Preference, Belief, and Similarity: Selected Writings (Bradford Books)

1041 Pages·2003·6.38 MB·English

by  Amos Tversky

tversky 12/16/03 12:58 PM Page 1
Preference, Belief, and Similarity T
Selected Writings v
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Amos Tversky r
edited by Eldar Shafir s
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Amos Tversky (1937–1996), a towering figure in cognitive and mathematical psychology, devoted his profes- y
sional life to the study of similarity, judgment, and decision making. He had a unique ability to master the
technicalities of normative ideals and then to intuit and demonstrate experimentally how they are systemat-
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ically violated by the vagaries and consequences of human information processing. He created new areas of
r
study and helped transform disciplines as varied as economics, law, medicine, political science, philosophy, e
and statistics. f
This book collects forty of Tversky’s articles, selected by him in collaboration with the editor during the e
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last months of Tversky’s life. Included are several articles written with his frequent collaborator, Nobel
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Prize–winning economist Daniel Kahneman. n Preference, Belief, and Similarity
Eldar Shafir is Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs at Princeton University. c
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“Amos Tversky was one of the most important social scientists of the last century. This extraordinary collec-
,
tion demonstrates his range and brilliance, and in particular his genius for showing how and why human
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intuitions go wrong. Is there a ‘hot hand’ in basketball? Is arthritis pain related to the weather? Why do we
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exaggerate certain risks? Why are some conflicts so hard to resolve? Tversky’s answers will surprise you.
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Indispensable reading, and full of implications, for everyone interested in social science.” i
e
—Cass R. Sunstein, Law School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago
f
,
“Amos Tversky’s research on preferences and beliefs has had a shattering and yet highly constructive influ-
a Selected Writings
ence on the development of economics. The vague complaints of psychologists and dissident economists
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about the excessive rationality assumptions of standard economics, going back over a century, had little d
impact. It required the careful accumulation of evidence, the clear sense that Tversky did not misunder-
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stand what economists were assuming, and above all his formulation of useful alternative hypotheses to Amos Tversky
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change dissatisfaction into a revolutionary change in perspective.” m
—Kenneth J. Arrow, Professor of Economics Emeritus, Stanford University
i
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“Amos Tversky’s work has produced an ongoing revolution in our understanding of judgment and choice. a
The articles in this book show why. They also show how: the articles are written with grace, wit, and a bril- r
liance that frequently verges on the pyrotechnic.” it
—Richard E. Nisbett, author of The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently . . . y
and Why
“Amos Tversky may have shown that basketball players do not have ‘hot hands,’ but he proved the opposite
for psychologists. Tversky always made his basket, and in the process changed psychology, and also eco-
nomics, forever.” S
—George Akerlof, Koshland Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 2001 Nobel Laureate h
in Economic Sciences a
f
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“It is deeply ironic that ‘similarity’ and ‘bounded rationality’ were two of the many topics that Amos Tversky r
studied—ironic because he seemed to be unboundedly rational and similar to no one. No one shared his ,
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combination of brilliance, precision, intuition, breadth, and enormous good humor. Few scholars change
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their own disciplines before they reach 40, as Tversky did, and even fewer then transform other disciplines, i
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as he and Daniel Kahneman did for economics. Their influence on economics, recognized by the 2002 Nobel o
Prize, is still growing, and the discipline will never be the same. Nor will anyone who reads these papers: it r
is impossible to read Tversky without changing the way you think.”
—Richard H. Thaler, Robert P. Gwinn Professor of Economics and Behavioral Science, University of Chicago
“This collection offers the best of Tversky, the best of the best. It is amazing how many of these articles are
already classics, not only in the fields of choice and decision making, but in psychology in general.”
—Edward E. Smith, Arthur W. Melton Professor of Psychology, University of Michigan
edited by Eldar Shafir
A Bradford Book 0-262-70093-X
The MIT Press ,!7IA2G2-haajdb!:t;K;k;K;k
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142
http://mitpress.mit.edu
Preference, Belief, and Similarity

Preference, Belief, and Similarity
Selected Writings
by Amos Tversky
edited by Eldar Shafir
A BradfordBook
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
62004MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedinanyformbyanyelectronicormechanical
means(includingphotocopying,recording,orinformationstorageandretrieval)withoutpermissionin
writingfromthepublisher.
ThisbookwassetinTimesNewRomanon3B2byAscoTypesetters,HongKongandwasprintedand
boundintheUnitedStatesofAmerica.
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Tversky,Amos.
Preference,belief,andsimilarity:selectedwritings/byAmosTversky;editedbyEldarShafir.
p. cm.
‘‘ABradfordbook.’’
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN0-262-20144-5(alk.paper)—ISBN0-262-70093-X(pbk.:alk.paper)
1.Cognitivepsychology. 2.Decisionmaking. 3.Judgment. 4.Tversky,Amos. I.Shafir,Eldar.
II.Title.
BF201 .T78 2003
153—dc21 2002032164
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Introduction and Biography ix
Sources xv
SIMILARITY 1
Editor’sIntroductory Remarks 3
1 Featuresof Similarity 7
Amos Tversky
2 Additive SimilarityTrees 47
ShmuelSattath and Amos Tversky
3 Studies of Similarity 75
Amos Tverskyand ItamarGati
4 WeightingCommonand DistinctiveFeatures inPerceptual and 97
Conceptual Judgments
Itamar Gati and Amos Tversky
5 NearestNeighbor Analysis ofPsychological Spaces 129
Amos Tverskyand J.Wesley Hutchinson
6 On theRelation between Common and DistinctiveFeatureModels 171
ShmuelSattath and Amos Tversky
JUDGMENT 187
Editor’sIntroductory Remarks 189
7 Belief in theLaw of Small Numbers 193
Amos Tverskyand Daniel Kahneman
8 Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics andBiases 203
Amos Tverskyand Daniel Kahneman
9 Extensional vs.Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in 221
Probability Judgment
Amos Tverskyand Daniel Kahneman
10 The Cold Factsaboutthe ‘‘Hot Hand’’ inBasketball 257
Amos Tverskyand Thomas Gilovich
Editor’sIntroductory Remarksto Chapter11 267
vi Contents
11 The ‘‘HotHand’’: Statistical Reality orCognitive Illusion? 269
Amos Tversky and Thomas Gilovich
12 The Weighing ofEvidenceandthe Determinants ofConfidence 275
Dale Gri‰n and Amos Tversky
13 On theEvaluation of Probability Judgments: Calibration, Resolution, 301
and Monotonicity
Varda Liberman and Amos Tversky
14 SupportTheory:A NonextensionalRepresentationof Subjective 329
Probability
Amos Tversky and Derek J. Koehler
15 On theBelief That ArthritisPain Is Related to theWeather 377
Donald A. Redelmeier and Amos Tversky
16 Unpacking, Repacking, and Anchoring: Advances inSupport Theory 383
Yuval Rottenstreich and Amos Tversky
PREFERENCE 403
Editor’s Introductory Remarks 405
Probabilistic Models of Choice 411
17 On theOptimal Numberof Alternatives ata Choice Point 413
Amos Tversky
18 Substitutability and Similarityin Binary Choices 419
Amos Tversky and J.Edward Russo
19 The Intransitivity of Preferences 433
Amos Tversky
20 Elimination by Aspects: ATheory of Choice 463
Amos Tversky
21 Preference Trees 493
Amos Tversky and ShmuelSattath
Choiceunder Risk and Uncertainty 547
22 Prospect Theory:An Analysisof Decision under Risk 549
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
Contents vii
23 On theElicitation of Preferences forAlternative Therapies 583
Barbara J.McNeil, Stephen G. Pauker,HaroldC. Sox, Jr., and
Amos Tversky
24 Rational Choice and theFraming of Decisions 593
Amos Tverskyand Daniel Kahneman
25 Contrasting Rational andPsychological Analyses of Political Choice 621
George A. Quattrone and Amos Tversky
26 Preference and Belief:Ambiguity and Competence in Choice under 645
Uncertainty
Chip Heath and Amos Tversky
27 Advancesin Prospect Theory:Cumulative Representationof 673
Uncertainty
Amos Tverskyand Daniel Kahneman
28 Thinkingthrough Uncertainty: Nonconsequential Reasoning and 703
Choice
Eldar Shafir and Amos Tversky
29 ConflictResolution: ACognitive Perspective 729
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
30 WeighingRisk and Uncertainty 747
Amos Tverskyand Craig R. Fox
31 Ambiguity AversionandComparative Ignorance 777
Craig R. Fox and Amos Tversky
32 ABelief-Based Accountof Decision under Uncertainty 795
Craig R. Fox and Amos Tversky
Contingent Preferences 823
33 Self-Deception and the Voter’s Illusion 825
George A. Quattrone and Amos Tversky
34 Contingent Weightingin JudgmentandChoice 845
Amos Tversky,ShmuelSattath, and Paul Slovic
35 Anomalies: Preference Reversals 875
Amos Tverskyand Richard H. Thaler
viii Contents
36 Discrepancy between MedicalDecisions for Individual Patientsand for 887
Groups
Donald A. Redelmeier and Amos Tversky
37 LossAversion inRisklessChoice: AReference-DependentModel 895
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
38 Endowment andContrastin Judgments ofWell-Being 917
Amos Tversky and Dale Gri‰n
39 Reason-Based Choice 937
EldarShafir,Itamar Simonson,and Amos Tversky
40 Context-Dependence inLegal Decision Making 963
MarkKelman,Yuval Rottenstreich, and Amos Tversky
Amos Tversky’sComplete Bibliography 995
Index 1001
Introduction and Biography
Amos Tversky was a towering figure in the field of cognitive psychology and in the
decisionsciences.Hisresearchhadenormousinfluence;hecreatednewareasofstudy
and helped transform related disciplines. His work was innovative, exciting, aes-
thetic, and ingenious. This book brings together forty of Tversky’s original articles,
which he and the editor chose together during the last months of Tversky’s life.
Because it includes only a fragment of Tversky’s published work, this book cannot
provide a full sense of his remarkable achievements. Instead, this collection of
favorites is intended to capture the essence of Tversky’s phenomenal mind for those
whodidnothavethefortunetoknowhim,andwillprovideacherishedmementoto
those whose lives he enriched.
Tversky was born on March 16, 1937, in Haifa, Israel. His father was a veterinar-
ian, and his mother was a social worker and later a member of the first Israeli
Parliament. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree, majoring in philosophy and
psychology, from Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 1961, and his Doctor of Phi-
losophy degree in psychology from the University of Michigan in 1965. Tversky
taught at Hebrew University (1966–1978) and at Stanford University (1978–1996),
where he was the inaugural Davis-Brack Professor of Behavioral Sciences and Prin-
cipal Investigator at the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation. After 1992 he
also held an appointment as Senior Visiting Professor of Economics and Psychology
and Permanent Fellow of the Sackler Institute of Advanced Studies at Tel Aviv
University.
Tversky wrote his dissertation, which won the University of Michigan’s Marquis
Award, under the supervision of Clyde Coombs. His early work in mathematical
psychology focused on the study of individual choice behavior and the analysis of
psychological measurement. Almost from the beginning, Tversky’s work explored
the surprising implications of simple and intuitively compelling psychological
assumptions for theories that, until then, seemed self-evident. In one oft-cited early
work (chapter 19), Tversky showed how a series of pair-wise choices could yield
intransitive patterns of preference. To do this, he created a set of options such that
the di¤erence on an important dimension was negligible between adjacent alter-
natives,butprovedtobeconsequentialonceitaccumulatedacrossanumberofsuch
comparisons,yieldingareversalofpreferencebetweenthefirstandthelast.Thiswas
of theoretical significance since the transitivity of preferences is one of the funda-
mental axioms of utility theory. At the same time, it provided a revealing glimpse
into the psychological processesinvolved inchoices of thatkind.
In his now-famous model of similarity (chapter 1), Tversky made a number of
simple psychological assumptions: items are mentally represented as collections of
features, with the similarity between them an increasing function of the features that