Legal Reason: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT

194 Pages·2005·0.93 MB·English

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LEGAL REASON
LegalReasondescribesandexplainstheprocessofanalogicalreasoning,
whichisthedistinctivefeatureoflegalargument.Itchallengesthepre-
vailingview,urgedbyEdwardLevi,CassSunstein,RichardPosner,and
others, which regards analogical reasoning as logically flawed or as a
defectiveformofdeductivereasoning.Itshowsthatanalogicalreason-
inginthelawisthesameasthereasoningusedbyallofusroutinelyin
everydaylifeandthatitisavalidformofreasoningderivedfromthein-
natehumancapacitytorecognizethegeneralintheparticular,onwhich
thoughtitselfdepends.Theuseofanalogicalreasoningisdictatedbythe
natureoflaw,whichrequirestheapplicationofrulestoparticularfacts.
Writtenforscholarsaswellasstudents,practitioners,andpersonswho
aregenerallyinterestedinlaw,LegalReasoniswritteninclear,accessible
prose,withmanyexamplesdrawnfromthelawandeverydayexperience.
LloydL.WeinrebisDaneProfessorofLawatHarvardLawSchool.Heis
theauthorofNaturalLawandJusticeandOedipusatFenwayPark:What
RightsAreandWhyThereAreAny.

Legal Reason
THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT
LLOYD L. WEINREB
HarvardLawSchool
  
Cambridge,NewYork,Melbourne,Madrid,CapeTown,Singapore,SãoPaulo
Cambridge University Press
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PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyCambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridg e.org /9780521849678
©LloydL.Weinreb2005
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relevantcollectivelicensingagreements,noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplace
withoutthewrittenpermissionofCambridgeUniversityPress.
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Contents
Preface pagevii
Introduction 1
1 AnalogyandInductiveandDeductiveReasoning 19
2 Steamboats,BroadcastTransmissions,andElectronic
Eavesdropping 41
3 AnalogicalLegalReasoning 65
4 AnalogicalReasoning,LegalEducation,andtheLaw 123
AppendixA:NoteonAnalogicalReasoning 163
AppendixB:BiographicalNotes 169
Notes 173
Index 181
[v]

Preface
Recentdiscussionsoftheuseofanalogyinlegalargument,whichmea-
sureitsuseagainstthestandardsofdeductiveandinductivereasoning
andfinditwanting,promptedmetowritethisbook.Eventhosewhohave
approvedtheuseofanalogicalargumentinthelaw,likeEdwardLeviin
hisclassicstudy,AnIntroductiontoLegalArgument,havethoughtitis
rationally“flawed,”althoughhowinthatcaseitcouldhavethebenignef-
fectsthatLeviandothersattributetoitisnotexplained.Soalso,effortsto
reconstructanalogicallegalargumentasonlyaslightlydisguisedform
of deductive or inductive argument, or some combination of the two,
distorttheargumentsthatlawyersandjudgesactuallymakeandareev-
identlydictatedonlybytheconvictionthatotherwisetheargumentsare
invalidandentitledtonoweight.
Viewsofthiskind,whichhavedominatedthediscussionaboutana-
logicallegalreasoning,flyinthefaceoftheindubitablefactthattheuse
ofanalogyisattheverycenteroflegalreasoning,somuchsothatitis
regardedasanidentifyingcharacteristicnotonlyoflegalreasoningitself
butalsooflegaleducation.Itissimplynotcrediblethatargumentssub-
jectedroutinelytotheclosestscrutinywouldcontainsuchfundamental
error. Studying the matter, I confirmed my belief that the use of ana-
logicalargumentinlawstandsuponitsowntermsandisnotdifferent
fromthereasoningonwhichweallrelyintheaffairsofeverydaylife.Its
[vii]
Preface
useinthelawisdistinctonlyinthatitisnotmerelycommonplaceand
useful but is essential to preservation of values that we ascribe to “the
ruleoflaw.”Theefforttodisplaceanalogicalreasoningbydeductiveor
inductivereasoningrespondstoamistakenbeliefthattheruleoflawso
requires.Analogicalreasoningdoesnotunderminetheruleoflawbut
rathersustainsit.
Iintendthisbookbothforthosewhoareinterestedinthescholarly
debateandthosewhoarebeginningtheirlegalstudiesorjustentering
the practice of law, as well as persons who have a general interest in
law.Addressingmyselftotheseaudiences,Ihavenotscanteddiscussion
oftheissues.Ihave,however,omittedmostoftheapparatus–lengthy
footnotesaboutmarginallyrelevantpointsandextensivecitation–that
is,excessivelyIthink,commontolegalscholarship.Ihavebeengenerous
withcommonplaceexamplesandwithexplanationsofmattersthatwill
befamiliartolegalscholarsandexperiencedpractitionersbutperhaps
nottobeginningstudents,practitionersstartingout,andothersoutside
thelegalprofession.
Iamgratefultomanycolleaguesandfriendswhoreadsomeorallof
themanuscriptandmadefruitfulsuggestions,amongwhomareBrian
Bix,MichaelDoyen,RichardFallon,RobertFerguson,MortonHorwitz,
Daniel Meltzer, Anton Metlitsky, Daniel Weinreb, Mark Yohalem, and
Benjamin Zipursky.
AndrewWaterhouse,GeorgeBorg,andMarciaChapinhelpedmeto
understandthechemistryofwinestainsandtalcumpowder.Ipresented
someoftheideasinthebookatworkshopsatCornellLawSchool,Ford-
ham Law School, and Harvard Law School and was encouraged and
stimulatedbycommentsoftheparticipants.
ThelibraryofHarvardLawSchoolprovidedreadyaccesstobooks
andarticlesaboutawidevarietyofsubjects,includingmanythatdidnot
makeitintothefinalmanuscript.ThelibraryofFordhamLawSchoolwas
similarlyhelpfulwhenIwasavisitingprofessortherein2003.Melinda
Eakin prepared and managed many drafts of the manuscript and as-
sistedinthefinalcopyediting.Herhelpwasinvaluable.EdParsonswas
agenerousandhelpfulrepresentativeofCambridgeUniversityPress.
LloydL.Weinreb
October2004
[viii]