkb licsohmedp rsieseves rarel asertaicrclehs, ndrism

international networking and project implementation P:
a
in the areas of international security issues, counterinsurgency and
k
counterterrorism, as well as regional peace building. i
s
t
a
n
Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism:
Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and
Pakistan
By Thomas Galasz Nielsen,
Mahroona Hussain Syed
&
David Vestenskov
2015
Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism: Sharing Experiences in
Afghanistan and Pakistan
Thomas Galasz Nielsen, Mahroona Hussain Syed & David Vestenskov
© Royal Danish Defence College
All rights reserved. Mechanical, photographic or other reproduction
or photocopying from this book or parts thereof is only allowed
according to agreements between The Danish Defence and
CopyDan.
Any other use without written consent from the Royal Danish
Defence College and Pakistan’s National Defence University
is illegal according to Danish law on intellectual property right.
Excepted are short extracts for reviews in newspapers or the like.
Copenhagen September 2015
Royal Danish Defence College
Ryvangs Allé 1
DK-2100 Copenhagen
Denmark
Tel.: [phone]
Editors in chief: D ean Ole Kværnø RDDC &
Major General Noel I. Khokhar HI(M), NDU
Printed in Denmark by Rosendahls A/S
Frontpage photos: Top: Danish soldiers from ISAF 6 conducting
CIMIC work with local Afghans in Helmand 2008. Archive: Danish
Defence. Below: Pakistani Armed Forces in Operation Rah-e-Nijat
(2011). Archive: ISPR
Layout: Bent-Ole Kure
ISBN: 978-87-7147-118-2
Number printed: 400
Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House
2
COIN & CT: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Contents
Foreword .............................................................................................................5
Abbreviations .....................................................................................................7
Introduction .......................................................................................................9
Project outline and study objective ............................................................11
Analytical framework ...................................................................................13
Methodology and criteria for selecting respondents for data collection .14
Contextual and analytical scope .................................................................15
Entering Afghanistan: Historical overview, the stages of the ISAF mission,
and understanding the basics of COIN and the opponent ..........................17
Abstract ........................................................................................................17
Preface .........................................................................................................17
Recent history of Afghanistan’s government .............................................18
Juridical foundation for the missions in Afghanistan ................................21
The Danish troop contribution in Helmand ................................................23
Danish tasks in Helmand ............................................................................25
Understanding the basics of countering insurgents and terrorists ..........27
COIN principles and laws ............................................................................28
Using Galula’s theories in a contemporary conflict – countering
insurgents ....................................................................................................28
Operational framework: The eight steps ....................................................30
The insurgency: The Taliban from 2001 to 2005 ......................................31
The Taliban from 2005 to 2014 .................................................................32
ISAF challenges with Taliban ......................................................................33
Counter-militancy operations in Pakistan: Through the prism of COIN
and CT ...............................................................................................................35
Abstract ........................................................................................................35
Preface .........................................................................................................35
Explaining the context: Pakistan’s geostrategic compulsions ..................35
Pakistan’s share in the war on Terror ........................................................39
Pakistan’s approach seen through the prism of COIN ..............................41
Pakistan decides to eliminate terrorism and militancy from its soil ........50
Concluding remarks ...................................................................................55
Counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan ..............................................57
Abstract ........................................................................................................57
counterinsurgency ...............................................................57
Insurgency motivations ...............................................................................63
Perception of
Counterinsurgency tools .............................................................................66
3
Contents
Tools crowded out ........................................................................................75
Counterproductive effects ...........................................................................78
Counterterror operations in Pakistan ............................................................82
Abstract ........................................................................................................82
Perception of the opponent ........................................................................82
Perceptions of counterinsurgency ..............................................................89
Insurgency motivations ..............................................................................91
Counterinsurgency tools ...........................................................................100
Tools crowded out ......................................................................................109
Counterproductive effects .........................................................................112
Conclusion ......................................................................................................114
Understanding the lessons identified ......................................................114
Appendix 1 - Complete list of lessons identified .........................................119
COIN operations in Afghanistan ...............................................................119
CT and CM operations in Pakistan ...........................................................124
Appendix 2 – Questions for the respondents..............................................132
Appendix 3 – Transcriptions of interviews from Pakistan ........................133
Appendix 4 – Transcriptions of interviews from Denmark ........................153
Bibliography ...................................................................................................346
Interviews ...................................................................................................354
4
COIN & CT: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Foreword
Considering the nature and gravity of the events related to 9/11, the coun-
terinsurgency efforts followed by the U.S./NATO drawdown in Afghanistan
and Pakistan’s ongoing war against domestic militancy and terrorism, the
states involved in these colossal efforts stand enriched with varied experi-
ences and deeper insights into issues that confronted all stakeholders in the
Post 9/11 period till 2014. Therefore, a need was felt in Denmark and in
Pakistan to share such experiences in collaboration, for the benefit of our
two countries as well as for others in the international community. Conse-
quently, researchers from both the RDDC and NDU have collaborated to
bring forth the book at hand.
Priority within both of our institutions has been given to this academic,
research-based book, in order to share the experiences gained by people from
the two countries who have been and are carrying out Counterinsurgency
and Counterterrorism operations in their respective areas of responsibility
and operations in an open, frank and comprehensive manner. As was hoped
for, the interviewees offered candid views, while expounding upon their
experiences, concerns and suggestions, which led to many shared lessons
identified all throughout the process. We extend our profound gratitude to
all the respondents, who offered insightful viewpoints for this research. It is
hoped that people from different segments of both societies, especially gov-
ernmental, political and military leadership circles, think tanks, universities,
media and other stakeholders will find this book to be a first drop of rain that
opens further avenues for joint cooperation amongst countries, especially
when it comes to exploring opportunities in the field of academic research.
The objective of this book has been twofold. First, the project upon which
this book is founded was initiated in order to create and develop academic
connections between Danish and Pakistani research institutions and establish
common ground for joint research within the area of security studies. Second,
this book analyses Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism operations in
Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to identify lessons that might potentially
be implemented in future operations, on both the Danish and the Pakistani
sides, and thereby have a strategic impact on the political level, as well as in
a military operational context.
The first objective was reached by connecting the National Defence Uni-
versity in Pakistan to the Royal Danish Defence College and the Danish
5
Foreword
Institute for International Studies in the spring of 2014. Researchers from
the three institutions had earlier met in November 2013 and drew up the
research guidelines for this book, which was approved by the National De-
fence University Pakistan and the Royal Danish Defence College and also
from the Danish Ministry of Defence, and the Danish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, which have jointly funded the project. The second objective to be
reached with the book at hand, and our hope, is that the book will not only
add to the field of security studies but also promote joint research projects for
sharing experiences between academic military institutions across borders,
regions, and continents.
In the end, we feel that there is a need to critically analyse the emerging
situation in this region and discover proactive approaches to forestall issues
that could generate the menaces of internal strife, terrorism, militancy, and
insurgency.
The lessons identified by the authors are many, but whether they will be
internalised will be up to political and military decision makers. However,
we are convinced that the results, as well as the cooperative process, are of
such a character that they should be addressed when future strategies of
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism are developed, be it domestically
or internationally.
Dean Ole Kværnø, RDDC &
Major General Noel I. Khokhar HI(M), NDU
6
COIN & CT: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Abbreviations
3D: Deterrence, Dialogue, and Development
ANA Afghan National Army
ANP: Afghan National Police
ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces
AO: Area of Operations
ARTF: Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation
COIN: Counterinsurgency
CT: Counterterrorism
CM: Counter-militancy
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration
DIIS: Danish Institute for International Studies
EU: European Union
FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FC: Frontier Corps
FOB Forward Operating Base
HTA: Human Terrain Analysis
HUMINT Human Intelligence
HQ: Headquarters
IDP: Internally Displaced Person
IED: Improvised explosive device
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
IS: Islamic State
ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan’s premiere intelligence
service)
ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
JPEL Joint Prioritized Effects List
LoC: Line of Control
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDU: National Defence University
NGO: Non-Governmental Organizations
NW: North Waziristan
OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom
RC SW: Regional Command South West
PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team
RDDC: Royal Danish Defence College
TTP: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban)
7
Abbreviations
UK: United Kingdom
UN: United Nations
UNAMA: United Nation Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMOG: United Nations Military Observers Group
UNSCR: United Nations Security Council Resolution
U.S.: United States (United States of America)
USA: United States of America
8
COIN & CT: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Introduction
The era launched by the declaration of the Global War on Terror1 by America
and its allies saw great instability and turmoil in the Central and South Asian
regions due to increases in militant and insurgent activities. Consequently,
all the regional actors had to develop new strategies to deal with uprisings,
unrest, and instability. An elusive and unpredictable enemy, difficult geo-
graphical terrain, politico-diplomatic upheavals, and public resentment over
governments’ decisions to engage in asymmetric warfare – counterinsurgency
(COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) - haunted the states with bleak prospects
of everlasting military engagement at home or abroad.
When the Danish parliament chose to join the American-led Operation
Enduring Freedom in 2001, it was greatly motivated by NATO’s core prin-
ciple2 of coming to the aid of an alliance partner under attack; in this case,
one that had suffered an attack by the terrorist network al-Qaeda, which
hijacked four planes and used them as weapons on U.S. soil in New York
and Washington on September 11, 2001 (9/11). Logically, both the strategic
and the operational planning were left to the United States, which relied
on a classic Clausewitzian centre-of-gravity approach3 and engaged itself
and its allies in the so-called War on Terror. This resulted in large-scale
military operations against the enemy’s strongholds – primarily the city of
Kabul.4 At this point, the primary objective for the military operation was to
overthrow a regime that sheltered the al-Qaeda terrorist leader responsible
for 9/11. The secondary objective was to prevent future terrorist networks
from training and operating on Afghan soil.5 Though capacity building of
both civilian and military institutions was carried out concurrently, the of-
fensive operations against the insurgent groups remained a core element in
the strategy throughout the entire International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) campaign in Afghanistan.
(1) ‘Text of George Bush’s Speech | U.S. News | The Guardian’ <http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13> [accessed 9 September
2015].
(2) Article 5 in: NATO, ‘NATO - The North Atlantic Treaty’, 1949.
(3) Antulio Joseph Echevarria and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies
Institute, ‘Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine--
Again!’, 2002 <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS23661>.
(4) ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ ([Arlington, Va.] : U.S. Army, 2001).
(5) Catherine Dale, ‘War in Afghanistan Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for
Congress’ ([Washington, D.C.] : Congressional Research Service, 2009).
9