Table Of ContentOUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,9/6/2021,SPi
Practical Thought
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,9/6/2021,SPi
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,9/6/2021,SPi
Practical Thought
Essays on Reason, Intuition, and Action
JONATHAN DANCY
1
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,9/6/2021,SPi
3
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OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,9/6/2021,SPi
Contents
Preface vii
Introduction:NoMoreAnswers? 1
1. TheLogicalConscience 15
SECTION 1: TOWARDS PARTICULARISM
IN ETHICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY
2. OnMoralProperties 21
3. EthicalParticularismandMorallyRelevantProperties 37
4. IntuitionisminMeta-Epistemology 51
5. TheRoleofImaginaryCasesinEthics 62
6. ExternalismforInternalists 75
7. TheParticularist’sProgress 91
8. Necessity,Universality,andtheAPrioriinEthics 114
SECTION 2: MORAL METAPHYSICS
9. TwoConceptionsofMoralRealism 129
10. ContemplatingOne’sNagel 145
11. InDefenceofThickConcepts 160
12. McDowell,Williams,andIntuitionism 178
13. PracticalConcepts 197
14. ShouldWePasstheBuck? 213
SECTION 3: ACTION AND REASONS
15. ArgumentsfromIllusion 229
16. WhyThereIsReallyNoSuchThingastheTheoryofMotivation 247
17. OnHowtoAct—Disjunctively 261
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,9/6/2021,SPi
vi
18. EnticingReasons 281
19. OnKnowingOne’sReason 304
SECTION 4: LEARNING FROM THE INTUITIONISTS
20. PrichardonDutyandIgnoranceofFact 321
21. Moore’sAccountofVindictivePunishment:ATestCase
forTheoriesofOrganicUnities 338
22. HasAnyoneEverBeenaNon-Intuitionist? 355
23. MoreRightthanWrong 375
24. PrichardonCausingaChange 394
PlacesofFirstPublication 405
WorksCited 407
Index 413
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,9/6/2021,SPi
Preface
This collection consists of papers all of which have been previously published.
IamgratefultoWiley-Blackwell,theRoyalInstituteofPhilosophyandRidgeway
Publishersforpermissiontoreprintmaterialofwhichtheyholdthecopyright.
ThepapersareprecededbyanIntroductionwhichisintendedasanintellectual
autobiography. I have found the attempt to put order into what was a pretty
random process both difficult and interesting. To the extent to which one can
discern a pattern, it was certainly not one determined in advance. Like most
people,Ilurchedfromtopictotopicasthemoodstruckme—stimulatedofcourse
byinvitationsandothersimilarmotives.Butlookingatthingsinretrospective,a
shapedoesemerge.
InselectingpapersforthiscollectionIhadthreecriteriainmind.Thefirstwas
absolutequality(realorsupposed).Thesecondwastotrytoconstructasmuchof
a narrative as possible. The third was to try to show the range of areas within
whichIhaveworked.Inthelastrespect,Iwassadnottobeabletofindroomfor
twopaperswhicharewayoutsidemynormalstampingground,oneonProust’s
conception of the self (Dancy 1995d) and the other on Hume’s Dialogues
ConcerningNaturalReligion(Dancy1995c).
Iowethankstomany,ofcourse.InthetwodepartmentsinwhichItaughtin
theUK,IhadenormoussupportfromDavidMcNaughton,PhilipStratton-Lake,
and Brad Hooker. David and I invented what I once (with great pride) heard
referredtoasKeeleRealism.PhilipwassupposedlyaKantianwhenwehiredhim
atKeele,butbythetimehefollowedmetoReadinghewasasinterestedinRossas
inKant.Braddidn’tagreewithanythingIthoughtbutdideverythinghecouldto
helpmeworkitalloutanyway.
Outside my own departments, the people with whom I have had the most
sustainedphilosophicalinteractionsare,orwere,DerekParfit(onwhomIwrotea
biographicalpiecefortheBritishAcademy:seeDancy2020),JosephRaz,Michael
Smith, andJohnBroome.Tothese people Iowe aparticular debtbecause ofthe
manywaysinwhichtheyhaveinfluencedmyworkdirectly,andforthatpeculiar
mixofpersonalandphilosophicalfriendshipthatsoenrichesacademiclife.Butof
course,afterfiftyyearsintheprofessiontherearemanyotherswhosefriendship
andsupport,bothphilosophicalandotherwise,havebeenveryimportanttome.
Withrespecttothiscollection,Iowethankstotwopeopleinparticularforwise
advice: to Peter Momtchiloff, conversations with whom persuaded me that a
collection like this might make sense and that I should not dismiss the idea as
little better than vanity publishing, and to my wife Sarah, who has given me all
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,9/6/2021,SPi
viii
sorts of wise advice and who kindly agreed to do the copy-editing. I am also
gratefultothethreeanonymousadvisersforOUP,andtoMichaelSmithandJay
WallaceforadvisingmeaboutmyIntroduction.
Actually,of course,Iowe Sarahmuch more thanthis.Onesignal instance: in
thelate1980sIhadbeenteachingatKeeleforseventeenyearsandhadbegunto
publishinawaythatIwasquitesatisfiedwith,butshethoughtIcoulddomore,or
better.SoshesuggestedthatIshouldtrytosetupasortoflecturingtourintheUS,
soastoputmyselfaboutabit.WhenIsaidthatwecouldnotpossiblyaffordsuch
athing,shepointed outthatUSdepartmentsgivehonorariato speakers attheir
colloquia, and pay expenses too, which meant that if I could get four or five
invitationsthehonorariawouldcoverthetrans-Atlanticfareandthewholething
wouldcostusnothing.SowithmanymisgivingsIwrotetoafewpeopleintheUS
sayingthatIhopedtobeflyingovertheirinstitutiononthewayfromonetalkto
anotherandaskingwhethertherewouldbeanyinterestinmystoppingofftogive
atalkforthem.Anditworked.SoIhadthisnicelittletoursetup.Buttheicingon
the cake came when I was writing to John McDowell about something else and
with some hesitation made the same suggestion to him. The completely unex-
pected resultwasaphonecallfrom thethenChairatPittoffering meaVisiting
Professorshipforayear.
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,9/6/2021,SPi
Introduction: No More Answers?
This book is a selection from papers published between1977and 2015. Most of
theearlierpaperswerepublishedinjournals,butthen,ashashappenedtomany,
nearlyeverythingIwroteemergedincollections,eitherasrecordsofconferences
orincelebrationoftheworkofothers,andsobecamelesseasilyavailable.
ThetitlethatIoriginallyintendedtogivetothiscollectionasawholewas‘No
MoreAnswers’,whichseemedappropriatetoacollectionpublishedattheendof
one’s intellectual career. (Sadly, my publishers would not allow me this title, for
marketing reasons.¹) I owe that title to my son Hugh, but in a rather different
context.Iwasamusingmyselfwhenhewasaboutsixyearsoldbyaskinghimwhy
I should not send him to bed. His answer was, ‘I don’t want to go to bed’. So
IaskedhimwhyIshouldnotmakehimdowhathedidn’twanttodo.Hesaid,‘It
wouldmakemeunhappy’.IaskedhimwhyIshouldn’tdowhatwouldmakehim
unhappy.Andhisreplywas,‘Therearenomoreanswers,Daddy’.Thisseemedto
me to be the right reply. We can often enough explain why a consideration is a
reason,buteventuallythatdesireforexplanationwillhitabrickwall,intheform
ofapointatwhichnomorecanbesaid,withoutthatdoinganythingtodestabilize
thereasonweweretryingtoexplain.
My introduction to philosophy was peculiar. At the end of six terms reading
GreatsatOxford,withJ.O.UrmsonandC.C.W.Taylorasmytutors,Ihadread
Plato’sRepublicandAristotle’sEthics(inGreek),LockeandHumeonthesocial
contract, Mill on utilitarianism, Russell on denoting, and then pretty much
everything written in Oxford since 1950 (but not including Anscombe’s
Intention). Not only was this rather limited fare, but I found the whole thing
verybewilderingandhadnorealideawhatwassupposedtobegoingon.Luckily
forme,IexperiencedakindofrevelationoneafternoonintheSpringvacationof
myfinal yearasan undergraduatewhenon areading weekwithsomefriends,a
momentatwhichthingssuddenlystartedtomakesense.IreturnedtoOxfordfor
the final summer term full of new enthusiasm, and even applied to read for the
BPhil.Inthosedays,doingtheBPhilatOxfordwasatrulyhazardousprocedure
because only around 25 per cent of the annual entry managed even to pass. But
Ididn’tcarewhetherIpassedornot.AllIwantedtodowastorectifysomeofthe
mostglaringgapsinmyphilosophicaleducation,expectingafterthattobecomea
¹ OUPwasunwillingtoallowthistitleonthegroundsthatthetitlesofacademicbooksshouldsend
clearsignalsabouttheircontent,whichthiscertainlywouldn’t.
PracticalThought:EssaysonReason,Intuition,andAction.JonathanDancy,OxfordUniversityPress.
©JonathanDancy2021.DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0001
