Reason's Rebellion, or Anarchism Out of the Sources of Spinozism

497 Pages·2017·2.76 MB·English

Reason's Rebellion, or Anarchism Out of
the Sources of Spinozism
Author: Hayyim Rothman
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:107277
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2016
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
Reason’s Rebellion, or Anarchism
Out of the Sources of Spinozism

Hayyim Rothman

A dissertation
submitted to the Faculty of
the department of Philosophy
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Boston College
Morrissey College of Arts and Sciences
Graduate School

November, 2016

© Copyright 2016 Hayyim Rothman
Reason’s Rebellion, or Anarchism out of the Sources of Spinozism
Hayyim Rothman
Advisor: Professor Jean-Luc Solere, Ph.D.

Abstract: In my dissertation, I aim (1) to render, from Spinoza’s philosophical system, a
critique of the State form or, more broadly, of political coercion and (2) to supply, on the
basis of the same, a positive account of the alternative. It is, in essence, my goal to derive
anarchism out of the sources of Spinozism. My claim is that, in Spinoza’s work, there
obtains a tension between force and freedom as models for political organization. While
other interpreters have tended to synthesize these opposing tendencies in one manner or
another, I endeavor to highlight their incompatibility and to show that, for Spinoza, they
produce two distinct forms of political life. One, the passive foundation of political union,
which grounds the State. Two, the active foundation of political union, which grounds the
rational community. Having identified this theoretical breach, I proceed to examine the
affective structure of each foundation as conceived by Spinoza. I find an inescapable
contradiction in the first, which — contrary to the best intentions of the founders of State —
tends not only to maintain citizens in a condition of perpetual minority, but progressively
erodes their capacity for autonomy, thus inviting a parallel and equally progressive
enhancement of coercive intervention. This result implies the moral necessity of revolution,
the spinozian contours of which I examine in detail. In the second, which I consider in both
affective and ontological terms, I discover the opposite movement. That is, a progressive
escalation of reason together with its affective modalities that enhances the human capacity
for political and social harmony, rendering political coercion obsolete.
Reason’s Rebellion, or Anarchism out of the Sources of Spinozism

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements i
List of Abbreviations ii

Introduction 1

Chapter One: Radical Readings of Spinoza Heretofore
I. Introduction 19
II. Late 20th Century Radical Appropriations of Spinoza:
Spinozist Marxism 17
III. Spinoza’s Place in Anarchist Theory 29
A. Anti-Romantic Anarchist Responses to Spinoza:
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Mikhail Bakunin 30
B. Romantic Anarchist Responses to Spinoza: Moses Hess,
Gustav Landauer and the Deep-Ecology/Anarcho-Primitivist Nexus 37
C. A Non-Romantic Anarchist Response to Spinoza: Peter Kropotkin 51
IV. Looking Backwards: The Promise and the Challenge of Spinoza 54

Chapter Two: The Dual Foundation of State 60
I. The Significance of a Fractured Text 61
II. Our Fracture Contextualized 65
III. The Fracture Itself 78
A. The Active Foundation of the State 78
B. The Passive Foundation of the State 82
IV. Three Interpretive Strategies in Response to the Fracture 98

Chapter Three: The Structural Contradiction of Political Passivity 107
I. The Necessity of Distinguishing what is Said in Favor of Sociality
in General from what is Said in Favor of the State Form 108
II. The Three Intersecting Bases of Rational Statecraft 112
A. Reason and Harmony Go Hand in Hand 114
B. Reason Accords with the Negation of Liberty
if the Alternative is Disharmony 124
C. Coerced Harmony Serves a Pedagogical Function,
Leading Passionate Men to Reason 129
III. Concerning Nationalism and Hatred,
or the State as an Irrational Corporate Body 157
IV. Rational Statecraft Harbors Within Itself a Structural Contradiction 166

Chapter Four: The Idea of Revolution 169
I. Revolutionary Ideas and the Idea of Revolution 170
II. Revolution in Three Senses 174
III. Spinoza’s Position Concerning the Legitimacy of Revolution:
Three Perspectives 181
A. Revolution has no Legitimate Place in Spinoza’s Political Philosophy 182
1. The Condemnation of Regime Change 183
2. The Limits of Progress and the Cyclicality of Political Change 192
3. Summary of Section III.A 196
B. Rationality and Revolution in Spinoza’s Political Philosophy 197
C. Passion and Revolution in Spinoza’s Political Philosophy 208
D. Section Three Conclusions 214
IV. Spinoza’s Position Concerning the Legitimacy of Revolution:
A Critique of the Three Foregoing Perspectives 216
A. Approbation of Rosenthal’s Position Respecting Rebellion,
Critique of his View Respecting Progress and Temporality 217
B. Approbation of Sharp’s General Position Respecting
the Rationality Revolution, Critique of her Apparent View
Respecting the Statist Ends Thereof 227
C. Critique of Stolze’s View Respecting the
Passionate Character of Revolution 230
V. Conclusions: Chapter Four 236

Chapter Five: The Rational Foundation of State 241
I. Introduction 242
II. Moses and Jesus: Theology of the State
and its Philosophical Opposition 243
A. The Case of Moses: Imagination, Law, and Stability 244
B. The Case of Jesus: Reason, Eternal Truth, and Salvation 246
C. Eternal Truth and Salvation at the Horizon of State, Displacing it 254
D. Section Summary 266
III. A Return to the Rational Foundation of “State:” The Political Community 269
A. The First Covenant Establishes a Rational Community but not a State 270
B. The Conatus Argument 275
1. Matheron’s Account 275
2. Bennett’s Account 279
3. Viljanen’s Account 283
4. A Proposal Based on the Negation of Neutrality 285
C. Rational Self-Interest and the Emergence of the Rational Community 291
1. Agreement in nature 293
2. Similarity 294
3. Harmonious Coexistence 296
4. The Escalation of Harmony 302
IV. Conclusion 313

Chapter Six: On the Ontology of Mutualism 317
I. Introduction 318
II. The Individual is a Group: Proudhon’s Anarchist Metaphysic 320
III. On the Mutuality of Being in Spinoza 332
A. The Status of “Being” in Spinoza 333
B. The Activity of Substance in Itself 337
C. The Indivisibility of Substance and the Relativity of Things 367
D. The Activity of Extended Substance 379
E. Subsection Summary: Refuting Proudhon’s Assessment of Spinoza 399
IV. Moving Beyond Proudhon: Mutualism of Being,
the Love of God, and the Love of Man 406
V. Conclusion 424
Appendix: On Definitions 429
General Conclusion and Parting Reflections 435
I. Our Findings Considered in Sum 436
II. Parting Reflections
A. General Reflections Arising 458
from the Critique of Political Authority
1. The Correlation of Means and Ends 458
2. The Superordination of Constructive
Over Destructive Action 462
3. The Superordination of Active Over Reactive Affects 464
B. A Speculative Proposition Relating to
the Organization of Rational Communities 465

Bibliography 473