Internal Affairs: Making Room for Psychosemantic Internalism

267 Pages·1998·35.15 MB·English

by  Keith L. Butler (auth.)

INTERNALAFFAIRS
STUDIES IN COGNITIVE SYSTEMS
VOLUME21
EDITOR
James H. Fetzer, University ofM innesota, Duluth
ADVISORY EDITORIAL BOARD
Fred Dretske, Stanford University
Charles E.M. Dunlop, University ofM ichigan, Flint
Ellery Eells, University ofWisconsin, Madison
Alick Elithom, Royal Free Hospital, London
Jerry Fodor, Rutgers University
Alvin Goldman, University ofA rizona
Jaakko Hintikka, Boston University
Frank Keil, Cornell University
William Rapaport, State University ofN ew York at Buffalo
Barry Richards, Imperial College, London
Stephen Stich, Rutgers University
Lucia Vaina, Boston University
Terry Winograd, Stanford University
INTERNALAFFAIRS
Making Room for Psychosemantic Intemalism
by
KEITH L. BUTLER
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-90-481-5104-2 ISBN 978-94-017-1921-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-1921-6
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved
© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1998
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
Po ur
Mireilte
SERIES PREFA CE
This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted
to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information, and
data-processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other)
animal, or machine. Its scope is intended to span the full range of
interests from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and
philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and
sociobiology (regarding the mental abilities of other species) to ideas
related to artificial intelligence and computer science. While emphasis
will be placed upon theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological aspects
of these problems and domains, empirical, experimental, and
methodological studies will also appear from time to time.
A fundamental but still unresolved issue in the philosophy of mind
remains the internalism/ externalism debate over the nature of the
contents of mental states. In this volume, Keith Butler elaborates three
important but not uncontroversial claims, specifically: that mental
states must be individuated on the basis of their contents; that they
typically refer to external states (and are therefore "broad" or "wide");
yet mental contents also supervene upon the internal states of
individuals. He thereby avoids the common pitfalls of assuming that
broad content presupposes or implies externalism and that internalism
presupposes or implies mental states that make no reference to external
states. The result is an illuminating study that not only clarifies but
even promises to solve this difficult problem.
J. H. F.
vii
CONTENTS
Preface Xl
Introducnon 1
1. Preliminary Remarks 1
2. The Argument 5
Part 1: Extemalism and the Propositional Attitudes
Chapter 1: Externalism and Twin Earth 12
1. Preliminary Remarks 12
2. Twins 12
3. A Fantasy 19
4. Concluding Remarks 24
Chapter 2: Self-Knowledge 25
1. Preliminary Remarks 25
2. Extemalism and Knowledge of Content 28
3. Intemalism and Knowledge of Content 57
4. Concluding Remarks 63
Chapter 3: Skepticism 64
1. Preliminary Remarks 64
2. The QB Strategy 67
3. Criticism of the QB Strategy 74
4. Beyond the QB Strategy 80
5. Concluding Remarks 82
Part II: Anti-Individualism and the Cognitive Seiences
Chapter 4: Computational Vision Theory 84
1. Preliminary Remarks 84
2. What Is lndividualism? 86
3. Burge's Argument 92
4. Shapiro's Argument 103
5. Epistemic and Metaphysical Projects 106
6. Segal's Liberal Strategy Reconsidered 119
7. The Conservative Defense Strategy 124
8. Concluding Remarks 130
Chapter 5: Causal Powers 131
1. Preliminary Remarks 131
2. A Prima Facie Case Against Anti-Individualism 132
ix
3. The Argument From Scientific Taxonomy 144
4. The Argument From Behavior 162
5. Concluding Remarks 174
Chapter 6: Cognitive Explanation 177
1. Preliminary Remarks 177
2. What Are Cognitive Systems? Some Preliminary Thoughts 178
3. Explanatory Virtues 182
4. Systemic Anti-individualism 199
5. Concluding Remarks 223
Notes 227
References 247
Index 257
X
PREFACE
This book is not written for posterity. It is meant to constitute
part of my contribution to a continuing debate at the intersection of the
philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, epistemology, and the
philosophy of cognitive science. The debate is over how mental states
are individuated. Many philosophers, call them externalists (or anti
individualists), believe that the individuation of mental states
requires appeal to an individual's social and/ or physical environment.
I am not among them; I am an internalist ( or individualist). This book
attempts to show that the leading proponents of externalism make a lot
of mistakes in defending their view. This is either because the view is
false, so any defense of it is bound to make some mistake or another, or it
is because the people defending externalism have not been very careful,
or both.
I have included some introductory material so that those not
already familiar with the issues involved might nevertheless gain
entry into the debate. The intended audience, however, consists in those
professional philosophers and students of philosophy who are already
familiar with and interested in the question of how mental states are
individuated. I do not spend much time trying to motivate an interest in
this issue. Like all philosophy, it is interesting and worthwhile if one
is blessed (or cursed) with the appropriate kind of intellectual
curiosity. Those who do not meet this requirement proceed at their own
risk.
This book is a deliberate antidote to four horrible tendencies in
recent philosophical writing. The first tendency is found in the work of
those writers who attempt to imitate the style of philosophers like
Fodor, Dennett, and Paul Churchland. Whereas Fodor, Dennett, and
Churchland have the skill and intelligence to frame their views in
clever and interesting language, those whose writing they have
influenced Iack either the writing skill of a Fodor or a Dennett or a
Churchland, or the intelligence, or both. As a result, there is a large
amount of philosophical writing that is cloying rather than clever.
Moreover, in their effort to be clever, these writers get sloppy; they miss
distinctions and obscure issues that are difficult enough already without
their unhelpful contributions; see Andy Clark's recent book for an
example of this tendency. I do not pretend tobe clever, but I do claim to
be clear; the writing in this book is as Straightforward as it gets.
The second tendency I have in mind is found in the work of those
philosophers who seem to wanttobe scientists (usually neuroscientists,
or cognitive scientists -- sometimes even cell biologists or some such
thing) rather than philosophers. These writers have produced volumes
of science journalism, and very little of philosophical interest. Such
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