Liberalism and Affirmative Obligation

273 Pages·1998·18 MB·English

by  Patricia Smith

Liberalism and Affirmative Obligation
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Liberalism and Affirmative
Obligation
Patricia Smith
New York Oxford
Oxford University Press
1998
Oxford University Press
Oxford New York
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Copyright © 1998 by Patricia Smith
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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
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without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.
Library of Congress Oataloging-in-Publication Data
Smith, Patricia C.
Liberalism and affirmative obligation / Patricia Smith.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-19-511528-7
1. Political obligation. 2. Liberalism. I. Title.
JC329.5.S64 1998
320'.01'l-dc21 97-30465
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 42
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
For my mother arid father
Russell and Evah Smith
With much love and gratitude
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Preface
[L]iberty without equality is a name of noble sound and squalid result.
Hobhouse, 1912.
The liberal theory of moral and legal responsibility has always rested heavily on the
distinction between positive and negative duty. But the general doctrine that rests
on this distinction has not been carefully treated. If we examine this doctrine care-
fully and adjust it slightly to reflect longstanding moral and legal practices that have
always been embedded in and central to liberal societies, as well as presupposed in
liberal theory, it becomes apparent that the traditional framework supports a moder-
ate liberal view of social responsibility better than a so-called atomistic individualist
perspective. Thus, with slight adjustment, the liberal tradition, including the doc-
trine of positive and negative duty which is usually taken as a limit on obligation,
instead supports more extensive positive duties than libertarian individualists tend
to admit. Such is the thesis of this book. Pursuing this thesis, I develop a liberal
theory of affirmative obligation which I call cooperative individualism. Its purpose
is to support the middle ground taken by thinkers such as John Stuart Mill, L. T.
Hobhouse, John Dewey, and John Rawls. Its motive and perspective thus fall in the
line of thought that Hobhouse in 1912 called "the new liberalism," a theory commit-
ted to reconciling social justice with individual freedom on liberal grounds.
I have received a great deal of help on this project as it developed over the
years, most of which I can no longer acknowledge individually. Pieces of it were
read in colloquia at the University of Kentucky, at Harvard University, and at the
University of Konstanz in Germany, as well as at meetings of the American Philo-
sophical Association and the International Association for Philosophy of Law and
Social Philosophy. I want to thank the participants for their many helpful com-
ments, although they are unfortunately too numerous to list. Some special thanks
are in order, however. Carol Gould and Larry May helped me clarify my ideas on
reciprocity and on the function of individuals within groups, both ideas that are
critical to the concept of membership I develop in this book. But I no longer know
whether this clarification came Iroin conversations with them or from reading their
work. Ken Kipriis and Joan Callahan helped me think through issues of profes-
sional responsibility in the same dual way. More generally, I would like to acknowl-
viii Preface
edge a debt of gratitude to Joel Feinberg and Virginia Held, who have influenced
my substantive views, my method, and my intellectual development by their work
and their example. I would also like to thank my colleagues at the University of
Kentucky for years of support, friendship, and collegial conversation. Many people
gave me specific comments on parts of the book. I want to thank James Rachels for
his helpful and supportive comments on chapters 2 and 3. Joan Callahan, with her
usual generosity and rigor, provided me with detailed comments on chapters 5 and
7. Larry May and Rex Martin gave me invaluable comments on chapters 8 and 9.
Ann Cudd read the entire manuscript, offering extensive and thoughtful comments
overall and especially on chapter 4. Despite fairly substantial revisions, I doubt that
I have satisfied all their penetrating questions. Yet the attempt has certainly made
this a better book. Finally I would like to thank my husband, Yuri Breitbart, for un-
characteristic patience, very characteristic support, and always stimulating and
challenging conversation. His contribution can never be measured.
Contents
1. Positive and Negative Duty in the Liberal Tradition: An Overview 3
1. Minimal Morality and the Dark Side of Human Nature 3
2. The Traditional Doctrine of Positive and Negative Duty 7
3. Four Contemporary Challenges 10
4. General Positive Duty: The Scope of Charity 16
5. Special Positive Duty: An Ignored Moral Category 18
Part I: Clarifying General Positive Duty 25
2. Special Circumstances and the Bad Samaritan Exception 27
r. On Clear Cases and Perfect Duties 28
2. Rights and Duties of Justice 30
3. Duties of Justice and Duties of Benevolence 33
4. Reconsidering Rights and Duties of Justice 36
5. Causing Harm and Failing to Prevent It 39
6. Commitment to Freedom and the Limits of Individualism 43
3. The Duty of Charity and the Equivalence Thesis 46
1. Preventing Serious Harm With Minimal Cost 48
2. Being Selected By Circumstances 50
3. Individual Duties and Multiple Parties 52
4. Emergencies, Disasters, and Chronic Conditions 62
5. World Hunger and Individual Obligation 67