Table Of Contenti
WHY WE SHOULD NOT BE UNHAPPY ABOUT HAPPINESS VIA ARISTOTLE
The functionalist account of Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia
by
Irene Caesar
A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New
York
2009
ii
© 2009
IRENE CAESAR
All Rights Reserved
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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the
Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the
dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Stefan Bernard Baumrin
Date Chair of Examining Committee
Iakovos Vasiliou
Date Executive Officer
Peter Simpson
Gerald Press
Nickolas Pappas
Supervisory Committee
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
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Abstract
WHY WE SHOULD NOT BE UNHAPPY ABOUT HAPPINESS VIA ARISTOTLE
The functionalist account of Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia
by
Irene Caesar
Adviser: Professor Peter Simpson
The purpose of my dissertation is to resolve the ongoing argument in the modern
Anglo-American interpretation of Aristotelianism regarding the principle of eudaimonia
(εủδαιµονία; happiness). Exlusivist interpretation argues that the principle of eudaimonia
is one dominant or exclusive telos (end) consisting of the aretê (excellence or virtue) of
theōria (contemplation of the divine). Inclusivist interpretation argues that the principle
of eudaimonia is an inclusive or compounded telos containing this and all other Aristote-
lian virtues in a comprehensive or mixed life ruled by phronēsis (practical wisdom). I
offer the functionalist interpretation that goes beyond the dichotomy of inclusivism and
exclusivism in arguing that (1) contrary to exclusivism, theōria is functionally linked with
all the other activities of the soul throughout the entire Aristotelian corpus and that (2)
contrary to inclusivism, theōria is functionally superior to each and all of the other activi-
v
ties of the soul, making a compound model irrelevant in its incapacity to express the hier-
archy within the soul.
The soul and polis are both a sustēma (systematic whole) organized by the ruler
nous (intuitive reason / active intellect) with its activity (energeia) of theōria (contempla-
tion) via formulating metron (measure). Metron in relation to us depends on metron
within the object, and the latter is assumed a priori as a major premiss (the universal) in
the practical and speculative syllogisms, while the practical reason is incapable of defin-
ing the universal. Eudaimonia is a perfect realization of the function of the ruler. Hu-
mans are functionally distinct from other animals precisely by this contemplative ability
of a priori assuming the universal within the particular. Soul, as any sustēma, is identi-
fied not with the hierarchy of its parts, but with its ruler, and the final virtue is identified
with the virtue of the ruler. The passive intellect and the active intellect are accordingly
the practical reason and the contemplative reason. The first principle and end (the cause)
of action is leisure spent in the disinterested and useless contemplative activity of the
ruler -- the active intellect. The moral action, which does not reach this end, is not ulti-
mately good-in-itself though outright dutiful.
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CONTENTS
Introduction 1
Chapter 1 Introduction of the debate on eudaimonia in the contemporary Aristotelian
scholarship 5
Chapter 2 Finality of eudaimonia as isolation 17
Chapter 3 Eudaimonia as the perfect functioning of the active intellect
3.1 Finality of the most final good as its functional peculiarity and superiority 28
3.2 The reconsideration of the ergon passage in NE 1, 7 33
3.3 Textual support for the new interpretation in NE 1, 13 42
3.4 Textual support for the new interpretation in NE 6 = EE 5 46
3.5 Textual support for the new interpretation in the De Anima and its teleological
argument for the identification of eudaimonia with theōria 49
3.6 The hierarchical argument for the identification of eudaimonia with theōria based
on the identification of any sustēma with its highest function 57
3.7 Implications of the hierarchical argument for the teleia aretê passage in NE 1, 7
62
3.8 The argument from the peculiarity of human ergon for the identification of eu-
daimonia with theōria 65
3.9 Concluding thoughts on the functional nature of happiness 70
Chapter 4 Eudaimonia as incompatible with the maximization of moral virtues and
unidentifiable with their compound
4.1 The requirement to limit social interactions and moral / practical virtues involved
75
4.2 The causal priority of eudaimonia: self-love as self-causation and self-causation
as eudaimonia 95
4.3 Mutual contemplation as the only true justification of social interaction: EE 7, 12
on the life as knowledge 117
4.4 Man does not need moral duty to prove himself good: NE 9, 9 on the life as
knowledge 123
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4.5 The requirement to limit the intensity of the most close social interactions 134
4.6 EE 7, 15 on the necessity to limit both extrinsic and intrinsic goods and on theōria
as the standard of human life 138
Chapter 5 The significance of the principles of pain and pleasure / leisure for eudai-
monia
5.1 Pain inherent in moral virtue: the existential incompatibility between moral vir-
tues and eudaimonia 157
5.2 The passage on the three types of life in NE 1, 5: the significance of the conflation
of the moral life with the practical life 162
5.3 NE 10, 6-8 on leisure as the principle of eudaimonia, different from its conditions
/ additions 173
5.4 NE 10. 8 on theōrētikos being the paradigmatic moral agent most capable of ap-
prehending the facts of life / establishing measure for the sake of leisurely theōria
184
5.5 NE 10. 9 on the role of theōria in the systematization of polis 197
5.6 Politics 8 on the role of theōria in the systematization of polis 203
5.7 The difference between eudaimonia as the contemplation of the measure and the
arithmetic mean of the moral virtue 209
Chapter 6 The role of pleasure in making eudaimonia final and self-sufficient. The
final reconsideration of the NE 1, 7 passage on the self-sufficiency of eudaimonia 214
Appendix Critical overview of the major interpretations of eudaimonia in the con-
temporary Aristotelian scholarship
A.1 Ackrill’s account 237
A.2 Cooper’s account 241
A.3 Kenny’s account 262
A.4 Broadie’s account 296
A.5 Kraut’s account 312
A.6 Hardie’s account 330
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Bibliography 352
1
Introduction
The purpose of my dissertation is to resolve the ongoing argument in the modern
Anglo-American interpretation of Aristotelianism regarding the principle of eudaimonia
(εủδαιµονία; happiness).
It is traditionally assumed that there are two major interpretations: the first one
argues that the principle of eudaimonia is one dominant or exclusive telos (end) consist-
ing of the aretê (excellence or virtue) of theōria (contemplation of the divine). The sec-
ond argues that the principle of eudaimonia is an inclusive or compounded telos contain-
ing this and all other Aristotelian virtues in a comprehensive or mixed life ruled by
phronēsis (practical wisdom). Nonetheless, there is no clear-cut division between inter-
preters into the inclusivist and exclusivist camps.
Earlier interpreters are inclusivists regarding only some parts of the Aristotelian
ethical corpus, and exclusivists regarding its other parts. They rest such an approach on
their claim that the Aristotelian corpus is inconsistent. Later interpreters argue either for
the consistency of the Aristotelian ethics, or else against the division of the interpretation
into the inclusivist and the exclusivist. Their position can be properly called neither in-
clusivist, nor exclusivist, for it is representing the happy life as a mixed life throughout
the entire corpus of Aristotle’s ethical writing, with “mixing” of the energeiai here and
now going beyond the simple inclusion principle.
I offer a fourth kind of interpretation – functionalist – that goes even farther be-
yond the dichotomy of inclusivism and exclusivism in arguing that neither the exclusive
2
nor the inclusive model is correct, but that (1) contrary to exclusivism, theōria is func-
tionally linked with all the other activities of the soul throughout the entire Aristotelian
corpus which, thus, appears to be consistent, and that (2) contrary to inclusivism, theōria
is functionally superior to each and all of the other activities of the soul, making a com-
pound model irrelevant in its incapacity to express the hierarchy within the soul. I argue
that so far no mixist interpretation, which is more or less close to functionalism, has been
able to construct a “working” model of precisely how theōria functions in the soul as a
whole. In the absence of a concrete working model any functionalist or mixist reading
collapses into the inclusive reading: it just adds theōria -- as some more sophisticated ac-
tivity -- to a lump of the other activities of the soul.
I suggest that eudaimonia in Aristotle is based on the following principles. The
soul is a sustēma (systematic whole) organized by its intrinsic metron (measure). The
systematicity of the soul requires a strict hierarchy between the activities of the soul –
one governing, and others subordinated in a “harmonic tuning of the soul,” as Aristotle
puts it in the Politics. Thus, there are parts of the soul – they cannot be discarded – but
they are ruled by one ruler – nous (intuitive reason / active intellect) with its activity (en-
ergeia) of theōria (contemplation). Even more, soul, as any sustēma, is identified not
with the hierarchy of its parts, but with its ruler – its superior function or standard, i.e.,
the active intellect. I argue that the passive intellect and the active intellect are accord-
ingly the practical reason and the contemplative reason. Because sustēma is identified
with its highest function, and, so, the practical reason is subdued to the ruler / the highest
function as a slave or a steward, the practical reason is a passive function, though it is an
imperative ruler of man’s appetites and emotions, and issues commands for sake of the
Description:the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of in a comprehensive or mixed life ruled by phronēsis (practical wisdom). nous (intuitive reason / active intellect) with its activity (energeia) of theōria .. they claim that the secondary happy life lacks sophia wit
