Pragmatic Reasons: A Defense of Morality and Epistemology

297 Pages·2009·0.923 MB·English

by  Jeremy Randel Koons (auth.)

Pragmatic Reasons
A Defense of Morality and Epistemology
Jeremy Randel Koons
Pragmatic Reasons
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Pragmatic Reasons
A Defense of Morality and Epistemology
Jeremy Randel Koons
GeorgetownUniversity
©JeremyRandelKoons2009
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2009 978-0-230-57696-4
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To my parents Don and Margaret Koons, and to Mark Nelson
whose teaching first sparked my interest in philosophy
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Contents
Acknowledgments viii
1 Introduction 1
PartI PragmatismandNormativity
2 Pragmatism,CausalExplanation,andNormativeFacts 13
3 PragmatismandRationality 46
4 Pragmatism,Normativity,andRelativism 92
PartII PragmatismandMorality
5 Pragmatism,Interests,andMorality 121
6 Pragmatism,Freedom,andResponsibility 152
PartIII PragmatismandEpistemology
7 PragmatismandEpistemology 189
8 Pragmatism,Internalism,andExternalism 234
Notes 263
Bibliography 280
Index 288
vii
Acknowledgments
This manuscript owes its present form to the penetrating criticism of
a number of readers. Mark Lance, Margaret Little, Mark Nelson, Steve
Kuhn, Gregg Osborne, David Alm, Henry Richardson, Mark Murphy,
and Muhammad Ali Khalidi read and provided generous feedback on
portions of the manuscript. Various chapters were read at the Auburn
Philosophical Society, the Alabama Philosophical Society Conference,
the 32nd Conference on Value Inquiry, Society for Exact Philosophy,
and the Philosophy Department at the American University of Beirut;
I am grateful to these audiences for their input. Also, a grant from the
HewlettFoundationallowedmetotakeresearchleavefromtheAmeri-
canUniversityofBeirutduringtheSpring2004semester,duringwhich
time I wrote a portion of the manuscript. My greatest intellectual debt
isowedtoMarkLance,whofirstintroducedmetotheSellars/Brandom
school of contemporary pragmatism; and Margaret Little, who (along
with Mark) helped me clarify my thinking on the nature of normativ-
ity.Theywillnotagreewithallofthepointssetforthinthisbook,but
without their influence there wouldn’t even be a book. Of course, any
argumentative lapses in this work are to be chalked up to my account,
and not theirs. Finally, my deepest gratitude is due to my wife Lucy,
whoseloveandsupportsustainedmethroughthisproject.
viii
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Introduction
This book is concerned with two projects: First, it seeks to develop a
novel and viable version of pragmatism, one that is free from the rel-
ativist tendencies one tends to associate with pragmatism (especially
contemporary pragmatism). Second, it seeks to provide a justification
for two types of normative discourse (morality and epistemology), and
shows that moral (and epistemic) constraints are rational constraints.
I wish to show how this novel version of pragmatism can provide an
answer to the question ‘Why be moral?’ (as well as the under-asked
question‘Whysubjectmyselftoepistemicconstraints?’).
Recent years have demonstrated a resurgence of interest in prag-
matism. Entire journal issues have been devoted to the topic of
pragmatism,1 and dozens of books on pragmatism have emerged, cov-
eringtopicsrangingfromtheclassicalpragmatismofDewey,Jamesand
Peirceto‘neo-pragmatists’suchasRortyandPutnam.
However, despite pragmatism’s current popularity, it is still viewed
by many as suspect. Pragmatism has not been able to shake its asso-
ciations with relativism and subjectivism. Why does pragmatism have
suchassociations?Onereasonisthatsometraditionalpragmatistswrite
as though they had a commitment to relativism or wanted to reduce
truthtomereagreement.DavidBakhurstwrites:
Anotherpotentialobstacletorealismliesinpragmatists’tendencies,
whenexplainingtheideathattruebeliefsarethosethatsurvivethe
trials of inquiry, to collapse the concept of truth into that of agree-
ment. Peirce himself writes that “the opinion which is fated to be
ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the
truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.”2 Here
itseemsthat,“attheendofinquiry,”humanagreementdetermines
1