Frege and Russell The Gray's Elegy Argument

148 Pages·2004·0.59 MB·English

Frege and Russell
The Gray’s Elegy Argument
Richard L. Mendelsohn
Lehman College and the Graduate School, CUNY

Contents
1 Inroduction page 2
2 The Transition 4
3 Primary and Secondary Occurrence 6
4 The Text 12
4.1 A 12
4.2 B 13
4.3 C 15
4.4 D 16
4.5 E 20
4.6 F 21
4.7 G 22
4.8 H 22
5 Summary 24
5.1 Finale 27
6 Scanned Old Version 29
6.1 A Little History 30
6.1.1 Introduction 30
6.1.2 The M Theory 32
6.1.3 The F Theory 33
6.1.4 Problems With The F Theory 37
7 The Argument Again in Scanned 42
7.1 My Interpretational Strategy 42
7.2 Russell’s Problem with Frege’s Theory 43
7.2.1 Indirect Reference 44
7.2.2 That 47
7.2.3 Direct Reference? 48
i
Contents 1
7.2.4 The Problem Again 50
7.2.5 Complications 52
7.2.6 A Further Problem 54
7.3 Is Russell’s Quarry Frege? 58
7.3.1 Searle’s Interpretation 58
7.3.2 Blackburn and Code’s Interpretation 60
7.4 Is Russell’s Quarry Russell? 60
7.4.1 Hylton’s Interpretation 63
7.4.2 Kremer’s Interpretation 67
7.5 Conclusion 74
8 Reflections on Russell 75
8.1 Introduction 75
8.2 Russell’s Theory of Definite Descriptions 77
8.3 The Referential/Attributive Distinction 82
8.4 Rigidity and Direct Reference 91
8.5 Concluding Remarks 98
9 Russell’s Theory of Descriptions 100
9.1 The Transition 100
9.2 Searle’s Interpretation 101
9.3 Was Russell’s Quarry Russell? 103
9.4 Did Russell Refute Russell? 105
9.5 Hylton’s Interpretation 106
9.6 Russell’s Theory of Denoting Expressions 124
9.7 Existence Claims 124
9.8 Descriptions 130
9.9 Names 134
9.10 Strawson’s Attack on Russell 135
9.11 Introduction 136
9.12 Names 140
9.13 Strawson’s Attack on Russell 141
Bibliography 142
1
Inroduction
There are two fundamental assumptions that inform my interpretation
of the Gray’s Elegy section of “On Denoting.”
ThefirstisthatitdoesconstituteacriticismofFrege’ssense/reference
theory. Russell explicitly says so, and other things being equal, I take
him at his word. But the literate philosophical public has for the most
part thoughtotherwise. As a matter of fact, I am unable to find anyone
whothingssootherthanSearle, whoseview, bytheway, isthatRussell
has totally misrepresented Frege. This view is unbelievable. But no one
elsehasmadethecasethatitisFregewhoRussellisafter. Infact,many
hold that Russell was so that he was criticizing his own theory of
denotingconcepts. InthestyleofMadLibs,thereaderistofilltheblank
with an adjective—stupid, cockeyed, mischievous, deceptive, wrong—
and then write a dissertation philosophically defending the canard.
Thesecondisthat,unlikehiscriticismofMeinong,whichclearlycon-
stitutes a refutation, Russell’s (1905a) conclusion is that to enter the
sense/reference theory is to enter a swamp in which one is never able to
gain firm footing. The morass he describes, with all its confusions are
not—Irepeat,arenot—ofhisownmaking;theyareconfusionsandprob-
lemswithFrege’stheory. Russelljustcouldn’tmakesenseofthetheory.
Now,readershaveapparentlycometobelievethattheconfusionsRussell
found in Frege’s theory meant that he was confused about the theory;
but that is a mistake. The confusions he uncovered were confusions in
the theory; he thought the theory was fundamentally unsalvageable. It
is the failure to observe this second point that has prompted readers to
fail on the first point.
The point here is important. Russell rejected Frege’s sense/reference
theory. What was it that he rejected? What was wrong with it? How
did his theory differ from Frege’s in crucial respects? Russell himself,
2
Inroduction 3
I submit, was unable to say with any clarity what the difference was
becausehewasgenuinelyunclearaboutthefundamentalerrorinFrege’s
theory. He only could identify that it was totally confused.
Is it not clear that Frege was totally confused himself? Consider the
following list of errors in his theory:
• Frege held that in indirect discourse, e.g., in the sentence “Frege be-
lieved that Kant had misrepresented arithmetic,” we are speaking
aboutthesenseormeaningoftheword“Kant”, notthemanhimself.
Thisisnonsense: surelyitisthemanFregethoughttobewrong,Kant
himself. Nonetheless, there are careful readers who thing otherwise.
Forbes (1987: 4) says:
In connection with the simplest kind of belief attribution, there are good
reasons to conclude that words used in specifying the belief refer to their
customary senses, not their customary references.
I believe this is the simplest kind of belief attribution, and it seems
to me that there is no good reason for thinking that I am speaking
about the sense of “Kant” and not Kant.
• Frege held that in oratio recta, e.g., “Frege said, ‘I am hungry’,” one
designates Frege’s words and says something about them. This too is
nonsense. I am not naming Frege’s words in uttering this sentence,
but reproducing them.
Because of these errors, there has been serious misrepresentation of
Frege’s views, and of the difference between Frege and Russell. Once
again, Forbes (1987: 5-6) who makes a crucial error in identifying what
he takes to be the basic Fregean position:
I will take the neo-Fregean position that a (first-level, one-place) predicate’s
customaryreferenceisaproperty,whileitscustomarysenseisawayofthink-
ing of that property, and an ordinary name’s customary reference is an ordi-
naryobject,anditscustomarysenseawayofthinkingof,ormodeofpresen-
tation of, that object.
This is not Frege’s position. It is critically important to recognize that
Frege did not take a predicate’s customary reference to be a property—
certainly not in the sense of attribute. That’s Russell’s view. It is one
of the critical points of contention between the two.
2
The Transition
Theyears1903through1905foundRussell’sthoughtsabouttheseman-
tics of singular terms in ferment. In the main body of The Principles of
Mathematics, he defended an ill-conceived doctrine of propositions, un-
derpinnedbyaMeinongianontology. Singulartermswereregardedallas
directly referential. The term denoted in each case was a constituent of
theproposition expressed. The meaningfulnessofthe singulartermwas
guaranteed by the corresponding term in the proposition. But the sym-
pathetic appendix on “The Logical and Arithmetic Doctrines of Frege”
belied the new directions of his thinking. No longer would all singular
termsberegardedasdirectlyreferential. Forthosethataredirectlyref-
erential, there must be a referent, and the item referred to will itself be
a constituent of the proposition expressed. But for those terms that are
not directly referential, the properties that purport to uniquely identify
the object will be constituents of the proposition, but the object the
proposition is about, if there is such an object, will not.
Russell shuffled the pieces of this story around to preserve the out-
lines of an overarching coherent picture. But there was always a loose
end somewhere.† This brief chapter in the development of Russell’s se-
mantic theory has come to light as the result of some excellent work
by Cartwright (1987) and Hylton (1990). Cartwright (1987), in partic-
ular, calls our attention to a number of unpublished manuscripts from
theRussellArchives‡inwhichRussellstruggleswiththedistinctionbe-
† Hisfundamentalproblemwastoidentifytheontologicalstatusofanobjectwith
itsepistemologicalstatus. Thatis,apropositionalcontentwas,byitsverynature,
somethingthatdrewimmediateacquaintanceandsoitcouldonlybeintroduced
thatway.
‡ Russell (1905d), Russell (1905e), Russell (1905f), and Russell (1905c). The last,
which is dated June of 1905, abandons the sense/reference distinction midstride
andoutlinesthenewtheoryofdenotingexpressions;theothersareallearlier,most
4
The Transition 5
tween meaning and denotation. Eventually Russell came to believe his
attemptinthisdirectionfoundered. Andinthecelebratedtheoryofde-
noting expressions, which replaced it, he jettisoned completely the idea
that indirectly referential terms played the role of logical subjects.
Russell’stransitionaltheoryofmeaninganddenotationneversawthe
light of publication. In fact, when Russell (1905a) announces the new
theory, there is no mention whatsoever of his own distinction of this
name. Instead,wefindthenewtheorypittedagainsttwofamousRealist
precursors: Meinong and Frege. The criticism of Meinong is clear and
cogent. But not that of Frege. In these, perhaps the most puzzling and
frustratingpassagesinthecorpusofmodernanalyticphilosophy,Russell
becomes difficult and obscure.
Church (1943) finds the relevant paragraphs hopelessly confused by
careless use/mention errors. Searle (1957) finds Russell to have misin-
terpreted or misunderstood Frege. Hylton (1990) finds Russell pinning
Frege’s name on his own theory he had been developing.† To be sure,
there are important differences to be found in these different readers,
and it is hardly likely they would all conceive of themselves in the same
camp. But there is this common thread: all deny that Russell is doing
there what he says he is doing, viz. presenting a clear, coherent and
telling criticism of Frege’s sense/reference distinction. We call this The
Orthodox View.
WebelievethisOrthodoxviewtobewhollyincorrect. Buildingonout
analysis in Mendelsohn (2005) of Frege’s account of indirect reference,
we will propose an interpretation of that notoriously difficulty passage
inRussell(1905a)onwhich(i)itisclearlyacriticismofFrege’sdistinc-
tion, (ii) it is a coherent criticism of Frege’s distinction made with full
understanding of that theory, and (iii) it is a very telling criticism of
Frege’s distinction. In addition, on this interpretation, we will be able
to identify the new theory presented in Russell (1905a) as a direct reac-
tion to the problems identified with the sense/reference theory. In the
next chapter, we will give a short illustration of the virulence of this in-
terpretation by demonstrating that recent efforts to construct Russell’s
scope distinction within the Fregean apparatus by Forbes (1990), are
ill-conceived.
likely from the beginning of that same year. Subsequent to Cartwright’s (1987)
essay,thesemanuscriptshavebeenpublishedinUrquhart(1994).
† SimilarviewshavebeenarguedrecentlybyKremer(1994)andNoonan(1996).
3
Primary and Secondary Occurrence
What is of interest to me is Forbes’s (1987) attempt to forge a de re/de
dicto distinctioninthisneo-Fregeansemanticstructure. Wewillsuggest
here that he is wrong.
Forbes (1987) asks us to consider the sentences†
Ralph believes Marilyn Monroe was murdered. (3.1)
Ralph believes the shortest spy is a spy. (3.2)
“If we use corner quotes around an English word or phrase to form a
name of its sense,” says Forbes (1987: 7), (3.1) is represented logically
as
B(Ralph, (cid:112)Marilyn Monroe was murdered(cid:113)) (3.3)
We have been using our Θ operator as doing this work, so we will rep-
resent (3.1) as
B(Ralph, Θ(Marilyn Monroe was murdered)) (3.4)
Similarly,
B(Ralph, (cid:112)the shortest spy is a spy(cid:113)) (3.5)
or
B(Ralph, Θ(the shortest spy is a spy)) (3.6)
represents the claim (3.2).
Now, (3.4) and (3.6) are, Forbes (1987: 7) says,
† In what follows, we will insert our numbering of the relevant sentences when
quotingForbes.
6
Primary and Secondary Occurrence 7
whollyspecificaboutthecontentofthepropositionsthatRalphisbeingsaidto
believe. Butoftenwewanttoattributebeliefsaboutanobjectxtoasubject
although we do not know what expressions that subject has in his repertoire
for referring to x, and which particular ways of thinking of x the subject has
employed in his thoughts. In such a case we have to hedge about the exact
contentofthepropositionthesubjectbelieves. Ifwewanttoattributebeliefs
about Marilyn Monroe or about the shortest spy to Ralph, but do not know
howRalphwouldexpresswaysofthinkingofthesepeopleorwhichwaysthese
would be, ...it is not (3.4) or (3.6) that we mean to express.
Forbes (1987) suggests
Marilyn Monroe is someone whome Ralph believes to have (3.7)
been murdered
and
The shortest spy is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy. (3.8)
as the appropriate locutions. Forbes (1987: 7-8) continues:
Intuitively, both (3.7) and (3.8) attribute beliefs about an object x to Ralph,
but they do not specify the whole content of the beliefs. The gist of (3.7)
and (3.8)is merely that Ralph believes a proposition aboutso-and-so to the
effect that he/she is such-and-such. In Fregean terminology as I employ it, a
proposition is about an object x only if it has some wayof thinking (mode of
presentation)ofxasaconstituent;so(3.7),forinstance,hastheimportthat
Ralph believes a proposition with a mode of presentation of Marilyn Monroe
as a constituent, to the effect that she was murdered. Thus we arrive at the
following Fregean analyses of (3.7) and (3.8), in which “Pxy” means “x is a
mode of presentation of y” and “ˆ’’ stands for the manner of combination of
senses in which they form a complex sense
(∃α)(P(α,MM) & B(Ralph, α ˆ (cid:112) was murdered (cid:113)) (3.9)
(∃α)(P(α,(ιx)Sx) & B(Ralph, α ˆ (cid:112) is a spy (cid:113)) (3.10)
Although it is a bit different, we will translate this into our Θ notation
(∃α)(P(α,MM) & B(Ralph, Θ(α was murdered) (3.11)
(∃α)(P(α,(ιx)Sx) & B(Ralph, Θ(α is a spy) (3.12)
Now, for some claims about these regimentation:
The regimentations reveal that the difference between the members of the
pairs(3.1)and(3.7),and(3.2)and(3.8),isnomerescopedistinction. Forbes
(1987: 9)