Rethinking Intensive Quantities via Guided Mediated Abduction

24 Pages·2012·0.23 MB·English

THEJOURNALOFTHELEARNINGSCIENCES,21:626–649,2012
Copyright©Taylor&FrancisGroup,LLC
ISSN:1050-8406print/1532-7809online
DOI:10.1080/10508406.2011.633838
Rethinking Intensive Quantities via Guided
Mediated Abduction
2
1
0
2
er DorAbrahamson
b
cto GraduateSchoolofEducation
O UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley
2
2
8
1
3:
2
at Some intensive quantities, such as slope, velocity, or likelihood, are perceptually
] privilegedinthesensethattheyareexperiencedasholistic,irreduciblesensations.
y
ele However, the formal expression of these quantities uses a/b analytic metrics; for
k example,theslopeofalineisthequotientofitsriseandrun.Thus,whereasstudents’
r
e
B sensationofanintensivequantitycouldserveasapowerfulresourceforgrounding
a, itsformalexpression,acceptingthemathematicalformrequiresstudentstoalignthe
rni sensationwithanewwayofreasoningaboutthephenomenon.Iofferacaseanal-
o
f ysisofamiddleschoolstudentwhosuccessfullycametounderstandtheintensive
Cali quantityoflikelihood.Theanalysishighlightsaformofreasoningcalledabduction
f andsuggeststhatsociocognitiveprocessescanguideandmediatestudents’abduc-
o
y tive reasoning. Interpreting the child’s and tutor’s multimodal action through the
sit lensofabductiveinference,Idemonstratetheemergenceofaproportionalconcept
r
e
v asguidedmediatedobjectificationoftacitperception.This“gestaltfirst”processis
Uni contrastedwithtraditional“elementsfirst”approachestobuildingproportionalcon-
y [ cepts,andIspeculateonepistemicandcognitiveimplicationsofthiscontrastforthe
b designandinstructionoftheseimportantconcepts.Inparticular,myapproachhigh-
d
e lightsanimportantsourceofepistemicdifficultyforstudentsastheylearnintensive
d
a quantities:thedifficultyinshiftingfromintuitiveperceptualconvictiontomediated
o
nl disciplinary analysis. My proposed conceptualization of learning can serve as an
w
o effectivesynthesisoftraditionalandreform-basedmathematicsinstruction.
D
This paper offers a new perspective on the pedagogy of intensive quantities,
which are central yet persistently challenging topics in both science and math-
ematics curricula (Howe, Nunes, & Bryant, 2011; Nunes, Desil, & Bell, 2003;
Correspondence should be addressed to Dor Abrahamson, Graduate School of Education,
University of California, Berkeley, 4649 Tolman Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720-1670. E-mail: dor@
berkeley.edu
GUIDEDMEDIATEDABDUCTION 627
J. L. Schwartz, 1988). In the physical sciences, an intensive quantity is a scale-
invariant property of a system—it does not depend on the system’s size or the
amountofmaterialinthesystem.Forexample,thetemperatureofasystemisthe
sameasthetemperatureofanypartofit.Density,too,isanintensivepropertyofa
substance,becauseitdoesnotchangeinaccordancewiththeparticularamountof
substanceunderconsideration.Bycontrast,massandvolume,whicharemeasures
oftheamountofasubstance,areextensiveproperties.Iamparticularlyinterested
inwhatIcallperceptuallyprivilegedintensivequantities(PPIQ)astheyrelateto
2
1 mathematicslearning.
0
2
r PPIQ such as slope, velocity, or likelihood present central dilemmas for
e
b researchonmathematicsinstruction.Ontheonehand,studentsarrivetotheclass-
o
ct room with rich intuitive understandings of these quantities. Granted, these are
O
2 naïve,holistic,andunarticulatedunderstandingsthataremostlymanifestinevery-
2
8 dayactivityandcolloquialexpression,suchassituateddealingswiththesteepness
1
3: of a hill, the speed of a vehicle, or the likelihood of an event. Yet these naïve
at 2 understandings enable students to share a fundamental sense of what it is they
] are studying with their teachers even before the teachers have introduced new
y
e vocabulary,notation,andprocedures.Moreover,students’particularquantitative
el
k sensations, such as “very steep,” can guide their evaluation of the information
r
e
B inherentintheformalmodels,forexampleincomparingtwoslopes.Ontheother
a, hand,studentslearningPPIQareexpectedtoadoptradicallynewwaysofseeing
ni
r andspeakingaboutthesequantities;inparticulartheyarerequiredtousequotient
o
alif (i.e.,a/b)metrics,forexampleinrethinkingsteepnessasriseoverrun.
C What isnot clear toresearchers ishow students accomplish the rethinking of
f
o holisticsensationinanalyticformsuchasaquotient.Howdostudentsalignthe
y
sit commonsense meaning of an intensive quantity and the meaning of its related
r
e quotient metric? A better theoretical understanding of this process may inform
v
ni betterdesignandinstructionoftheseimportantconcepts.Moreover,Ibelievethat
U
[ determining how students rethink PPIQ would inform the theorization of math-
y
b ematics learning more generally, because the naïve-versus-analytic polarization
d
e of views typical of PPIQ learning brings into relief for scrutiny how instructors
d
a
o andstudentsnegotiatecontestedviewsofsituationsandtheirmodels.Lookingin
wnl particular atintensive quantities, I consider the intriguing notion that instruction
Do should begin from phenomenal gestalts rather than from the a and b of the a/b
concepts.Thatis,studentsshouldfirstexperiencethesensationthatanintensive
quantityevokesandonlythenlearntoanalyzeanddescribethephenomenonasa
measuredquotient.
The conjecture that both naïve perceptions and mathematical analyses play
vital roles in PPIQ learning suggests the dialectical approach to conceptual
change(diSessa,2008)asappropriateforstudyingthislearningprocess,because
this approach draws explicitly on both cognitive and sociocultural theories to
explain the microgenesis of students’ understanding. The dialectical approach
628 ABRAHAMSON
is still nascent, and researchers are currently developing and exploring a variety
of constructs and methodologies to describe the complementarity of individual
and social factors in content learning (cf. diSessa, Philip, Saxe, Cole, & Cobb,
2010; Greeno & van de Sande, 2007; Halldén, Scheja, & Haglund, 2008). The
approachproposedinthispaperistoviewmathematicslearningasguidedmedi-
atedabduction,mydialecticalexpansionofthelogicalinferentialmechanismfirst
suggested by Peirce (1931–1958). To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to
carefully describe formal inferential structures and processes as inherently sit-
2
1 uated, embodied, distributed, and interpersonal. More broadly, I thus pursue a
0
2
r viewofmathematicallearningassubjectivecognitiveachievementdesignedand
e
b steeredbyculturalforces(seealsoEnyedy,2005;Saxe,2004).
o
ct ElsewhereIhavesketchedseveralcasesofstudentsusingabductivereasoning
O
2 tomakesenseofculturalmodelsforPPIQ(Abrahamson,2008).Thepresentpaper
2
8 presents a dialectical case analysis of one middle school student’s guided medi-
1
3: ated abduction of likelihood. In what follows I unpack my theoretical structure
at 2 andthenapplyittothecaseanalysis.
]
y
e
el
k THEORETICALBACKGROUNDANDEMPIRICALCONTEXT
r
e
B
a, I propose a view of logical inference as socioculturally situated. Specifically
ni
or withineducationalcontexts,Iargue,logicalinferencecanbeconstruedasguided
f
ali mediatedabduction,thatis,astheappropriationofculturalformsthroughaheav-
C ily scaffolded (yet) creative reasoning process. This view, I maintain, gives both
f
y o constructivist and sociocultural theorists footholds to conceptualize guided rein-
sit ventionasadesirablepedagogy.Ibegintobuildmythesisbyelaboratingonthe
r
e motivationforselectingPPIQasaphenomenalclassforthestudyofconceptual
v
ni change. Next I situate and elaborate on my thesis in the context of a particular
U
y [ design for probability. Finally I explain abduction, demonstrate it by applying
b it to learning processes supported by my design, and suggest its epistemic and
d
e affectiveentailments.
d
a
o
nl
w
o RethinkingAppropriation:TowardanEmpiricallyBasedDialecticalView
D
Theconjecturethathumansperceivesomeintensivequantitiesholisticallyissup-
ported by the empiricism of cognitive science (Gelman, 1998). For example,
Suzuki and Cavanagh (1998) identified a cognitive faculty for discriminating
shapes with similar or dissimilar aspect ratios, Resnick (1992) discussed every-
dayproportionalreasoning,Gigerenzer(1998)arguedfortheecologicalrootsof
humans’senseforfrequency,XuandVashti(2008)demonstratedinfants’capacity
togaugetherepresentativenessofstatisticalsamples,andThacker(2010)showed
middle school students’ sensitivity to relative steepness of line segments. Yet
GUIDEDMEDIATEDABDUCTION 629
what role might this tacit perceptual capacity play in understanding the analytic
reinterpretationofintensivequantities?
Therelationbetweentacitandanalyticconstructionsofquantitiesisnuanced,
and so are the pedagogical implications of this relation. Piaget and Inhelder
(1969) argued that the relation between innate perceptual capacity and the nat-
uraldevelopmentofrelevantlogico-mathematicalstructurationsisnotdirectbut
ratherismediatedthroughindividuals’reflectiveabstractionontheirgoal-oriented
spatial–temporal interactions. When these interactions are designed to support
2
1 mathematicallearning,however,students’intuitiveperceptionsmaypresentedu-
0
2
r cators with a double-edged sword because of the incompatibility of inferences
e
b from intuitive and formal views on situations (Cobb, 1989; Fischbein, 1987;
o
ct Mack, 1990). In general, students are likely to resist formal analyses of sensory
O
2 informationwhentheanalysesre-parsetheirperceptionbydimensionsandgrada-
2
8 tions they had not attended to (Bamberger & diSessa, 2003). Granted, designers
1
3: can mitigate the clash of tacit and analytic views of phenomena by creating
at 2 representations of quantitative information that accommodate our species’ per-
] ceptualinclinations(Abrahamson&Wilensky,2007;Gigerenzer,Hell,&Blank,
y
e 1988), yet the pedagogical challenge for students to re-see phenomena analyti-
el
k cally remains. And although teachers regularly help students re-see phenomena
r
e
B (Alibali, Phillips, & Fischer, 2009; Goodwin, 1994; Stevens & Hall, 1998), the
a, question of how and why students might accept analytic construction as aligned
ni
r withintuitivejudgmentremains.Anexamplemightbeusefulatthispoint.
o
f
ali Although thispaper ultimatelyfocuses onan empiricalcase pertaining tothe
C intensive quantity of likelihood, I use for this example the intensive quantity of
f
o slope.Therhetoricaladvantageofelaboratingmythesisviasloperatherthanlike-
y
sit lihoodisthatsensoryperceptionofdiagonalorientationisencodeddirectlyonthe
r
e cortex (Hubel & Wiesel, 1962), whereas perception of likelihood is more epis-
v
ni temically complex—it is mediated via contextual mental construction, wherein
U
[ the property of chance is attributed as an apparent propensity of a situation
y
b (M. Borovcnik, personal communication, August 15, 2011). Thus, slope and
d
e chance are structurally akin for the purposes of discussing mediated abduction,
d
a
o yetslopeaffordsasimpleranalysis.
wnl Consider a child who has compared two inclined planes with respect to their
Do steepnessandhasindicatedthesteeperone.Thischildmayresistaninstructor’s
prompttodothefollowing:(a)attendto,discern,andmarktheriseandruninher-
ent in each plane’s incline, possibly by inscribing a diagram of the plane lying
upon perpendicular axes of a Cartesian space; (b) measure these two extensive
quantities of rise and run in each plane using appropriate standard units (e.g.,
centimeters);(c)calculatethequotientofthesetwopairs’measuredvalues(e.g.,
9cm/15cmand14cm/20cm);(d)acceptthesetwonumbers(i.e.,0.6and0.7)as
meaning the planes’ respective reified property of slope; and (e) infer that one
planeissteeperthantheotherbecauseitsslopevalueisgreater(Thacker,2010).
630 ABRAHAMSON
(Later I return to the issue of causality inherent in the final phase, which I see
as implicating an emotionally challenging yet epistemically necessary rethink-
ingofnaïveperceptionsnotasapriorisynthetictruthsbutastenuoussensations
warrantingproof.)
Sociocultural theorists (Newman, Griffin, & Cole, 1989) explicitly perceive
no theoretical difficulty in students replacing their naïve view of a phenomenon
withthenormativeanalyticviewofthephenomenon.Forthesetheorists,student
appropriation of normative views through participation in the social enactment
2
1 of cultural practice is the prevalent modus operandi of knowledge mediation.
0
2
r In fact, this perspective posits that participation in social activity precedes an
e
b understandingoftheactivity’srationale:
o
ct
O
2 Itisnotthecasethatthechildfirstcarriesoutthetaskbecauseshe/hesharesthe
2
8 adult’sdefinitionofsituation.Itispreciselythereverse:she/hecomestosharethe
3:1 adult’s definition of situation because she/he carries out the task (through other-
at 2 regulation).(Wertsch,1979,p.20)1
]
y
ele Endorsing the Vygotskian perspective, I view mathematics learning as the
rk appropriation of disciplinary practice, and I examine how this practice is medi-
e
B atedinthecontextofparticipatinginsociallyenactedproblem-solvingactivities
nia, utilizing cultural–historical artifacts. At the same time, however, I have been
or concerned that these models of learning undertheorize learners’ tacit perceptual
f
ali capacity and the cognitive operations upon which appropriation is predicated
C
f (cf. Gelman, 1998; Karmiloff-Smith, 1988). That is, I accept that students can
o
y beguidedtoenactcultural–historicalsolutionproceduresforaparticularclassof
sit mathematical problems prior to understanding the rationale of these procedures,
r
ve but I persist in asking how and why the students eventually arrive at under-
ni standing these rationales. That is, I do not see doing-before-understanding as a
U
y [ “crime” (Freudenthal, 1971, p. 424; von Glasersfeld, 1987) just as long as stu-
d b dentscaninferhowtheteacher’sstructurescoherewithandempowertheirearlier
de understandings(Cazden,1981;Lobato,Clarke,&Ellis,2005;D.L.Schwartz&
a
o Bransford,1998).
nl
w
o
D
1Vygotsky’sconceptionofsocialmediationhasinspiredmanytheorists.Ithasbeenelaborated,
forexample,as:(a)studentsbecomingfluentinthe“leadingdiscourse”concerningsituatedobjects
(Sfard,2002,2007);(b)teachers’“semioticmediation”ofmathematicalre-descriptionsforthesituated
task-basedmanipulationofpedagogicalartifacts(BartoliniBussi&Mariotti,2008;Mariotti,2009);
(c)learnersimplicitly“instrumenting”themselveswithconceptualsystemsinherenttoobjectsthey
“instrumentalize”toattaintheirobjectives(Artigue,2002;Vérillon&Rabardel,1995);(d)membersof
acommunityofpracticeroutinizingtheuseofavailableculturalformsasthemeansofaccomplishing
personalgoalsforthesolutionofcollectiveproblems(Saxe,2004);and(e)studentsappropriating
availableobjectsandinscriptionsinthelearningenvironmentassemioticmeansofobjectifyingtheir
presymbolicnotionsregardingquantitativepropertiesinsituatedproblems(Radford,2003).
GUIDEDMEDIATEDABDUCTION 631
In Abrahamson (2009b) I focused on the objects that students are guided to
generateintheseinstructionalactivities—objectsthatinstructorsviewasconsti-
tuting analytic models of some phenomenon under scrutiny yet that students do
notyetseeassuch.Buildingonmyinterpretationsofacaseanalysis,Isuggested
thatstudentsperformheuristicsemioticleapsbywhichtheydetermineawayof
seeingtheobjectsassignifyingtheirownnaïvesensationregardingtheproperties
inquestion.Oncetheyseeanartifactasaviablemodeloftheirtacitjudgment,stu-
dentsretroactivelyvalidateastrustworthyandmeaningfultheprocedureleading
2
1 totheconstructionofthemodel.
0
2
r In this paper I return to the case analysis as a means of elaborating on my
e
b proposedconstructofguidedmediatedabduction.Bywayofsettingthegrounds
o
ct for an explanation of mediated abduction, I now introduce the empirical context
O
2 ofthecase.
2
8
1
3: ADesignforProbabilityasaContextforStudyingGuidedMediated
2
at Abduction
]
y
e The empirical data I draw on for this study were collected during an interview-
el
k based pilot implementation of an experimental mathematics mini-unit on prob-
r
e
B ability. The PPIQ in this unit was “likelihood” (Xu & Vashti, 2008), and the
a, situation was modeled mathematically as the quotient of “number of favorable
ni
or eventsintheeventspace/totalnumberofeventsintheeventspace”(p=.5).For
f
ali morecomprehensivetreatmentsofthedesignproject,includingagroundingofits
C
rationaleinresearchonprobabilisticreasoning,seeAbrahamson(2009b,2009c,
f
y o 2011).
sit Inthisstudy,participantswereaskedtoexamineanurn-typerandomgenera-
r
e tor: a box containing a mixture of marbles of two colors with equal numbers of
v
ni green and blue marbles as well as a utensil for drawing out of the box samples
U
y [ ofexactlyfourmarbles(seeFigure1a).Unlikeliterallyalldesignsforprobability
b involvingrandomgenerators,suchascoins,dice,orspinners,atthispointwedid
d
e not let the participant experiment with the random generator so that no samples
d
a
o were drawn. Instead, once the participants understood how the device worked,
nl
w weaskedthemtopredictoutcomesofrunningthisexperiment.Generallyspeak-
o
D ing, participants predicted correctly that the most likely sample would have two
green and two blue marbles (hence “2g2b”), and asked to support this response
theyalludedtotheequalnumbersofgreenandbluemarblesinthebox.Nextwe
guidedtheparticipantstocolorintemplatecards(seeFigure1b)soastoconstruct
the experiment’s event space through an algorithmic process formally known as
combinatorialanalysis(seeFigure1c).Namely,participantsweretofindallofthe
possiblecombinations(0g4b,1g3b,2g2b,3g1b,4g0b)and,foreachcombination,
findalldistinguishablefour-elementpermutations(1,4,6,4,and1permutations,
632 ABRAHAMSON
2
1
0
2
r (a) (b) (c)
e
b
cto FIGURE 1 Materialsusedinadesignforprobability:(a)themarblesscooper,arandom
O generatorfordrawingoutorderedsamplesfromaboxfullofmarblesoftwocolors;(b)acard
2 forconstructingtheexperiment’seventspace(astackofsuchcardswasprovided,aswere
2
8 twocrayons,andstudentscoloredinallpossibleoutcomes);and(c)acombinationstower,
3:1 a distributed event space of the marbles-scooping experiment anticipating the conventional
2 histogramrepresentationofactualoutcomedistributions(p=.5).
at
]
y
e
el
k respectively,forthefiveclasses).Wethenaskedthemtoexaminewhattheyhad
r
e
B builtandreflectontheirearlierprediction.
a, Amathematicallyknowledgeableviewoftheeventspacetriangulatesthenaïve
ni
or prediction of a 2g2b plurality, because there are more elemental events with
f
ali exactly two shaded cells as compared to other columns. However, the partici-
C
pantsdidnotinitiallysharethisview.Theyfoundtheanalysissurprising,because
f
y o it parsed the phenomenon along dimensions that they had not attended to and
sit therefore included information that appeared to them as irrelevant to the prob-
r
e lem as stated or as referring to different objects. Specifically, the event space
v
ni displayed permutations and notonlycombinations, whereas theparticipants had
U
y [ notbeenattendingtotheinternalorderofgreen/bluemarblesinthescooperbut
b only to overall numbers by color (cf. English, 2005). The intervention thus gen-
d
e erated interactions wherein participants were encouraged to perceive an analytic
d
a
o model of a phenomenon as indexing their gestalt sensation of the phenomenon.
nl
w Eventually the students accepted the artifact they had built as a representation
o
D of the phenomenon’s focal quantitative properties. In particular, they indicated
thepluralityof2g2belementsintheeventspaceasimplyingapluralityof2g2b
experimentoutcomes.
Inthenextsubsections,andlaterinthecaseanalysis,Iscrutinizetheinteraction
dynamics between the researcher and participant as they negotiated competing
perceptions of the phenomenon and its model. I attempt to identify “cognitive”
and“sociocultural”factorsthatapparentlycontributedtothestudents’successful
alignments.Therhetoricalstructureisasfollows.IfirstapplyPeirce’sconstructof
GUIDEDMEDIATEDABDUCTION 633
abduction toplot theparticipants’ deliberations as atriadicinferentialreasoning
process.ThenIcastuponthistriadicstructureaVygotskianperspectivethatfore-
grounds heavy-handed socialmediationinherent totheinferentialprocess.Inso
doing, I hope to demonstrate how the instructor’s multimodal utterance framed
thematerialresourcesbothperceptuallyandsocioepistemicallyand,inturn,how
these actions stimulated and guided the student to figure out the mathematical
principletargetedbythepedagogicaldesign.Thatis,Ibelievethatabductiveinfer-
encedoesnottranspireinanunsituatedvoid.Rather,fromadialecticalperspective
2
1 Iinterpretabductionascruciallydrawingonculturalresources.
0
2
r Thus,intheremainderofthissectionIexplainPeirce’sconstructofabduction
e
b thatframesmydialecticalinquiryofguidedreinvention.Thisgeneraltheoretical
o
ct presentation of guided mediated abduction foreshadows the empirical section of
O
2 thepaper,inwhichIdemonstratemediatedabductiveinferenceinacaseanalysis
2
8 featuringachildwhoisguidedtoreinventthePPIQoflikelihood.
1
3:
2
at AbductionandArtifacts
]
y
e This subsection is composed of three parts. I begin with a general explanation
el
k concerningthenatureofabductivereasoning.Ithenbuildonthisintroductionto
r
e
B elaborateadialecticalviewofguidedreinventionasmediatedabduction.FinallyI
a, support the plausibility of my view by modeling the probability activity, which
ni
or I outlined earlier, along the lines of mediated abduction. These structures are
f
ali implementedinalatersection,whereIofferacaseanalysisofguidedreinvention.
C
f
y o Whatabductionis. Abduction,aformofinferentialreasoningmostclosely
sit associated with the philosopher C. S. Peirce (1931–1958), can be explained
r
e through comparison with the more familiar constructs of deduction and induc-
v
ni tion.Formallyspeaking,deduction,induction,andabductionarelogicalinference
U
y [ sequences, and each is modeled as a triadic structure leading from a premise
b through to a proposition whose truth is necessary (deduction), apparent (induc-
d
e tion), or possible (abduction). All three types of inference are predicated on the
d
a
o epistemologicalframingthatwithinanysituationunderinquirythereissomegen-
nl
w eralcasethatnecessarilyimpliesalocalresultduetosomerule.Theruleassigns
o
D toallmembersofsomeclassofentitiesaparticularproperty,thecasestatesthata
specificentityisamemberoftheclass,andtheresultspecifiesthattheparticular
entity(therefore)bearsthepropertyinquestion.Anindividualpersonenteringa
situation may have only partial knowledge of the totality of these three notions.
Which of these three notions the individual initially knows dictates the type of
inferencerequiredinordertoobtainmorecompleteknowledgeofthesituation.
The bean situation and its variants are often used in treatises on inferential
reasoningcomparingdeduction,induction,andabduction.Thesituationinvolves
a large sack of beans on the floor and a small pile of white beans on the table.
634 ABRAHAMSON
Noteinparticularhoweachofthethreeinferencemechanismscanbeexpressed
asadifferentpermutationofthecase–rule–resultinferencetriad:
● Deduction. If I know that all of the beans in a sack are white (the rule)
andthatapileofbeansisfromthissack(thecase),thenIcanconfidently
deducethatthepileofbeansisexclusivelywhite(theresult).
● Induction. If I know that a pile of beans is all from a sack (case) and that
2 thepileisallwhite(result),thenIhavegroundstoinducethatperhapsall
01 ofthebeansinthesackarewhite(rule).
2
r ● Abduction.IfIknowthatallofthebeansinasackarewhite(rule)andthat
e
b a pile of beans is all white (result), I may abduce that the pile is from the
o
ct sack(case).
O
2
2
8 This event of finding white beans on a table, mundane as it seems, should be
1
3: taken as a parable for the discovery of any unexplained phenomenon, such as
2
at in scientific inquiry, when the findings are compelling but initially cannot be
] accountedfor.
y
e
el FollowingShank(1987,1998),Iuseamodifiedpresentationoftheabductive
k
r triad: Instead of rule–result–case I use result–rule–case. This modified version
e
B lendstheinferentialmechanismgreaterphenomenologicalandcognitiveviability.
nia, Namely,althoughthepersonenteringthebeansituationimplicitlyknowstherule
or priortotheinquiryprocess,theruleisnotontheforeoftheperson’smind;con-
f
ali sequently,recalling,selecting,andapplyingthisruleoccursonlyaftertheperson
C
f hasencounteredthepuzzlingresultandbeguntoreasonaboutit.Alsofollowing
o
y Shank, Iinterpolate intomynarrative hypothetical inner speech thatmayrender
sit the paradigmatic bean situation more reminiscent of what a scientist or student
r
ve maysubjectivelyexperience:
ni
U
[
y Ihavejustenteredaroomandamsurprisedtofinduponatableapileofwhitebeans
b
d (result).Idonotknowforafactwherethesebeanscamefrom.YetasIconsiderthis
de question,itoccurstomethatanearbysackcontainsexclusivelywhitebeans(rule).
a
o Now,ifonlyitweretruethatthepileofbeansisfromthebag(case),itwouldmake
nl
w sensethatallofthesebeansarewhite(result).
o
D
Again, what is unique about abduction, as portrayed in the bean example, is
that elements in the perceptual field that ultimately bore critical information for
thesolutionoftheconundrumwerenotinitiallyprominentaspectsofthesituation.
Rather,onlyuponfacingtheperplexingpresenceofapileofwhitebeansdidthe
individual engage in explorative reasoning through which she first detected the
sackandimplicateditasimplyingacandidateruleattributingthebeans’colorto
theirplausibleorigin.Inthepresentcasestudy,too,thechildisoffereda“case”
asameansofrethinkinganintensivequantity“result,”howeverthechildinitially
GUIDEDMEDIATEDABDUCTION 635
does not consider some elements of this case as pertinent to the situation. The
pertinenceoftheentirecaseemergesevenasthechilddeterminesarulejustifying
thispertinenceinlightoftheevidentresult.2
Notealsothecrucialyettentativeattributionof“truth”tothecase.Theguided
mediated abduction conjecture problematizes this attribution by recognizing its
socioepistemicconstruction.Namely,whenaninstructorproposesaculturalarti-
factasconstitutingamodelofasituationunderinquiry,itissociallyincumbent
uponthestudenttocomplywiththisproposalandadopttheartifactassuch.Yet
2
1 I am interested in whether and how the student abduces the artifact’s histori-
0
2
r cal logic (see Harel, in press, on social vs. intellectual needs). Moreover, I am
e
b interested in how the syllogistic architecture of inferential processes mediates a
o
ct transitionofconvictionandcausalityfromaphenomenontoitsmodel.
O
2
2
8 Abduction as guided reinvention. SinceAthenianantiquity,logicalinfer-
1
3: ence has been positioned as a rarified, insulated cognitive process that ties
at 2 premisesthroughtoconclusionsusingthe“powerofthemind”alone.Syllogistic
] reasoning and, moreover, its reification and formalization were regarded as a
y
e great epistemic achievement of the emerging Western psyche, so much so that
el
k the capacity to reason thus was evaluated as marking advanced civilizations.
r
e
B This appeal for the transcendent nature of logical inference was revisited and
a, bolstered from the Enlightenment through to the 20th century by some philoso-
ni
r phersofscience.Notably,HansReichenbach(1956)attemptedtopurgeinferential
o
f
ali reasoning of any semblance of anthropomorphism by conceptualizing intuitive
C reasoningasacomponentofinduction.3Thishistorical,popular,andformalfram-
f
o ingoflogicalprocessesasanexerciseofsheerintelligence,however,isliableto
y
sit preclude a researcher’s attention to the necessarily mediated, situated, and col-
r
e laborative nature of intellective competence (cf. Bamberger, 2011; Lee, 2006;
v
ni Sawyer, 2007). Furthermore, any notion of inferential reasoning as a solipsistic
U
[ intellective activity becomes absurd in the context of educational research into
y
b mathematicallearning,whereinpsychologicaltrajectoriestowardreinventionare
d
e pavedoutaprioriforstudentstotraverseunderaninstructor’sattentivetutelage.
d
oa Insum,whenpeopleuselogicalinferencetosolveproblems,theydosowithin
wnl interactivecultural–historicalcontextsofinquirythatarepopulatedwithhumans
o
D
2Althoughtherehasbeenasustainedinterestamongphilosophersofscience,cognitivescientists,
andscience-pedagogyresearchersinPeirce’streatisesonthelogicsofdiscovery(McKaughan,2008;
Prawat,1999;Thagard,1981),recentdecadeshaveseenanapplicationofthisworktoresearchon
mathematicallearningaswell.OftenthesepublicationspresentPeirce’sconstructsofabductiverea-
soningandhypostaticabstractionastentativelychallengingKantianconstructivism(Norton,2008,
2009;Rivera,2008)orofferingaresponsetothe“learningparadox,”whichtracesbacktoPlato’s
Meno(Bakker,2007;cf.Bakker&Hoffmann,2005;Bereiter,1985;Hoffmann,2003).
3Forarevealingdiscussionofhistoricalrelationsbetweenintuitionandinductioninthephilosophy
ofscience,seeBraude(2012).