Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature

498 Pages·2000·5.901 MB·English

by  Stephen C. Levinson

Contents
Conventions xi
Preface xiii
NotetoStudents xvii
Acknowledgments xxi
Introduction 1
Chapter1
OntheNotionofaGeneralizedConversationalImplicature 11
1.0 TheArgument 11
1.1 Grice’sProgram 12
1.2 ThreeLayersversusTwointheTheoryofCommunication 21
1.3 TheArgumentfromDesign:TheMaximsasHeuristics 27
1.4 ATypologyofGCIs 35
1.4.1 TheFirst(Q)Heuristic 35
1.4.2 TheSecond(I)Heuristic 37
1.4.3 TheThird(M)Heuristic 38
1.4.4 InteractionsBetweenImplicatures 39
1.5 Non-monotonicityandDefaultReasoning 42
1.5.1 TypologyofNonmonotonicReasoningSystems 42
1.5.2 NonmonotonicInferenceandImplicature 45
1.5.3 InvestigatingtheDefeasibilityofScalarImplicatures 49
1.6 AgainstReductionofGCIstoNonceSpeaker-Meaning 54
1.6.1 Sperber-WilsonRelevance 55
1.6.2 ImplicatureasAccommodation 60
1.7 GeneralizedImplicatureandStablePatternsofLexicalization 64
1.8 Conclusions 71
viii Contents
Chapter2
ThePhenomena 73
2.1 Introduction 73
2.2 TheQPrinciple 75
2.2.1 QInferences 75
2.2.2 EntailmentScales 79
2.2.3 Q-ContrastsBasedonOtherKindsofLexicalOpposition 98
2.2.4 ResidualProblems:ScalarImplicature,GCIs,andPCIs 104
2.2.5 ClausalImplicatures 108
2.3 ExploringI-Inferences 112
2.3.1 FormulatingtheMaximorHeuristic 112
2.3.2 SomeProminentI-Implicatures 122
2.4 M-ImplicaturesandHorn’sDivisionofLabor 135
2.4.1 Horn’s(1984)DivisionofPragmaticLabor 137
2.5 TheJointE¤ectofQ-,I-andM-Implicatures 153
2.5.1 TheProjectionProblem 155
Chapter3
GeneralizedConversationalImplicatureandtheSemantics/Pragmatics
Interface 165
3.1 Background 165
3.2 TheReceivedView:SemanticsasInputtoPragmatics 170
3.2.1 Grice’sCircle:ImplicaturalContributionsto‘‘WhatIsSaid’’ 172
3.2.2 Disambiguation 174
3.2.3 IndexicalResolution 177
3.2.4 ReferenceIdentification 180
3.2.5 EllipsisUnpacking 183
3.2.6 GeneralityNarrowing 184
3.2.7 SomeInterimConclusions:ResponsestoGrice’sCircle 186
3.3 IntrusiveConstructions 198
3.3.1 Comparatives 199
3.3.2 TheConditional 205
3.3.3 MetalinguisticNegationandOtherNegatives 210
3.3.4 ConclusionsRegardingIntrusiveConstructions 213
3.4 TheArgumentfromReference 217
3.4.1 HowImplicaturesCanDetermineDefiniteReference 217
3.4.2 ImplicaturallyDeterminedReferenceandDonnellan’sReferential/
AttributiveDistinction 225
3.4.3 TheObstinateTheorist’sFinalRetortonReference 230
3.4.4 PresemanticPragmaticsversusPostpragmaticSemantics 232
ix Contents
3.5 SomeImplications 236
3.5.1 DisposingoftheExistingResponses 236
3.5.2 ModularityandControl 243
3.5.3 Sag’sProposalandPossibleAmplifications 245
3.5.4 Kadmon’sDRTProposalandPossibleExtensions 248
3.5.5 SomeFutureDirections:DRTandIntrusiveConstructions 251
3.5.6 AResidualProblem:HowtoGetfromSemanticRepresentationsto
Propositions 256
3.6 Conclusions 259
Chapter4
GrammarandImplicature:SententialAnaphoraReexamined 261
4.1 GrammarandImplicature 261
4.2 ImplicatureandCoreference 267
4.2.1 ThePragmaticsofLocalAnaphora 267
4.2.2 InferringCoreference 273
4.2.3 InferringDisjointReference 277
4.3 BindingTheoryandPragmatics 280
4.3.1 Introduction 280
4.3.2 TheA-FirstAccount:PragmaticReductiontoBindingConditionsB
andC 285
4.3.3 TheB-FirstAccount,withaPragmaticReductionofBindingConditionsA
andC 327
4.4 TheB-then-AAccount:SynthesisoftheA-FirstandB-FirstAccounts 345
4.5 Conclusions 359
4.5.1 Summary 359
4.5.2 PragmaticsversusParametersinLanguageLearningandLanguage
Change 361
4.5.3 PragmaticsandtheGenerativeProgram 362
Chapter5
Epilogue 367
5.1 PredictivePoweroftheTheoryofGCIs 368
5.2 PresumptiveInferenceandGeneralReasoning 371
5.3 RoleofGCIsinLinguisticTheory 374
Notes 379
References 425
NameIndex 451
SubjectIndex 457

Conventions
1. TYPOGRAPHICAL
Italic isusedfor emphasis and mention of linguistic expressions.
Doublequotesindicateutterances(i.e.,usesofexpressionsandsentences).
Single quotes are used to gloss foreign-language expressions and prag-
matic inferences.
2. SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
& logical conjunction
4 logical disjunction
! materialconditional (logical‘‘if’’)
@;s negation
1 logical equivalence
p, q(occasionally sentential and propositional variables
f, j, P, Q)
F, G predicate variables
K(as in Kp) epistemicmodifier,tobereadas‘thespeakerknowsp’
P(as inPp) epistemic modifier (the dual of K: Kp1@P@p), to
be read as ‘for all thespeaker knows,p’
‘ entails, asin p ‘q
(cid:135)> implicates, as in ‘‘p’’(cid:135)>‘q’ (uttering ‘‘p’’ impli-
cates‘q’)
(cid:135)(cid:135)> communicates (the sum of what is said and what is
implicated)
xii Conventions
Q(cid:135)> implicates under theQ-principle
I(cid:135)> implicates under theI-principle
M(cid:135)> implicates under theM-principle
i¤ ifand only if
ha;bi ordered pair
fa;bg unordered set
hS;Wi Horn scale, of linguistic expressions, such that
linguistic expression S is an informationally stronger
element than W.
GCI generalized conversational implicature
PCI particularized conversationalimplicature
* sentence ungrammatical sentence
?? ‘‘sentence’’ pragmatically odd or unacceptable utterance
Further symbols put to limited use are introduced in passing.
Preface
InthisbookIattempttodefendthenotionofageneralizedconversational
implicature as a species of preferred interpretation. I do not pretend that
thisnotionisstraightforward,andIgrantthatitisnoteasytodefend.Yet
Ibelievethattheideaofapreferred(ordefault)interpretationismuchtoo
important to be ignored just because it is a di‰cult concept. Moreover,
theexistenceofpreferredintepretationshas(formeatleast)somethingof
thatbruteself-evidencethatDr.Johnsoninvokedwhenhekickedastone
to dispatch Berkeley’s idealism. We grope to grab and harness the beast
without theslightest doubt about its existence.
I attempt in the book to justify the notion of a generalized conversa-
tional implicature, first, by trying to show that some general theoretical
sense can be made of the notion of a preferred interpretation; second, by
defendingthenotionagainstitsdetractorsandexposingthedeficienciesof
the pro¤ered alternatives; and third, by showing that a rather simple first
approximationtoatheoryofsuchthingscangiveuscoverageofabroad
range of important interpretive phenomena. This is the thrust of the first
two chapters.
Then Itrytoshowjusthowusefulandimportantsuchatheoryofpre-
ferred interpretation isfor ourunderstanding ofhow languageworks.To
make the point with maximum dramatic e¤ect, I have gone for the lin-
guistic jugular, as it were. On the one hand, I try to show that the phe-
nomena of preferred intepretations force us into a radical reconstruction
oftheentiretheoryofmeaning.Ontheother,Iattempttoreducemuchof
the alleged grammar of anaphora—central to many recent developments
in syntax—to matters of preferred interpretation. I feel that these attacks
are successful enough to lend powerfulcredence to the theory I provide.
My ambitions, in this book at least, do not extend beyond this. There
are no general claims being made about the underlying mechanisms
xiv Preface
constituting a fundamental aspect of human cognition or the essence of
human communication. On the contrary, I believe that a theory of pre-
ferred interpretations is just another piece in the jigsaw puzzle of the
theory of meaning, that complex multifaceted landscape which the ex-
plorers of twentieth-century philosophy and linguistics have proved to be
ruggedterrainindeed.Thusmymodestambitionscontraststrikinglywith
anotherrecentattempttorecastGrice’stheoryofimplicature,viz.Sperber
and Wilson’s (1986) Relevance theory, which is o¤ered to us as a wide-
ranging cognitive principle from which all pragmatic facts follow just as
do facts about human attention, memory, and so on. Nevertheless, I do
not believe that my narrow, technical slant is devoid of general con-
clusions; on the contrary, I believe that the theory of preferred interpre-
tation that I sketch, although crude, is su‰cient to show that central
problems in the theory of meaning and the theory of grammar have been
completely misconstrued. Ascalpel cuts deep just because itisthin.
Finally,thosewhoknowotherstrandsofmyworkmaybepuzzledthat
I should have written this book: the rationalist, universalist tinge may
seeminconsistentwithmycurrentattempttodivertcognitivescienceinto
a proper consideration of social and cultural factors, or my previous ef-
forts to understand some of the bases of social interaction. But I do not
believe there is any inconsistency. Current perspectives on the relation
betweenuniversal human nature and cultural factors often seem to meto
be inverted: for example, language is held to be essentially universal,
whereas language use is thought to be more open to cultural influences.
Butthereversemayinfactbefarmoreplausible:thereisobviouscultural
codification of many aspects of language from phoneme to syntactic
construction, whereas the uncodified, unnoticed, low-level background of
usage principles or strategies may be fundamentally culture-independent.
This is not to suggest that culture is a mere veneer that sticks just to the
more rule-bound aspects of human behavior. Indeed, I think I havedem-
onstrated that culture-specific semantic concepts can run deep in human
thinking (Levinson 1996, 1997). But underlying presumptions, heuristics,
andprinciples ofusagemaybemoreimmunetoculturalinfluencesimply
because they are the prerequisites for the system to work at all, precon-
ditionsevenforlearninglanguage.Whethertheprinciplesexploredinthis
book really have universal application is, given the primitive state of our
knowledge in pragmatics, merely a working hypothesis, which at least
seems to fit what we currently know. (Incidentally, the idea that usage
principles may be much more uniform and simpler than the conventions
xv Preface
of language is interestingly at variance with Chomsky’s (1975: 25) oft-
repeated pessimism about ‘‘our very limited progress in developing a
scientific theory of any depth to account for the normal use of lan-
guage,’’ perhaps because ‘‘human science-forming capacities simply do
not extend to thisdomain.’’)
If this picture inverting the normal presumptions is correct, then prog-
ress in this area of pragmatics, the theory of preferred interpretations,
may be a prerequisite to progress in semantics, for we may eventually be
able to use well-established pragmatic principles to help unravel what
contentisactuallycodedinlexemesandconstructionsinotherlanguages,
where we are far too prone to assume universal patterning. It may also
help in the other direction, so to speak, by connecting to other, more
complex, areas of pragmatics like the study of verbal interaction. Here,
our patterns of preferred interpretation should provide an additional
semiotic out of which the moves in social interaction must willy-nilly
be constructed (see Levinson 1987a). And here, there are perhaps con-
nections to broader strands of thinking in the social sciences, such as
Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of habitus, a structure of dispositions that gen-
erates tendencies to act and interpret in certain ways.