Table Of ContentRealism – Relativism – Constructivism
Publications of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society
New Series
Volume 24
Realism –
Relativism –
Constructivism
Edited by
Christian Kanzian, Sebastian Kletzl, Josef Mitterer,
Katharina Neges
ISBN 978-3-11-046773-4
e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-052405-5
e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-052342-3
ISSN 2191-8449
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Preface
Philosophical ideas can change the way we perceive and experience our world
andleadourlives.Thisisnotonlycorrectforphilosophersbutinamoreindirect
way also for people far away from philosophical seminars.Opinions and argu-
mentsthatoriginatedinphilosophyoozeintocommonsenseandchangeitsdi-
rectionandourunderstandingoftheworldwelivein.Threeimportant,spacious
and far-reachingclusters of philosophical ideas that influenced for a long time
howwedescribedifferentaspectsofourworldwerethetopicoftheInternation-
alLudwigWittgensteinSymposiuminKirchberg2015–realism,relativism,and
constructivism.
To be sure all three are diffuse and heavily loaded concepts and in such
caseswe–asWittgensteinputit–“strugglewithlanguage”.Ifoneaskstwophi-
losopherswhatrealismis,oneendsupwith(atleast)adozendefinitions,andof
course,thesamecanbesaidconcerningrelativismandconstructivism.Thiscon-
fusingsituation is the reasonwhy the central concern of manyof our contribu-
tions is to provide a clear and distinct definition of one or more of those con-
cepts.
Thisseemstobeofutmostimportanceconcerningrelativismsincethe“self-
refutationargument”lurksinthebackgroundofalmosteverydiscussion.Simply
put it says that a position which is seriously relativistic is either an absolutist
view in disguise because it assumes its relativistic thesis to be universally
true,oritisitselfonlytruerelativetosomethingelsewhichmakesitpowerless
and irrelevant. Constructivism, it is often argued, falls prey to a very similar
problem.Constructivistsreplacetherealistconceptoftruthwiththatofviability
orasimilarconcept.Butwhy,onecouldasked,isawayofdescribingtheworld
viable and another is not? It seems that in the end the world singles out some
ways of coping as successful – but this is simply a form of realism. Realism
on the other hand is often deemed to be useless by critics because we can
never silence our doubts if we have already arrived at a correct description of
the world, a doubt which is fuelled by a history of failed attempts to find out
about the real“inventoryof the world”.Therefore manydiscussions in thisvol-
ume try to provide a remedy to such fundamental problems, for example by
showingthatrealismisareasonablepositiontotakeorthatrelativism,correctly
understood, is not in any meaningful sense self-refuting.
Other contributions are an attempt to apply fundamental convictions con-
cerning realism, relativism and constructivism to concrete cases and examples.
Especially in such discussions it is important to be clear about the extension
of the concepts involved. Realism, relativism and constructivism can be explic-
VI Preface
itlyfoundasdesignatorsofdistinctpositionsinethics,epistemology,philosophy
ofmind,ontology,andphilosophyofscience.Moreovertheuseoftheseconcepts
isnotlimitedtophilosophybuttheyarealsoemployedanddiscussedinsocial
andnaturalsciences,forexample,geology,history,andliterature.Itisimportant
to keep in mind that in different fields those concepts might (and they usually
do)describedifferentpositionsandconnections.Thestructureofthisvolumeat-
tempts to make explicit some basic distinctions and to provide at least a broad
scheme inwhich different positions and fine grained nuances are located.
On a final note we can happily say that suitable for a conference in Kirch-
bergmostcontributionsinthisvolumearewritteninwhatcanbecalleda“Witt-
gensteinianspirit”.Wittgensteinhimself wasatirelessandintellectuallyhonest
thinker. He took philosophical arguments serious and did not hastily abortdis-
cussion butexaminedthem againandagainfromdifferentperspectives.Thisis
alsotheguidingspiritofthecontributionsofthistovolume.Allparticipantsare
concernedwithacollectivephilosophicalendeavour,witharespectfulexchange
of thoughts, ideas and arguments and, of course, their critical examination.
Regardless of disagreements, at the end of the day everyone feels that it is im-
portant to get a clearer grip of realism, relativism or constructivism aiming at
a better understanding of phrases like “constructing reality”, “really existing”,
“matter of fact”,or “relatively true”.
ThecrucialoutcomeoftheIWS2015isnotthatwefinallyknowthatthereis
a realworld independent of us or that relativism in ethics is after all a rational
position, but rather that the discussion between realists, relativists, and con-
structivistsisanongoing,interestingandphilosophicallysignificantenterprise.
Wittgenstein’sgreeting “Take your time!” may well be good advice.
TheeditorswanttothanktheGovernmentofLowerAustriaandtheboardofthe
AustrianLudwigWittgensteinSocietyforthesupportofourconference,andDe
Gryuter for the friendly and professional cooperation.
The editors
Table of Contents
1 Constructivism and Beyond
Krzysztof Abriszewski
Are Philosophers’ Actions Realist or Constructivist? 3
Marzenna Cyzman
On the Non-Dualizing Rhetoric. Some Preliminary Remarks 17
Volker Gadenne
Ist der Konstruktivismus selbstwidersprüchlich? 31
Olaf Hoffjann
Die Wahrheitsspieler. Strategische Kommunikation als Spiel 45
Sebastian Kletzl
Who Wants to Be a Non-Dualistand Why? 59
Albert Müller
Jean Piaget und die Erfindung von Radikalem Konstruktivismus und
Kybernetik Zweiter Ordnung 73
Karl H. Müller
Two Ways of Exploring the World 83
2 Epistemology/Epistemological Relativism
Hans-Herbert Kögler
The Truth of Social Constructivism 103
Gerhard Schönrich
The Objectivity of Epistemic Values and the Argument from Immersion 117
Erwin Tegtmeier
Epistemological Realism, Representation, and Intentionality 129
VIII TableofContents
Martin G. Weiss
Angelina’s Truth: Genetic Knowledge, Preventive Medicine, and the Reality
of the Possible 137
3 Realism versus Relativism
Heike Egner
Neither Realism nor Anti-Realism: How to approach the
Anthropocene? 153
Hans Rudi Fischer
Ein Bild – ohne Betrachter – hielt uns gefangen. Wittgensteins ambivalenter
Abschied vom Realismus 167
Michael Krausz
Relativisms and Their Opposites 187
Martin Kusch
When Paul Met Ludwig: Wittgensteinian Comments on Boghossian’s
Antirelativism 203
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock
Fighting Relativism: Wittgenstein and Kuhn 215
Franz Ofner
Wissenschaftstheoretische Überlegungen jenseits von Realismus,
Relativismus und Konstruktivismus 233
Peter Strasser
Realism without Foundation 241
4 Ontology/Ontological Relativism
Ludger Jansen
Constructed Reality 255
Peter Kügler
Ontological Relativism as Transcendental Nominalism 269
TableofContents IX
Martine Nida-Rümelin
Realism about Identity and Individuality of Conscious Beings 279
Nikos Psarros
What is the Thing Whose Measure is Money? 293
5 Values and Value Relativism
Paul Boghossian
Relativism about Morality 301
Cora Diamond
Slavery and Justice: Williams and Wiggins 313
Marie-Luisa Frick
A Plurality of True Moralities? Tracing ‘Truth’ in Moral Relativism 327
Martina Herrmann
Zum Wert von Vertrauen 339
Hans Kraml
Die Erfindung der Sein-Sollen-Dichotomie 353
Peter Schaber
Wird die Moral von uns geschaffen? 365
6 Wittgenstein
David Bloor
The Sociology of the Supernatural: Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics 381
Rom Harré
Can We Piece Together a Coherent Accountof the “Person” from the Writings
of Wittgenstein? 397
Ingolf Max
Wittgensteins Philosophieren zwischen Kodex und Strategie: Logik, Schach
und Farbausdrücke 409
