Table Of Contentn Governing Least
OXFORD POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
GENERAL EDITOR: SAMUEL FREEMAN, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Oxford Political Philosophy publishes books on theoretical and applied political
philosophy within the Anglo- American tradition. The series welcomes submissions
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socialism, and constitutionalism.
N. Scott Arnold
Imposing Values: An Essay on Liberalism and Regulation
Peter de Marneffe
Liberalism and Prostitution
William J. Talbott
Human Rights and Human Well- being
Iris Marion Young
Responsibility for Justice
Paul Weithman
Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn
Aaron James
Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy
Margaret Moore
A Political Theory of Territory
Alan Thomas
Republic of Equals: Predistribution and Property- Owning Democracy
Dan Moller
Governing Least: A New England Libertarianism
Governing Least
A New England Libertarianism
Dan Moller
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Moller, Dan, 1975– author.
Title: Governing least : a New England libertarianism / Dan Moller.
Description: New York, NY, United States of America : Oxford University Press, [2019]
Identifiers: LCCN 2018033647 (print) | LCCN 2018010446 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780190863241 (hardcover) | ISBN 9780190863258 (updf) |
ISBN 9780190863265 (ebook) | ISBN 9780190863272 ( online component)
Subjects: LCSH: Libertarianism. Classification: LCC JC585 .M795 2019 (ebook) |
LCC JC585 (print) | DDC 320.51/2—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018033647
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Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
n Contents
1. Introduction: Toward a New England Libertarianism 1
Part one n Property
2. Morality and the State 13
3. Libertarianism: A Classic Argument Revisited 28
4. Property as a Moral Phenomenon 48
5. Property as a Constraint on the State 66
6. Property and the Creation of Value 84
7. Aid 100
Part two n Markets
8. Morality and Markets 121
9. Luck and Opportunity 140
10. Wealth, Disability, and Happiness 157
11. The Epistemology of Popularity and Incentives 172
Part three n History
12. Justice and the Wealth of Nations I 183
13. Justice and the Wealth of Nations II 201
14. Reparations, History, and Nietzsche 220
v
vi n Contents
Part four n Theory and Practice
15. Dilemmas of Political Correctness 241
16. Utopia and the Real World 254
Appendix A: Utilitarianism as Self- Deception 271
Appendix B: Victim- Blaming and Moral Modus Tollens 275
Notes 279
Works Cited 295
Acknowledgments 307
Index 309
1
Introduction
Toward a New England Libertarianism
Libertarianism is the widely reviled idea that we should use reason and persua-
sion to accomplish our distributive aims. Only reason and persuasion. According
to the libertarian, it is wrong to utilize threats or violence in the form of state-
sponsored coercion, however sublimated by bureaucratic routine, in order to re-
distribute property that we have an antecedent claim to. Aiding the worse off or
promoting economic equality may be worthy aims, but these are endeavors we
should persuade our fellow citizens to join, not mandates to be enforced by the
state. Promoting these goals at the end of a pitchfork, whether ours or our repre-
sentatives’, is a moral mistake according to the libertarian.
Talk of threats and violence may seem overblown. What is at issue is generally
redistribution through taxation, and what’s so bad about voters democratically
deciding on laws that require us to fill in certain tax forms once a year? The
forms are boring but hardly violent. But threats and violence are in play when-
ever the state issues its demands. When the state mails us the forms requesting
our money, it is not asking nicely; the demands of the state are backed by force.
And when voters decide on laws that culminate in demands from the state, they
are deciding to compel those around them to do their bidding, again with the
implicit threat of force. In fact, the reason that threats and violence seem so far
removed from the process of peacefully debating laws and filling in forms is in
part that these threats are so successful: it is only when threats are unpersuasive
that one must employ violence. Of course, many people agree with the state’s
demands and are happy to cooperate— I don’t wish to exaggerate the coercive
element. But the bureaucratic routine shouldn’t blind us to the fact that the state
and, by extension, democratic majorities aren’t asking nicely.
Libertarians of all stripes are skeptical of encroachments by the state, but
the “New England” version I propose to defend is distinctive in two respects.
First, libertarianism is often grounded in an uncompromising approach to in-
dividual rights, which others absolutely must not infringe. By contrast, in my
account libertarianism emerges from everyday moral beliefs we have about
when we are permitted to shift our burdens onto others. In fact, my account
intentionally downplays the role of rights, and is motivated by doubts about
what we may demand of others, rather than outrage about what others de-
mand of us. As I will argue, if we recognize even modest strictures on making
others worse off to improve our lot, if we acknowledge even defeasible claims
to ownership, we quickly run into a form of libertarianism. This is because it
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2 n Governing Least
turns out to be very hard to justify permanently transferring our misfortunes
to others in the way an expansive welfare state requires. One goal of this book,
then, is to defend a version of libertarianism that rests on modest premises
about burden- shifting. Because this view is inspired by the spirit of self-
reliance in figures like Thoreau, Emerson, and Melville, I think of it as having
a New England cast.
A second distinctive feature of this book is that it ranges widely across his-
tory, economics, and politics, as well as philosophy. I have cast my net widely
in order to take up such questions as the transmission of wealth across gen-
erations, reparations for slavery, and the politics of political correctness. The
reasons for this are partly substantive and partly methodological. Substantively,
our responses to complex philosophical arguments move both forwards and
backwards— from accepted premises to accepted conclusions, as well as from
rejected conclusions to rejected premises. Even if the moral arguments I make
about burden- shifting were initially persuasive, we would reject them if they
seemed to have absurd implications when projected onto the world at large. If
libertarians seem to ignore the fact that many who are poor are so through no
fault of their own, or that rich countries got rich in the course of an incredibly
violent history, they will hardly be persuasive on the basis of tidy syllogisms
alone. Political theories are inevitably assessed in light of a much broader pic-
ture of the world and how it works, and philosophers ignore such pictures at
their peril.
Another reason for casting the net wide is methodological. Anglophone po-
litical philosophy has— with some notable exceptions— become an increasingly
arid and insular field, disconnected from economics, history, and politics. (Of
course, in part this just reflects a broader trend toward parochial specialization.)
Academic Marxists write books that ignore the triumphs of the market economies;
libertarians write books that ignore the vast injustices that accompanied the era
of economic growth. It is noteworthy, for instance, that works discussing the
Marxist theory of history rarely mention the past— in contrast to Marx’s own
practice.1 I want to resist this narrow approach. Quite apart from the substantive
conclusions I reach, I hope to reconnect with an earlier tradition of philosophers
practicing political economy who wallowed in the murk of history and weren’t
afraid of the occasional fact or figure. (Imagine John Stuart Mill or Karl Marx
without a little murk!) Accordingly, the later parts of the book don’t directly de-
fend libertarianism, narrowly construed as resistance to the welfare state, but
champion a more broadly classical liberal perspective that emphasizes limited
government, free markets, and the system of private property, in the tradition
of John Locke and Adam Smith.2 My hope is that this broader perspective both
creates a more hospitable environment for assessing libertarianism, and helps us
reconnect with the earlier approach to political economy.
At the end of this introduction I offer a more detailed preview, but first let me
try to motivate what I am calling the New England approach a bit more.
Introduction n 3
n The Speech
Imagine calling a town hall meeting and delivering the following speech:
My dear assembled citizens: I know most of us are strangers, but of late I have fallen
on hard times through no fault of my own, by sheer bad luck. My savings are low, and
I don’t have friends or family to help. Now as you know, I’ve previously asked for help
from you as private citizens, as a matter of charity. But unfortunately that hasn’t been
sufficient. Thus, I’m here now to insist that you (yes you, Emma, and you, John) owe
me assistance as a matter of justice. It is a deep violation if you don’t work additional
hours, take fewer vacations if need be, live in a smaller house, or send your kids to a
worse school, in order to help me. Failing to do so is no less an injustice than failing
to pay your debts.
Moreover, calling this an injustice means that it’s not enough that you comply with
your obligations by working on my behalf. No, I insist that you help me to force your
fellow citizens to assist me. It doesn’t matter if these others say to you that they need
the money for their own purposes, that they prefer worthier causes, or if they’re just
hard- hearted and don’t care. To the extent you care about justice, you must help me to
force these others to assist me whether they wish to or not, since that is what is owed
me in light of my recent bad luck.
Could you bring yourself to make this speech? The essence of the dispute between
moral libertarians and anti- libertarians is that libertarians think that they could
not in good conscience make this speech, and neither would they be persuaded
by others making it. And in their view, a redistributive welfare state is simply the
speech put into action and writ large through taxes and transfers. Later on we
will consider some of the complexities of global capitalism and modern property
regimes, but I believe that the important disputes about economic justice largely
boil down to this speech.
I don’t want to wade too deeply into the philosophical issues the speech raises
yet, but we can at least anticipate a few immediate reactions. Inevitably it will
be said that to the extent the speech bothers us it is because of its rhetorical
flourishes, various pragmatic features, its name- calling and first- personal gusto,
or because the speaker seems presumptuous, or otherwise annoys us. Compare,
then, a similar speech advancing a different substantive claim:
My dear assembled citizens: of late, some of you have been stealing my money. I’m
here now to insist that you (yes you, Emma, and you, John) give it back. This means
that you owe me thousands of dollars which you stole. It’s a deep violation if you don’t
work additional hours, take fewer vacations if need be, live in a smaller house, or send
your kids to a worse school, in order to pay me back what you stole. Failing to do so is
no less an injustice than failing to pay your debts.
Moreover, calling this an injustice means that it’s not enough that you comply with
your obligations by working on my behalf to repay me what you’ve stolen. No, I insist
