Table Of ContentOntological Commitment Revisited
Aporia / Ἀπορία
Edited by
Jesús Padilla Gálvez
Advisory Board:
Pavo Barišić, Michel Le Du, Miguel García-Baró,
Margit Gaffal, Guillermo Hurtado, António Marques,
Lorenzo Peña, Nicanor Ursua Lezaun,
Nuno Venturinha, and Pablo Quintanilla
Volume 13
Ontological
Commitment
Revisited
Edited by
Jesús Padilla Gálvez
ISBN 978-3-11-074999-1
e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-075004-1
e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-075011-9
ISSN 2197-862X
Library of Congress Control Number: 2021936898
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The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;
detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.
© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck
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Contents
Jesús Padilla Gálvez
Ontological Commitment: An Introduction 1
Peter Simons
Meinong’s Objectives 21
Julian Nida-Rümelin
Metaphysical Aspects of Agency 33
Margit Gaffal
Representation as Ontological Problem 63
Jesús Padilla Gálvez
Ontological Commitment and State of Affairs 79
António Marques
“I know” Language-games in Wittgenstein’s Late Philosophy 99
Manuel García-Carpintero
Against Propositional Substantivism 111
Jonathan Smith
Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, a Case for Practical Ontology? 131
Arthur Gibson
Paradox in Ontology: Black Holes, Cosmology, Wittgensteinversus Stephen
Hawking’s Claim that Philosophy is Dead 139
List of Contributors 153
Index of Names 155
Subject Index 157
Jesús Padilla Gálvez
Ontological Commitment: An Introduction
There are philosophical issues thatdeal withwhat is known as ontology.Onto-
logicaltopicsincludequestionssuchaswhetherathingisrealorwhetherexis-
tencecanbeascribedtothings.Awell-knownexampleistheproblemofuniver-
sals, which arose out of the nominalist-realist controversy as to the actual
existenceofuniversalsorabstractentities.Suchentitiesaregenerallydiscussed
whenwerefertoclassesorpropositions,thatis,whenwerefertothecontentof
anabstractstatementwithparticularterms.Ifonereflectsonthesedebates,one
notices that philosophers who reject the reality of entities tend to contradict
themselves after a certain time. As the history of ontology is complex,we shall
approach the matter systematically,beginning with a succinct introduction.
What does it mean to ask if an entity exists? Observe that Quine did not
focus on the question of whether an entityexists or not, but rather focused on
exploring the scope of what it means to ask about an entity.¹ This constitutes
achangein approach toexaminingwhatexists andwhatdoesn’t.The question
invitesustoassesswhatitmeanstoexist,ortobeconsideredanentity.Quine’s
researchdidnotprovideacatalogueofwhatexists,butaninterpretationofwhat
itmeanstoexist,whatthecoreofa“conceptofexistence”isaspartofalarger
“doctrine of being.” In order to argue about the existence of a supposed entity,
one must adopt a (general) concept of existence that provides a rational stan-
dard for the argument. If we cannot previously characterize what it means to
exist, any debate on ontology is reduced to prejudices and arbitrariness. As
such, the opening question determines the notion of ontological commitment.
It does this by determining two preconditions for ontological debates, namely,
the stipulation of a concept of existence and the requirement of coherence. Re-
gardless of how “existence” is determined, all assumptions about “existence”
that occur in an ontological debate can only be ascribed if they are ontological
commitmentsgivenbythepreviouslyassumedconceptofexistence.Thenotion
of ontological commitment is,therefore, avindication of rationality.
Although Aristotle does not use the term “ontology” in his writings, he
makes reference to it when he indicates that “there is a science that studies
beinginsofarasitisbeing–expressedbytheexpression:“τὸὂνᾗὂν””.²How-
Quine,1966a,64–69.
Aristotle,Metaphysica,1003a21.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110750041-001
2 JesúsPadillaGálvez
ever,Aristotledoesnotrecognizethisscienceashavinga“γένος”.³Thisdiscrep-
ancygeneratedtensionwithintheprinciplethateachsciencemusthavea“ὑπο-
κείμενον γένος”, that is to say a fundamental subject and the definition of the
science.⁴Hence,theproblemarisesthatthe“γένος”,whichisthebasisofontol-
ogy, is not a genus. Aristotle did not resolve this discrepancy but offered a sol-
ution by identifying “γένος” as immobile and immaterial. As such, ontology
dealswiththehighestkindofbeing,thatis,“περὶτὸτιμιώτατονγένος”.⁵Schol-
arsofantiquityarguedthatbeingisnot simplypredicatedinanequivocalway,
butratherinrelationto“theprincipleofone”,thatis,“πρὸςἓν”.⁶This“one”is
interpreted as the “oὐσία” or the highest class of being.
Another fundamentalchangeinhowontologywasanalysedcamefromthe
twelfth-century philosopher Gundisalvo. His proposal was collected by Albert
Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. Medieval philosophy distinguishes two different
aspects of the “ὑποκείμενον γένος”: on the one hand, the fundamental matter
is what is studied,which is the subjectum that represents the ens; on the other
handisgenus,whichisconsideredthehighestclassofbeing.Gundisalvoargued
thatspeciesarethecharacteristicsthataccompanybeinginsofarastheyarecon-
sidered“consequentiaentis”⁷andthattheyaresubdividedasfollows:abeingis
substance, another, accident.One isgeneral,the other particular.One is cause,
another is caused, one is possibility,the other is reality,etc.
Theaimofontologyhasalwaysbeentoknowwhichentities(things)wecon-
siderasexisting.Formanyphilosophers,thisdefinitionappearsredundantsince
itreferstowhatisorwhatexistsormayexist.Anentityparticipatesinbeingand
hasitsownproperties.Weshallleaveasidethediscussionofwhatisconsidered
“entity”,butwewillratherclarifytheontologicalpointofviewfromtheperspec-
tive of enlightenment.This bids us raise the question of our commitment.The
first thingthat is important tohighlight is the primarycharacterof this science
–that is,entisscentia–which hasalwaysbeen focused on thestudyof “specu-
laturens”.Ontologyseemstobeasystemthatincludesthemethodtobeusedin
the doctrine of being.This is so because it has generally been considered a ra-
tionalscienceparexcellencesince,itusesademonstrativemethodthatisration-
al and deductive. Its main concern has alwaysbeen the examination of the su-
premekindsofthingsfromaformalpointofview.Thispointofviewshouldnot
Aristotle,Metaphysica,998b22. Platoconsideredthe studyof “being” as themostimportant
topic,namely“μέγισταγένη”.Plato,Soph.,253b8–c3.
Aristotle,Analyticaposteriora,75a42.
Aristotle,Metaphysica,1026a21.
Aristotle,Metaphysica,1003a33.
Gundisalvo,2007,100.
OntologicalCommitment:AnIntroduction 3
be confused with logical formalism. It seems that any definition of “ontology”
willalwaysbequiteimprecisesincethereremainsacertainambiguityregarding
itsobjectofstudy.Ontheonehand,ontologycanbeunderstoodasthescience
ofbeinginitself,thatis,ofultimateandirreduciblebeinginthesenseofapri-
mus ens, on which other entities depend. On the other hand, ontology aims to
analyse of what entities consist or of what being consists. In line with this
view, ontology is considered a science of essences rather than of existences –
thusbeingconsideredatheoryofobjects.Additionally,itisascienceofpurefor-
malities.Thisambiguityremainsincontemporaryontologyandmakesitsinves-
tigation a complex undertaking.
Traditionally,ontologydealswith the analysisof being (onta) and analyses
everything that we consider to be “there”.This definition is circular since the
definiendum“ontology” is defined by use of a term that appears in its nominal
composition,“tobe”,whichiswhythedefiniensmustbeclarifiedagain.Putting
“being” and “what there is”to gether does not help much because we have to
determine what we consider “to be there” before we can say what is there. For
instance,ifweaskwhattypesofentityexist,thequestioniswhatkindofentities
wearereferring to, abstractorconcreteentities? Are thesepropertiesor univer-
sals or are they rather particular entities? We thereby introduce a new problem
becausewehavetodeterminethemeaningof “existence”.And,inoneway,we
have to make this determination before we can make this determination. It
seems that when we analyse the ontological problem we find ourselves in a
self-referential argument.Whenever we aim to define “ontology” we use of the
verb “ontos” or “to be” and thereby we introduce synonymous terms such as
“be”and“exist”.Bystatingthatwewanttoknowsomething,wearealreadyaf-
firmingthatthereissomething,somethingthattheGreekscalled“onta”,mean-
ing “that which exists”. In other words, the person examining a question as-
sumes that the question arises at all. To sum up, without noticing it we
introduce a copulative verb into our approach to ontology that determines the
very structure of the question.
Obviously,this argument is not new. Aristotle had already been confronted
with the problem of definiendum and definiens overlapping and with this para-
doxheintroducedacomplexprobleminaninformalway.Thisapproachappears
originalsinceitconsistsofa“formal”versionandreadingoftheargument,tak-
ingintoaccountthepropositionspreferredbyclassicalphilosophy.Inanycase,
the presented argument acts as a placeholder that allows for the introduction
of abstract entities, such as the verbs “to be”, “to have” and “to exist” as they
appear in the discussion. Indeed, the main purpose of classical philosophy
wastoguaranteeacertain“commitment”andtomaintainanorderofpriorities
inontologicalquestions,therebyestablishinganontologicalthesisfromthebe-
4 JesúsPadillaGálvez
ginningof the investigation.This circle in contrahendo is developed in the orig-
inaldefinitionofthematterweareanalysing.However,thisdefinitioncausesan
obstructive error which results from a lacking connection between definiendum
anddefiniens.Theresultofthiserrorissimilartotheonethatoccursinamental
caveat that generates a discrepancybetween the concept to be defined and the
set of termsthatexplain the definiendum. Assuch,ontologycontains a self-ref-
erentialargumentthatimpliesapriorassumptionofsomeunshakableprinciples
about ontology.
Kant was aware of this error and pointed to a lack of progress in the field
of ontology since the time of Aristotle.⁸ To break his circle some authors pro-
posed to assume that ontology be expressed exclusively in defined language.
Thatlanguageinvolvescertaincommitmentsinasmuchasweacceptthecontent
being expressed in a particular way.We cannot therefore refer to an entity or
discuss its existence without clarifying beforehand the meaning of the expres-
sions used and the way in which they are applied. To know the ontological
commitment(s)atplaywemustdeterminethemeaningoftheterms,expressions
or symbols used and characterize theircontent.The definition expressed at the
beginning, in which definiendum and definiens are self-referencing without ac-
tually granting any properties to the referenced object, may be considered the
metaphysicalprogram.Ontologicalcommitmentisaprerequisiteforontological
research insofar as we must study whether the terms used in a given language
refer to a specific content and are determined by a specific form. Once we
haveclarifiedtheseelementswecanestablishthetypeofentitiestowhichitre-
fers,butnotviceversa. Atfirstsight,thenotionofontologicalcommitmentap-
pearssosimpleandinformallyobviousthatnotheoryconcerningitisrequired.
Beforeweanalysethismatterinmoredetaillater,weshallintroduceanewprob-
lem that is related to this field.
The verb“to be” determines a predicate-subject relationship that remained
unquestioned until the end of the 19th century. Frege and Russell were the
first to introduce what is called the ambiguity thesis. When a speaker states
that“Johnisaman”,wecannotdetermineexactlywhetherJohnhastheproperty
ofbeingaman:DoesitmeanthatJohnisidenticaltomanorthatthereissome
kind of bi-conditional relationship between “John” and “man”? Does it mean
that John is an individual who belongs to the class of men or if what is valid
for John is valid for some case – which would mean introducing an existential
generalization – according to which to be a man is true at least for the given
case. Or does it imply a generalisation in the sense that what is valid for John
KantFortschr.d.Metaph.Vorr.(V3,84f.).
