Table Of ContentP PRINCIPLES
Oppenheimer’s book makes big claims about what we know about complex political R
phenomena, and backs up those claims with rigorous argument. Each chapter I
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unfolds with unique insights in the form of ‘propositions’ on collective action, social
choice, institutional design, and political leadership. This makes the book easily the C OF POLITICS
most cogent and coherent account available of rational choice models and what I
P
they have to say about the political world we live in.
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– Gary Miller, Washington University in St. Louis
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A RATIONAL CHOICE
S
Oppenheimer’s Principles of Politics is intellectually incisive, and a practical book for
THEORY GUIDE
anyone concerned with what government can – or should – do about the common O
good. Instead of grand apolitical claims about justice divorced from political
F TO POLITICS AND
institutions or amoral empirically precise analyses of political outcomes,Oppenheimer
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responds to Amartya Sen’s calls to skip the trivial objections and begin eliminating SOCIAL JUSTICE
O
intense injustice or unfairness. He overcomes Kenneth Arrow’s claims that the common
good cannot be agreed upon and John Rawl’s assertions about what a just agreement L
should be. A timely, inspiring clarion call. I
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– Samuel Popkin, University of California, San Diego
I
C
I am often asked ‘What is Political Science?’ Oppenheimer has given me the broad
S
outline to answer this question. Firmly rooted in the rational choice tradition (with a
focus on both positive and normative political theories), this book is a clear and
lucid discussion of the central problems tackled by political scientists and a wonderful
overview of the state of the discipline’s knowledge. The book takes stock of 61
propositions by political scientists, places those propositions in their logical
and empirical context, and makes the case for their truth content. Even better,
Oppenheimer points to areas that are fruitful for new work. Anyone, from a
beginning student in political science to a wizened senior member of the discipline, O
can benefit from Oppenheimer’s insights and conjectures. P
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– Rick K. Wilson, Editor of the American Journal E
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of Political Science, Rice University
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JOE OPPENHEIMER is Emeritus Professor in the Department of Government IM
and Politics at the University of Maryland. E
R
JOE OPPENHEIMER
Cover image: Sarah Oppenheimer
Cover design by ALICE SOLOWAY
PrinciplesofPolitics
ARationalChoiceTheoryGuidetoPoliticsandSocialJustice
Modern rational choice and social justice theories allow scholars to
develop new understandings of the foundations and general patterns
of politics and political behavior. In this book, Joe Oppenheimer enu-
merates and justifies the empirical and moral generalizations com-
monly derived from these theories. In developing these arguments,
Oppenheimergivesstudentsafoundationalbasisofbothformaltheory,
andtheoriesofsocialjustice,andtheirrelatedexperimentalliteratures.
He uses empirical findings to evaluate the validity of the claims. This
basicsurveyofthefindingsofpublicchoicetheoryforpoliticalscientists
coverstheproblemsofcollectiveaction,institutionalstructures,citizen
well-being and social welfare, regime change, and political leadership.
Principles of Politics highlights what is universal to all of politics and
examines both the empirical problems of political behavior and the
normativeconundrumsofsocialjustice.
JoeOppenheimerisEmeritusProfessorintheDepartmentofGovernment
andPoliticsattheUniversityofMaryland.
Principles of Politics
A Rational Choice Theory Guide to Politics
and Social Justice
JOE OPPENHEIMER
UniversityofMaryland
cambridge university press
Cambridge,NewYork,Melbourne,Madrid,CapeTown,
Singapore,SãoPaulo,Delhi,MexicoCity
CambridgeUniversityPress
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©JoeOppenheimer2012
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Firstpublished2012
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Oppenheimer,JoeA.
Principlesofpolitics:arationalchoicetheoryguidetopoliticsandsocialjustice/Joe
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pages cm
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindexes.
isbn978-1-107-01488-6
1. Politicalscience. 2. Rationalchoicetheory. 3. Socialjustice. I. Title.
JA71.O65 2012
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Abstract
People have claimed to understand the empirical and moral principles
of politics for thousands of years. These assertions have never escaped
contention.Thisbookisaboutsome oftheempiricalandmoralgeneral-
izations arrived at with the tools that comprise what might be called the
new political science. The book deals with the findings directly. It also
explores how one justifies such claims. It reveals how the quality of the
justificationhelpstodeterminethequalityoftheclaims.Thefoundations
used to develop the arguments, or justifications, are those of rational
choiceandsocialjusticetheories.Butoneusuallyneedsmorethanreason
toestablish(or,forthatmatter,todisestablish)claimsofknowledgeabout
politics. Empirical findings, especially those gleaned from careful labora-
toryexperiments,areintroducedtohelpthereaderevaluatethevalidityof
the claims. The principles discussed improve our understanding of con-
ceptssuchassocialwelfare,collectiveaction,altruism,distributivejustice,
group interest, democratic performance, and more. The methods
employed help us understand what is universal to all of politics. This
volume zeros in on these universals with an eye to both the empirical
problemsandthenormativeconundrumsofpolitics.
Contents
PropositionsandCorollaries pageix
Tables xv
Figures xvii
Sidebars xx
Definitions xxi
Preface xxiii
OverviewoftheBook xxvii
Acknowledgments xxxi
Introduction:Politics,Universals,KnowledgeClaims,and
Methods 1
parti. thelogicofcollectiveaction
1. VoluntaryContributionsandCollectiveAction 27
2. GoingBeyondthePrisonerDilemma 60
3. CollectiveActionApplicationstoandBeyondDemocratic
Politics 71
partii. collectivechoice
4. IndividualtoCollectiveChoiceinOne-DimensionalPolitics 95
5. IndividualtoCollectiveChoiceMoreGenerally 116
partiii. politicalinstitutionsandqualityoutcomes
6. PoliticalNecessityandtheTetheringofLeaders 143
vii
viii Contents
7. AFewInstitutionalPitfalls 161
partiv. socialjustice,choice,andwelfare
8. TheGeneralProblemofCollectiveWelfareandChoice 193
9. VotingRules 211
10. SocialWelfareandSocialJustice:APartialIntegration 223
Conclusion:QuestionsandLessons 245
Bibliography 253
NameIndex 269
SubjectIndex 273
Propositions and Corollaries
Throughout,empiricalpropositionsareinbold;corrolariesarenot.Both
areinsmallcaps.Normativepropositions(inbold)andcorollaries(not
bold)areitalicized.
AN UNORGANIZED GROUP CANNOT OPTIMALLY SATISFY ITS SHARED OR
COLLECTIVEINTERESTS.page27
a group can only get members to contribute to solve its
shared problems by providing incentives independent of the
publicgood.page27
’
INDIVIDUALSDONTHAVEANINCENTIVETOGIVETHEIRTRUEVALUATION
OFAPUBLICGOOD.page28
for groups of people to meet their shared needs over
timetheymusthavethefreedomtoorganizethemselvespoliti-
cally.page28
THE LARGER THE GROUP, THE FURTHER FROM OPTIMAL WILL BE THE
AMOUNT OF APUBLIC GOOD WHICH ANUNORGANIZEDGROUP WILLSUPPLY
ITSELF.page29
THE FURTHER FROM OPTIMAL THE GROUP IS WITHOUT ORGANIZATION,
THEGREATERWOULDBETHEPOTENTIALPROFITINORGANIZINGTHEGROUP
TO SATISFY THEIR COMMON INTERESTS OR TO SUPPLY THEM WITH PUBLIC
GOODS.page29
politicsis potentiallymoreprofitable forpolitical leaders
inlargergroups.page29
politicalcompetitionwillbestifferinlargergroups.page29
in most collective action problems there will be a breakeven
point,suchthatifmorethanthebreakevennumberofpeoplecan
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