Table Of ContentLogic, Language, and the
Structure of Scientific Theories
Proceedings of the Camap-Reichenbach
Centennial, University of Konstanz,
21-24 May 1991
ED IT E D BY Wesley Salmon and
Gereon Wolters
Bogazici University Library
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39001100362485
University of Pittsburgh Press/Universitatsveriag Konstanz
Published in the U.S.A. by the University of Pittsburgh Press, cP/1
Pittsburgh, Pa. 15260
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Published in Germany by Universitatsverlag Konstanz
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Copyright © 1994, University of Pittsburgh Press
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All rights reserved _,dIf, :,.:;:;;::~,'~r; '~ ':~" ",,' -,_,
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~~;';~:~··'~-,;\4"'i~i.'t" t. h:, '" ~ .'~"r' '-:_ .... ~\.~._, To Rudolf Carnap, Carl G. Hempel, and
Manufacture,' t~ited States of Americ~~ :\~
-00- 1900 1/ Hans Reichenbach
Printed on a, -free pat2ro
Three great philosophers who together form
the nucleus of twentieth-century scientific
philosophy
proceedings of the Carnap-Reichenbach centennial, University of
Konstanz, 21-24 May 19911 edited by Wesley Salmon and Gereon
Wolters.
p. cm. - (Pittsburgh-Konstanz series in the philosophy and
history of science)
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-8229-3740-9
1. Science-Philosophy-Congresses. 2. Science-History
Congresses. 3. Carnap, Rudolf, 1891-1970-Philosophy-Congresses.
4. Reichenbach, Hans, 1891-1953-Philosophy-Congresses.
I. Salmon, Wesley C. II. Wolters, Gereon. III. Series.
Q174.L64 1993
501-dc20 93-47985
CIP
A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library.
Die Deutsche Bibliothek -CIP-Einheitsaufnahme
Logic, language, and the structure of scientific theories:
proceedings of the Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial, University
of Konstanz, 21-24 may 1991 1 ed by Wesley Salmon and
Gereon Wolters. -Konstanz : Univ.-Verl. Konstanz ;
Pittsburgh, Pa. : Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1994
(Pittsburgh-Konstanz series in the philosophy and history of science; 2)
ISBN ,.3-117940-4 77-\
NE: Salmon, Wl'sll'y C. IHrsg.l; Canup Rl'il-hl'nhach Cl'ntl'nnial <1991,
K. . n~lanl .; 1II11vl'r~il;il . Konsl;lIw .; (;T
Contents
Preface
IX
1 Scientific Philosophy 3
The Other Side
Gereon Wolters
:21 Geometry, Convention, and the
Relativized A Priori 21
Reichenbach, Schlick, and Carnap
Michael Friedman
Comment 35
Joelle Proust
3 Einstein, Kant, and the Origins of
Logical Empiricism 45
Don Howard
Comment: Einstein's Disenchantment 107
Thomas Oberdan
4 Scientific Explanation and Equivalent
Descriptions 119
Felix MiihlhOlzer
Comment: Reichenbach on Realism 139
Wesley Salmon
5 Descriptive and Inductive Simplicity 147
I1kka Niiniluoto
VIII Contents
6 The Problem of Operational Definitions 171
Andreas KamIah
Comment 191 Preface
Joelle Proust
7 Reichenbach on Quantum Mechanics 195 Many celebrate, many deplore, but few can doubt that logical em
hamar Pitowsky piricism-nee logical positivism-has had a profound influence on
twentieth-century philosophy. As it happened, the two most creative
8 On Reichenbach's Principle of the and influential philosophers of this movement, Rudolf Carnap and
Common Cause 211 Hans Reichenbach, were both born in 1891. We have taken the cen
Wolfgang Spohn
tennial of their births as an occasion to celebrate-but not uncriti
cally-their intellectual achievements. In May of 1991 the First
-'9)
Camap, Hempel, and Reichenbach on
Biennial Meeting of the Pittsburgh-Konstanz Colloquium in Philos
Scientific Realism 237
ophy of Science, sponsored by the University of Pittsburgh and the
Wesley Salmon
University of Konstanz, was held in Konstanz, Germany. This volume
contains the proceedings of that meeting.
--- to With Camap, Beyond Camap 255
The contents of this book amply demonstrate the scope of the
Metaphysics, Science, and the Realism/
philosophical thought of these two figures. It ranges from general
Instrumentalism Controversy
epistemology and philosophy of language to logic, semantics, and the
Paolo Parrini
philosophy of physics and mathematics. In the realm of physics it fo
cuses upon such topics as space, time, and causality, which play fun
Comment: Camap on Realism 279
damental roles in relativity theory and quantum mechanics. In
Wesley Salmon
addition, of course, these topics, along with realism, have been dear
to the heart of speculative metaphysics. Although Carnap and Reich
Functionalist Theories of Meaning and
~11
the Defense of Analyticity 287 enbach abhorred the methods of traditional metaphysics, they main
tained that these topics could be approached in a scientifically
Richard Creath
respectable manner, and that is precisely what they endeavored to do.
.. ~t2 Camap and Quine 305 This book maintains their attitude; such topics are treated herein in
Neil Tennant ways that are fully cognizant of the spirit of modern science and in
accord with the technical standards of logical empiricism.
Comment 345 Twentieth-century scientific philosophy is old enough and deep
W. V. Quine cnough to reward historical investigation-as the essays in this vol
umc also demonstrate-and the Archives at the Universities of Pitts
,L hurgh and Konstanz greatly facilitate research along these lines. This
Index 353 1l10Vl~mcnt is also, however, an ongoing enterprise with important ap
plkations at the frontiers of current philosophy, The discerning
rl'adl'r will find many significant new contributions to this enterprise
ill I hl' present volumc.
IX
x Preface
Our colloquium was greatly enriched by the participation of Carl
G. Hempel, who is unquestionably the most distinguishl·d living
member of the logical positivist/empiricist movement. During tlU" (On
ference he was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of Philosophy Logic, Language, and the
by the University of Konstanz. Salmon's essay "Carnap, Hcmpel, and
Structure of Scientific Theories
Reichenbach on Scientific Realism," was presented as the Laudatio in
the ceremony at which the degree was conferred.
This Carnap-Reichenbach conference would not have been pos
sible without the generous support of Deutsche Forschungsgemein
schaft (Bonn) and a minor contribution from the Ministerium fur
Wissenschaft und Kunst des Landes Baden-Wurttemberg (Stuttgart).
The first timid attempts to get business sponsorship remained not com
pletely without resonance: Kluwer (Dordrecht) and Vieweg (Braun
schweig) did not hesitate to help us, though about twenty others
declined. Klaus Wernigk (Konstanz) was kind enough to give a deficit
guarantee, which we finally did not need to take advantage of. More
over, Johannes Carnap, son of Rudolf Carnap, gave us generous sup
port. Planning for the conference and participation in the conference
by members of the Center for Philosophy of Science (University of
Pittsburgh) were both made possible by generous support from the
Richard King Mellon Foundation.
Last, but not least, we gratefully acknowledge the strong support
of all members of the Zentrum Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie
(University of Konstanz) in organizing the conference. Our particular
gratitude goes to Erika Fraiss for her tireless and highly successful ef
forts in the detailed planning and carrying through of the technical
aspects of the conference.
The Program Committee for this conference consisted of Martin
Carrier (University of Konstanz), Richard Creath (Arizona State
University), John Earman (University of Pittsburgh), Carl Friedrich
Gethmann (University of Essen), Adolf Grunbaum (University of
Pittsburgh), Jurgen Mittelstrass (University of Konstanz), Wesley
Salmon (University of Pittsburgh, Co-chair), and Gereon Wolters
(University of Konstanz, Co-chair).
The index was compiled by Charlotte A. Broome, to whom we
wish to express our sincere gratitude.
Wesley Salmon
Gcrcon Wolters
1
Scientific Philosophy: The Other Side
Gereon Wolters
Philosophische Fakultat, Universitat Konstanz
Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, two important cofounders
of the new philosophy of science, propose that the task of philosophy
is to make a fresh, historically irreverent, systematic attack on current
philosophy problems: "Those wh~~orLi,[],_~~,~_ne~ phiIosophydo
m>'lJqQ,k __b a,ck; their work would not profit from historical ~onsidt:r
ations" (Reichenbach 1951, 325). Nonetheless, if we are to believe
certain philosophical auguries, shadows have been cast over scientific
philosophy for more than thirty years. Three challenges in particular
have been posed: (1) The critique within philosophy of science, begun
in the 1950s and directed at the kind of philosophy of science inau
gurated by Carnap and Reichenbach. Here, Frederick Suppe (1979)
felt obliged to conclude his anthology with "A Swan Song of Posi
tivism." The other challenges are (2) the so-called positivism-critique
of neo-Marxism, and (3) the critique of rationality of so-called post
modernism. The last mentioned also likes to join in on Suppe's fu
neral metaphors. (See, for example, the title of Lyotard 1984,
"Tombeau de I'intellectuel"; and Wellmer 1985, who cites the post
modernist announcement of the "death of reason" and speaks of an
"Elegy to the Modern Age" and of the European Enlightenment,
"carried with so many imprecations to its grave" [po 100; translated
hy McLaughlin]).
This essay of course is too short to set a counterpoint en detail
10 thes(' swan songs and funeral dirges. But perhaps the historical
3
4 Gereon Wolters Scientific Philosophy: The Other Side 5
localization of recent scientific philosophy by means of a character The perspective I have mentioned for the defense against unjusti
ization of its "other side" can provide some of the themes to such a fied criticism as well as for the basic lines of an answer to current
counterpoint. challenges is derived from reflection on its practice by Carnap and
First, let us provisionally clarify some terms. I will denote scienti Reichenbach. The word "practice" indicates that I will base this re
fic philosophy in the form given it by Carnap and Reichenbach by flection less on the explicit preaching of their writings and more on
the fitting term, coined by the Finnish philosopher Kaila (1926, 35), the evidence of their practice. Such representative titles of works as
logical empiricism. A slew of other names are also in circulation: Logische Syntax der Sprache or Testability and Meaning and as Axio
neoempiricism, neopositivism, plain old positivism, and more. I pre matik der Raum-Zeit-Lehre or Philosophical Foundation of Quan
I
suppose that there are other forms of philosophy of science alongside tum Mechanics do not lead us to expect straightforward answers
logical empiricism. The logical empiricism that Carnap and Reich from the founders of logical empiricism to the challenges to scientific
enbach founded is thus not the philosophy of science, but only one philosophy just mentioned-that arose later in history. The founders
variety of it. I should like to call philosophy of science any philosoph of modern philosophy of science did philosophy of science and only
ical endeavor to understand science that itself uses scientific methods, on the side did they deal with the question of what it actually means
in particular those of logic and applied logic, and that measures its to do scientific philosophy. The question of the self-reflection of sci
own premises against the reality of the sciences and thus of a partic entific philosophy points to what I want to call "the other side" of
ular form of experience. Such methods, which need not exclude his philosophy of science, the discussion of which will constitute the bulk
torical investigations, can be applied not only to the philosophical of this essay. On the basis of the results of this reflection I will then
study of science but can also be fruitfully applied to other areas, for take up the challenges to and perspectives of scientific philosophy.
instance, in ethics, aesthetics, and political theory. Let me call the ap
plication of scientific methods in philosophy that extends beyond the
On the Way to the "Other Side" of Scientific Philosophy
domain of "science" scientific philosophy. I would thus like to suggest
the following hierarchy of terms: Logical empiricism is a form of phi We can most easily get to the other side of scientific philosophy
losophy of science; philosophy of science is part of the project of sci with the help of a distinction introduced by G. H. von Wright (1971,
entific philosophy. 66ff.): the distinction between result of an action and consequence of
In the following characterization of the other side of recenr sci an action. If I open a window, then the result of this action is an open
entific philosophy, I want not merely to provide instruments for its window. A variety of consequences of this action can follow: I lower
defense against what I consider to be unjustified challenges. More im or raise the temperature of the room, I circulate the air, or achieve
portantly, I wish to display the significance of scientific philosophy some other desired change in the existing situation. I will in the fol
for the intellectual and thus also practical mastery of contemporary lowing deal rather with the consequences of the philosophical actions
and future problems. However, let me admit that both the identifi of Carnap and Reichenbach than with the results. I will argue that
cation of the challenges as well as their rejection are grounded in a Carnap, Reichenbach and most of the other logical empiricists no
European or perhaps simply German perspective. My impression is more pursued philosophy of science only for the sake of philosophy
that the neo-Marxist challenge to scientific philosophy was not felt as of science than we would normally open a window for the sake of
strongly in the United States. Perhaps the same holds for the post opening a window alone. To show this I go back to the beginnings of
modern intellectual nonchalance, whose Italian variety calls itself logical empiricism in Vienna of the 1920s.
rightly pensiero debole, weak thinking. Just as the identification of In 1922 M. Schlick was given the chair of philosophy founded in
the challenges to scientific philosophy makes no universal claims, so, 1895 for E. Mach at the University of Vienna. In Vienna, Schlick did
too, is the identification of the problems that scientific philosophy not find a tabula rasa in philosophy of science as he would have
must help us tackle based on a perspective that can claim only con found at almost every other German-speaking university. Since about
ditional universality. 19()7 a discussion circle on the philosophy of science had existed
Scientific Philosophy: The Other Side 7
6 Gereon Wolters
Vienna Circle in 1928 founded what they called the Verein Ernst
there. The hard core of this circle was made up of followers of Mach,
Mach (Ernst Mach Society) for just these propaganda purposes. The
most of whom however had not studied with him: the theoretical
program pamphlet of the Verein Ernst Mach, published in 1929,
physicist P. Frank, the mathematician H. Hahn, an~ the .econom~st
bears the title Scientific World View-The Vienna Circle:
O. Neurath. Mach's antimetaphysical attitude and his radical empir
icism were the intellectual orientation points of the circle (Frank The Vienna Circle does not confine itself to collective work as a closed
1975, 7). The three Machians survived the World War and after group. It is also trying to make contact with the living movements of the
about 1920 met occasionally and attempted once again to encourage present, so far as they are well disposed toward the scientific world
scientific philosophy. According to K. Menger (Hahn 1980, ix) it was con~ept~on and turn away from metaphysics and theology. The Ernst Mach
mainly due to Hahn's influence that Schlick was offered Mac~'~ ~ha.ir SO~lety I.S today the pl~c~ from which the Circle speaks to a wider public.
ThiS SOCiety, as stated In Its program, wishes to further and disseminate the
in Vienna. Thus, after Schlick's arrival in Vienna the local activities 10
scientific world-conception. It will organize lectures and publications about
philosophy of science centered more ~nd more ~ro~nd .him .. In 1924 the present position of the scientific world-conception, in order to demon
the old informal philosophical discussions were IOstltutlonahzed as a strate the significance of exact research for the social sciences and the natural
seminar with weekly meetings. This year is taken as the founding ~c!ences. In this way intellectual tools should be formed for modern empir
year of the Vienna Circle, but as we have seen it was not a real found ICism, tools that are also needed in forming private and public life. (Neurath
ing but rather an institutional transformation of contexts of discus- 1973,305)
sion that were already almost two decades old. . We should however not ignore the fact that the enlightenment dy
Frank, Hahn, and Neurath brought not only the empiricist and
namics of the Vienna Circle that led to the founding of the Verein
anti metaphysical stance inspired by Mach into the Vienna Circle, but
Ernst Mach did not affect all members in equal measure (see Wolters
all three (as Mach before them) were convinced democrats and were
1992a). The chair of the Verein Ernst Mach, for instance, was foisted
multiply integrated in the cultural network of associations and activ
on the politically reticent, conservative Schlick, who could not fend
ities developed in or in connection with the Socialist party of Austria.
off the honor since he could scarcely oppose the promulgation of the
This party was not just a political party but also the focal poin~ of
truth to wider strata of society. Nonetheless he had considerable res
numerous specialized clubs and associations dealing with all vital
ervations about the whole enterprise, which the left wing of the Circle
questions from cradle to grave, in which the claim to an enlightened
had initiated, that is, a~ong others, Carnap, Hahn, and particularly
form of life found its organizational expression (Stadler 1982,
Neurath. These reservations, however, applied less to the broader en
151ff.). In the intellectual saturation of the West today it is hard to
li.gh.tenme~~ aspects of the enterprise than to its embedding in the so
imagine that personal and collective enlightenment mood of fu~da
clahst pohtlcal and social context of Vienna.
mental change, which had to a certain extent already characterized
~ith the founding of the Verein Ernst Mach, at the latest, the oc
the Vienna of the turn of the century, and which was catalyzed by the
casion arose to take up the theme of the relation between scientific
experiences of the World War and the collapse of the royal imperial
philosophy and .enlightenment practice. However, this question was
double monarchy. left untouched 10 the theoretical discussions in the Vienna Circle.
Scientific philosophy was not pursued for its own sake by its Vi-
T w~ ~ifferent basic practical positions can be distinguished: first, the
ennese representatives.3 Scientific philosophY, too, was part of the
position taken by Neurath and E. Zilsel that there is a strong depen
enlightenment context in Vienna of the 1920s and 1930s. Enlighten
~ency. of scientific and political theory on the political and cultural
ment dynamics determined the public presentation of the Circle, for
situation (see Freudenthal 1989), and second, the position taken by
scientific philosophy constituted the core of a "scientific worldview"
the ~ther "Viennese," and also by Carnap, that there is a strict sep
that potentially embraced all areas of life. Scientific philosophy was
aration between philosophical theory and political practice. With a
part of enlightened civil society and thus so to speak demanded to be
view of the differences to Neurath, Carnap remarks:
brought to the pcoplc. Thus it was only logical that members of the
8 Gereon Wolters Scientific Philosophy: The Other Side 9
All of us in the Circle were strongly interested in social and political opens a window merely with the intention of opening a window, so,
progress. Most of us, myself included, were socialists. But we liked to keep too, the founders of recent scientific philosophy scarcely pursued it
our philosophical work separated from our political aims. In our view, logic,
for its own sake. For the logical empiricists, scientific philosophy
including applied logic, and the theory of knowledge, the analysis of lan
stands-above and beyond the cultural context of Vienna-in a
guage, and the methodology of science, are, like science itself, neutral with
broader historical context of intention that can be characterized by
respect to practical aims, whether they are moral aims for the individual, or
the key words "rationalization" and "modernization."
political aims for a society. (1963,23)
The sociologist M. Weber4 analyzed the historical process of mo
How is this demand for the neutrality of theoretical investigation dernity under these categories. Weber saw the modern age in its early
to be understood? First, in an epistemological sense, there is no nec seventeenth-century beginnings as determined by rationalization
essary connection, conceptual or logical, between practical positions processes on three different levels: (1) rationalization of society,
and decisions of philosophers and the theoretical results of their phi (2) rationalization of culture, and (3) rationalization of personality.
losophy. Both areas apply different methods to arrive at differently (Habermas 1981 represents in large parts a critical discussion of
dependable results that have a different epistemic status. Weber's analysis; see, for the following, vol. 1, 226ff.)
Let us now consider the matter from the point of view of philos Rationalization of society means, as a first step, the early capital
ophy of action using von Wright's window example. The result of istic rationalization of economic activity through the dissolution of
the action of opening the window has no logical or conceptual con the premodern unity of household and workshop, through the orien
nection to the desired consequences of the action. This is immedi tation of new investment on profitability, through the technological
ately obvious, since the consequences of opening the window do not application of scientific knowledge, in short: the rationalization of
follow logically or analytically from the result of the action, that is, society consists as a first step in all those activities that constitute the
an open window. Rather, they depend on the intention and the situ efficiency of capitalistic economy. However, economic rationaliza
ation that determine the context of action. If we assume, for instance, tion cannot remain limited to the domain of economics. In order to
that:. is warm outside, cold inside, and that I want to change this, be effective it also needs in addition a rationalization of institutions,
then by opening the window I bring about a rise in temperature in both of the state and of the system of laws.
the room. As mentioned earlier, many other intentions of action are Rationalization of culture is seen by Weber in the phenomenon of
poss:ble and thus consequences of action that can be realized by an modern science and technology, in autonomous art and in an ethics
open window: for instance, cooling the room, airing it out, hearing that presses from a still religious background toward rational auton
what is going on out on the street, reacting to someone's call, and so omy based on universalistic principles. Rationalization of personality,
on. We can thus say that a single result of action is compatible with finally, consists in the methodical conduct of life by individuals with
a number of consequences of action and with the intentions that lead out which capitalist forms of production and the rationalized social
to them. In terms of philosophy of action, the intentions' constitute relations could not be realized.
the unity of the results and the consequences of actions (von Wright Scientific philosophy in its beginnings in Vienna and Berlin saw
1971,.89). itself as rationalization and thus as modernization in the hard
Transferring the example of window opening to scientific philos to-modernize area of philosophy. All the writings of the logical em
ophy and its relation to the political and social intentions of its rep piricists that are not strictly devoted to a particular philosophical
resentatives, we see that for Carnap scientific philosophy as such is problem give expression to this self-understanding-sometimes with
logically and conceptually just as distinct from the intentions of its considerable pathos. Thus, for instance, Schlick in his introduction to
practitioners as is the opening of a window from the motives one has the first volume of Erkenntnis (1930-1931), the central organ of log
in opening it~ That is the one side, that of the logical and conceptual ical empiricism, criticized the quarrel of systems that had up to then
connection. Let us turn to the other side. Just as hardly anyone ever ~:haracterized philosophy, continuing:
10 Gereon Wolters Scientific Philosophy: The Other Side 11
I refer to this anarchy of philosophical opinions which has so often been de Why did logical empiricists insist so strongly on clarity? Was it
scribed, in order to leave no doubt that I am fully conscious of the scope and
their ambition merely to realize in philosophy, in the form of effi
weighty significance of the conviction that I should now like to express. For
ciency of comprehension and possibilities of progress, that modernity
I am convinced that we now find ourselves at an altogether decisive turning
which had begun its march to victory in the natural sciences of the
point in philosophy, and that we are objectively justified in considering that
seventeenth century and since then had become the mark of Western
an end has come to the fruitless conflict of systems. ([1959] 1963, 54)
culture? I think, rather, that in the unerring and often polemical de
Thus, philosophical modernity begins, according to Schlick-as
mand for clarity (see Carnap 1931), that enlightenment striving for
presumably in the eyes of the other logical empiricists as well-not
personal intellectual autonomy that sought its fulfillment in private
with Descartes or somewhere thereaboutsS but with the philosophy
as well as in the public sphere, that Kant (1968) had expressed: "Sa
of science of the Vienna and Berlin circles. The modernity of logical
pere aude! Have the courage to use your own intellect! is the motto of
empiricism consists not in ending the quarrel of philosophical sys
enlightenment. ... For this enlightenment nothing is needed but free
tems of the past with a new and now finally and universally convinc
dom ... namely the freedom to make public use of one's reason in all
ing philosophical system. Rather the idea of a philosophical system
regards" (pp. 53, 55; translated by McLaughlin; Kant lacked, how
itself as the attempt to make philosophical statements about the
ever, most of the logical means of satisfying this need).
world is explained by logical empiricism to be the original sin of all The "other side" of scientific philosophy is the private and public
previous philosophy. In the eyes of the logical empiricists philosophy realization of personal autonomy. It is, in Kant's words, its "Vernunft
cannot make any substantive assertions about the world. This is the interesse" (interest of reason). The new scientific philosophy was al
task of the sciences and the sciences alone. Their step-by-step differ
ways understood by its cofounders also in this sense and with regard
entiation and emancipation from the domain of philosophy is the his
to the consequences that result from this intention, as well.
torical expression of a philosophical truth: Next to, above, below, or
beyond the sciences there is no place for a philosophy that pretends to
On the Other Side: Theory and Practice
be able to say something about the world that had not been said be
fore or will be said in the future by the sciences. What remains for
Let us return to the question of how to conceive the relation of
philosophy is the logical analysis of the language of science. Carnap
philosophical theory and social practice. Carnap rejected-as we have
([1934] 1968, iii) speaks of "Wissenschaftslogik" which is to replace
seen-a conceptual or logical connection. We have also seen that in
philosophy; Reichenbach (1936, 142) speaks of "wissenschaftsana
spite of this there existed for the logical empiricists a pragmatic con
Iytische Methode." nection. Precisely in regard to this connection with enlightenment
For its own modernization, philosophy can draw on a successful
practice they saw that philosophy differed from, for example, math
model, the natural sciences. This does not of course mean to fall back
ematics. For the logical empiricist philosophy became a science, but a
on the methods of the natural sciences. Mathematicized theory and
science that forgot neither the origins and the historical development
control by experiment and observation do not help philosophy pro
of its problems nor its practical context. Philosophy was often pur
ceed. What philosophy takes over from modern science is rather the
slled precisely for the sake of the autonomy thus supported.
methodological stance. Two components of the scientific attitude
What precisely is then the pragmatic connection between the two
were emphasized by logical empiricism as guiding and binding: clar
sides and scientific philosophy? Carnap (1934; reprinted in Schlei
ity and critical cooperation.6 Only if we are clear in philosophy can
chert 1975) wrote a fiery text of four pages on this question. (This
we be understood by others, and only if we are understood can we be
text probably derived from a lecture in the Ernst Mach Society.) The
criticized and helped by criticism. A large part of the philosophical
oretical questions, according to this paper:, can be decided through
labor of logical empiricism consisted in working out the logical con
sl"ientific investigation. What cannot be decided with the means of
ditions of clear philosophical language.
sl'iencc is whether one ought to carry out a particular action or take
