DTIC ADA241732: Joint Communications in Support of Joint Task Force South during Operation Just Cause

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AD-A241
JOINT COMMUNICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH
DURING OPERATION JUST CAUSE
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree
D TICA
4i tLECTE MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
OCT 10 1991
D U
by
JARED A. KLINE, CAPT (P), USA
B.A., The Citadel, Charleston South Carolina, 1980
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1991
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
91-12885
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1991 Master's inesis,8-19-90 to 6-19-91
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE S. FUNDING NUMBERS
Joint Communications In Support of Joint Task Force South
During Operation Just Cause
6. AUTHOR(S)
Capt. Jared A. Kline
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER
US Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
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12a. DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. A
"13. ABSTRACT (M~aximum 200 wors)
This study investigates and analyzes the provision of tactical and strategic
communications in support of Joint Task Force, South (JTF-South) during Operation
Just Cause, the Amertcan invasion of Panama during the period Decimber 1989 - January
1990. The purpose of the study is to present a detailed arn:lysis of communications
support actually provided to a joint task force engaged in a contingency operation,
while at the same time recording for posterity the actual history of what occurred
in this connection. This study explains that communications in support of JTF-South,
while they were a brilliant success, were not perfect, and that lessons for future
operations may be derived from a study of the actions of the men and machines that
provided communications during Operation Just Cause.
"14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES
Com.munications, Operation Just Cause, Panama, Communications 240
Support, Joint Task Force-South 16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURiTY CLAWSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT
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Standard Form 298 Bak (Rev. 2-89)
JOINT COMMUNICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH
DURING OPERATION JUST CAUSE
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
by
JARED A. KLINE, CAPT (P), USA
B.A., The Citadel, Charleston South Carolina, 1980
/'(cid:127)COIC, ior
NilS CPA&I
DaiC 1 .,t3[
U: .3;,lo~ : ,ed
L.i
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1991 By .................
Av,-,ii.'i:v tu<es
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Di.;t
A-I
MASTER OF MILITARY SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE
Name of candidate: Captain Jared A. Kline
Title of thesis: Joint Communications in Support of Joint
Task Force South during Operation Just
Cause.
Approved by:
Lawrence A. Wates, Ph.D.
Member
,
Major Scott Solon, M.A.
Accepted this 7th Day of June 1991 by:
6 I,
.... Director, Graduate Degree
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of
the student author and do not necessarily represent the
views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or
any other governmental agency. (References to this study
should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT
JOINT COMMUNICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH
DURING OPERATION JUST CAUSE by Capt. (P) Jared A. Kline,
USA, 240 pages.
This study investigates and analyzes the provision of
tactical and strategic communications in support of Joint
Task Force South (JTF-South) during Operation Just Cause,
the American invasion of Panama during the period 20
December 1989-12 January 1990. The purpose of the study is
to present a detailed analysis of communications support
actually provided to a Joint Task Force engaged in a
contingency operation, while recording for posterity the
actual history of what occurred in this connection.
Operation Just Cause was conducted in a country that had
known a long and continuous U.S. military presence. An
extensive "fixed-station" or strategic telecommunications
i --- rfst cllt.L1re t herofn-r ec % +xbise upon~rw hic h JTF-Sou+t!h ,-^,,IA
build their tactical communications networks. This w&s a
critical factor in the quality and quantity of
communications means available to JTF-South. Single channel
radio was the most important tactical means of command and
control communications, and the use of a single document to
govern all radio communications, the Joint Communications
Electronics Operating Instructions (JCEOI), and the use of a
single communications security (COMSEC) variable throughout
the entire theater ensured the reliability of radio
communications, in spite of the risk to COMSEC. The
tactical multichannel network, initially a weak area as a
result of inadequate systems and technical (cid:127)o..itrol, was made
useful by bringing a large contingent of tactical systems
control officer; and sergeants from Fort Iragg to Panama
four days after the initiation of open war.
This study explains that communications in support of JTF-
South, while they were a brilliant success, were not
perfect, and that lessons for future operations may be
derived from a study of the actions of the men and machines
that provided communications during Operation Just Cause.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to acknowledge my de7.t of gratitude to Colonel
Jackson C. Moss III, formerly Commander, 35th Signal
Brigade, and to Colonel William L. Mason, formerly Deputy J-
6 for JTF-South. These gentlemen contributed so much not
only to the successful outcome of the events described in
this history, but also to my ability to put all of this
information together while the operation was still in
progress, that it is no exaggeration to state that the
success of both enterprises would have been in doubt without
their wise and effective leadership.
I would also like to acknowledge the kind assistance of
Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Lambert and Major Steve Witt, both
formerly of JTF-South J-6, for reviewing and criticizing
Chapters II-V. The success 'd single channel radio
communications in support of the operation which is the
subject of this study owed more to these two gentlemen than
to anyone else.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the bravery and
skill of the Signal Corps and Air Force communications
soldiers who helped to make Operation Just Cause a military
victory.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ..................................... ii
ABSTRACT ........................ .9. .9. 9... 9.... 9..9 9..1.iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................... iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................ o................... -..... v
LIST OF FIGURES ................................... 9....... 9.... . .... vi
PREFACE ..........................9 . .............. 9..... vii
CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND TO OPERATION JUST CAUSE .......... 1
CHAPTER TWO: COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE BEFORE
JUST CAUSE ................................. 17
CqAPTER THREE: CONTINGENCY COMMUNICATIONS IN
....ii~th AIBRECRS..........48
CHAPTER FOUR: OPERATIONS PLAN 90-2 ...................... 73
CHAPTER FIVE: THE SOUTHERN COMMAND ALTERNATE
COMMAND CENTER MISSION ................... 103
CHAPTER SIX: SINGLE CHANNEL RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
DURING THE WAR ........................... 124
CHAPTER SEVEN; THE TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
rTtnI-n 6^ rmi tt IVTA n I A 1
Ll , 1,Jfl .Tj~ ±S&I1F , "%Lfl ...... .9. a* . ... .* *.. . ... .. tAti
CHAPTER EIGHT: FIXED STATION, STRATEGIC, AND COMMERCIAL
COMMUNICATIONS DURING THE WAR ........... 174
CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION ............................... 193
APPENDIX A: COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT USED
IN JUST CAUSE ................. ...9. .... 9. .. 208
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................ 237
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .............................. 9 240
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1-1 United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) ........... 14
1-2 JTF-South Task Organization ...... ... ;............. 15
1-3 Map of JTF-South Area of Operations ................. 16
2-1 Strategic External Connectivity,............... . ... -4Z
2-2 Strategic Microwave Radio Network.................... 43
2-3 Strategic Cable Network ........ .... * .............. o44
2-4 Military Dial Central Offices in Panams ............ 45
2-5 1109th Signal Brigade Organization Chart ............ 46
2-6 154th Signal Battalion Organization Chart ........... 47
3-1 XVIIIth Airborne Corps Organization Chart ............ 67
3-2 35th Signal Brigade Organization Chart .............. 68
3-3 25th Signal Battalion Organization Chart............69
3-4 50th Signal Battalion Organization Chart ............ 70
3-5 327th Signal Battalion Organization Chart ........... 71
3-6 426th Signal Battalion Organization Chart ........... 72
4-1 Communications Systems Control Under "Blue Spoon"..100
4-2 Communications Systems Control Under OPLAN 90-2 .... 101
4-3 OPLAN 90-2 Tactical Multichannel Radio Network ..... 102
5-1 Tactical Communication2 Network as of 18 Dec 1989..123
6-1 Single Channel Radio Net Matrix.................... 142
1-i Tactical Network as of 19 December 1989............167
7-2 Tactical Network as of 20 December 1989 ............ 168
7-3 Tactical Network as of 27 December 1989 ............ 169
7-4 Mature Tactical Voice Switching Network (TP) ....... 170
7-5 Tactical Network as of 12 January 1990.............171
7-6 Communications Systems Control Prior to 24 Dec 89..172
7-7 Communications Systems Control on 25 Dec 89 ........ 173
8-1 Strategic Telephone Network with ALASCOM Overlay...191
8-2 Message Switching (Teletype) Network ............... 192
PREFACE
This paper is addressed to two audiences. In the first
place, it is intended to provide an analysis of an instance
in which successful communications were provided in support
of a small war in the form of a contingency operation, at a
basic enough level that a reader who is not a specialist in
such things (such as a civilian, a new Signal Corps
lieutettant, or an officer, non-commissioned officer, or
soldier with a different area of expertise) may derive some
useful knowledge from it. In the second place, this study
is intended to rpeord fnr ntnrity the history of
communications in support of Joint Task Force South (JTF-
South) on Operation Just Cause, the .American invasion of
Panama in 1989-1990.
This second reason is of some moment. As yet, there
has been no detailed attempt to record and analyze
communications in support of Operation Urgent Fury, the
American invasion of Grenada in 1983, which had been the
last large contingency mission prior to Just Cause, even
though communications were an important issue in thet
operation. Much has been lost in regard to the history of
Urgent Fury, as imperfect and impermanent human memory has
thus far been the primary repository for the events
surrounding communications support for that operation. This
vii