Table Of ContentISLAMISM AND
POST-ISLAMISM
IN IRAN
An Intellectual History
Yadullah Shahibzadeh
Islamism and Post-Islamism in Iran
Yadullah S hahibzadeh
Islamism and Post-
Islamism in Iran
An Intellectual History
Yadullah Shahibzadeh
Department of Cultural Studies and Orien
University of Oslo
Oslo, Norway
ISBN 978-1-137-58206-5 ISBN 978-1-137-57825-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57825-9
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P
REFACE
More than three decades ago, Hayden White distinguished between
political and interpretative authorities. Whereas interpretative authority is
achieved through argument, political authority is imposed through the
use of force. White argued that the interpretative authority of an inter-
preter reaches its limit the moment he or she appeals to force to resolve his
or her interpretative disputes with other interpreters.1 The history of the
contemporary Middle East is, to a certain extent, the history of the inter-
preters who knowingly or unknowingly have appealed to force to resolve
the interpretative confl icts in the region. Convinced of the authority of
Western governments to resolve interpretative confl icts by force in the
Middle East, many interpreters stopped being interpreters. Instead, they
have been mapping out different social forces’ proclivity to accept or resist
Western governments’ solutions to the various situations in the region. In
the mid-2000s, the USA and its allies speculated on the construction of an
Iraqi nationalism to resist Iranian infl uence in the region, which led some
researchers to explore how a new Iraqi nationalism could be constructed.
The indecisiveness of the USA and its European allies during the Arab
Uprisings deepened the divide between two groups of specialists of the
Arab world. Despite the dedication of both groups to the neoconservative
project for democracy in the Middle East, one group favored the I slamists
and the other supported the s eculars as the more qualifi ed to implement
the “democratic project.” In the case of Egypt, many specialists of the
region encouraged Western governments to resolve the interpretative
1 Hayden White, The Content of The form: narrative discourse and historical representation ,
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), pp. 58–59.
v
vi PREFACE
confl ict between the Islamist and secular Egyptians in favor of one side or
the other. In the spring of 2013, the secular Egyptians appealed to their
military generals to resolve their interpretative confl icts with the Islamists
on the nature of the government in their country. When the military coup
became a fact, the backers of Egyptian secular forces in the Western aca-
demia were busy telling their governments that the military coup would
guarantee the democratic process in Egypt. Those who hailed the Islamists
in Egypt had lost their claim to any interpretative authority long before
the coup in Egypt. Long before the Arab uprisings, these interpreters were
“democratizing,” “moderating,” or rather d omesticating the Islamists of
the Arab world to fi t the political authority of their government in the
region. They pointed to the Turkish Model of Islamism in the same way
that Bernard Lewis advertised the S ecular Turkey , as a model for the rest of
the Middle East. The degree of d omestication of every Islamist movement,
organization, and state was determined according to a simple but decisive
criterion. The extent to which every movement, organization, and state
was willing to incorporate the “democratic project” in their political goals,
programs, and policies was that simple and decisive criterion. The rest
would be categorized as radical, extremist, or terrorist. Many scholars have
invested their hopes, energies, and research capabilities in t he neoconserva-
tive project for democracy in the Middle East. These scholars have mistaken
the political authority of Western governments to resolve interpretative
confl icts in the region for their own interpretative authority.
In Norway, like every other Western country, scholars and politicians
have been enthusiastic about t he neoconservative project for democracy in
the Middle East. In defense of this project and with total public consensus,
Norway participated in the bombing of Libya in 2011. As we know, the
“democratic bombs” did not work in Libya. When I was preparing this
preface, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace
Prize to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet for its contributions to the
democratic transition in Tunisia. The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet
took shape while the coup in Egypt was taking place. Since its inception
in 2013, the Quartet has been telling the Islamist and secular Tunisians
that they have two choices. They either accept t he neoconservative project
for democracy or experience the Egyptians horror after the coup, or worse,
the Libyan and Syrian civil wars. What is peculiar with the Norwegian
Nobel Committee is that it consists of the former leaders of the same
Norwegian political parties which decided to bomb Libya. On other occa-
sions, these same political parties endorsed the invasion of Afghanistan and
Iraq. They remained silent when the prodemocracy movement in Bahrain
PREFACE vii
was viciously quelled, and the military coup in Egypt was massacring and
incarcerating thousands of anticoup protesters. According to the Nobel
Committee, the Peace Prize was meant to strengthen the democratic
process in Tunisia and promote it as a model for democratization in the
region. Now that the secular-Islamist Turkish Model has been exposed as a
sham, it seems that t he neoconservative project for democracy in the Middle
East needs a new model. Let us assume the transition to democracy in
Tunisia has been so successful that it deserves being advertised as a model
for democracy in the region. A legitimate question to be raised is why have
thousands of Tunisian youth been recruited by ISIL and other terrorist
groups in the region, during this democratic transition? A possible answer
can be that there are only two alternatives before the young Muslims in
Tunisia. They either embrace d omesticated Islamism or become extremists.
The choice between domesticated and extremist Islamism excludes the
possibility of any Islamism or post-Islamism which is peaceful but critical
and democratic but sovereign. In fact, what is absent in Tunisia and the
rest of the Arab World and Turkey is a critical Islamism, which rejects any
appeal to force as a means to resolve interpretative confl icts. Such criti-
cal Islamism emerged in Iran. The advocates of critical Islamism in Iran
sought to resolve interpretative confl icts by supplementary interpretations,
public speeches, and public arguments. Post-Islamism in Iran is a result
of critical interpretations of Islamism and its political consequences. This
book is a history of the interpretative supplements of Iranian Islamism and
post-Islamism to the interpretative confl icts in Iran since the 1960s.
I thank Farhad Khsroukhavar, Bjørn Olav Utvik, Kjetil Selvik, Nikkie
Keddie, Yann Richard, and Sadeq Zibakalam, who have offered valuable
comments on the earlier drafts of this book. I am very grateful to the anony-
mous reviewer(s) for the interesting comments and suggestions. I would like
to extend a special thank you to the Palgrave Macmillan’s publisher Farideh
Koohi-Kamali and editorial assistant Alisa Pulver for bringing this book to
production. I am also very grateful for the professional work of the produc-
tion editor (Leighton Lustig). I am grateful to the joys of my life, Roya and
Omid, whose presence always inspires me. Last but not least I thank my
lovely wife Giti who has tirelessly given me moral support and encourage-
ment in the over-a-decade-long process it took to fi nish this book.
Oslo, Norway Y adullah Shahibzadeh
C
ONTENTS
1 Introduction 1
Democracy: A Neoconservative Project 4
The Culturalist View of Politics and History 5
Totalism and Perspectivism 10
The Intellectual 11
Privatization versus Enlargement of the Public Sphere 13
2 The Crisis of Political Leadership 1 5
Stalinist Totalitarianism and Its Contenders 19
The Story of Infertility 24
The Theist Socialists 29
3 Islamist Totalism 37
Personal Experience and Revolutionary Consciousness 40
Politics of the Islamist Discourse: Neither Secular nor Religious 43
The Return to the Self 46
Islam and Humanist Marxism 49
Active and Reactive Concepts 54
Humanist Islamism 56
Total Society and Total Man in Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism 6 3
Islamist Leninism 67
ix
