Table Of ContentPresidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy
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Presidential Risk Behavior in
Foreign Policy
Prudence or Peril?
By
William A.Boettcher III
Assistant Professor
North Carolina State University
PRESIDENTIALRISKBEHAVIORINFOREIGNPOLICY
© William A.Boettcher III,2005.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2005 978-1-4039-6854-8
All rights reserved.No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any
manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief
quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews.
First published in 2005 by
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ISBN 978-1-349-53071-7 ISBN 978-1-4039-7940-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781403979407
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Boettcher,William A.,1969–
Presidential risk behavior in foreign policy :prudence or peril? / by William A.
Boettcher III.
p.cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1.Presidents—United States—Decision making—Case studies.2.Presidents—
United States—Psychology—Case studies.3.Risk-taking (Psychology)—Political
aspects—United States—Case studies.4.United States—Foreign relations—
1945–1989—Decision making—Case studies.I.Title.
JK516.B64 2005
327.73(cid:1)001(cid:1)9—dc22 2004058691
Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd.,Chennai,India.
First edition:March 2005
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For my wife,Becky
and our children,Abigail and Andrew
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C O N T E N T S
Preface viii
One Introduction 1
Two Clarification,Critique,Framework Construction,
and Research Concerns 16
Three Truman Case Studies 47
Four Kennedy Case Studies 113
Five Conclusion 164
Notes 180
Bibliography 190
Index 202
P R E F A C E
Three core questions provide the underlying structure for this book:Why
did U.S.presidents frequently engage in anticommunist crusades in periph-
eral areas (in terms of strategic value) during the Cold War? How can we
explain individual decisions that appear to be irrational? How should we
apply and test psychological theories of human decision-making based on
laboratory experiments? My interest in these questions emerged in the early
1990s as articles by Robert Jervis,Jack Levy,Barbara Farnham,and Rose
McDermott introduced “prospect theory”to international relations schol-
ars.Borrowing from the seminal work of psychologists Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky,these authors sought to develop explanations for risk-
taking decisions that could not be easily explained by expected-utility
theory.Prospect theory provided a relatively parsimonious,intuitively com-
pelling, and descriptively accurate challenge to the reigning paradigm.
Prospect theory’s emphasis on risk-taking, when faced with losses (along
with research on the endowment effect, sunk costs, and escalation of
commitment), seemed particularly well suited for military intervention
decisions that are often fraught with danger. Unfortunately, much of the
early research on prospect theory in international relations was focused on
straightforward application instead of adaptation and integration. The
current wave of international relations research on prospect theory takes
account of the critiques leveled at the work of the early pioneers,builds on
the latest research in behavioral decision theory, and self-consciously
attempts to combine the insights derived from prospect theory with knowl-
edge gained from years of research by international relations theorists.
This book integrates research on reference dependence,personal predis-
positions,and uncertainty and information accuracy in a “Risk Explanation
Framework”(REF) designed to reflect the contextual nuance of the empir-
ical realm of foreign policy decision making.I argue that personal predis-
positions interact with the characteristics of a situation (including the
number and framing of alternatives and the degree of uncertainty and time
pressure) to produce choices that could not be predicted by theories of
rational state interest or domestic politics. Hypotheses gleaned from the
theoretical discussion and critique are tested in six case studies across two
Preface ix
presidential administrations (Truman and Kennedy).Throughout these case
studies,I am sensitive to the problems of evaluation and testing that have
plagued earlier research in this area. I find particularly strong support for
the hypotheses regarding reference dependence and uncertainty and infor-
mation accuracy, while the weaker results for the hypotheses regarding
personal predispositions suggest areas for revision and future research.
I would like to thank the people who introduced me to the study of
foreign policy decision making, encouraged my interest in political psy-
chology,supplied thoughtful advice and criticism of draft manuscripts,and
provided emotional support in times of frustration.Throughout my years in
graduate school and my time as an assistant professor,Don Sylvan (my dis-
sertation advisor) pushed me to follow my heart and pursue an independent
course.He has not only been a great teacher but also a true colleague and
friend.I must also thank Rick Herrmann,Peg Hermann,and Tom Nygren
for their patience as I struggled through the early phases of my research.
Michael Fischerkeller, Tanya Charlick-Paley, Michael Young, Jack Levy,
Yaacov Vertzberger,Jerel Rosati,and Nehemia Geva have provided com-
ments on various chapters and conference papers that greatly improved the
quality of the manuscript.Jeffrey Taliaferro has acted as a model colleague:
reading multiple versions of each chapter,challenging unexamined assump-
tions,forcing me to refine weak arguments,and catching both major and
minor errors.I owe a great debt to the archivists at the National Archives,
National Security Archive,John F.Kennedy Library,and Harry S.Truman
Library.In particular,Sam Rushay of the Truman Library went out of his
way to assist a young political scientist struggling through his first attempt
at archival research. As I prepared the final manuscript for publication,
Ekaterina Barachkova meticulously corrected flaws in citations and helped
me track down incomplete bibliographic entries.David Pervin,my editor at
Palgrave Macmillan,encouraged and supported me throughout the publi-
cation process, and his assistant, Heather VanDusen, was instrumental in
helping me deal with the minor obstacles that often frustrate authors.I also
need to thank the copyediting team at Newgen Imaging Systems for clean-
ing up a number of flaws in the manuscript (those that remain are the
author’s responsibility alone). Finally, my wife Becky and our children
Abigail Grace and Andrew William have provided love and patience in
times of stress.
This project was supported in part by a grant from the National Science
Foundation (DIR-9113599) to the Mershon Center Research Training
Group on the Role of Cognition in Collective Political Decision Making,by
a Graduate Student Alumni Research Award and a Presidential Fellowship
from the Graduate School at The Ohio State University,by a research grant
from the Harry S.Truman Library Institute,and by financial support from
the Department of Political Science and Public Administration and the
College of Humanities and Social Sciences at North Carolina State
University.
