Table Of ContentINTO THE
QUAGMIRE
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INTO THE
QUAGMIRE
Lyndon Johnson and the
Escalation of the Vietnam War
Brian VanDeMark
New York Oxford
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1995
Oxford University Press
Oxford New York Toronto
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and associated companies in
Berlin Ibadan
Copyright © 1991, 1995 by Brian VanDeMark
Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.,
198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016-4314
First published as an Oxford University Press paperback, 1995
Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
VanDeMark, Brian
Into the quagmire : Lyndon Johnson and the escalation
of the Vietnam War / Brian VanDeMark.
p. cm. Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-19-506506-9
ISBN 0-19-509650-9 (pbk.)
1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975—United States
2. United States—Politics and government—1963-1969.
3. Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973.
I. Title. DS558.V36 1991
959.704'3373—dc20 90-6829
2 4 6 8 10 9 7 5 3
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
To my parents and Dian
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Preface
SOME YEARS AFTER leaving the presidency, Lyndon Johnson reflected
on the Vietnam War's significance to both his historical reputation and the
American experience. "The struggle in Vietnam," LBJ rightly observed in his
memoirs, "inspired one of the most passionate and deeply felt debates in
our nation's life." "That debate will go on," he correctly added, for as
Johnson himself realized, succeeding generations of historians "will make
[their] judgments on the decisions made and the actions taken."1
LBJ had voiced similar thoughts as President. As early as 1965, Johnson
sensed that the Vietnam War would determine his ultimate place in history,
overshadowing all else, including his extraordinary domestic reform pro-
gram, the Great Society. LBJ, one associate vividly remembered, talked
"about this all the time."2
How, then, should historians interpret this epochal event of Johnson's
presidency and 1960s American life? Vietnam's very importance demands a
thorough, critical, but sensitive understanding of the people and forces
which together shaped the struggle. The privilege of hindsight, if not humil-
ity, calls for nothing less. For, as Carl von Clausewitz, the pre-eminent
student of war, once wrote, "we see ... things in the light of their result,
and to some extent come to know and appreciate them fully only because
of it."3
I have tried to heed this advice in analyzing LBJ's Vietnam decisions from
November 1964 through July 1965—the pivotal months when Johnson
launched the bombing of North Vietnam and dispatched major U.S. ground
combat forces to South Vietnam, thus fixing America on a course of massive
military intervention in the region. I have sought to reconstruct those events
viii Preface
in their widest possible light, stressing the tangle of international and
domestic pressures confronting LBJ and his advisers during this watershed«
period.
I feel this approach best recaptures the contemporary context in which
decisionmakers acted, while also illuminating the immense complexities and
tensions surrounding the war. I believe these insights, in turn, oiler readers
a clearer, deeper understanding of LBJ's—and America's—Vietnam ordeal.
I make no claim, though, to exhausting study of this important subject-
only broadening and, hopefully, enriching perceptions of it. Such goals, how-
ever modest, remain the historian's proper task. Richard Hofstadter, a wise
and gifted practitioner of this craft, put it best, I think: "The closer the
historian comes ... to the full texture of historical reality, the more deeply
is he engulfed in a complex web of relationships which he can hope to un-
derstand only in a limited and partial way."4
With that thought in mind, I hope the following account casts added light
on Lyndon Johnson and the escalation of the Vietnam War, while moving
the reader to reflect further on this fateful chapter in modern American
history.
Although writing is a solitary labor, all historians rely on others for help
along the way. I am no exception. I have several people to thank for advice
and assistance in preparing this book.
First is the archival staff at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library in Austin,
Texas—particularly its chief Vietnam curator, Dr. David C. Humphrey. LBJ
Library archivists extended a rare blend of skillful help and warm courtesy
during my many visits to Austin. Thanks also are due to the library's LBJ
Foundation, for a Moody grant-in-aid to defray travel and research expenses.
This book began as a dissertation in history at the University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles. Throughout much of the project, UCLA's Department of
History provided a stimulating and collegial environment in which to teach
and write. It also bestowed generous and welcome fellowship support.
UCLA's University Research Library furnished a rich storehouse of books
and, at times, a quiet haven for reflection.
Two fine historians deserve particular thanks for their guidance and sup-
port over many years. Professor Robert A. Divine of the University of Texas
at Austin first stimulated my interest in diplomatic history, and inspired me
to do my best. My doctoral mentor, Professor Robert Dallek of UCLA,
proved a model scholar and teacher, from whom I learned much indeed. His
example and encouragement, quite simply, made this a better book.
I have also benefited from the rare privilege of assisting Mr. Clark M.
Clifford in preparing his memoirs. Working with Mr. Clifford and his dis-
tinguished coauthor, Richard C. Holbrooke, deepened my appreciation for
Preface ix
both the complexities and the burdens of governance. Mr. Clifford, more-
over, graciously allowed me to quote from his forthcoming autobiography.
I have, however, neither sought nor received Mr. Clifford's endorsement of
the views expressed in this book.
A word of thanks must also go to my publisher, Sheldon Meyer, editors
David Bain and Stephanie Sakson-Ford, and all the other talented and
friendly people at Oxford University Press, who helped make the manu-
script a book.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge a very special and heavy debt to my wife,
Dian Owen VanDeMark. Her encouragement, understanding, and, above
all, her extraordinary forbearance sustained me from beginning to end.
Washington, D.C. B. V.
January 1990
Description:In November of 1964, as Lyndon Johnson celebrated his landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, the government of South Vietnam lay in a shambles. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor described it as a country beset by ''chronic factionalism, civilian-military suspicion and distrust, absence of national spirit a
