Origin of car enthusiasm and alternative paths in history

2018·0.61 MB·English

by  Mats Bladh

Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect
Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions
journal homepage:www.elsevier.com/locate/eist
Original Research Paper
Origin of car enthusiasm and alternative paths in history
Mats Bladh1
Curmansgatan4,SE-58252Linköping,Sweden
ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT
Keywords: Howcanweexplaintheformidablesuccessofthecarallovertheworld?Itissuggestedherethat
Carculture the historical origin is key to the root of this enthusiasm. From a climate change mitigation
Electriccar perspectivecarcultureisadifficultproblem,butwhyisthatso?Thispaperpresentsaframework
Useragency of interpretation based on the literature of the birth of the American car culture about one
Alternativefuels
hundredyearsago.Agency,nottheleastonthepartoftheuser,technologicalchoice,andin-
Developmentblock
dustrial links are emphasized and put together in a framework called “forks and links”. This
frameworkistestedasanarrativeinthesecondpartofthepaper.Itisarguedthatthecarbelongs
toaproductcategorywithwhichactiveuserscanchangetheirlives,whilefuelandpropulsionis
justaninput.Adesiredcapacityfortouringwasdecisiveinthechoicebetweengasolineand
electriccars.
1. Introduction
1.1. Aim,questionsandbackground
Thecarisperhapsthemostsuccessfulinnovationever,spreadingallovertheworldasitseems,despitewell-knownbacksidesto
thissuccess,nottheleastinlightofclimatechange.Thestrivetowardssustainabilitytodaydirectspoliciesthataimtoreducethe
car’s environmental effects. Many national strategies are similar to that of the United Nations’ “Avoid-Shift-Improve Approach”:
Reducetheneedfortransport,shifttoothermodesoftransport,andimprovetheenvironmentalcharacteristicsthroughmoreenergy
efficientengines,renewablefuelsorelectricpropulsion.2
Thisstudyconcentratesonexplanationsoftheformidablesuccessoftheautomobileandthechoiceofpropulsionandfuelinthe
early1900’sintheUSA.Nowheredidautomotiveusebecomesowidespreadsofastasinthiscountry–inthelate1920’sthreeoutof
fourcarsintheworldwereAmerican.Itisagoodcaseforastudyofcarenthusiasmalsobecauseofthevolumeandqualityofthe
literatureontheseissues.3
The American case is very good for gaining a deeper understanding of the problems we face today concerning transitions to
sustainabletransportpaths.Thehugesuccessoftheautomobileisoneaspect.Whatdoweknowabouttheloveofthecar,howdidit
originate?AnotherfieldofinquiryforwhichtheUScaseissuitableconcernstheelectriccar.Itiswellknownthatthreetypesofcars
existedsidebysideattheturnofthecentury,butwhywastheelectricmarginalized?Athirdfocusisthatofchoiceoffuel.That
alcohol, or ethanol, was one possible alternative, is not so well known, but it is important considering discussions today around
renewablefuels.
E-mailaddress:[email protected].
1Ph.D.economichistory;Docenttechnologyandsocialchange;Retired.
2UN(2016);OnesynthesizingreferenceisGEA(2012),chapter9”Transport”and20”Landandwater:Linkagestobioenergy”.
3Yergin(1991),pp208–209.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2018.09.003
Received26September2017;Receivedinrevisedform9August2018;Accepted18September2018
2210-4224/ © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article as: Mats Bladh, Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2018.09.003
M.Bladh Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
When answers are based on close looks at the artifacts themselves there is an obvious danger of ending up with an isolated
technicalexplanation.Socialscientistsandinter-disciplinaryscientistsoftenlookforcontextualorsocialexplanations.Sometimesthe
reactionagainst“technologicaldeterminism”goestoofarsothattechnicalaspectsaredeniedaltogether.
Theaimofthisstudyistopresentatheoreticalframeworkthatcanexplainbothwhytheelectriccarwasmarginalized,andwhy
thecaringeneralwassuchahugesuccess.Anexplanationopenforchoicesbetweendifferenttechnologies,butalsoabletoexplain
whyonebecomesdominantinthedynamicallyconservativesenseweassociatewiththesocio-technicalregimeinthemulti-level
perspective.4
Isuggestanewframeofinterpretationbasedon“developmentblocks”andMcCarthy’sdialecticalenrichmentofVeblen’sconcept
“conspicuousconsumption”.Characteristicofthisframeisthattheuserandagencytakeprominentplace,togetherwithadistinction
betweenconsumerproductswithwhichuserscandeveloptheirsocialandeverydaylifeandotherconsumerproducts.Amongthe
latterwecanfindnecessitiesfortheformerwherethedynamicdevelopmentinsteademanatesfrompossibleinter-industrialcom-
plementarities.Thisframework,namedForksandLinks,willbepresentedinSection2:
Whywasthecarsopopular?Whywastheelectriccarmarginalized?Couldtherehavebeenanotherfuelforthewinningcar?
MysuggestedtheoreticalframeworkorganizesanarrativeinSection3,withempiricaldatatakenfromtheliteratureandfrom
descriptivestatistics.Thisframeworkandresearchquestionshaveguidedthechoiceofdataforthisnarrative.Threetheoreticalissues
arediscussedinthefollowingsection:Theideaofhybridizationandthenormalcarascitycar,acornerstoneinDavidKirsch’sand
GijsMom’sinterpretation;Thedifferencebetweentheactiveuserand“user-roles”suggestedbySchot,KangerandVerbong;Anda
critiqueofGeels’“de-alignment,re-alignment”pathway.TheconcludingSection5answersresearchquestions,withoneadditionon
policyimplications.
MyinterestinthehistoricaloriginofthecarandtheuseofgasolineasfuelwasraisedwhenIcomparedtheeffectsoftheoilcrises
inthe1970’sontheuseofheatingoilandgasolineinSweden.Despitethatpricesincreasedforboth,reactionswerequitedifferent,as
canbeseeninFig.1.5Theremustbesomethingspecialwiththecar.
2. Forksandlinks
2.1. Pathdependence
According to the theory of path dependence even inferior technologies can survive due to chance at some early point in the
development.PaulDavidandW.BrianArthurhaveproposedconceptsforrigorousdefinitionsof“pathdependence”and“increasing
returnstoadoption”.ThedebatewithStanLiebowitzandStephenMargolisisquiterevealing,asthelattercannotacceptthatthe
rational actor chose an inferior good. Inferior technologies are looked at as dead-ends and failures. In this perspective history is
uninteresting,asitcanonlytellusaboutobstaclesanddelaysfortheinevitablerationalprocess.LiebowitzandMargolisdefendthe
basic assumptions of neoclassical theory, but even though Paul David wanted to attack these assumptions he unfortunately for-
mulatedhistheoryinasimilartypeoflanguage,intermsofprobabilitiesandwithparallelstophysics,argumentsthatareconvincing
tomathematicaleconomistswhobelieveinequilibria.David’sinsistenceonaprecisedefinitionhasnarrowedtheusefulnessof“path
dependence” for most historical cases. It is suitable only for technologies like keyboard arrangements, railway gauges and other
designstandardizationsfixedatanearlypointintime.6
Whenitcomestocomparisonsofcomplexmatters–smalltechnicalsystemslikesteamcars,electriccarsandcarswithaninternal
combustion engine, or large technical systems like the automobile with its supporting infra- and superstructure – it is hard to
determinewhatissuperiorandinferior.Systemsarecomplex,andtheyoftenchangequiterapidlyinearlyphases.Andcompeting
largetechnicalsystemsrarelyexistsidebyside.ButevenmoreimportantiswhatLoebindicated,thatconsumerspreferredsome
capabilitiesorcharacteristicsofthemanytypesofcarsthatappearedinthe1890’sand1900’s.Acarwithtouringcapacitybecame
“thecar”,thedominantexpectation,whichmarginalizedothertypesofcars.7
Whatweneedisatheoryofpathdependencewherediversityisreducedorlostwhenusersdeveloptheirpreferencesandafewor
onedesignbecomesdominant,andthesystemgrowswithstrongerlinkstocomplementaryinvestmentsandinterdependencieswith
otherindustries,makingit increasinglydifficultto changedirection.Thiscould be investmentsinroadsthat compete withother
modes of transport, divestments in sidewalks, bicycle lanes and room for public transport, links to the oil industry and mutual
development and dependence between industries, etc., that excludes options that were at hand earlier. Technological under-
development(thebatteryasstarterbatterymakesthedevelopmentofbatteriesdependentonthegasolinecar),anddivestmentsin
othermodesoftransportlock-inbothusersandproducerstoanarrowpath.Ibelievemanyresearchersneedatheorylikethat,but
DavidandArthurdidnotprovideit.
4AformulationofGeelsis“dynamicallystable”(Geels,2012).Itisnotabigdifferencetoreplace“stable”with“conservative”,butthelatteris
moreinlinewithHughes’distinctionbetweenconservativeandradicalinnovations,andRosenberg’scaseofchangesinoldtechnologiesasdefense
againstchallengesfromnewtechnologies.
5HowheatingoilwasreplacedisquiteacomplexstoryinvolvingbothdistrictheatingandelectricheatingandastrugglebetweenCHPand
nuclearpower.ForaglimpseofthisseeDiLuciaandEricsson(2014).
6David(2002);LiebowitzandMargolis(1999);Puffert(2008).
7Loeb(1995).
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M.Bladh Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
Fig.1.Useofgasolineandheatingoil1946–2014inSweden.Thousandsofcubicmeters.
Source:SPBI(2015).
2.2. Developmentblocks
Fork refers here to a choice of path that historical actors must have made, and link refers to complementarity between two
industries or two technologies. The latter has been conceptualized as “salient” and “reverse salient” by Thomas Hughes, and as
“development block” by Erik Dahmén. Hughes pictured the phenomenon of the reverse salient in terms of system, where one
componentwasatthefrontandotherslaggedbehindsothatfurtherdevelopmentofthesystemdependedondevelopmentofthose
laggingandthisnecessityappearedamongtheactorsas“criticalproblems”tosolve.8ThatEdisonsearchedforabetterbatteryfits
perfectlywellintotheconceptof“criticalproblems”,buthefailedtofindasolutionsuitablefortheelectriccarasasystem.
Dahmén’sideaof“developmentblock”isquitesimilarbutintermsofindustries,andcomplementaritiesbetweenindustries.A
development can be “premature” if the complementary ones are missing, according to Dahmén, and thus there is a “structural
tension”.Adevelopmentblockexanteiswhatthehistoricalactorscansee,imagineandactupon,whileadevelopmentblockexpost
iswhatallthosedecisionsperhapsendedupwith.AccordingtoLennartSchön“complementarities”intheeconomyraisesthevalue
ofbothsides–thewholeisbiggerthanthesumofitsparts.Theycreateleapsintheeconomyasdevelopmentblocksarecreated
aroundinnovationsthatchangesthecomplementaryrelations.Theyalsocreateimbalancesandbottlenecksasactorsdiscoverthe
need for new competences, new equipment or new organizations in light of the complementarity. Development blocks appear at
differentscales,frommicrotosocietal.9
WhenaconglomeratewasformedinNewYorkbythestreet-carmonopolyandmajorelectricityproviderstoexpandtheelectric
taxibusinessin1899,andwhentheElectricVehicleandCentralStationAssociationwasformedin1909,describedindetailbyDavid
Kirsch,theywereexamplesofdevelopmentblocksexante,whilesuchblocksexpostneverwererealized.10
2.3. Agencyandinterplaybetweenusersandmanufacturers
Inordertokeepthisframenon-deterministicitmustopenthedoorforinitiativeanddecisionsofhistoricalactors.McCarthy’s
view is helpful in that it allows us to see “supply and demand” not as anonymous and balancing forces, but as real people and
organizations exploring and offering new technologies. Somehow a quite expensive and immature consumer product became ex-
tremelypopular,butchoicesatonestagenarrowedthechoicesetatthenext.11
McCarthynotonlymakeuseofVeblen’s“conspicuousconsumption”butalsodevelopsthisidea.Hefillstheemptycategoriesof
“supplyanddemand”ineconomicswithagency:Emotions,searchandchoice.Thehave-notsbothhatedandlovedthecar,andFord
triedseveralmodelsbeforehefoundawinningconcept.Manufacturersofferedcarswithdifferentcapabilitiesandcharacteristics
withinthelimitsoftechnologyatthespecificpointintime,butbuyerschosethosecapabilitiesandcharacteristicstheypreferred.In
racesandreliabilityrunsrichpeopleshowedwhatacarcouldbe,andthisstartedadialecticalprocesswherebothcar-ownersand
car-makerstookinitiative,i.e.actorsweretheoriginofevents,notcausedbysomethingelseoutsideorbehindactors,buttheroot
itself.Thereweremanychoicestomake,andateachpointadifferentchoicecouldhavebeenmade.Whenhistoriansgofurtherand
trytoexplainthestrivefordistinctionandentrepreneurialinitiativebycircumstances,agencyisdiminishedorevenlostandthe
causeisreducedto“structure”or“culture”.12
8Hughes(1989/2004),pp71–74.
9Dahmén(1989);Schön(2006),53–61.
10Kirsch(2000a),pp53–61,94–96.
11McCarthy(2007).
12Ontheobjectofthehistorian’sinquiry,seeCarr(1961),pp44–55.Foraninterestingphilosopher’sviewonsocialstructureandhumanagency,
seeBhaskar(1989),pp92–95.
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M.Bladh Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
2.4. Conceptsandhypothesis
ThisstudyfollowstheMulti-LevelPerspectivetraditioningeneral,andborrowsconceptsfromothertheoriesaswell.However,
workingwiththisideaithasbecomeobviousthat“theactiveuser”isdistinctiveandinneedofaspecialplaceasanewconcept.The
usermaybetheconsumer,thebuyer,butitisnotthesamecategory.Theuseractivelyusestheproductandinthatdevelopshisorher
socialandeverydaylife.Itisamatterofexploringwhatcanbedonewiththeproduct,testing,improvising,experimenting.Atsome
pointintimesomeoneputatentinthebackseatofthecarandwentfor“autocamping”forthefirsttimeever–a“newcombination”.
Thesimilaritywiththemobilephoneanddevelopmentofnewhabitsarounditisquiteobvious.Thus,thereisneedforadistinction
betweendifferenttypesofproducts.Farfromallconsumerproductscanbeusedinthismulti-functionalandexperimentalway,quite
thecontrarymanyofthemarejustnecessaryfortheuseoftheformer.Perhapswecancallthem‘exciting’and‘boring’products:
Excitingbecausetheusercaninnovatehisorhersocialandeverydaylife,andboringbecausetheproductisjustanecessity.
Forksaresituationsinhistoricaltimewhenchoicesbetweenalternativesaremadeinonewayoranother.Thedominanceofone
alternativehasnotyetbeensettled.Supplier’slinktoconsumersisdecisivewhentheproductcanbeactivelyused.Usersexplore
whatcanbedonewiththeproductandatthesametimedeveloptheirownsociallifeandpreferences,oftenasdistinctionsbetween
socialgroups.Themoreuserscandowiththeproduct,themorepopulartheproductbecomes,andthisgivesastrongmomentumfor
theinnovation,raisingitfromnichetoregime.Forthistooccurmanufacturersandsellersmustforeseefutureuseandhaveafeeling
forsocialinterplay,experimentingwithdifferentdesignsinordertoconnecttodifferentusergroups.Whentheproductcannotbe
usedinanexploringandexperimentalway,butismerelyanecessaryinputfortheuseofthe‘exciting’ones,thelinktotheconsumer
is not decisive while that to other, complementary, industries is. Energy always belongs to this second category of ‘boring’ in-
novations,andtheoutcomeofstrugglesbetweendifferentenergycarriersisdeterminedbytheabilitytoadjusttotheusesofthe
‘exciting’product.
3. Emergenceofthecaranditsfuel
Publictransportandtourismaretakenhereasstartingpointsofanarrativearoundtheearlycaranditsfuel.Bothwerenewinthe
19thcentury,andascategoriestheyareopenastowhattechnologyisused.Therewereseveraltechnologiesusedforpublictransport,
andchoicesamongthemhadconsequencesforthetechnologicaldevelopmentof,expectationsonandalternativestothecar.All
studiesdiscusspublictransportandtouringinrelationtothecomingautomobile.Inaworldofhorsesandhorse-drawnwagonsthese
two sociotechnical innovations introduced new mobility patterns. Cab-service, or taxi, was part of the old world, a semi-public
service.
Twobasicinnovations
A Publictransport
B Tourism
Americancitiesgrewinsizeandpeopleneededtofindacheapwaytomovebackandforthfromthecenter.Railroadshadbeen
builtsincethe1820’s,butsteampoweredpublictransportwasneveracceptedinurbanareas,accordingtoMcShane.Fearofboiler
explosions,highspeedandsmokemayhavebeengroundsforresistance,butprimarilybecauserailsroseabovestreet-level,blocking
cross-traffic.LocalauthoritiesinNewYorkwantedtrainstationstobeoutsidethecitycenter,andforolderstationsalreadysituated
downtowntrainshadtoswitchtohorsesforthelastpartofthetrackincities.Anothersolutionwastoputthemasideonelevated
railways.Forashortwhilesmallsteamers,“dummies”,wereusedbutwereneveraccepted.AnimportantpointMcShanewantedto
makewasthatinanerawhenhorsesandpedestrianswerethenorminurbantraffic,steamvehicles,includingsteamautos,were
resisted.13
A.Choiceofpublictransporttechnology
A.1 Steamtrain
A.2 Omnibus
A.3 Trolley
Insteadhorse-drawncarriageswerethepathchoseninAmericancities.Tobeginwiththeomnibus,ahorse-drawncaronthe
streets.ItwasintroducedinNewYorkin1831,butwidespreadintroductionofthehorsecardatedonlyfromthe1850s,accordingto
Hilton:“Previously,citieshadbeenwithoutpublictransport”.Thismeantheavyloadforthehorses,especiallysincepavingofstreets
wasnotverycommon(seeFig.2).Eventhoughpavementsofthetimeweresuitableforhorses,theywerenotsuitableforbiggercars.
Macadamandcobblestoneswerecommonbuttherewerealsostreetspavedwithwoodenorgraniteblocks.Thesharewithpavement
increasedfromabout40percentin1880tomorethan80percentin1925,andasphalthadthebiggestincreasesothatitrepresented
13McShane(1994),chapters3and5;McShaneandTarr(2003).
4
M.Bladh Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
Fig.2.TheshareofpavedroadsandstreetsintheUS,percent.
Sources:USBuroftheCensus(1975)part2,p710;McShane(1994),p59.McShane’sdataonpavedstreetscovers12majorcities.Thegraphshows
allpaving,notonlythosesuitableforautomobiles.
about40percentofallpavementsin1925.14
Frictionwasradicallyreducedwhenthecarwasputonrail(thetrolley).Railsforstreet-carscouldbelaidflushwiththestreet
surface,madepossiblebytheside-bearingrail,aFrenchinvention.Thehorsecarstartedarevolutionintravellingandresidential
patternsinAmericancities.IthadspreadtoeverylargeUScityalreadyby1860andmadesuburbanlivingpossible.Technological
improvements were made: The weight of the car was reduced considerably in the 1860’s, so that typically a 20-passenger car
demandedonlytwohorsesinsteadoffour.Haulingcapacityincreasedalsoasstrongerhorseswerebredandused.
However,hillycitieslikeSanFranciscowereinaccessiblebythehorsecar.Whenthenumberofhorsesgrewproblemswithanimal
power followed. Horses must be fed and stabled even when they were not working. An obvious disadvantage was the fouling of
streets with urine and excrement. The Great Epizootic of 1872, a respiratory and lymphatic disease, killed 2 250 horses in
Philadelphiainthreeweeks,andhitalsomanyeasterncities.Horsecar-ownersnowbecamesusceptibletohorselesssolutions.15
Theverysameyearthecablecarwasinvented.Nowsteampowerwasused,butonlyfortransmittingpowertotheendlesscable
pulledthroughconduitsundercitystreets.Carsmovedbyhookingontotheconstantlymovingcable,andreleasingitwhenthey
wanted to stop. Even though this transport technology spread to some cities, primarily San Francisco and Chicago, it had its
drawbacks.Investmentsinconduitswereexpensive,andspeedwasquitelow.Thevehiclecouldloseitsgriponthecableandproceed
outofcontrol.Itwasquiteinflexibleasthecablemustgoinastraightline.Thismeantthatcurveshadtobetraversedattopspeedso
thatthecarcouldgetholdofthenextcable.“AlthoughatleastninemajorAmericancitieshadcablecarsby1890,suchsystemsstill
madeuponly6percentofthestreetrailwaymileageoperatedintheUnitedStatesinthatyear.”16
Withinjustafewyears,1894–1897,thestreet-carbusinesshadchangedalmostcompletelytotheelectricsystemproposedand
demonstratedbyF.J.Sprague.Itwasanoverheadsystemofwirestransmittingelectricpowertotrolleys.Investmentcostsweremuch
lowercomparedtothecablesystem,sowhenSpraguehaddemonstratedthatthesystemworkedinRichmondin1888manystreet
car-ownersswitchedtothissystem.In1902only1percentofurbantransitlinesusedhorses,1percentcablecars,4percenteither
elevatedrailroadsorelectricsubways,and94percentelectricstreetcars.17
A.3Choiceofhorselessstreet-carsystem
A.3.1 Cablecar
A.3.2 Electricstreet-car
A.2.2.1 Thirdrail
A.2.2.2 Battery
A.2.2.3 Overhead
Therewereseveralelectricsolutions.Athirdrailcouldbeusedintheconduitslotthatpreviouslyhadbeenusedforthecablefor
cablecars,butwerevery rare,probablyduetoconstructioncostsfornewconduits.Batterystreetcars wasanothersolution,but
accordingtoSchallenbergthistypenevergotmorethantwopercentofallstreetcar-linesintheUS,andthishadconsequencesfor
battery development and competition between electric and internal combustion cars. The overhead wires became the dominant
system,despitethefactthattheairwascloggedwithwiresinthe1890’s.Thetelegraph,thetelephone,arc-lights,andincandescent
lampsgaveanincreasingmassofwires,andsomecommunitiescomplainedwhenSprague’ssystemwasproposed.Nevertheless,the
14Hilton(1969),p123;McShane(1994),p59.
15Hilton(1969),p124;McShaneandTarr(2003),pp182–185.
16McShane(1994),pp27–28;Hilton(1969),p125;McShaneandTarr(2003),p186;Chandler(1977),p192(quote).
17Chandler(1977),p193.
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M.Bladh Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
overheadsystemswereerectedexceptforafewplacessuchaspartsofManhattan.18
Themajorityofstreetcarrailwayswereprivateventures,developedoutofoldhorsecarlinesorwerebuiltbyinvestorsspec-
ulatinginrealestate.Propertyvaluestendedtoincreaseinthevicinityoftherailway.Anewtrendappearedinthe1890’swhensmall
linesmergedintolocalmonopolies.Thenewelectriclinesoperatedatamuchlargerscalethanthehorsecarlinesgeographicallydue
tothehigherspeedoftheelectrictram,andthishadconsequencesonthestructureofthebusiness.Smallenterpriseswerecombined
intolargercompanieswhereprofessionalmanagersrationalizedtheservice,asoperationbecamemorecomplexandrequiredcareful
scheduling. In New York, for example, the Metropolitan Street Railway Company was the result of mergers that led to complete
controlofthestreetrailwaysofManhattanandtheBronxin1900.19
Atfirstsalariedmanagerssharedtop-leveldecisionswithentrepreneurswhocreatedtheconsolidatedsystem.“Latertheywere
replacedontheboardofdirectorswithinvestmentbankerswhosefirmssoldbondstofinanceexpansion,andbypubliccommissions
or municipal governments which increasingly took the responsibility for financing and constructing the growing systems.” There
werecasesofbriberywhengiantsgotmonopolycontroloveracity’snetwork,andstrikesandboycottsfromemployeesandriders
whenserviceswerecutdownorfreetransferswereeliminated.AboycottinStLouisin1900lastedforweeks,butthestrugglewas
wonbythecompany.Aftersimilarstrugglesinotherplacesthepubliclostsympathyfortractioncompanies.20
Tractioncompaniesnotonlyconnecteddowntownwiththesuburb,theyextendedtheirlinestosmalltownsintheregionand
evenothercities.ItwaspossibleforpeopleinMuncie,Indiana,togotoChicagoorevenBuffalo,orforNewYorkerstogotoplacesin
New England or even Chicago. Interurban lines were growing during the first two decades of the 20th century, particularly in
Indiana,Ohio,Pennsylvania,Illinois.Iowa,UtahandCalifornia.Thelengthofinterurbantracksincreasedfrom3391kmin1900to
25,070kmin1916.
Trolley lines became a link to a wider world and opened up for new forms of entertainment. Electric railways offered the
possibilityoftakingajobinanothertown,ofchoosingaschoolatanothertrolleystop,orshoppinginthelargercity.Thetraction
companyranspecialcarstotheatersandsportingevents,theyrentedoutcarsforparties.Suchinterurbanridesbecameanimportant
form of tourism as they were inexpensive and reached areas not covered by railroads. Day trips were popular as they permitted
factoryworkerstotakepicnicsorwalksinthecountry.Tractioncompaniescreatedamusementparksthemselves.Theyproduced
theirownelectricity,soelectrifiedparksnearthepowerhousecoulduseidlegeneratingcapacityineveningsandincreaseridership
duringslackperiods.21
Untilthe1920’selectricrailwayscontinuedtoexpandandofferaffordableurbanandinterurbantravel.Butinthelongrunthey
surrenderedtoothermodesoftransport,suchasautomobiles,busesandsubways.VirginiaScharffhasshowndeepdissatisfaction
amongcustomers,especiallyinLosAngeleswherecarintensityreachedhighlevels.Passengerscomplainedthatcarsmadetoofew
runs,ranlateandwereoftenpackedwithpeople,andwomencomplainedaboutsexualharassments.Thestreetrailwaycompanies
hadrespondedtoastrikein1919bybringinginincompetentstrikebreakerswhoendangeredthelivesofpassengers.Newspapers
reportedaboutpickpocketsandconductorswhohadthrownoffpassengersfrommovingcars.Badexperienceslikethiscanexplain
protestsin1920againstthesuggestionfromlocalauthoritiestosolvetheproblemofcongestioninthedowntownareawithaparking
ban.Womenstartedaboycottofdowntownstoresandacommitteeorganizedanautomobileparadeandaskedbusinessownersto
jointhem.Eventhoughprotestersdefendedthecitycenterinthisparticularbattleatransportsystembasedontheautomobilehad
decentralizingtendenciesontheAmericanurbanlandscapeinthelongrun.22
This narrative about public transport in the USAteaches us six things: As long as city traffic was dominated by horses steam
vehiclesofallsortsweremetwithresistance;Horseswereparadoxicallypartofthenew,modernandurbanworld,literallypulling
publictransportthroughitsfirststages;Adevelopmentblockofstreetcarandbatterymanufacturerswashamperedwhentherewere
sofewbatterystreetcarsinoperation;Interurbanrailwayswasanexistingalternativetotouringbybikeorcar(moreonthisbelow);
Monopoliesandtrustsamongtractioncompaniesmadeindividualmobilityseemevenmoreadvantageous;Unsaferidesonstreetcars
madetheautomobilelookasafeprivateroominthepublicspaceforwomen.
B.Vehiclesfortourism
B.1 Bicycle
B.2 Automobile
B.2.1 Steamcars
B.2.2 Electricbatterycars
B.2.3 Internalcombustionenginecars
In1880theLeagueofAmericanWheelmen(LAW)wasfoundedasanationalassociationofclubsandpromoterofcyclingandgood
roads.WhentheSafetybicyclewasintroducedintheUSAin1887cameanewandbroaderwaveofenthusiasmforcyclingthat
18McShane(1994),pp27–28;Schallenberg(1982),pp221–243;McShaneandTarr(2003),p187;Hilton(1969),pp126–127.
19Nye(1990),p90;Schallenberg(1982),p260.
20Chandler(1977),p194(quote);Nye(1990),pp97–104.
21Nye(1990),pp8–12andchapter3.
22Scharff (1991), pp 152–164. See also Davis (1995) on passenger’s experiences of public transport, and Flink (1990), pp 140–143 on the
interurbanrailwayasforerunnerofurbansprawlinCalifornia.
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M.Bladh Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
reacheditszenithduringthelastyearsofthe1890’s.23
OnlyfragmentarydataexistsintheliteratureonthenumberofbicyclesintheUS.Itissaidthatthenumberofmanufactured
bicycleswas200,000in1889,one millionin1899,and160,000in1909. Ifwe assumethatproductionincreasedanddecreased
smoothlybetweentheseyears,andthateachbicyclelastedtenyears,astockofbicyclescanbeestimatedandrelatedtothenumber
ofhouseholdsfortheyearsshowninTable1.Inthattablethesamerelativenumberforcarsisshown.
The table supports, albeit on shaky statistics, the 1890’s as the period of “bicycle craze”. Even though cycling originally was
somethingfortheyoung,athletic,withhighincomeandplentyofleisuretime,thisleisurespreadtoabroaderlayerofthepopu-
lation.Cyclingwasaphenomenonamongurbanpeople,sotospeakrediscoveringthecountrysidebywayoftouring.
Oneobstacleforcyclistswasbadroads.Sinceroadpavementwasunderdevelopedwhentransportinvestmenthadbeenchanneled
infavorofrailroadsandrailways,roadswereoftendirtroadsor,atbest,macadamroads.Cycliststookinitiativestobuildandfinance
“pleasureroutes”themselves.ThemostfamouscyclepathwasConeyIslandCyclePathbuiltin1894linkingBrooklynwithConey
Island,adistanceof5.5miles(8.8km).InJune1896areturnpathwasbuilt,andthiswasopenedwithagalaparadeorganizedbythe
Wheelmen,attendedby10,000cyclistsandabout100,000spectators.
HiramPercyMaxim,whowashiredbyAlbertPopeintheearly1890’stobuildcars,wroteabouthisdiscoveryofthecarinthe
bicyclewhenhewastakingarideofsixkilometersbetweenSalemandLynn,twotownsnortheastofBostonin1892:
Herewasarevolutionarychangeintransportation.Mybicyclewaspropelledatarespectablespeedbyamechanismoperatedby
mymuscles.Itcarriedmeoveralonelycountryroadinthemiddleofthenightcoveringthedistanceinconsiderablylessthanan
hour.Ahorseandcarriagewouldrequirenearlytwohours.Arailroadtrainwouldrequirehalfanhour,anditwouldcarryme
onlyfromstationtostation.AndImustconformtoitstime-table,whichwasnotalwaysconvenient.24
Bicycleenthusiasmdiedfasterthanitwasborn.MembershipintheLeagueofAmericanWheelmenreachedatopin1898with
102,636people.Alreadyin1900thenumberwasdownto76,944andin1902therewereonly8629membersleft.Thevalueofthe
bicycleindustry’soutputwas2.6milliondollarsin1890,31.9in1900,and5.2in1905.Anewgadgetwasinsight,theautomobile.
Leisuretouringwastransferredtothemotorvehicle.25
Thebicycle,andthe“craze”ofthe1890’s,wasthefirsthorselessvehicleforindividualmobility.Touringwasanimportantpartof
bicycleusewhichlinkedituptoabroaderromanticandnaturalisticmovementof“hiking”andestablishmentsofnationalparks.
Urbanpeoplediscoveredthecountrysideandnaturewithouthavingtoadjusttotimetablesortravellingwithstrangers.Withoutthe
bicycle,orifithadbeenconfinedtoonlyurbanuse,theexpectationsontheautomobileofindividual(family)mobilityfortouring
mayhavenotappeared.Ifso,carculturemayhavedevelopedslowerandtheoutcomebetweensteam,electricandICEcarsmayhave
been different. Later on, in the 1920’s, the train-hotel-holiday system was replaced by the car-hotel-holiday system, as Mom de-
scribed,anindicationthattouringwasagreatforcebehindautomobilism.26
GermanyandFrancelayaheadofAmericaonautomotivetechnology,soearlycarsintheUSAwereimported.Sooninventors
triedtoconstructtheirownautomobiles,andtheycouldfindprotection,notonlybehindfreightcostsovertheAtlantic,butalsodue
tothetariffof45percentonpassengercars.Thistariffwasreducedin1913to30percentoncarsvaluedunder2000dollars,andin
1922changedto25percentorequaltothatimposedbytheexportingcountry,andin1930reducedto10percent.Importedcars
amountedtoonlyasmallshareoftotalsupplyofcarstotheUS,between0and4percent1901–1912.27
PeoplewithlotsofmoneyandleisureimportedexpensivecarsfromEuropeforthejoyofdrivingfastandshowingoff.Withthis
newtoy,addedtotherace-horseandthesail-boat,theycoulddrivealmostasfastasthetrain,butwithoutadaptingtotime-tables,
tracksandstations.Touringfreedfromhavingtotravelbyafixedrouteandwithotherpeoplemadeitpossibletoexplorevastspaces
between railroads. Newspapers reported widely of these exploits and of car-exhibitions like that in New York in 1900. Publicity
influencedallconsumers,creatingenvyandhostilityatthesametime.
Conspicuouscarusewassociallydestabilizing,itmarkedagulfbetweenthehavesandthehave-nots.“Thestorybeginswithwhat
mayhavebeenthegreatestclassprovocationinAmericanhistory”,McCarthywrote.Thearroganceofearlyrichdriversthatscared
horses and put pedestrians at danger and the general disregard of other users of the road, outraged the public. Anger and even
violencemettheearlycars,suchasstoning,“tirepuncturinginstruments”andeventheuseofshotguns.Anti-automobilelawswere
introducedsuchasspeed-limits.Oppositiontoautomobilesgenerally,andespeciallyamongruralAmericans,wasnotaresponsefrom
thenarrow-minded,accordingtoMcCarthy:“Onthecontrary,ordinarypeoplesawaggressionfromearlyautomobiledriversasa
threattotheirsocialstanding,masculinity,anddignity,andrespondedwithunderstandableanger”.28
Achangeofattitudetowardsthecaroccurredinthelatterhalfofthefirstdecadeofthe20thcentury.ClayMcShanestudiedwhat
theNewYorkTimeswroteaboutcarsduringthisdecade.Hecouldseeachangeafter1904,frommainlynegativereportsandlimited
advertising,tomoreconciliatoryandforgivingreportsandmoreadvertising.JamesFlinkalsodetectedachangeinattitudeasso-
ciatedwithreportsontheearthquakeinSanFranciscoin1906whenmotorvehicleswereusedinrescuingmissionsashorsescould
23ThissectionbuildsmostlyonReid(2015),withadditionalinformationfromBijker(1995),p98;Smithsonian(2016);Chapot(2001);Quinn
(1968);McShaneandTarr(2003).
24OriginallyfromMaxim’smemoirs,HorselessCarriageDayspublishedin1937,citedfromHounshell(1984),p214.
25Quinn(1968),p38;Rosenberg(1976),p24.
26Mom(2015),pp328–335.
27Flink(1990),pp44,253;Flink(1970),p60.
28McCarthy(2007),Introductionandchapterone,quotespxvi,11and14.
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M.Bladh Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
Table1
Estimatednumberofbicyclesandcarsrelativetohouseholds.Percent.
Sources:USBureauoftheCensus(1975),part1,p41;USBurofthe
Census(1975)part2,p716;Smithsonian(2016);Chapot(2001);Quinn
(1968),p38.
Year Bicycles Cars
1890 3.5
1900 33.7 0.1
1910 20.6 2.3
1920 33.4
notdistribute suppliesor towvansafter thehorses pullingthem hadexpired from heat andstrain. StandardOildonated 15000
gallonsoffuelforthesecars.Anotherchange,orratheranindicationofgrowinguseofautomobilesamongnon-richpeople,isthe
dropafter1908inthenumberofcar-ownersthathiredachauffeur.DatafromthestateofNewYorkshowedthatbeforethatyeartwo
outofthreeownershadachauffeur,andaftertheratewasfallingtooneofthree.Thecarwasnotonlyarichman’stoyanymore.29
3.1. Theelectricpath
CarmodelssoldinlargernumberwerethesmallvehiclesOldsmobileCurvedDashandLocomobile,theformeragasolinecarwith
adesignofahorselesscarriage,thelatterasteamcarwithbicyclewheels.Electriccarswereproducedtoo,forexampleElectrobatby
HenryMorrisandPedroSalomwhostartedproductionin1894.MorrisandSalomhadpreviouslyworkedatatractioncompanyso
theyknewthatleadacidbatterieslimitedtherangeofabatterycar.TheycontactedtheElectricStorageBatteryCompanywhich
would presumably be interested in batteries for small cars when demand from street cars had been lost as local public transport
invested in the overhead system. A new company was established, later named the Electric Vehicle Company, which began its
businessasprovideroftaxi-servicesonandaroundManhattanin1897.Thesecarslookedlike,andcompetedwith,existinghorse
drawncabrioletcarriages.EVCgotagoodreputationinlate1898whenelectriccabscouldcopewithasnowstormandhandledcalls
forwardedfromhorse-cabcompanies.InJanuary1899EVChad45carsinserviceandanother40leasedtopatronsunderlong-term
contracts.30
Nowanelectriccarbubblewasblownup.EVCwastransformedtoasyndicateinwhichtheMetropolitanStreetRailwayCompany
andbigelectricutilitiesofNewYork,besideEVC,tookpart.Theideawastostartregionalcompaniesforcabservicesandselling
privateelectriccarsinnolessthansevenlargecityareas.Atfirst1600vehicles,aboutafourthoftotalautomanufacturingthatyear,
wereordered,laterraisedto4200!Ayearlaterthebubbleburst.Inearly1900areportwaspublishedaboutaseriesofbatterytests
madeinFrance.Allbatteriesshowedbadresultsandnobatterylastedlongerthansixmonths.ThisdeathblowtothegrandioseEVC
projectaddedammunitiontothecampaignbyHorselessAge,amotormagazine,whichhadaccusedthe“LeadCabTrust”ofa“rotten
foundation”.Thetestsseemedtoconfirmthis,butperhapsthemuckraker’scritiqueoftrustsandmonopoliesatthetime,supported
bythepresident,playedasignificantroleinthisdisclosure.TheEVChadboughttheso-calledSeldenpatentin1899,andarguedthat
thispatentgaveuniquerighttoallinternalcombustion-basedtechnologies.Thiscomesclosetoadmittingthedisadvantagesofthe
electriccarcomparedtogasolinecars.TheEVCchangeditsnametoNewYorkTransportationCompanyin1901andstoppedusing
electriccarsaltogetherin1906.Nowtheyusedgasolinecarsinstead.31
AftertheFrenchbatteryteststheElectricStorageBatteryCompanybeganseriouslytodesignaspecialtractioncell.Alreadyin
1900ESBpresentedanon-ChloridebatterynamedtheExide,forwhichthedetailsofthedesignwereobtainedfromothercompanies
andinventors.Thiswasaradicaldeparturefromthecompany’spastpractice.Amodifiedversion,withthreetimesthelifeofthe
original,waspresentedin1911.The“IroncladExide”becamethestandardforstoragebatteriesusedinelectricvehiclesuntilthe
early1950’s.32
B.2.2Improvingtheelectricbatterycar
B.2.2.1 ESB:Exidebattery
B.2.2.2 Edison:Miraclebattery
B.2.2.3 Ford&Edison:Fordelectric
ThomasEdisonputalotofeffortindevelopingthemuchsoughtafter“miraclebattery”.Hehadhisownincentive,namelythe
defenseofdirectcurrentinthe“battleofthecurrents”inthe1890’s.Edisonhaddevelopedhisownsystemaroundtheincandescent
lamp and direct current and saw that electric cars as major consumers of urban-generated electric current would slow down the
29McShane(1994),pp174,183–184;Flink(1970),pp45–46;Mom(2015),pp109–110.
30Schallenberg(1982),pp222,250–255;Kirsch(2000a),pp41–49.
31Schallenberg(1982),pp264–266;Kirsch(2000a),pp50–84;Flink(1990),pp51–53;CowanandHultèn(1996).
32Schallenberg(1982),pp267–271.
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M.Bladh Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
conversiontoalternatingcurrent.Hestartedhisbatteryprojectin1898,buttheproblemwasquitedifficulttosolve.Notuntil1909
didhepresenthisalkalinecell,anditsperformancewasnotverymuchbetterthanthelead-acidtype.33
HenryFordandThomasEdisonannouncedatanautomobileshowinJanuary1914thattheywouldputa“FordElectric”witha
rangeof160kmonthemarketfor$900.Edisonevenmentionedapricerangeof$500–$750,wellbelowthatofexistingelectric
vehiclesatthattime.AccordingtoMomtheFordMotorCompanydistanceditselffromthisidea,statingthattheelectricwas“Mr.
Ford’spersonalproject”,whileKirschnotesthatarchivalmaterialtestifiestoanenormouspublicinterestintheproject.Butitended
withjustafewprototypes,andinsteadEdisonandFordchosetoworkonanelectricstarterfortheModelT,whichwasrealizedin
1919sevenyearsafterCadillac.34
A door was closed when the possibility of a development block embracing battery and car manufacturers was marginalized.
Insteadstoragebatterytechnologybecamesubordinatedtotheneedsofthegasolinecaranditsstartermotor.AndréGunderFrank
coinedtheconceptof“underdevelopment”inthe1960’s,referringtoadependentdevelopmentoftheLatinAmericaneconomiesin
relationtothemetropolitancountries.Eventhoughitisnotamatterofcountriesoracolonialtypeofrelation,thereisneverthelessa
similarityhere.Comparedtowhatmighthavebeen–adevelopmentofthebatteryasthemainprimemoverofvehicles–thestarter
motorforanICE-carisahelpfunction,andthedevelopmentassuchdirectedinterestsandsearchinthebatteryindustrytowards
anotherpath.ThisalsoconfirmsSchallenberg’sevolutionaryviewofthebatteryindustry:“…thereadinesswithwhichthetechnology
hasbeenadaptedtonewneeds”.35
3.2. Thegasolinepath
Henry Ford, a farmer’s son, knew well what theordinary man in the countryside and in small towns wanted, and shared the
suspicionandhostilitytowardsthewealthy.ForddeliberatelyturnedawayfromthewealthyandtowardsruralAmerica.Andhe
knewthatifhecouldreachouttothem,theurbanmiddleclasswouldbuyanaffordablecartoo.Thecarmustbebothaffordableand
respectable,sointheModelTalowpricewascombinedwithrespectablesize.Ithadtobeabigandpowerfulcar,butverydifferent
fromthesnobberyoftheearlyinfluentialdrivers.Itwasslowerbutsaferthanrichmen’scarsbutbiggerandstrongerthansmall
buggy-likecars.
Whiletherichfoundnewhobbiesinpolo,flyingandspeed-boating,carculturechangedwiththeenormoussuccessoftheT-Ford.
Affordabilitywasachievedinthreeways:ThepriceforanewModelTcarwasloweredradically,amarketforusedcarsgrew,and
consumercreditsbecamecommoninthe1920’s(seeFigs.4and5).“Theautomakersactuallymettheconsumershalfway”,according
to McCarthy. The use of cars was stimulated by the shortened work-week, and automobile tourism became a major recreational
activity.36
GeneralMotorsandAlfredSloanhadtofindawaytocompetewiththedominantFordModelT,whichhadbetween30and72per
centoftotalpassengercarproductioneveryyearfrom1913to1927(seeFig.3).Sloanfearedthatdemandwouldbesaturatedand
salesgodowniftherewasnoreasonwhypeoplewouldbuyanewcarbeforethefunctionalobsolescenceoftheold.Anewstrategy
developed consisting of two elements: First, what Sloan chose to call “constant upgrading of product”, later known as “planned
obsolescence”,wastheannualmodelyearchangeover.Second,SloancalledGMtobuild“acarforeverypurseandpurpose”,which
meant diversity in what the concern had to offer, a car brand and model for each segment. In the 1920’s car ownership was so
commonintheUSthatownershipbyitselfnolongerconferredstatus.Socialdistinctionnowwouldcomeonlywithhavingacarthat
wasbetterthanone’sneighbors’.ThiswasareturntotheerathatexistedpriortotheappearanceoftheModelT.
ButthechoicebetweenthreetypesofcarswasnotsettleduntilthepriceoftheModelThadmadeitaffordableamongfarmersand
broaderlayersofthepopulation(seeFigs.5and6).Numbersmatterhere:In1908alonetherewereasmanycarssoldastherewerein
thefiveyear-period1900-04puttogether,andin1910almostthreetimesasmanyasin1908,andin1913morethantwiceasmany
asin1908.Fortheperiod1909–1927ModelThada40percentshareofallcarsproducedintheUSA(seeFig.3).Thefutureforthe
automobile, in terms of propulsion system or dominant design, was not settled before sales took off in the 1910’s. A successful
initiativecouldnarrowthedefinitionofwhatthecarshouldbe,anddid.
Farmershadexperienceofpower-drivenmachinerybefore,accordingtoBerger,especiallythestationarygasolineengine,and
werecapableofrepairsthemselves.Oilandgascouldbeboughtinlargequantitiesatwholesale.Thecarcouldfunctionasaprime
movertosawwood,pumpwater,generateelectricity,runsmallgrainmillsandunloadhay.TheModelTwaspracticalfromthe
farmer’spointofview:Itwashighenoughtocopewithrutsandditches,andwascomposedofstandardizedpartsavailableinthe
smallestoftowns.Itneedednospecialgasoline,itcouldbeliftedforchangingawheel.Anditwasadeviceforleisure-timepursuits,
thechurchandeducationbecameaccessibletotheruralfamily,familymemberscouldgotothenearesttownforshopping,etc.The
shareofAmericanfarmsowningacarrosefromabout14percentin1911,to26in1920and58in1930(seeFig.6).37
Manyauthorshavesearchedforpossiblealternativepathsthatwouldhavechangedthecourseofautomobilism,mostlyinfavor
oftheelectric.Infact,FordandtheModelTdidchangethecourse,withdifferentcharacteristicscomparedtosomepreviousmodels:
Lowemphasisonspeedandluxuryandhighonthepracticalsideofacar.Withloweredpricefora“big”carModelTbecameahuge
33Schallenberg(1982),pp352–372;Kirsch(2000a),pp196–201.Mom(2004),pp212f,givesamorepositivepictureofthenewbatteries.
34Kirsch(2000a),p200;Mom(2004),p255.
35Frank(1966);Schallenberg(1980),pxi.ThisevolutionaryviewseemstohavebeenindependentfromthatofNelson&Winter.
36McCarthy(2007),pp1-54,quotefromp41.
37Berger(1979),pp31–53.SeealsoKlineandPinch(1996).
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M.Bladh Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
Fig.3.Numberofpassengercars,T-FordsandmotortrucksproducedintheUSA.1900–1938.
Sources:USBuroftheCensus(1975)part2,p716;Wikipedia(2016).FordModelTareincludedin“Passengercars”.
Fig.4.PriceindexforindustrialcommoditiesingeneralandfortheFordmodelT.1913=100.
Sources:USBureauoftheCensus(1975),part1,p199;Wikipedia(2016).
Fig.5.AnnualearningsandpriceofFordmodelT1909-1926.Dollars.
Sources:USBureauoftheCensus(1975),part1,p168:Wageearnersmanufacturing;Wageearnerssteamrailroads;Clericalworkersmanufacturing
andsteamrailroads;Farmlabor;Publicschoolteachers;Ministers.Wikipedia(2016):PriceModelTRunabout.
successevenbeyondthetargetedgroup.Initiativesfrommanufacturers,orsupply-sideactorsgenerally,playasignificantrole,and
canchangethedefinitionofaninnovation.
Touring was an important use of the automobile, a way to explore the nation, or “See America First” as the patriotic slogan
formulatedit.Costcalculationspresentedin1914showedthatitwascheaperforafamilytotravelbycarthanbytrain,especiallyif
tentandcannedfoodreplacedhotelsandrestaurants.In1915over44000peoplearrivedatYellowstoneNationalParkbytrain,
whilejust7000camebyauto.By1930figureswereinverted,when28000arrivedbytrainand195000bycar.Automotivetourism
wasimpressive,accordingtoMom:In1928,outof20millioncarsregistered11millionparticipatedinsummertourisminvolving44
millionindividuals.Carsovertookrailroadsasmaintransportationtonationalparksbythemid1920s,earlierthanthecarbecame
thenormforcommuting:“…thepleasureofthefamilytripseemedtodominateinterwarcarculture”.38
10