Russian Information Warfare: Assault on Democracies in the Cyber Wild West

312 Pages·2022·10.355 MB·English

by  Bilyana Lilly

R U S S I A N
INFORMATION
W A R F A R E

R U S S I A N
INFORMATION
W A R F A R E
Assault on Democracies in the Cyber Wild West
B I L Y A N A L I L L Y
NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS
Annapolis, Maryland
Naval Institute Press
291 Wood Road
Annapolis, MD 21402
© 2022 by The U.S. Naval Institute
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in
any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying
and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Lilly, Bilyana, author.
Title: Russian information warfare : assault on democracies in the cyber wild west /
Bilyana Lilly.
Description: Annapolis, Maryland : Naval Institute Press, [2022] | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2022006406 (print) | LCCN 2022006407 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781682477199 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781682477472 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Information warfare—Russia (Federation)—History—21st century.
| Cyberspace operations (Military science)—Russia (Federation) | Hacking—Russia
(Federation)—Political aspects. | Disinformation—Russia (Federation) | Western
countries—Foreign relations—Russia (Federation) | Russia (Federation)—Foreign
relations—Western countries. | BISAC: HISTORY / Military / Strategy | COMPUTERS
/ Security / General
Classification: LCC UA770 .L48 2022 (print) | LCC UA770 (ebook) |
DDC 355/.033547—dc23/eng/20220223
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022006406
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022006407
∞ Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992
(Permanence of Paper).
Printed in the United States of America.
30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
First printing
To Laura Survant and Fiona Hill
who showed me how to lead with grace

CONTENTS
List of Illustrations xi
.................................................................
Preface xiii
...........................................................................
Acknowledgments xv
.................................................................
List of Abbreviations xvii
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Introduction 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Questions This Book Answers 3
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Main Criteria for Case Selection 4
............................................
Identifying the Cases This Book Analyzes 6
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Methodology and Data Collection 9
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. The Role of Cyber Operations and Forces in Russia’s Understanding
of Warfare: A Foundation for Subsequent Frameworks 17
.........................
Russia’s Strategic Outlook 17
..................................................
Russia’s View of Modern Warfare: Increased Application of
Nonmilitary Measures 20
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Russia’s Cyber Strategy: Cyber Operations as a Part of Information
Warfare in Peacetime and during War 22
.....................................
Russia’s Cyber Strategy in Practice: Forces and Capabilities 27
................
Conclusion 30
.................................................................

2. Frameworks for Predicting and Analyzing Cyber Operations in the
Context of Information Warfare 31
.................................................
A Framework for Identifying Factors Associated with the Initiation
of Russian Cyber Operations 32
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A Political Hack Map of Russian Targets 35
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Russia’s CHAOS 40
...........................................................
Conclusion 41
.................................................................
vii
viii » Contents
3. Web War I: How a Bronze Soldier Triggered a New Era in Cyber Warfare 44
. . . . . .
Factors in Estonia-Russia Relations Potentially Associated with
the Launch of Cyber Operations 44
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Russia’s Information Warfare Activities 45
.....................................
Russia’s Interference in Estonia: Associated Factors and Mapping
the Information Warfare Campaign Using CHAOS 52
.......................
The Effectiveness of Russia’s Cyber Operations and Information
Warfare Campaign 54
.........................................................

4. Blowing Up Its Own Trojan Horse in Europe: DDoS Attacks against
Bulgaria’s Political Infrastructure, Assassinations, and Explosions 56
.............
Factors in Bulgaria-Russia Relations and the Bulgarian Election
Environment Potentially Associated with the Launch of Cyber Operations 57
. . .
Russia’s Information Warfare Activities 60
.....................................
QCA and Visualization of Russia’s Cyber Attacks and Other Activities 68
......
The Effectiveness of Russia’s Cyber Operations and Information
Warfare Campaign 71
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5. The 2016 and 2020 U.S. Presidential Elections, or Why the Devil
Wears Gucci, Not Prada 74
.........................................................
A Note on Standards of Evidence 75
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Factors in U.S.-Russia Relations and the U.S. Election Environment
Potentially Associated with the Launch of Cyber Operations 76
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Russia’s Information Warfare Activities 77
.....................................
Russia’s Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections: Associated Factors
and Mapping the Campaign Using CHAOS 90
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Observations about Russia’s Information Warfare Playbook 92
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Effectiveness of Russia’s Cyber Operations and Information
Warfare Campaign 93
.........................................................

6. Phishing in Norway’s Nets in 2016: Where Sputnik Crashed and Burned 96
......
Factors Potentially Associated with the Launch of Cyber Operations 96
.......
Russia’s Information Warfare Activities 97
.....................................
Russia’s Interference in Norway: Associated Factors and Mapping
the Information Warfare Campaign Using CHAOS 102
.....................
The Effectiveness of Russia’s Cyber Operations and Information
Warfare Campaign 102
.......................................................

7. How the Tiny Balkan Nation of Montenegro Withstood a Russian-
Sponsored Coup 105
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Factors Potentially Associated with the Launch of Cyber Operations 106
.......
Contents « ix
Russia’s Information Warfare Activities 106
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Russia’s Interference in Montenegro: Associated Factors and Mapping
the Information Warfare Campaign Using CHAOS 114
......................
The Effectiveness of Russia’s Cyber Operations and Information
Warfare Campaign 114
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8. Trying to Trump En Marche! Russia’s Interference in the 2017 French
Presidential Elections 117
............................................................
Factors Potentially Associated with the Launch of Cyber Operations 118
......
Russia’s Information Warfare Activities 119
....................................
Russia’s Interference in the 2017 French Presidential Elections:
Associated Factors and Mapping the Information Warfare
Campaign Using CHAOS 126
...............................................
The Effectiveness of Russia’s Cyber Operations and Information
Warfare Campaign 128
.......................................................

9. The Hack of the Bundestag and Aiding AfD 130
.................................
Factors Potentially Associated with the Launch of Cyber Operations 131
.....
Russia’s Information Warfare Activities 131
..................................
Media Coverage and Social Activities: The Lisa Case 136
....................
Russia’s Interference in Germany: Associated Factors and Mapping
the Information Warfare Campaign Using CHAOS 139
.....................
Germany’s Policy Response 141
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Effectiveness of Russia’s Cyber Operations and Information
Warfare Campaign 143
.......................................................

10 . Cross-Country Analysis and Effectiveness of Russia’s Cyber Operations
and Information Warfare Campaigns 145
..........................................
Cross-Country QCA Analysis and Main Conclusions 145
.....................
Cross-Country Hack Map Analysis and Main Conclusions 147
...............
Cross-Country CHAOS Analysis and Main Conclusions 149
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Overall Effectiveness of Russia’s Cyber Operations and Information
Warfare Campaigns: Is Being the Top Villain Worth It? 150
.................
Main Takeaways of the Cross-Case Analysis and the Effectiveness
of Russia’s CHAOS 154
.......................................................

11. Policy Recommendations for Defending against Russia’s Information
Warfare Activities 156
..............................................................
Improve Data Collection and Knowledge about the Different Information
Warfare Activities That the Russian Government Supports 156
...............
x » Contents
Address the C in CHAOS: How to Defend against Russia’s Most Likely
Cyber Operations against Political Infrastructure 158
........................
Address the H in CHAOS: How to Enhance Resilience against
Disinformation and Strategic Messaging Campaigns 160
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Address the AOS in CHAOS: How to Defend against Russia’s
Other Information Warfare Operations 161
...................................
Final Thoughts about Russia’s Assault on Democracies in the
Cyber Wild West 163
..............................................................
Notes 167
...........................................................................
Selected Bibliography 237
...........................................................
Index 279
...........................................................................