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NPR HAZARDS REVIEW - VOLUME I
i i i ii i | i
Table of Contents
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NUMBER OF PAGES
ii| • i
SECTION i: I_ODUCTION Page i-i Through i-2
SECTION 2: St_ AND CONCLUSIONS Page 2-1 Through 2-6
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SECTION 3: DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY Page B-i Through 3-29
SECTION 4: REACTOR HAZARDS Page 4-I Through 4-69
i a, i
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SECTION 5: C01_2ROLOF _R_,C,TIVITY_ Page 5-I Through 5-22
SECTION 6: HF_AT,,REMOVAL AND DISSlPATION Page 6-I Through 6-0"3
SECTION 7: FISSION PRODUCT CONFI_ SYST_4S_ Page 7-1 Through 7-._/
SECTION 8: RFACTOR OPERATI,0N Page 8-1 Through 8-
SECTION9: Cor_usNcEs_ _ 0.F.._SSION.PR(_UCPTaSge9-]-_rough9-_,_
SECTION i0: DEVELGPMENT PROGRAMS Page lO-i Through i0-6
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SECTION ii: ACKNOW[_DG_24ENTS Page ll-i
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cnasslnED
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I. INTRODUCTION
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1.1 Pu o,.anaSco e
...
A preliminary hazards review of the N Reactor was published in January
1958. At that time, the design concept had not been fully developed
and detailed design had not been started. The preliminary review,
therefore_ was general in nature and served Inainlyto isolate characteristic
nuclear hazards associateA with reactors of the general type o_
the New Production Reactor (N-Reactor) being built at Hanford.
.:
At the present time (October 1961), the scope design is essentially
completeI most of the detailed design has been done and construction
is about 25 per cent complete. Therefore, it is possible to present
a much more detailed treatment of the nuclear hazards involved. On
the other handp not all the hazards analyses and experimental programs
to define safety limits have been completed. Some systems, particularly
instrumentation and control systems have not been completely designed.
Detailed operating procedures have not been defined_ nor have operat-
ing limits been set. Therefore, this review cannot be complete in all
respects. I% is believed, however_ that significant nuclear'safety
problems have been identified and, if specific solutions %o the pro-
blems have not been worked out in detail, the probable approaches
to solutions have been determined.
This document is designed to present as complete a review of the
hazards associated with the operation of the N Reactor as is feasible
at %hls time. Where completeness is not possible the problems are
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indicated and probable paths of solution are suggested. Background
material is provided to put the hazards in context. Supplements to
this report will be issued when the additional data and information
required for completeness are obtained.
1.2 Organization ofl Review
This review is organized into two parts. The first part issued as
Volume I is in the _ture of an expanded sum_ry. The second part
of the review will be issued in a succeeding volume or volumes and
will consist of results of' eValUations obtained following the ,publish-
ing of this volume plus more detailed supporting_ information.
UNCLASSIFIED
2. SU_%RY AND CONCLUSIONS
. -- . .... .i
2.1 Nature of Hazards
.,.,,.
...
Release of radioactive fission products in damaging quantities to the areas
outside the Hanford reservation is the primary hazard of concern in this
zeview. A more demanding objective of the General Electric Company in
operating the NPR will be to prevent any releases of fission products
which could endanger personnel or interfere with operations within the
Hanford reservation or within the N Reactor buildings.
The best confinement for fission products is the clad, cooled, fuel
. element itself. Thus, the first line of defense against release of
fission products is the maintenance of adequate cooling to fuel elements
during all conditions of operation and shutdown.
Inadequate cooling can result from either of two general situations:
(i) A power level excursion could increase the heat generation rate of the
fuel charge to a level beyond the capacity of the cooling system, and (2)
Reduction of the heat removal rate to a level below the heat generation
rate of the fuel. Either situation could result in extensive release of
fission products from the fuel. Since irradiated fuel elements continue
to generate heat after the fission reaction has been terminated, adequate
cooling must be provided for an extended period after reactor shutdown.
Failure of the cladding of a single fuel element would have a very small
potential for spreading fission product contamination. Resulting contamina-
tion can be readily controlled.
2.2 PhilosophY of 0peration-
The philosophy of operation of the NPR will parallel that for the operation
of the existing Hanford production reactors. It will be the objective of
the General Electric Company to operate the NPR efficiently for the produc-
tion of plutonium within the overriding requirement that the potential for
the release of fission products slmll be maintained at acceptably low
levels. The most rigorous attention will be devoted to control of the nuclear
process, and to maintenance of adequate cooling to the fuel elements during
all phases of operation, shutdown an_ discharge operations by all organiza-
tions associated with the operation of the NPR.
I
Prime responsibility for production is organizationally separated from
prime responsibility for nuclear safety. Prime responsibility for nuclear
safety is vested in the Research and Engineering S ction of IPD which does
not have production responsibility. This organization establishes process
limits designed to assure nuclear safety and conseruatlon of the reactor
plant llfe. After msmagerial review and acceptance, these process limits
become mandatory upon operational personnel.
Theseprocess limits are inherently conservative. They are designed to
assure operation within Enown-safe limits. Process limits are based on
experimental data and interpreted by analytical techniques, using, where
necessary, conservative interpolations and modest, always conservative,
extrapolations. The limits will be constantly reviewed and updated as
additional information becomes available from operational experience and
agressive research and development programs.
Qualified reactor operators will be relied upon to operate the reactor
within these mandatory limits. Conformance will be monitored. The reactor
has been designed, and limits established, for manual operation of the
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reactor plant. However, multiple automatic instrument systems have been
provided to automatically terminate the nuclear reaction and shut the plant
down in the event process limits are exceeded.
The incident rate of fuel cladding failures can be controlled to a degree
by control of power levels and exposure limits. It is anticipated that the
acceptable rate of fuel claddlng_ailures will be determined by process
economics.
2.3 Specia! Precautions Against Identified Hazards
2.3.1 Inadequate Cooling
Two independent electrical power systems are provided to power
critical pumps and components in the heat removal system. Equipment
is divided between the two independent po_er sources and the equip-
ment on each power source is sufficient to shutdown and maintain the
shutdown reactor indefinitely without fuel damage. Thus, each system
!
acts as an operating backup to the other system. These two electri-
cal supplies are supplemented by an electrical intertie to the D and
H Reactor area substations which was provided for construction.
The primary loop pumps will normally be powered during operation by
process generated steam in the secondary loop. During initial phases
of startup and after shutdown they will be powered by steam
generated by the local oil-fired boiler. In the event of failure
of the local boiler the process can be shut down andmaintained in
the shutdown condition without fuel damage by the use of BPA electri-
cally powered motors provided for the purpose. Any two of the five
primary loop process pumps have the capability of providing adequate
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