Nietzsche and/or Arendt?

20 Pages·2008·0.22 MB·English

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Nietzsche and/or Arendt?
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Vasti Roodt
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9 Introduction
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11 In recent years, a number of philosophers and political theorists have
12 pointed to Nietzsche’s influence on various aspects of Arendt’s thought.
13 It is possible, for instance, to recognise traces of Nietzsche’s thinking in
14 Arendt’s theory of action, her valuation of appearance, her rejection of
15 ‘the social question’, her critique of utilitarianism and her generally crit-
16 ical stance towards modernity1.Nevertheless, it should be equallyclear to
17 any serious reader that there are many respects in which these two think-
18 ers stand opposed to one another. In this paper, I shall defend the para-
19 doxical claim that Nietzsche and Arendt could (cid:2) indeed, should (cid:2) be
20 read together precisely in light of their very opposition to one another.
21 Hence,insteadof tryingtoforceNietzscheandArendtintothestraitjack-
22 et of mutual consistency, I shall focus on the central conflict between
23 their projects and approaches. This conflict can be variously described
24 as the conflict between the life of the mind and life in the world (cid:2) in
25 Arendt’sterms,thevitacontemplativaandthevitaactiva(cid:2)ortheconflict
26 betweenthephilosopherandthepoliticalthinker,whichitselfmirrorsthe
27 ancient conflict between the philosopher and the polis. Moreover, this
28 conflict is itself a crucial theme in both Nietzsche’s and Arendt’s respec-
29 tive works2. Hence Nietzsche famously maintains that ‘anyone who has
30 the furor philosophicus will have no time whatsoever for the furor polit-
31 icus’ and that ‘[any] philosophy that believes that the problem of exis-
32 tence can be altered or solved by a political event is a sham and pseudo-
33 philosophy. […] How could a political innovation possibly be sufficient
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35 1 Forasummaryofsomeofthesearguments,seetheessaybyDanaVillaelsewhere
36 in this volume.
2 Nietzschediscussesthistensioninvariousothercontexts.SeeforinstanceSEfor
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an extended treatment of theopposition between philosopher and polis, aswell
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asHH235,438,465.InArendt’scase,theessayentitled‘PhilosophyandTruth’
39 in BPF provides an extensive account of this tension, as does her essay on ‘Phi-
40 losophy and Politics’ (1990).
374 Vasti Roodt
1 to make human beings once and for all into contented dwellers on this
2 earth?’ (SE 4).
3 Arendt agrees with Nietzsche that the very nature of the furor philo-
4 sophicus stems the philosopher antagonistic towards the furor politicus, al-
5 thoughshegenerallythinksthatthisreflectsbadlyonphilosophersrather
6 than on those who concern themselves with politics. What is more, both
7 thinkers bemoan the suspension of this very conflict in the modern
8 world. Thus Arendtlaments that‘[in] the world we live in,the last traces
9 of this ancient antagonism between the philosopher’s truth and the opin-
10 ions of the market place have disappeared’ (BPF 235)3, while remarking
11 later on that ‘it is only by respecting its own borders that [the political]
12 realm…canremainintact,preservingitsintegrityandkeepingitsprom-
13 ises’ (BPF 263–4, my italics). Nietzsche in turn offers a telling note that
14 contains the following indictment of modern philosophy: ‘it destroys be-
15 cause there is nothing to hold it in check. The philosopher has become a
16 being who is detrimental to the community. He destroys happiness, vir-
17 tue, culture, and ultimately himself’ (30[8] 7.733f.).
18 In light of these remarks, it seems to me that a good argument for
19 reading Nietzsche and Arendt together would have to take the conflict
20 between them (cid:2) and, by implication, the conflict between philosophy
21 and politics (cid:2) seriously,and then go ontodemonstrate how thisconflict
22 can be made fruitful for understanding their respective projects. The
23 point of such an argument would be to read Nietzsche and Arendt to-
24 gether precisely by remaining true to the opposition between them.
25 This is the argument I intend to make.
26 I shall begin by situating this conflict in the context of Nietzsche’s
27 and Arendt’s shared criticism of modernity as the most iniquitous in-
28 stance of the moral interpretation of the world. I then turn to their re-
29 spective attempts at overcoming this interpretation, together with the re-
30 sentment of the world that has been bound up with it. My aim here is to
31 demonstrate that what is at stake in the opposition between Nietzsche
32 and Arendt is the inescapable conflict between two notions of reconcili-
33 ation between self and world: a worldly – or political – reconciliation
34 (Arendt), and a much more radical, philosophical notion of reconcilia-
35 tion (Nietzsche), that ultimately does away with all distance between
36 self and world. In order to make this claim, I investigate Nietzsche’s con-
37 ception of amor fati in part two of my paper, which I then contrast with
38 Arendt’snotionofamormundiinpartthree.Inthefourthandfinalpart,
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40 3 The full titles of Arendt’s texts
Nietzsche and/or Arendt? 375
1 I try to show how the opposition between amor fati and amor mundi re-
2 latestotheconflictbetweenthefurorphilosophicusandthefurorpoliticus.
3 My intention in this concluding section of the paper is not to force a
4 choice between these two alternatives (cid:2) hence: Nietzsche or Arendt, phi-
5 losophy or politics (cid:2) but precisely to argue the importance of maintain-
6 ing the conflict between these two dispositions towards the world and of
7 availing ourselves of Nietzsche and Arendt while doing so.
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1. The desert
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For the purposes of my argument, I want to suggest that we situate
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Nietzsche’sandArendt’srespectivecritiquesofmodernity(cid:2)modernphi-
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losophy and politics included (cid:2) within a particular metaphorical land-
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scape. This is the landscape of the desert. We find in both thinkers a di-
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agnosis of modern existence as desert existence, characterised by the twin
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experiencesof homelessnessandloneliness.Toinhabitadesertistolacka
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home(cid:2)moreaccurately,tolackasenseof home(cid:2)understoodbothasa
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20 locus of security and as a place towhich one belongs and from where one
21 is able to relate to others. Nietzsche writes, for instance, of ‘[t]he tremen-
22 dous surging of human beings on the great desert of the earth, their
23 founding of cities and states, their warmongering, their restless congrega-
24 tion and opposition, their running through one another, their copying
25 from one another, their contradictory outwitting and stepping down
26 on one another, their shouting in distress, their pleasure in fighting’
27 (SE 5). Elsewhere he refers to ‘the last human beings sitting on the
28 dried-out desert of the decayed earth [Denken wir uns den letzten Men-
29 schen auf der ausgedçrrten W(cid:2)ste des morschen Erdballs sitzen]’ (29[181]
30 7.706). Arendt similarly characterises the modern world as a desert.
31 More precisely, she argues that it is in fact the very absence of a world
32 – the worldlessness – of modern existence thatcasts us backon ourselves,
33 onourbasicspeciesexistence, ouranimality,andtherebyrelegatesustoa
34 desert-existence4.
35 Both Nietzsche and Arendt develop an account of the conditions
36 under which the world has become a desert in just this sense. I only
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4 Perhapsthemostpoignantevocationofthedesertcanbefoundinherconclusion
39 to an unpublished lecture course from 1955 entitled ‘The History of Political
40 Theory’reprinted as the Epilogue in The Promise of Politics, 201–204.
376 Vasti Roodt
1 want to pick out one strand of argumentation that spans both their ac-
2 counts. Nietzsche and Arendt agree that the process of desertification is
3 bound up with the moral interpretation of the world that underlies
4 our philosophical, political and religious tradition. On this interpreta-
5 tion, the contingent world that circumscribes human existence is to be
6 valuedonlyforthesakeof someexternal,non-contingent groundorprin-
7 ciple.Thisiswhatisatstakeintheage-oldschismbetweenthetrueworld
8 and the apparent world, being and appearance, which has informed our
9 tradition from its inception.
10 Thepredicamentofmodernityasidentified byNietzsche andArendt
11 both is that we have lost the unquestioning belief in any such ultimate
12 ground, any definitive ‘for the sake of’, while we are nevertheless still
13 plagued by the continued longing for precisely such a ground. This is
14 the paradox of the modern condition, which Nietzsche captures in the
15 well-known formula: ‘the world as it ought to be does not exist, and
16 theworldas itis,should notexist’(WP585;cf.9[60]12297f.).Arendt
17 herself points out that ‘[the] end of a tradition does not necessarily mean
18 that traditional concepts have lost their power over the minds of men’
19 (BPF 26). We are still in thrall to the most basic assumption of the
20 very tradition that no longer binds us, namely the belief that the world
21 that circumscribes our existence must be redeemed from its contingency
22 byaneternalstandardof value.Withthelossofsuchastandard,wehave
23 lostaworldofunquestionablemeaningfulness,inwhichwecouldalsobe
24 unquestionably‘athome’.Whatremains istheworldinwhichweactual-
25 lyexist,butwhichnowappearsentirelybereftofmeaning;aworldthatis
26 innowayahometous,andinwhichithasbecomeimpossibletoendure
27 our own existence. Nietzsche recognises this resentment at the bottom of
28 a wide range of symptoms, such as cultural decline, the emergence of the
29 ‘lastman’,theproliferationofpettypolitics,utilitarianism,socialism,etc.
30 InArendt’saccount,the worldlessness of modern human beings isdirect-
31 ly related (cid:2) though not always causally so (cid:2) to the rise of mass society
32 and the political horrors of totalitarianism.
33 Whileit is important tounderstand thiscriticalaspect of theirthink-
34 ing, I want to devote the rest of this paper to the positive aspect of
35 Nietzsche’s and Arendt’s critical enterprise, namely the overcoming of
36 the moral interpretation of the world and the resentment that springs
37 from it. Given the nature of resentment, this overcoming would have
38 to entail a reconciliation with the world that is no longer predicated
39 on principles, categories, or ‘yardsticks’ derived from a tradition that
40 has lost its validity for us. Stated differently, if the resentment that in-
Nietzsche and/or Arendt? 377
1 forms the moral interpretation is directed against the world as it is given
2 to us, the overcoming of such resentment would involve coming to love
3 the world as it is. And indeed, both Nietzsche and Arendt hold out a vi-
4 sion of redemption from resentment that is predicated on love: amor fati
5 and amor mundi, love of fate and love of the world.
6 It might strike us (cid:2) and correctly so (cid:2) that the love of fate is both
7 more abstract and more encompassing than love of the world, and that
8 Nietzsche’s proposed project of overcoming must therefore be different
9 in kind to that of Arendt. This difference might have to do with their
10 conflicting diagnoses of the locus of the desertification of the world.
11 Arendt writes in this regard:
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The modern growth of worldlessness, the withering away of everything be-
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tween us, can also be described as the spread of the desert. That we live
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and move in a desert-world was first recognized by Nietzsche, and it was
15 also Nietzsche who made the firstdecisive mistakein diagnosing it. Like al-
16 most all who came after him, he believed that the desert is in ourselves,
17 therebyrevealinghimselfnotonlyasoneoftheearliestconsciousinhabitants
18 of the desert but also, by the same token, as the victim of its most terrible
illusion. (PrP 201)
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20 To illustrate Arendt’s point, here is Nietzsche on the desert:
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The desert grows: woe to the one who harbours deserts!
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Stone grinds against stone, the desert ensnares and strangles,
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Glowing brown monstrous death stares
24 And chews, (cid:2) its life is its chewing …
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Do not forget, human, consumed by lust:
26 you – are the stone, the desert, are death … (DD 6.387)5
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I now want to explore the opposition between Nietzsche and Arendt as
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demonstrated by these two citations by relating it to the notions of
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amor fati and amor mundi in sections 2 and 3 of my paper.
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2. Nietzsche: amor fati
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We have seen that Nietzsche diagnoses the resentment that is embedded
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in our philosophical and religious tradition and which has persisted in
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37 modernity as a symptom of the moral interpretation of the world. On
38 this interpretation, the world and everything that belongs in it is to be
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40 5 See also Z IV Daughters of the Desert 2.
378 Vasti Roodt
1 loved for the sake of some external principle (‘creator’, ‘idea’, ‘truth’), in
2 so far, but only in so far, as the world bears the imprint of this higher re-
3 ality. The predicament of modernity is that we have lost the unquestion-
4 ing belief in any such ultimate ‘for the sake of’, which has left the world
5 and our existence within it bereft of meaning. In Nietzsche’s account,
6 overcomingthispredicamentdoesnotdependondiscoveringyetanother
7 ultimate purpose, such as ‘progress’, ‘peace’, ‘justice’, ‘universal brother-
8 hood’ or whatever new gods we should like to devise for ourselves, but
9 in overcoming the moral interpretation of the world altogether. Against
10 a moral interpretation that measures the world as it is against the
11 world as it ought to be and finds it wanting, Nietzsche advocates a reval-
12 uation of all values from a standpoint beyond the good and evil of tradi-
13 tional morality. As part of this revaluation process, he posits an ‘illogical
14 original relationship with all things’ (HH 31). On this view, everything
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exists by virtue of its relationship to everything else and there is no exter-
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nal ‘for the sake of’to which such existence must conform.
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While I cannot argue this here, I would contend that Nietzsche’s
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theory of the will to power is an attempt to think this illogical relation-
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ality of all to all. The most important point for our purposes is that
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Nietzsche tries to argue, contra the moral interpretation of the world,
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that the rejection of any aspect of existence amounts to the rejection of
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all of it, since there is no way of separating out any aspect of reality
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from the force-field of power-wills to which it belongs. The converse
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also holds: to care for anything at all and to will it to exist requires
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one to affirm the existence of everything that exists (Z IV Drunken
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Song 10).
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The highest form of affirmation that explicitly wills the existence of
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everything that exists in eternal entanglement is love. Nietzsche’s formula
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for this affirmation is amor fati (cid:2) the love of fate: ‘that one wants noth-
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ingtobeotherthanit is,notinnature,notin thefuture,notin thepast,
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not in all eternity. Not merely to endure that which happens of necessity,
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still less to dissemble it (cid:2) all idealism is untruthfulness in the face of ne-
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cessity (cid:2) but toloveit …’(EH Clever 10).Infact,it seems thatthecen-
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tralideaofamorfatiislovingthatwhichisnecessary–andNietzschede-
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36 scribesitinthiswayonmorethanoneoccasion(see,forinstance,15[20]
37 9.643; 16[22] 9.664). This attitude is not a mere passive acceptance of
38 theworldaswefindit,buttowilltheworldtobeaswefindit,knowing
39 thatthewholeofourexistence(cid:2)includingtheveryfactofour willing(cid:2)
40 isboundupwithit.Onthisview,wearemanifestlyimplicatedinthefate
Nietzsche and/or Arendt? 379
1 of theworldandtheloveoffatealsomeanstolovetheworldasourfatal-
2 ity.
3 Against this background, the vision and the riddle of eternal recur-
4 rence can then be understood as this same conception of the illogical re-
5 lationality of all to all, applied to time. Hence Nietzsche, by mouth of
6 Zarathustra, presents us with a vision of the ‘moment’ as a knot which
7 ties together everything that was necessary for it to exist and everything
8 that will follow from its existence6. Instead of a moral-teleological
9 time-conception in which what is is always justified with reference to
10 some final intention, Nietzsche offers a view in which the ultimate pur-
11 pose of existence is achieved in every moment7.
12 Onthisreading,theconjunction of thethoughtof eternalrecurrence
13 and amor fati cannot be said to amount to a new categorical imperative
14 alongthelinesof:liveyourlifeinsuchawaythatyoucanwillittoreturn
15 eternally. In the first place, it is not merely one’s own life that is in play
16 here, but the whole of existence, the best and the worst of it. We cannot
17 select what to affirm and what to exclude from affirmation. Secondly,
18 precisely because we ourselves are bound up with all that is, we are not
19 the masters of our own lives. We do not stand over and against fate,
20 against the world, freely deciding to form our lives one way rather
21 than another. Nietzsche’s concern is with our perspective (cid:2) affirmative
22 or negating (cid:2) towards the one reality of which we are part, and this re-
23 ality is not a static condition or set of facts, but everything that is in its
24 ever-changing relationality of all to all. Nietzsche thus confronts us with
25 the most radical reconciliation with the world that does away with the
26 distancebetweenselfandworldaltogether,aswellaswithanydistinction
27 between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, instant and eternity, particular and universal. In
28 thewordsof EugenFink(2003213):‘Mandissolves inuniversalbecom-
29 ing; the world concentrates itself into man’.
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Inlightof theseinsights, onecouldargue thatNietzsche’sconception
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of redemption from resentment entails a personal transformation or con-
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6 ‘Must not allthings thatcan run havealready run along this lane? Must not all
34 things that can happen have already happened, been done, run past? […] And
35 are not all things bound fast together in such a way that this moment draws
36 after it all future things? Therefore (cid:2) draws itself too?’ (Z III Vision).
7 Nietzsche writes inanunpublished note:‘Becoming mustbeexplained without
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recoursetofinalintentions;becomingmustappearjustifiedateverymoment(or
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incapable of being evaluated, which amounts to the same thing); the present
39 mustabsolutelynotbejustifiedbyreferencetoafuture,northepastbyreference
40 to the present’ (WP 708, cf.11[72] 13.34).
380 Vasti Roodt
1 version from ‘experience’to ‘innocence’. This innocence is not goodness,
2 but rather a perspective from ‘beyond good and evil’ that no longer
3 weighs and measures the world with reference to an unconditional
4 ‘ought’ to which it must conform8. We find this transformation clearly
5 captured in Beyond Good and Evil 56, as well as in an unpublished
6 note, where Nietzsche evokes the name of the god Dionysus to describe
7 this supreme affirmation that follows upon the most extreme negation:
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SuchanexperimentalphilosophyasIliveanticipatesexperimentallyeventhe
9 possibilitiesofthemostfundamentalnihilism;butthisdoesnotmeanthatit
10 musthaltatanegation,aNo,awilltonegation.Itwantsrathertocrossover
11 to the opposite of this (cid:2) to a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is,
without subtraction, exception, or selection (cid:2) it wants the eternal circula-
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tion: (cid:2) the same things, the same logic and illogic of entanglements. The
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highest state a philosopher can attain: to stand in a Dionysian relationship
14 to existence (cid:2) my formulation for this is amor fati. (WP 1041; cf.16[32]
15 13.492f.)
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It should be clear, therefore, that Nietzsche envisages the escape from the
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desert as a philosophical project. The world is not to be transformed by
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whatwedoinit,butbytransformingourselvesbymeansofaphilosoph-
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ical thought-experiment. On this view, the overcoming of resentment re-
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quires overcoming the desert in oneself. Upon this self-overcoming, one
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wouldnolongerbehomeless,becauseonewouldfeeloneselfathomeev-
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erywhere, no longer lonely, because one would be diffused with the sense
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of one’s intimate relation to everything else.
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It is precisely in this conception of the most appropriate means for
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overcoming resentment that Nietzsche comes into conflict with Arendt.
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In the same text in which she pointedly opposes Nietzsche’s diagnosis
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of the origin of the desertification of the world, she writes:
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29 What went wrong is politics, our plural existence, and not what we can do
andcreateinsofarasweexistinthesingular:intheisolationof theartist,in
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the solitude of the philosopher, in the inherently worldless relationship be-
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tweenhumanbeingsasitexistsinloveandsometimesinfriendship(cid:2)when
32 one heart reaches out directly to the other, as in friendship, or when the in-
33 between, the world, goes up in flames, as in love. (PrP 202)
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And yet, I have indicated that Arendt’s attempt to overcome the moral
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interpretation of the world is also predicated on love. How then are we
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8 Arendt herself considers the eternal recurrence Nietzsche’s ‘final redeeming
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thought’ precisely in so far as it proclaims the ‘Innocence of all becoming’ (die
39 UnschulddesWerdens)andwiththatitsinherentaimlessnessandpurposelessness,
40 its freedom from guilt and responsibility’ (LM VOL. II 170).
Nietzsche and/or Arendt? 381
1 to understand her notion of amor mundi, and how does it differ from
2 Nietzsche’s more radical and encompassing conception of amor fati?
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5 3. Arendt on amor mundi
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7 In a letter to her old teacher Karl Jaspers, Arendt writes: ‘I’ve begun so
8 late, really only in recent years, truly to love the world […] Out of grat-
9 itude, I want to call my book on political theories [the book that would
10 become The Human Condition] Amor Mundi’ (AJC 264). In light of this
11 remark,wecanbegintoseethat,tolovetheworld,forArendt,isamatter
12 ofourrelationswithoneanotherintheworldratherthanamatterofself-
13 transformation. Furthermore, her notion of amor mundi has an undeni-
14 able political dimension.
15 For Arendt, the world is the realm in which human beings appear,
16 not as instances of biological life, but as individuals. That is to say, the
17 world is a space of appearances, in which we appear to one another in
18 our distinctness rather than in our sameness as members of a biological
19 species. This ‘space’ is not only constituted by the durable things we fab-
20 ricate and by which we surround ourselves, but also by the fragile net-
21 work of relations that springs up between human beings when we engage
22 in action and judgement.
23 Whatwoulditmean,then,tolovetheworldinallthesefacets?More
24 importantly, perhaps, why should we love the world in any of them? Any
25 attempt to make sense of Arendt’s notion of amor mundi must do so
26 against the background of her interpretation of the concept of love in
27 St. Augustine. The most important idea she takes over from Augustine
28 is that in birth we enter a world that is ‘strange’to us because it exists be-
29 foreus.Atthesametime,wearealsostrangers totheworld;‘newcomers’
30 to a play that is not of our own making, and for whom there are no
31 scripted parts. In this sense the world is not a home to us, but an unfa-
32 miliar environment in which we, as newcomers, perforce must live9. For
33 Arendt, the question is not how to escape the world into which we enter
34 as strangers, but precisely how to reconcile ourselves to it. In her disser-
35 tation on Augustine, she makes much of the notion that our being in the
36 world does not yet make us of the world (LA 66); the mere fact of our
37 being-here does not yet make ‘here’ into home.
38
39 9 ArendtpointstoAugustineunderstandingof‘theparticularstrangenessinwhich
40 the world as a “desert” (eremus) pre-exists for man’ (LA 67).
382 Vasti Roodt
1 In Arendt’s analysis, it is precisely the inability to reconcile ourselves
2 to a world that precedes us and that will outlast us (cid:2) a world that there-
3 fore does not coincide with our specific arrival in it (cid:2) that has led to the
4 twofold flightfrom theworld intoan eternalrealm (which is alsoAugus-
5 tine’s solution) and into the self (which is the specific solution that char-
6 acterises modernity). In the context of our present discussion, one might
7 argue thatbothof theseflights aremerelytwodifferent manifestations of
8 an underlying resentment towards a world in which we are not perfectly
9 athome.Againstthisbackground,amormundicanthenbeunderstoodas
10 a way of reconciling ourselves to the world by fitting ourselves into it (cid:2)
11 that is to say, by making ourselves at home where we are not. In this re-
12 gard, Arendt’s argument is diametrically opposed to the notion that we
13 can only be at home in the world by fabricating (cid:2) which generally
14 means: by destroying and remaking (cid:2) the world in accordance with
15 human needs and interests. Her point, in other words, is not that we
16 can be more at home if only we work harder at making the world con-
17 form with our requirements, but rather by choosing to fit ourselves
18 into a world that is not in the first place ‘for us’. Thus to love the
19 worldisinthefirstplacetochoosetheworldasone’shome:‘itisthrough
20 loveof theworldthatmanexplicitlymakeshimselfathomeintheworld,
21 andthendesirouslylookstoitaloneforhisgoodandevil.Notuntilthen
22 dotheworldandmangrow‘‘worldly’’’(LA67).Inanunpublishedlecture
23 entitled ‘Basic Moral Propositions’, Arendt remarks that ‘it is love of the
24 worldthatfitsmeintoit,insofarasitdeterminestowhomandtowhatI
25 belong’10.
26 Again appealing to Augustine, Arendt proclaims on more than one
27 occasion that ‘there is no greater assertion of something or somebody
28 than to love it, that is to say: I will that you be (cid:2) Amo: Volu ut sis’
29 (LM VOL. II 104). On this view, love is the very opposite of possession
30 or assimilation, both of which only understand the object of love as an
31 extension of the one who loves. Moreover, in an earlier reference Arendt
32 speaksof‘thegreatandincalculablegraceof love’whichneverthelessdoes
33
not depend on our ‘being able to give any particular reason for such su-
34
premeandunsurpassableaffirmation’(OT301,myitalics).Clearly,then,
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this affirmation of something or someone cannot be brought about by
36
argument, persuasion or threat. Rather, it is a matter of ‘grace’.
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10 This quotation is from an unpublished lecture entitled ‘Basic Moral Proposi-
39 tions’, container 41, p024560, Library of Congress, cited by Beiner (1992 173
40 fn 149).