Table Of ContentPIERRE GASSENDI’S PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE
BRILL’S STUDIES
IN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
General Editor
A.J. Vanderjagt, University of Groningen
Editorial Board
C.S. Celenza, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore
M. Colish, Oberlin College
J.I. Israel, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton
J.D. North, University of Groningen
W. Otten, Utrecht University
VOLUME131
PIERRE GASSENDI’S
PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE
Atomism for Empiricists
BY
SAUL FISHER
BRILL
LEIDEN•BOSTON
2005
On the cover: Portrait of Pierre Gassendi, from Charles Perrault, Les Hommes illustres qui ont paru
en France pendant ce siècle: avec leurs portraits au naturel(Paris: Antoine Dezallier, vol. 1, 1696; vol. 2,
1700). Courtesy of the Smithsonian Institute Libraries.
Brill Academic Publishers has done its best to establish rights to use of the materials printed
herein. Should any other party feel that its rights have been infringed we would be glad to
take up contact with them.
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Fisher, S. (Saul)
Pierre Gassendi’s philosophy and science : atomism for empiricists / by S. Fisher.
p. cm. — (Brill’s studies in intellectual history, ISSN 0920-8607 ; v. 131)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 90-04-11996-5 (alk. paper)
1. Gassendi, Pierre, 1592-1655. 2. Atomism. 3. Empiricism. I. Title. II. Series.
B1887.F57 2005
194—dc22
2005050827
ISSN 0920-8607
ISBN 90 04 14152 9
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CONTENTS
Preface ........................................................................................ vii
Notice to the Reader .................................................................. xi
Foreword: A New, Integrated Picture of Gassendi .................. xv
Introduction: Basses-Alpes Priest, Provençal Scientist, and
Parisian Philosopher ................................................................ 1
PART I
A CONSTRUCTIVE SKEPTICIST THEORY
OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
Chapter One The Skeptical Challenge, an Empiricist
Response, and a Physicalist Theory of Perceptual Belief .... 19
Chapter Two The Theory of Signs: Cautious License
for Truth-Like Empirical Belief.............................................. 43
Chapter Three Empiricist Epistemic Warrant, and Probabilist
and Anti-Essentialist Consequences ........................................ 55
PART II
SCIENTIFIC METHOD:
THE REGRESSUS DEMONSTRATIVUS AND
HYPOTHETICAL REASONING
Chapter Four Methodological Pursuits: The Regressus
Recast, Induction, and Probability.......................................... 89
Chapter Five The Institutio Method in Practice: Gassendi’s
Report of the Pascalian Experiment...................................... 123
Chapter Six A Method of Hypotheses and Hypothetical
Reasoning.................................................................................. 149
vi contents
PART III
THE ATOMIST HYPOTHESIS
Chapter Seven Smallest Particles: From Ancient Atomist
and Minima Theories to Minima Naturae and Physical
Corpuscularianism.................................................................... 191
Chapter Eight The Mechanical Philosophy............................ 205
Chapter Nine Ultimate Particles and Essential Features ...... 213
Chapter Ten Atomic Motion, Causal Role, and Internal
Impetus .................................................................................... 247
Chapter Eleven Explanatory Uses of the Atomist
Hypothesis ................................................................................ 289
Chapter Twelve Atomism, the Mechanical Philosophy, and
Empirical Viability.................................................................... 321
PART IV
ATOMISM AS HYPOTHESIS AND AS
EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
Chapter Thirteen Atomism and Scientific Method................ 343
Chapter Fourteen Is There a Circle in Gassendi’s
Reasoning?................................................................................ 367
Bibliography.................................................................................. 383
General Index ............................................................................ 411
PREFACE
Some years ago a well-known, living philosopher offered me his
thoughts regarding the comparative merits of Pierre Gassendi and
another well-known, deceased philosopher, who shall also go unnamed
but is generally acknowledged to have some debts to Gassendi. The
well-known philosopher of the past faired surprisingly poorly in this
assessment, his lesser known predecessor faired surprisingly well.
“Gassendi—he’s a terrific philosopher!” said our contemporary critic,
a worthy historian of philosophy. Such an upbeat assessment may
be a diminishing mystery these days, following a resurgence of inter-
est in minor seventeenth century figures and a wave of exegetical
work focusing on the Descartes-Gassendi debate. Nonetheless, it
remains a major undertaking for any student of the early modern
period to get a very good idea of Gassendi’s philosophical and
scientific projects and their intricacies and relations. The primary
effect of the contemporary critic’s remark was to challenge any ves-
tige in my thinking of the notion that Gassendi is lesser-known—
and his works hard to know—because he is a deserved lesser light.
Indeed, against the background of hundreds of years of Gassendi
belittling,1 I conceive of my challenge as presenting his thought, or
some core elements thereof, in a light that illuminates his deserved
significance.
My focus is the epistemological and scientific element of Gassendi’s
thought, and in particular the relations between his empiricism and
atomism. The pressing question for any adherent of those two views
is how they might possibly fit together, and my short, judgmental
1 In the history of ideas, critics can be merciless to the perceived ‘loser’ of grand
debates. Thus, for example, Voltaire offers ridicule: “Dieu me préserve d’employer
300 pages à l’histoire de Gassendi! La vie est trop courte, le temps trop précieux,
pour dire des choses inutiles.” (to the Abbé Dubos at Cirey, October 30, 1738.)
And in more recent times, Koyré renders this damning judgment: “En effet Gassendi
n’est pas un grand savant, et dans l’histoire de la science, au sens strict du terme,
la place qui lui revient n’est pas très importante.” Q.v. Koyré, “Gassendi et la sci-
ence de son temps.” In Comité du Tricentenaire de Gassendi (ed.), Actes du Congrès
du Tricentenaire de Pierre Gassendi (1655–1955) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1957), 175.
viii preface
answer relative to Gassendi is that in the end they cannot, at least
with any pretensions to success. My long answer—premised on pur-
suit of the history of philosophy with a principle of charity firmly in
place—takes us through his strongly Epicurean theory of empirical
knowledge, the scientific methodological principles he crafts (in part)
after his rich experimental and observational work, and his exten-
sive explorations of a physical atomism borrowed as a working hypoth-
esis from ancient traditions. My long answer represents Gassendi as
a philosopher who, despite his many historical debts, fashions an
innovative empiricist method that is supposed to accommodate war-
ranted claims about the hidden by reference to more traditional
empirical warrant for associated claims about the evident. He builds
the latter sort of warrant on claims concerning the nature and oper-
ations of our perceptual apparati—hence on his atomist views of
sense perception. This is at once broadly inventive yet corrosive rel-
ative to his own specific project. His views are remarkable, their
flaws notwithstanding, for providing a robust empiricism that pays
homage to and renders profound analysis of past thought, builds on
carefully outlined reasoning, and incorporates the lessons of scientific
practice as pursued by himself and his contemporaries.
My own debts in telling this story—historical and otherwise—are
many and extend back quite some years. Some of those to whom I
owe great thanks include Antonio Clericuzio, Dennis Des Chene,
Karen Detlefsen, Lisa Downing, Jonathan Kastin, Arnold Koslow,
Mark Kulstad, Charles Landesman, Aaron Lipeles, Christoph Lüthy,
Emily Michael, Fred Michael, Sylvia Murr, Carla Rita Palmerino,
Sophie Roux, Lisa Shapiro, and Martin Tamny. These (and other)
patient souls threw caution to the wind in believing that they might
learn about Gassendi from my meager efforts—and at primeval stages
in the evolution of my thinking, no less. Yet in so doing they encour-
aged me to be that much bolder in my analysis, thereby increasing
risk of error. This is the truth worth noting that underlies the stock
acknowledgement that all faults are strictly my own.
Much of the material for this study led a former life as my doc-
toral dissertation in Philosophy at the CUNY Graduate Center—
and some years on, while the manuscript is clearly the better it is
hard to see how one might improve on the education I received at
the Graduate Center. Diverse experience helps, though, and one
such source of advancement was a fruitful year at the Laboratoire
de l’Histoire des Sciences et Techniques of the CNRS (1994–1995).
